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ABSTRACT 
THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR. 
John G. O'Reilly. 
Security of passage of the Strait of Gibraltar is an imperative 
for the world community. To achieve this, there must be 
stability on the northern and southern shores of the Strait. 
Peace in the region is currently threatened by the "creeping 
jurisdiction" which both Spain and Morocco wish to exert over 
the waters of the Strait. Other factors which threaten 
stability are the historical rivalry which exists between Spain 
and the Islamic southern shore; the legacy of disputed 
sovereignty in the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish 
Plazas in North Africa; the economic divide betwen the EC and 
Maghreb along the Strait axis; and the possible threat of 
militant Islam. Contentions also exist between Morocco and 
Algeria, eg the Western Saharan War. The re-establishment of a 
strong "power hierarchy" in the area must be supported by such 
international instruments as the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1982). The Crown Colony and the Spanish Plazas must be 
decolonized once Spain is firmly integrated into the EC and 
NATO, and once Morocco has reached a level of economic and 
political development that is condusive to closer ties with 
Western institutions. 
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LNG ...................................... Liquified Natural Gas. 
LOS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Law of the Sea. 
LPG .................................... Liquified Petroleum Gas. 
LTDP ........................... Long-Term Defence Program (USA). 
Maghreb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North Africa. 
Mare clausum ....................................... Closed seas. 
Mare liberum ............................... Freedom of the seas. 
Medersas ....................... Islamic educational institution. 
Medina ............... Arab city/town (traditional urban centre). 
MEDOC ............................ Western Mediterranean Command. 
MOD ........................................ Ministry of Defence. 
Mujahidin ........................... Muslim soldier (guerrilla). 
MTI ............ (ITM) Mouvement ~ Tendance Islamique (Tunisia). 
NATO ........................ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NAVOCFORMED ................. Naval On-Call Force, Mediterranean. 
NLF ................... (FLN) Algerian National Liberation Front. 
nm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nautical miles. 
OAU .............................. Organization o~ African Unity. 
ODA ............................. Overseas Development Authority. 
OR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Official Records. 
PCE ................................... Communist Party of Spain. 
Plazas ........... Spanish Sovereign Territories in North Africa. 
POLISARIO:Peoples Organization for the Liberation of the Saguiet 
alHambra and the Rio de Oro (Western Sahara). 
Politische Ansammlung .. Indirect control of strait states by the 
seapowers. 
Presidios: Literally 'penal colony', but used in relation to the 
Spanish Territories in North Africa. 
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PSOE ......... Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spanish Workers 
Socialist Party). 
RAF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Royal Airforce (UK). 
RAF ......................... (FAR) Royal Armed Forces (Morocco). 
RDF ..................... Rapid Deployment Force/Central Command. 
Res Communis .................................. Common ownership. 
Res Nullis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sovereignless. 
Ribat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Islamic monastery-fort. 
RN ............................................. Royal Navy (UK). 
SACEUR ........................ Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 
SACLANT ..................... Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. 
SADR ......................... Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic. 
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Umma .............................. The global Islamic community. 
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PREFACE. 
This preface outlines the aims, major themes and structure 
of the thesis, sketching the methods employed, the data sources 
and the problems encountered. 
The author's interest in the western Mediterranean region 
dates largely from 1978, when I went to live in Algeria, 
intending to stay there for one year. However I remained in the 
Maghreb for six years, working at academic institutions in 
Algeria (1978-81) and Tunisia (1981-84), and travelling widely 
in Morocco, Spain, France, Italy and the Arab world. My 
interest in the political geography of the region and Islam laid 
the foundations for my MA thesis in geography (O'Reilly, 1983); 
and has led to further research in the geopolitics of the 
Maghreb and Iberia. Any understanding of the western 
Mediterranean region requires an indepth analysis of the pivotal 
role of the Strait of Gibraltar, linking the Atlantic Ocean to 
the Mediterranean Sea, and joining the EC to the Arab world. 
Aims: 
The aim of this study is to analyse the interaction between 
regional and global power protagonists in the western 
Mediterranean region, with particular reference to the Gibraltar 
area. This embraces the themes of the importance of straits in 
international commerce and naval deployment, use of Gibraltar, 
and the issue of sovereignty over waters in the Strait region, 
and implications of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea {LOS 
1982) for Gibraltar. In attempting to elucidate geopolitical 
processes in the region, a major theme is that of the "disputed 
sovereignty" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish 
Plazas in North Africa. However as the geopolitics of Gibraltar 
are closely inter-related with global processes, it is important 
to juxtapose global geopolitical mo.dels with regional factors 
such as the EC and Islam. An understanding of these themes 
should help to further peace and security in the area (see 
figure 1). 
This study is unique in that it attempts explanation with 
reference to the LOS, decolonization, Islamic fundamentalism and 
politics in the Gibraltar region. The Strait's cardinal role in 
the global order is the all important background to these 
political movements and events. Sectoral studies do exist 
relating to such aspects of Gibraltar's geography as the history 
of the Crown Colony and the International Tangier Zone 
(1923-56), Morocco's role in the Arab world and so on; but to 
date no work exists which attempts to embrace the entire 
geopolitical mosaic of the Gibraltar region. 
Hypothesis: 
The central hypothesis of this work is that security of 
passage of Gibraltar is an imperative for the world community. 
To achieve this, there must be stability on the northern and 
southern shores of the Strait. 
This is currently threatened by: (i) the "creeping 
sovereign jurisdiction" which both Spain and Morocco wish to 
exert over the waters of the Strait; (ii) the historical rivalry 
which exists between Spain and the Islamic southern shore; (iii) 
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the legacy of disputed territories and hence the acrimonious 
issue of "decolonization" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and 
the Spanish Plazas in North Africa; (iv) the so called 
North-South divide along the Strait axis; and (v) the possible 
threat of militant Islam. Hence dialectics exist between 
Morocco and Spain, and between them and the major powers. In 
the global political order there is rivalry not only between the 
first-order powers, but second-order regional powers like Spain, 
Morocco and Algeria. These antagonisms are accentuated by the 
issues of legal transit passage regimes, decolonization, 
unbalanced EC-Maghrebi trading relations, and anti-Western 
sentiments among militant Muslims. Morocco and Algeria are 
struggling for predominance in the area. These second-order 
regional powers have a significant role to play in relation to 
the first-order powers such as the USA, USSR and EC, as well as 
in the Mediterranean, Arab and Muslim worlds. Instability in 
Morocco, especially if galvanized into militancy by Islamic 
fundamentalists could threaten the balance of power. The 
fundamentalists seek not only to "liberate" Morocco from the 
present political regime, but also the Plazas from Spanish rule, 
and to challenge the present international order, particularly 
the power of the West. Because of the power hierarchy which 
existed in the Strait area between the 18th century and the 
1960s, with Britain at the apex, security could be ensured by a 
combination of "force" and international "accords". If the 
Crown Colony and the Plazas are decolonized, there will be a 
radical restructuring of the power hierarchy in the Strait 
region. 
A synthesis of the geographical and political factors shows 
that security of the Strait has been maintained in the 
historical context by a combination of force and legitimizing 
treaties. To ensure future stability, the Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar must be eventually retroceded to Spain and the Spanish 
Plazas returned to Morocco, once Spain is firmly integrated into 
the EC and NATO. and when Morocco has gained a level of economic 
and political stability conducive to greater positive political 
interaction with such Western institutions as the EC and NATO. 
Morocco, Spain, Britain and the USA must give greater support to 
the LOS (1982), which could be strengthened by additional 
accords catering specifically for the Strait of Gibraltar. 
Structure: 
In Part One, the geopolitical and legal attributes of 
straits are examined. Chapter one seeks to alalyse the 
geographical heterogeneity of straits in the global context, 
particularly the problem of definiti~ns for straits and the 
eternal dialectic between state hegemonism and freedom of the 
seas. In chapter two, we look at the use made of Gibraltar by 
international shipping, and the Strait's political and legal 
history. In chapter three, the geographical phenomenon of 
straits is juxtaposed with the institution of legal regimes for 
straits, and the quest for a legal passage regime for Gibraltar. 
The complexity of the situtation is illustrated by the different 
viewpoints of the riparian states, and those of the major 
seapowers, in relation to the rights and duties of nations 
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wishing to make transit of Gibraltar. 
Part Two deals with the history and politics of Gibraltar. 
In chapter four, the history and continuity of competition 
between the riparian states, Morocco and Spain, and between them 
and outside powers is examined. Particular attention is paid to 
the fragmentation and attempted internationalization of the 
southern shore of the Strait, in the form of the Tangier Neutral 
Zone (1923-56) and the Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1865-1956) 
during the colonial era. The partial success of these 
experiments until 1956 was made possible by the colonial 
presence of Britain on the northern shore. The Spanish presence 
in Ceuta, provided the second pillar of the geopolitical 
hierarchy in the region. Chapter five examines the geopolitical 
role which Spain has played on the southern shore of the Strait 
since the 15th century from the Ceuta and Melilla bases. With 
the winds of change still sweeping the region, possible future 
scenarios concerning the disputed Plazas are analysed in depth. 
Chapter six examines the historical and geopolitical 
significance of the Gibraltar Crown Colony. The issue of its 
disputed sovereignty betwen Britain and Spain and possible 
future scenarios are discussed. 
Part Three presents the Strait in the regional and global 
geopolitical contexts. Chapter seven looks at geopolitical 
models and the role of Gibraltar in global and superpower 
organizational structures. Chapter eight examines intra and 
extra-Maghrebi affairs from the viewpoint of future stability in 
the region. 
Methodology: 
In general the methodology used is based on a combination 
of inductive and deductive processes within a broad empirical 
framework. This has included many interviews, both oral and 
"written" in the target study area, closely following Maghrebi 
and European media analyses of events pertinent to the region, 
extensive travel, library searches and analysis of shipping 
data. 
In the past, geopolitical analyses were carried out from a 
purely quantitative perspective, which enhanced our geographical 
knowledge, but did little to elucidate the political processes 
and "realities" of the chief protagonists in any geopolitical 
study, the people who inhabit the target study area. In this 
study, quantitative techniques are only employed in so far as 
they support a humanistic perspective. 
Because of the complex nature of 
"doctrinaire" approach or "rigid schematic 
been adopted. The issues involved such 
rights", "decolonization", "security" and 
could lend themselves to extremist 
interpretations. 
this study, a 
viewpoint" have not 
as "international 
"Islamic militancy" 
viewpoints and 
If the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) (1982) was 
comprehensive enough to cater for all problems relating to 
international usage of straits, then there would be far fewer 
contentions between Spain and Morocco, and between them and 
other states. Unfortunately for all its merits, the LOS (1982) 
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has not solved all the problems. Yet some analysts persist in 
invoking the LOS (1982) in disputes as if it were a deus ex 
machina. Likewise the issue involved in the Crown Colony and 
Spanish Plazas sovereignty dispute, is not merely a "classical" 
case of decolonization. However some analysts invoke the UN 
principles of "self determination" or "territorial integrity" as 
the panacea to these disputes. By examining a broad number of 
factors which go to constitute the geopolitics of the Gibraltar 
region, it is hoped to present the complex inter-linkages which 
will shape future processes and events in the region. 
Research: 
This section includes field-work, travels, interviews and 
experiences, as well as data sources. 
Having lived in the Maghreb for six years (1978-84) and 
travelling extensively in the research area as well as the 
Middle East (1978-85) has given the author a thorough knowledge 
of the geography, politics and languages of the region. Trips 
to the Spanish Territories in North Africa (1979, 1981, 1985), 
Spain (1982, 1985) and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (1985) 
helped reinforce knowledge of the Gibraltar area. Library 
searches in several countries, and interviews with experts in 
the USA (December 1985-August 1986) were also of immense value. 
While in the Maghreb, it was possible to carry out some 300 
oral and "essay-type" interviews with students and staff at the 
local universities. Because of the secretive nature of Maghrebi 
society, and the respective national preoccupations with 
security, many of the "written" interviews were conducted by 
non-formal methods, as questionnaires were not appropriate. 
Themes relating to Islam, fundamentalsim and politics were 
largely undertaken with university students as part of their 
European-language projects, and hence an "essay-type" approach 
was often employed by the author. Topics relating to 
fundamentalism, Israel/Palestine, and decolonization of the 
Spanish Plazas, often led to vivacious debate, but on occassion 
were investigated by the university or police authorities. 
Interviews (in French, Arabic and English) included the themes 
of nationalism, inter-Maghrebi relations, Arabism, Berberism, 
Islam and fundamentalism. Similar themes were explored with 
Maghrebi intellectuals, journalists, dissidents and 
fundamentalists. 
While there is relative freedom of movement in the Maghreb, 
sometimes problems are encountered. For instance on two 
occassions (1980, 1982), the Moroccan border police confiscated 
Michelin and other touristic maps, which they claimed were 
banned in Morocco "because of the inaccurate boundaries 
illustrated on the maps". Also it was difficult to travel in 
the Tindouf region of Algeria, and interviews with the Saharawi 
people were almost impossible to arrange. While travelling in 
the northern Algerian-Moroccan border area in the early 1980s, 
the author was taken into custody by members of the Algerian 
army, and brought under military escort to the Oran barracks; 
however the author was released within a few hours, once it was 
confirmed that I was an employee of the Algerian Ministry of 
Education. In 1982, the author was threatened at the University 
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of Tunis by one fundamentalist group, who misconstrued 
non-participation in a strike at the university as being 
anti-Islamic. However on the whole, the Maghrebis were most 
hospitable and willing to discuss grass-root issues, once 
promises of anonymity had been assured. The respective national 
presses of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia also proved a valuable 
source of information, especially Al Bayane, El Moudjahid, 
Algerie Actualite and La Presse de Tunisia. An understanding of 
the region was also helped by closely following the Spanish, 
British and French (eg Sur, The Times, The Guardian). Staff at 
the headquarters of Le Monde in Paris were most helpful in 
procuring back-issues of the paper and Le Monde Diplomatique. 
Members of the Annaba section of the Algerian National 
Liberation Front also gave of their time in explaining 
intra-Maghrebi and Arab affairs. 
Extensive travels were undertaken in Morocco (1979, 1981, 
1985), these included the Atlas Mountains and Mediterranean 
coastal regions, and most Moroccan cities, particularly 
Marrakech, Fez, Casablanca, Rabat and Tangier. Fieldwork in the 
cities included spending time in the "bidonvilles". The "Casa 
bidonvilles" are a microcosm of all the problems which exist in 
Morocco and the Muslim world in general. The clearest insight 
into the complex world of fundamentalist revolution in ferment 
is possible in the Moroccan "bidonvilles" and on university 
campuses. At Tangier (1985), interviews were carried out with 
the Port Authorities, the French Consul, teachers and 
journalists, and the local population, particularly those in the 
Medina and "bidonvilles". The staff at the American Legation 
Museum and Archives were most helpful in giving access to data 
concerning the American presence in the area since the 19th 
century and the International Zone (1923-56). Unfortunately the 
Moroccan authorities were unable . to find suitable times to 
permit a visit of the interior of the once International Cape 
Spartel Lighthouse. Interviews with bureaucrats and agencies in 
Morocco proved less fruitful than in other countries. 
Fieldwork was also undertaken in the Spanish Territories in 
North Africa (1979-85). The tourist bureaus and port 
authorities were most helpful as were the local populations, 
however bureaucrats were more difficult to interview. 
Nonetheless, the port authorities at Ceuta were most willing to 
be interviewed. Once again, the local press in Ceuta and 
Melilla often facilitated a greater understanding of the areas. 
Trips to Madrid, Cordoba, Seville and Algeciras (1983, 1985) 
afforded a greater appreciation of the interconnections between 
Spanish and Maghrebi cultures. The port authorities at 
Algeciras (1985) though greatly pressed for time were helpful in 
discussing maritime traffic in the area, the intensity of 
cross-Strait traffic, trafficking and Spanish attitudes to the 
Crown Colony of Gibraltar. 
Over 50 interviews were conducted at Gibraltar (1985), 
these included Royal Navy/NATO staff, representatives from the 
port authorities and commercial port businessmen, local 
politicians, notables, bureaucrats, teachers and reporters. A 
visit to the Europa Point Lighthouse, and the Signal Hill 
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Station with its communications centre and radar system was most 
helpful in coming to appreciate the international nature 
(including type and variety) of traffic which make transit of 
the Strait; and also security interests in the area. Several 
days were spent counting the average number of ships which 
transit the Strait from the vantage points of Gibraltar, Ceuta 
and Tangier (March-April 1985). Ten days were spent living on a 
yacht in the Gibraltar port (March 1985). 
Other interviews were carried out with politicians and 
staff at the House of Commons, and the Spanish and Moroccan 
embassies in London. Lloyd's Maritime Information Services, A 
and P Appledore Shipping Information Services, and the 
International Wheat Council (London) were helpful with 
interviews and supplying computer data. However, high costs 
were a prohibitive factor in obtaining more computer data from 
Lloyds concerning shipping in the Strait area for specific years 
(see chapter 2). 
Discussions and interviews were also carried out with 
experts at conferences, eg the Law of the Sea Institute 
Conference (Cardiff, 1985) and the Association of American 
Geographer's annual general meeting (Minneapolis-St Paul, 1986), 
as were meetings with geographers and international lawyers in 
the USA (1986), including Dr. Robert Smith, the Geographer for 
the US Department of State, Professor Saul B. Cohen, and 
Professor Louis Alexander (see acknowledgements). Maps and data 
on maritime limits, and the Spanish Plazas were supplied by the 
Geographer, US Department of State. 
Library Searches: 
Libraries where work has been carried out by the author 
include the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) Library, 
Annaba; the Bibliotheques Nationales of Tunisia and France 
(1981-84); the Centre des Recherches Maghribines (Charles de 
Gaulle Centre), Tunis (1981-84); the Centre for Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Studies, University of Durham; the Palace Green 
Library, University of Durham (for international law and the 
LOS) (1984-1987); the British Library (1984-1987); the House of 
Commons Library, London (March 1985); the Garrison Library, 
Gibraltar (April 1985); the American Legation Museum and 
Library, Tangier (April 1985); the Centre for Maghrebi Studies, 
UCLA, California (December 1985); the Ohio State University 
Library, Columbus (January-June 1986) and the Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC (June-August 1986). Lloyd's Maritime 
Information Services also gave access to reading materials. 
As with the press and interview sources, library research 
was conducted in English, French, Spanish and Arabic which 
enriched the overall viewpoint, and helped counterbalance some 
of the respective national prejudices. The author is 
responsible for all translations and hence any possible 
mistakes. 
Maps: 
All major atlas sources consulted are indicated in the body 
of the thesis and in the bibliography, eg (Couper, 1984, p.12), 
as are materials supplied by different international and state 
organizations. Of particular help were the cartographical 
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materials dealing with world straits, shipping lanes and the 
Spanish Plazas supplied by the Geographer, US Department of 
State. A major source of maps, aerial photographs and satellite 
imagery were the House of Commons, Seventh Report from the 
Foreign Affairs Committee Gibraltar: The Situtation of Gibraltar 
and UK Relations with Spain, (1980-81); The Spanish Red Book Qn 
Gibraltar: Gibraltar in the Spanish Cortes, (1965); and 
Negotiations Qn Gibraltar {A New Spanish Red Book) (1968) (see 
bibliography). 
Bibliography: 
The bibliography includes all the principal works 
consulted, such as government publications, reports, published 
and unpublished materials, conventions and treaties, and a 
selection of the major press articles used. Within the body of 
the thesis the author's name or key words (treaties, reports, 
press articles) are used, with the relevant dates. Full details 
of all sources are arranged alphabetically in the bibliography. 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, it may be said that at present this thesis 
is particularly pertinent because of the themes which it 
embraces. World attention has been focussed on issues related 
to the passage rights of the USA and global community in the 
claimed territorial waters of Spain (1967, 1986), Libya (1981, 
1986) and Iran (1987). The mayhem in Lebanon and the 
Arab/Persian Gulf, and the Arab/Israeli imbroglio threaten world 
peace. The transportation of oil to the West has become a 
global preoccupation. The rise of militant Islamic 
fundamentalism since 1979 has captured the attention of the 
world. Recurrant topical affairs in the 1980s in the media are 
fishing disputes (eg Spain-Morocco and Britain-Argentina); and 
the problem of disputed sovereignty and decolonization, 
particularly of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, the Spanish 
Plazas, the Falklands/Malvinas, Hong Kong and Northern Ireland. 
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PART ONE. 
STRAITS AND GIBRALTAR. 
It is desirable that there be a body of international law 
such as that contained in the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (LOS) (1982) guaranteeing the rights of the international 
community and riparian states in relation to passage and usage 
of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
It is difficult to standardize international law pertaining 
to legal regimes for all straits because of the heterogeneity of 
their geographical characteristics and their respective 
importance to particular states, and the world community. 
Precedent shows that there has always been a dialectic between 
states which support the freedom of the seas philosophy and 
those wishing to establish sovereignty over the oceans. Thus 
the eternal conflict between freedom of the seas and hegemonism 
persists. Gibraltar has been kept open to the world community 
as a transit route since the 18th century by a combination of 
force, balance of power strategies and supporting international 
treaties. However no single legal instrument may be cited as 
rendering the Strait international. 
Gibraltar's geographical characteristics, contemporary 
usage by international shipping and history prove that it is a 
key international artery. Unimpeded usage of the Strait must be 
guaranteed by the riparian states in collaboration with other 
10 
powers such as the USA and Britain, and the relevant 
supra-national organizations to which they belong. Legal 
instruments such as the LOS conventions (1958, 1982) help 
support the contention that Gibraltar Strait is international, 
and must be bolstered by pragmatic political organization in the 
region with the aid of supporting accords. 
CHAPTER ONE 
STRAITS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES. 
"Freta sunt triplica: vel enim conjungunt 
Oceanum cum Oceano, vel Oceanum cum sinu, 
vel sinum cum sinu" . 
Varenius. 
Geographia Generalis, 
1650. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION. 
1.1.1 Geography and Straits. 
11 
Straits provide access to semi-enclosed seas, and link the 
isolated basins and seas of the "global ocean" (Pirtle, 1978, 
p.487). Gibraltar links the Mediterranean and Black Seas with 
the Atlantic Ocean, and ultimately the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans via the Suez Canal. Because of international dependence 
on strategic commodities ranging from oil to grain, the 
"locational utility" of straits is vital, for example Gibraltar 
in contrast to the Strait of Magellan (Pirtle, 1978, p.487). So 
the maritime powers struggle to preserve freedom of the seas and 
passage rights through straits. "Low aggregate travel-time 
expenditure per unit of transport is of economic-security 
interest to the maritime powers" (Pirtle, 1978, p.487). Because 
of this, maritime traffic shows a certain inertia as regards 
choice of routes (Bruel, 1947, Vol.I. p.50). So straits like 
Gibraltar and Dover continue to be major international arteries. 
Most important of all, usage of straits saves distance, time and 
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cost (see map 1.1a). 
Historical, economic and political geography illustrate 
certain facts in relation to straits. Straits are areas of 
intrigue and geopolitical struggle as they constitute poles of 
interaction. Straits used for international navigation are foci 
of power hierarchies with the consequent political and spatial 
competition between rival powers for influence and control. 
access 
balance 
legal 
"A precarious balance exists between 
to straits and its denial, and the 
hinges more on political than 
considerations" (Pirtle, 1978, p.488). 
Global viewpoints concerning straits are reflected in 
perception, language, role and problem of definition. According 
to The New York Times (13 Feb.1986) at least 16 straits and 
canals including Gibraltar constitute "choke-points" and thus 
potential ;; flash points" in the global communications system 
(see map 1.1b). According to President Reagan: 
"Soviet forces have placed themselves to be 
able to intercept the 16 choke-points in the 
world through which supplies and materials 
are shipped to Western nations" (New York 
Times, 13 Feb.1986). 
However according to US official and non-governmental experts: 
the Soviet Union (is) 
more vulnerable to the 
choke-points than the USA" (New 
13 Feb. 1986). 
potentially 
closing of 
York Times, 
The Strait of Gibraltar uniting the Mediterranean Sea with the 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the world community, is the 
quintessential international strait (see map 1.1a). 
1.1.2 Perception and Definition. 
According to Gidel (1934, Vol.III, p.729): 
"A strait is a sea 
between two land areas, 
type of territories, or 
the name which is given 
passage restricted 
regardless of the 
width of channel, or 
to it". 
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The words strait, narrow, passage, belt, sound and channel are 
used in relation to bodies of water connecting larger bodies of 
water and President Reagan has used the word ~ to describe 
some of these geostrategic areas (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986). 
Like the evolution of the territorial sea concept, historically 
there is no common agreement as to what specific geographical 
dimensions constitute a strait. However there is common 
perceptual agreement as to the geographical characteristics of a 
strait. 
According to Bruel (1947, Vol.I, pp.15-17), etymologically 
in languages of Germanic and Latin origin, the word "strait" is 
associated with passage, narrowness, separation, constriction 
and restriction. In Danish, straede means a very narrow street, 
and entry to the larger ocean surrounded by land. This concept 
of "narrow street" and "entrance to the ocean" are also found in 
the English "strait" (straet), Spanish diretto and French 
detroit. However in Latin the term "fretum or fretus" is used, 
signifying "ocean currents", especially in sea areas between 
land, the Strait of Gibraltar was known as Fretum oceani. 
The word sound (sund) with its Scandinivian origins 
indicates 'narrow water between two coasts, an ocean street'. 
Also belt conveys the idea of narrowness and separation, 
17 
possibly from the Latin verb stringere/destringere, to pull 
asunder or separate. The word Ba-lti-c is derived from "belt" or 
band. Channel also encompasses this idea of narrow land 
separation and passage. In Scandinavian the word hals is used 
for both small strait and larynx. Similarly in Turkish "bogazi" 
means strait, narrow street and larynx, eg "Canakkale Bogazi" 
(Dardanelles) and "Karadeniz Bogazi" (Bosporus). Though bab 
(door) is sometimes used in Arabic, Gibraltar Strait is known as 
Mathiq Jabal Tariq, with mathiq meaning street, stream and 
narrowing (Balabakki, 1980). Thus straits used for 
international navigation are the larynxes of the global naval 
system, constituting vulnerable choke-points. Depending on 
geostrategical viewpoints, straits may be seen as ~ in 
defence networks (see map 1.1a,b). 
Straits have been defined as a "narrow passage of water 
connecting two larger bodies of water" (Stamp, 1968, p.70). 
Such definitions convey the idea but no precise length or 
breadth are given. For instance the Dardanelles narrow to some 
750 yards while the Davis Strait is about 164 nautical miles 
(nm) wide. Lack of precision has led to legal problems in 
distinguishing between gulfs and straits, especially in the case 
of Aqaba, where the Tiran passage connects Aqaba to the Red Sea 
(Lapidoth, 1982; Bloomfield, 1957). 
A sound has been defined as: 
"a long passage of water connecting two 
larger bodies of water, but too wide and 
extensive to be termed a strait; a passage 
connecting a sea or lake with an ocean or 
with another sea, or channel passing between 
a mainland and an island, as the sound 
between the Baltic and the North Sea" 
(Webster, 1959). 
1.1.3 Legal Definitions. 
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From a geographical viewpoint, any reasonably narrow 
natural passage between adjacent landmasses, linking two bodies 
of water constitutes a strait. As of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) 1982, the legal 
definition of a strait is an area of sea between territories 
whose breadth is 24 nm or less, whose waters wholly or partly 
fall within the territorial seas (12 nm) of the riparian state 
or states (Arts. 2-54, LOS, 1982), linking the high seas, 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) (200 nm) or high seas to an EEZ; 
or to a territorial sea. Thus as of the LOS, 1982, some 116 
straits, including Gibraltar, through which there had previously 
been a high seas corridor became entirely territorial sea 
straits once the 12 nm breadth was generally accepted (Couper, 
1983' p. 243). 
According to Article 16 (4) of the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), a strait may be 
considered as international once it is: 
"used for navigation between one part of the 
high seas and another part of the high seas 
or the territorial sea of a foreign state". 
From a geographical viewpoint, the LOS (1982) essentially 
retains the same definition for straits as the LOS (1958), but 
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coastal states may claim territorial seas jurisdiction up to 12 
nm, and different legal regimes apply for different categories 
of'- -s-trait-s. -According to -Art-~cle 37 of t-he LOS (1982),- those 
straits with a minimium width of 24 nm or less, are defined as 
maritime areas: 
(where) international navigation between 
one part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone (200 nm) and another part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone 
(takes place)" . 
Straits such as Gibraltar which fall into this category are 
subject to the legal regime of transit passage (see chapter 3). 
However where there is a territorial sea at one end of the 
strait, a different legal regime applies. Also sea-lanes in 
archipelagic areas are subject to different legal regimes. For 
the purposes of the LOS Convention (1982), the legal definitions 
for archipelagic straits apply where: 
" "archipelago" means a group of is.lands, 
including parts of islands interconnecting 
waters and other natural features which are 
so closely interrelated that such islands, 
waters and other natural features form an 
intrinsic geographical, economic and 
political entity, or which historically have 
been regarded as such" (Article 46, LOS, 
1982). 
Thus legal definitions are exact, "but the application of 
the definition varies with each strait" (Smith, 1974, p. 88). 
However, the history of states claiming sovereignty over coastal 
waters suggests that there is no guarantee that the maximium 
width claimed as territorial seas will remain at 12 nm, and thus 
this may affect the legal definition of straits. Hence a 
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geographical perspective remains paramount to any discussion of 
straits. 
1.2 STRAITS: OCEAN AND TERRITORY ATTRIBUTES. 
There are ocean, territorial and state factors associated 
with the geography of every strait (see table 1.1, and appendix 
I). The following classifications are not mutually exclusive, 
for instance, sometimes there are several smaller seas within 
larger seas, and hence the problem of classifying straits as 
inter or intra sea straits. 
1.2.1 The Ocean Factor. 
From an oceanographic perspective there are five categories 
of straits. 
(i) Inter-oceanic straits, eg Magellan. 
(ii) Intra-oceanic straits, eg the Mozambique Channel. 
(iii)Inter-sea straits, eg the Dardanelles. 
(iv) Intra-sea straits, eg Freu de Minorca. 
(v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits, (included in this category 
are inter semi-enclosed-seas-oceanic straits) eg Gibraltar, 
Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb. 
Classification based on the maritime connection suggests 
that straits which join the same body of water (intra) are not 
Tab I e 1 . 1 
Straits Most Used for International Navigation. 
St ro it I I I I I IV 
(nm) 
V VI 
(nm) 
VII VIII IX X 
( nm) (m) 
XI 
1. Gibraltar<> (2) Spain 
Morocco 
G i b (UK) 
UK 
( 12) 
( 12) 
(3 )-
(v) a 7.6 36 82- T-S NAR 110-
1000 200 
(2nd) 
2. Otronto (2) Albania 
It a I y 
(1) Turkey 
( 12) 
( 15) 
(12) 
(12) 
(iv) bG 39.25 40 88- H-S NAR 
732 
3. Dardanelles (iii) o <1 .0 31 45- T-S NAR 57 
91 (6th) 
4. Bosporus (1) Turkey (12) (iii) o <1.0 15 70 T-S NAR 57 
(6th) 
5. Tiron (2) Egypt 
Saudi Arab 
6. Bob el Mondeb•(4) Djibouti 
7. Hormuz• 
N Yemen 
Ethiopia 
S Yemen 
(2) Iron 
Oman 
8. Mozambique Ch.(2) Mozambique 
9. Oresundo 
10. Kottegot• 
11. Dover 
Modogoscor 
(2) Denmark 
Sweden 
(2) Denmark 
Sweden 
(2) UK 
france 
( 12) 
(12) 
(12) 
(12) 
(12) 
(12) 
( 12) 
( 12) 
(12) 
(50) 
(3) 
(12) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(v) 
( i i) 
(v) 
(3) (v) 
(12) 
(12) (v) 
( 12) 
12. Molocco• (2) Indonesia (12) (v) 
Malaysia (12) 
bG 3.1 7 73- T-S NAR -
183 
oG 9.4 50 42- T-S NAR 50 
322 (7th) 
~G 20.6 100 55- T-S NAR 80 
91 (5th) 
c 30.0 300 1830 H-S AR< -
cG 2.0 58 9 T-S AR< 130-
142 
(4th) 
17- T-S NAR 130-cG 12.0 125 
124 142 
(4th) 
c 17.5 30 20- T-SAR> 300-
37 350 
(1st) 
c 8.3 500 21- T-S AR> 140-
97 150 
(3rd) 
13. Singapore (3) Singapore 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
( 1 ) Indonesia 
(3) 
( 12) 
( 12) 
(12) 
( i i i) e 2.4 75 21-
55 
T-S AR< 140-
150 
(3nd) 
14. Sunde• (v) e 4.3 70 27- T-S AR< 
183 
15. Lombok (1) Indonesia (12) (v) 
16.Son Berr.ordino (1) Phi I ippines (v) 
(varies, up to 285 nm) 
17. Luzon (Boshi) (2) Philippines (v) 
( 11 a r i e s , up to 2 8 5 rom) 
Taiwan (12) 
e 11.3 27 192- T-SAR<-
e 
1280 
3.5 35 55- T-S AR> -
183 
e 40.5 5 55- H-S AR< -
183 
18. West Korec• (2) S Korea ( 12) (, i i) c 22 0 26 62 T-S AR< 
(Cho~en St) Japan (12) 
Both states claim o~ly 3 nm in West Korea Strait. 
19. Windward (2) Cuba (12) (v) e 46.25 40 369 H-S AR< 
Passage Haiti (12) 
20. Mono Possoge (2)Dominicon Rep (6) (v) 
Puerto Rico (US)(3) 
21. Florida (E)• (3) USA Bahamas (3) (v) 
FIori do (W) • Cuba ( 12) 
e 
c 
26. YS 50 61- H-S AR< 
274 
82 0 330 
42 5 
1042 H-S AR< 
21 
(TABLE 1.1) KEY: 
NUMBER OF RIPARIAN STATES. 
II SOVEREIGNTY. 
Ill TERRITORIAL SEAS claimed (nm). 
IV MARITIME CONNECTION: 
(i) Inter-oceanic straits. 
(i i) Intra-oceanic straits. 
(iii) Inter-sea straits. 
(iv) Intra-sea straits. 
(v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits. 
V TERRITORIAL CONNECTION: 
a Intercontinental straits. 
b Intracontinental straits. 
c Continental-island straits. 
d Inter-insular straits. 
e Archipelagic straits. 
G Gulf. 
VI MINIMIUM WIDTH (nm). 
VII LENGTH (nm). 
VIII DEPTH (metres). 
IX LEGAL STATUS: H-S High Seas route. T-S =Legal International Straits. 
X ALTERNATIVE ROUTES: NAR =No Alternative Route. AR< =Alternative Route less 
than 500 nm. AR> =Alternative Route more than 500 nm. 
XI AVERAGE NUMBER OF SHIPS PER DAY, AND RANK. 
• Straits included in I ist of the 16 MOST GEOSTRATEGIC WATERWAYS in the world 
(potential flash-points) by the Reagan Administration (1986). 
Sources: ''World Straits and Shipping Lanes" (Mop) 504911(545037)12-18, Office of 
the Geographer, Dept. of State, Washington DC; LIMITS IN THE SEA: NATIONAL 
CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTIONS, no. 36. US Dep. of State, Bureau of 
Intel I igence and Resarch, Washington DC , 1985; Couper, (1983); THE TIMES ATLAS 
OF THE WORLD (1985); Kennedy (1958, pp.114-164); Koh (1982, pp.24-26); Smith 
(1973); Rozokis & Stogos (1987); Leifer (1978); Romazani (1979); Truver, (1980); 
Lapidoth-Eschelbocher (1982); Alexandersson (1982); Cuyvers (1986); 'THE NEW 
YORK TIMES', 13 Feb.1986 (see bibliography). 
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as strategic as straits which interconnect different bodies of 
water, because viable alternative routes usually exist. 
Straits ar'e -strategi-c because they -save distance, time and 
cost in communications. Strategic value is increased when no 
alternative routes exist. Where there are alternatives it is 
estimated that the maximium feasible detour is about 500 nm, as 
this makes a substantial difference to time and cost (Smith, 
1974, pp . 8 8- 1 0 1 ) . The difference in distance from New York to 
Basra (Al Basrah) in the Arabian/Persian Gulf using the 
Gibraltar route as opposed to the Cape of Good Hope route is 
over 3,400 nm (see map 1. 1c). 
For the Mediterranean and Black Sea states, the only 
alternative point of access besides Gibraltar is the Suez Canal, 
where passage has been interrupted or barred twice because of 
the Arab-Israeli dispute (1967, 1973). Western maritime 
communications with the Middle and Far East are heavily 
dependent on Gibraltar, because of the distance involved in 
using the much longer Cape route around southern Africa. The 
journey from New York to Basra via the Cape of Good Hope is 
12,012 nm, and via Gibraltar is 8,508 nm. The distance from 
Bishop's Rock (SW England) to Basra via the Cape of Good Hope is 
11,151 nm and via Gibraltar is 6,283 
504911(545037)12-18, the Geographer, US Dept. 
1982), (see map 1.1c). 
nm (Map 
of State, c 
The absolute dimensions of a strait does not dictate it's 
strategic importance, but rather the traffic volume, including 
type and nature of vessel (see chapter 2). The geostrategic and 
economic environments of connecting sea 
hinterlands help determine the importance 
Gi-:l)ral tar and Turkish Straits linking 
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areas and their 
of a strait. The 
the Atlantic, 
Mediterranean and Black Seas, and penetrating three continents 
interconnect the West with the communist block, North Africa and 
Middle East, and give access to southern and eastern Asia via 
the Suez Canal. The number of straits giving access to a region 
is crucial. Once again Gibraltar is the only natural entrance 
to the Mediterranean-Black Sea area. Even when there are 
several possible routes one is often preferred. Examples are 
Malacca, Dover and Little Belt. This inertia is based on 
geography, and on perceived or actual distance, costs, 
facilities and services offered on routes. Also the 
relationship between voyagers and the riparian state is 
significant. Based on interviews (March-April 1985) the author 
found that a majority of commercial and pleasure vessel captains 
prefer use of facilities at the Crown Colony of Gibraltar to 
others in the region because of language, range of facilities, 
and efficient and good quality workmanship. Even Atlantic 
passers, not wishing to enter the Medirerranean Sea, often make 
use of the facilities offered at the Crown Colony of Gibraltar. 
Changes in technology, political instability and war 
influence choice of route, as is witnessed by international 
concern over Bab el Mandeb and Hormuz in the 1980s. With the 
blockage of the Suez Canal during the Israeli-Arab War (1967), 
and the oil crisis (1973) Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) 
became increasingly important and alternative routes to the Suez 
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Canal and hence Gibraltar were sought. Nevertheless there was a 
sharp increase in the transit of Algerian and Libyan oil through 
Gibraltar (see chapter 8). However the clearence and widening 
of the Suez Canal in the 1980s has facilitated transit of 
supertankers via the Gibraltar route. The construction of 
several pipelines to the Levant coast has enhanced Gibraltar's 
potential as an energy supply route (see chapter 2). 
1.2.2 The Territorial Factor. 
The territorial perspective may be broken into five 
subdivisions: 
(a) intercontinental, eg 
Bosporus Straits; 
Gibraltar, Dardanelles and 
(b) intracontinental, eg Otrano, Tiran and Hormuz Straits; 
(c) continental-island, eg Dover, Messina, Sicily and Corfu 
Straits: 
(d) inter-insular, eg St. George's and the North Channels, 
and the Strait of Bonifacio; and 
(e) archipelagic, eg Freu de Minorca, Kithera and San 
Bernardino Straits (see table 1.1 and appendix I). 
According to Smith ( 1974, p. 90) , "using the viable 
alternative route criterion" for measuring the strategic quality 
of a strait based on the territorial factor, straits with 
continental attributes are more strategic than 
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continental-island straits; whereas categories a, b and c are 
more strategic than inter-insular and archipelagic straits. 
Concerning land communications, the strategic 
characteristics of the territorial factor are communication, and 
the barrier effect. Depending on geopolitical history, straits 
have acted as bridges or barriers between races, ethnic groups, 
civilisations and states. Gibraltar provides the classic 
example linking Europe to Africa, and Iberian to Arab/Maghrebi 
cultures. Straits have often functioned as barriers, for 
instance it is not a coincidence that the Straits of Gibraltar 
and Messina, and the Turkish Straits more or less constitute the 
boundaries of Islamic and Christian civilizations. Another 
example of the barrier 
Britain's geopolitical 
since 1066. 
effect is the Strait 
relationship with the 
of Dover and 
rest of Europe 
Sometimes there is economic complementarity between the 
riparian strait states, but political cooperation has been the 
exception rather than the rule. Straits are an area of 
"interrupted land-traffic" (Bruel, 1947, Vol. I, pp. 20-25). 
Their traffic-economic function has sometimes given rise to twin 
cities such as Istanbul-Skutari, Messina-Geggio. 
Brindisi-Durazzo. Dover-Calais. Detroit-Windsor, 
Algeciras-Ceuta, and Tangier-Tarifa-Algeciras-Gibraltar. 
The aim of avoiding trans-shipment or break of bulk at 
straits is not something new. To avoid inconvenience and costs, 
there have been projects for land links since antiquity. 
Bridges were built over the Bosporus and Dardanelles 
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(Hellespont) during military expeditions over 2000 years ago. 
The Bosporus Bridge (1074 m, 1175 yards) which was opened in 
1973, has alleviated much of the cross-strait traffic which once 
took place by sea. The Romans linked Djerba to Africa (150 AD) 
by a causeway which still functions today. The Little Belt 
Bridge was opened in 1935 (Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, Part I) and the 
Bahrain-Saudi Arabian Bridge was constructed in the early 1980s. 
One of the most spectacular projects aimed at creating a fixed 
link between strait states is the Channel Tunnel. In 1875, 
France and Britain initiated plans for the Channel Tunnel. 
Under a treaty ratified in July 1987, the British and French 
governments granted a 55-year 
which it will build and 
concession to Eurotunnel under 
operate a rail tunnel beneath the 
Channel between the two countries, opening in 1993. The 
Eurotunnel System will incorporate two rail tunnels and, running 
between and linked to them, a service tunnel to provide 
ventilation and allow routine maintenance. Each of the tunnels 
will be about 50 km long. Passengers, vehicles and freight will 
travel on specially designed shuttle trains, direct rail travel 
between London and Paris, will take less than 3 hours 
(Eurotunnel PLC & Eurotunnel SA, 1987, p.1). To avoid usage of 
sensitive straits, the Kiel Kanal (Danish Straits region) was 
constructed in the last century, and there were proposals in the 
1970s and 1980s to cut canals through the Kra peninsula 
(Malaysia) and the Musandam peninsula (Oman). 
In 1980, Spain and Morocco signed a Convention on 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation, a complementary 
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agreement was signed to carry out research on the feasability of 
a fixed-link across Gibraltar. Joint meetings were carried out 
at Tangier (1980) and Madrid (1982) where the technological, 
economic and ecological aspects of the project were discussed. 
Research has been carried out in the Strait area to the east of 
Tangier (1981-84). The possibilities of a subterranian tunnel 
were explored, this would be some 50 km long; while a bridge 
would be some 25 km long. By 1985, it would seem that both 
governments had provisionally opted for the construction of a 
bridge, despite the hazards which this may pose for 
international navigation (see map 1.2). A fixed-link would be a 
major feat not only linking Spain to Morocco, but the EC to the 
Maghreb (see chapter 8). In 1985 and 1987, the Moroccan 
authorities informed the author that they were especially in 
favour of the project and wished construction of a bridge to 
commence as soon as possible; the Spanish authorities seem to 
consider the project as less urgent than the Moroccans. However 
both governments have established permanent commissions in Rabat 
and Madrid to deal with the project. Moroccan representatives 
informed the author (April 1985) that the link would be a bridge 
a couple of miles west of Tarifa. The Spanish authorities were 
less forthcoming with information. 
1.3 OCEAN AND TERRITORIAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR. 
1.3.1 Dimensions. 
The Strait of Gibraltar runs in a general east-west 
29 
direction (see map 1.2). To the west, Cabo Trafalgar and Cabo 
Spartel (Espartel) form the natural entrance points, and those 
to the east are Europa Point (Gibraltar) and Ceuta. The Strait 
is approximately 36 nm (58 km) long. The breadth at the western 
entrance, the widest part from Cabos Trafalgar to Spartel is 
about 24 nm. The breadth at the eastern end, from Europa Point 
to Ceuta is 13 nm. The narrowest part of the Strait is some 10 
nm west of Ceuta narrowing to only 7.6 nm (12.5 km). In general 
the Strait narrows uniformly from its western end for a distance 
of about 18 nm to a width of some 8.25 nm on a line running 
south-east from Isla Tarifa. Eastwards of here it retains this 
general width for about 6 nm, embodying the narrowest part (7.6 
nm), before widening again to its eastern end. The channel is 
not particularly narrow compared with other straits, eg the 
Dardanelles (less than 1 nm) (Kennedy, 1957. pp.114, 115, 129, 
134) (see table 1.1). 
1.3.2 Depths. 
The Strait's maximium water depth in the main channel used 
for shipping is some 935 metres (3,068 feet) and the minimium 
depth about 320 m (1,050 ft) (Lancry, 1982; Couper, 1983, 
pp. 150-157; Lucchini & Voelckel, 1978; TAW, 1980; Walker, 1965; 
Kennedy, 1957, pp.115-116; Nairn et al, 1978, esp.p.48-50; 
Truver, 1980; Gulland, 1971). Some shoals lie 2-3 nm off the 
coast and need to be given wide berth. Thus Gibraltar is deep 
in comparison to other straits; Babel Mandeb's Large Strait 
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averages 322 m, Malacca 27 m and the Dardanelles 50-91 m (see 
table 1.1). Gibraltar's "sills", although restricting the water 
flow between the Mediterranean and Atlantic to the upper layers, 
do not constitute a "serious barrier for water, organisms and 
eventually pollutants" (UNEP, 1985, p.1). 
1.3.3 Pollution. 
The Strait plays a crucial oceanographic role for the 
entire region, as about 75% of Mediterranean water lost by 
evaportaion is replaced by inflowing Atlantic currents. Along 
with this, the high salinity of the seawater (38 parts per 
thousand) before dilution by Atlantic waters significantly 
influences the ecology of the region. Mediterranean 
water-turn-over via the Strait takes 70-80 years, a key element 
in regional ecology in the light of high pollution levels 
(Ambroggi, 1977; UNEP, 1985; Ritchie-Calder, 1972; Glassner, 
1981; Borgese & Krieger, 1975, pp.144-165; Saliba, 1978, p.173; 
Le Lourd, 1977; IOC/IMO/UNEP, 1985, p.8; Couper, 1983, 
pp.176-177, 224; O'Reilly, 1987, p.105). In the 1970s, it was 
feared that the Mediterranean was becoming a dead sea because of 
intense pollution. Regional and international cooperation since 
the mid-1970s, in relation to the Mediterranean has helped raise 
ecological and political awareness of the problem. According to 
Dr Louis Saliba, Senior Scientist for the Mediterranean Action 
Plan (MAP): 
"By 1986 . (one can no longer) 
speak of the Mediterranean as becoming a 
dead sea . although . 
certainly becoming progressively 
years ago . " (letter to the 
10 Feb. 1986). 
Because of dense traffic, risk 
it was 
so a few 
author, 
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of collision is 
considerable, and coastal states are particularly worried about 
the risk of pollution and nuclear-related problems caused by 
accidents. Some experts fear that the proposed trans-Strait 
fixed-link may pose further risks to navigation. 
In the Strait area, the Vandals, Levanter, and Sirocco 
winds influence conditions significantly producing the infamous 
mists and dust clouds which may reduce visibility to less than 5 
nm (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, pp.54-67). Shipping disasters were 
common in the past. A major collision in 1979 resulted in the 
loss of 50 lives and an oil spill of over 95,000 tons. In the 
West Mediterranean region (1975-1980), 112 ships Cover 100 tons) 
were classified as wrecks, and there were 101 founderings and 41 
collisions (Couper, 1983, pp.162-163). Disasters in the Strait 
area include the Jakob Maresk (300,000 barrels of oil) in 1975, 
the Ellen Conway (225,000 B/0) (1975) and Gogo Rambler (26,250 
B/0) (1979) (Couper, 1983, pp.170-171). 
Traditionally vessels navigated near the coasts of the 
Strait rather than in the middle in order to benefit from the 
currents and tidal streams to a maximium (see map 1.2). By the 
1980s, an International Maritime Organisation (IMO) traffic 
separarion scheme had been implemented with the approval of 
Spain and Morocco, and is helping to reduce risk of collision. 
Vessels entering the Mediterranean must use the lanes closest to 
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the African coast, and exit is via those lanes nearer the 
European mainland (all pass to the right). Traffic separation 
schemes are also successfully operating in Dover, and to a 
lesser extent Hormuz and Malacca. 
Nonetheless according to the Port Authorities in Gibraltar 
and Algeciras, "cowboy captains" and those "wanting to maximize 
speed and minimize costs" often take the "handiest route" 
(interviews, April 1985). It was also pointed out that vessels 
cross-transiting the Strait from north to south, particularly 
ferries, were lax in observing the rules of the separation 
scheme. 
The danger of pollution-related accidents is increased by 
the presence of two oil refineries on the southern shore of the 
Strait (capacity range 20,000-100,000 B/0); and one on the 
northern shore (capacity over 100,000 B/0) and a petro-chemical 
plant at Algeciras, at which explosions occured in 1985. 
Unlike Malacca which has a coastal population of over half 
a million people, the coastal area of Gibraltar Strait cannot be 
said to be densely populated. In the immediate area of the 
Strait the main service and transit ports are Gibraltar 
(population 29,000), Algeciras (100,000), Tangier (250,000) and 
Ceuta (80,000) (see map 1.3). 
1.3.4 Strategic Islands. 
Because of Gibraltar's geostrategic location and importance 
to Western defence systems, strategic islands in the orbit of 
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the Strait must be appreciated in any analysis of the region 
(see chapters 7-8), (see map 1.4). 
Unlike Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb and the Danish Straits, there 
are no islands or drying banks in the actual Strait other than a 
few detached rocks very close inshore eg near Tarifa and Ceuta. 
Nonetheless, from a strategic viewpoint, islands in or near the 
region are important. These include the Spanish islands of 
Alboran, Chafarinas, Balearics and Canararies, and the 
Portuguese Azores and Madeiras (see map 1.4). 
Alboran (35 56'N, 3 02') lies 50 nm S-SE of Cabo Sacratif 
(Spain) and 30 nm north of Ras Tleta Madari (Morocco), and 120 
nm from the centre of the Strait. It has an area of about 1 sq 
km (0.62 sq ml) and coast length of 1 km (0.62 ml). It is flat, 
reddish and about 20 m (66 ft) high. Cliffs to the south are 
steeper than those to the north. Alboran lies on a narrow bank 
with a depth of less than 200m (656 ft). The bank extends some 
12 nm E-NE and 20 nm W-SW of the island, with depths ranging 
from 2.5 m to 38m (8-125 ft) (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, pp.60-61). 
The Chafarinas (35 11'N, 02 26'W) afford the only natural 
anchorage off the coast of Morocco which is suitable for all 
classes of vessel (Pilot, 1978, Vol.I, p.130) (see chapter 5). 
The Balearics (Majorca, Minorca, Ibiza, Formentera and 
islets) (38 40' & 40 5'N, 1 and 5 E) lie north east of Cabo de 
San Antonio (Spain) (Pilot, Vol.I, 1978, pp.100-121; 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.III, pp.276-279). The Balearics 
are about 300 nm from the centre of the strait. The largest 
island, Majorca (2301 sq km/1430 sq ml) has many inlets and 
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bays. such as Alcudia and Pollenza (NE), and the Bay of Palma 
(SW). There are some 12 ports or harbours including Andraix, 
Soller and Porto Colom. The northern mountains afford great 
protection to the rest of the island from the violent gales to 
which it is exposed, and render the climate mild. There is an 
excellent road service and airport. 
Minorca (418 sq km/260 sq ml) lies 27 nm E.NE of Majorca. 
It's coast is deeply indented with creeks and bays, on one of 
which is sited Port Mahon, reputedly one of the best natural 
ports in the Mediterranean. Port Mahon's strategic importance 
is proven by history. It was occupied by Britain several times 
(1708-56, 1769-82, and 1798-1808), and France (1756-69); though 
Spain recaptured it (1782-98) periodically, it was only in 1808 
that Spain finally gained permanent control there. 
Ibiza lies some 50 nm south west of Majorca and 60 nm from 
Cape San Martin (Spain). It's greatest length NE-SW is 40km (25 
mls), and maximium breadth is 21 km (13 mls). The island is 
very indented, and has important bays such as San Antonio (NW) 
and Iviza (SE). South of Ibiza lies Formentera. 
The Canary Islands (27 41'-29 3'N and 13 7'-18 2'W) are 
located in the Atlantic Ocean 60 nm off the Moroccan Coast. 
Alegranza island (NE) is about 680 nm south west of Cadiz and 
Fuerteventura (E) is 65 nm west of Cape Juby (Yubi). Hence Las 
Palmas is about 700 nm from the Strait. The Islands cover an 
area of 7,273 sq km (2,808 sq ml) and have a coastline of 1,007 
km (626 ml). The 2 main ports are Las Palmas (with Porto de la 
Cruz) and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, which act as fuelling and 
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communications centres on the Europe, Africa and American 
routes. 
The Azores (36 55'-39 55'N, and 25 -31 16'W) consist of 10 
major islands 
north Atlantic. 
and several smaller entities situtated in the 
They have an area of 2,247 sq km (868 sq ml) 
and are broken into three widely separated groups. They lie 
900-1200 nm west of Lisbon. The islands are mountainous with a 
steep rugged coastline, (maximium height is 2,351 m/7,713 ft). 
They stretch 483 km (300 ml) in an E-W direction and 209 km (130 
ml) from north to south. The main ports are Angra do Heroismo 
(Angra), Ponta Delgada and Horta. During World War II, the 
latter two were developed by the USA as allied bases, and major 
airports were built at Lajes (Terceira Island) and on Santa 
Maria Island. The US maintains a NATO base in the Azores, which 
provides an ideal location between the USA and Mediterranean 
region. During the Arab-Israeli War (1967), the bases proved 
invaluable in ferrying supplies to Israel. 
The Madeira/Funchal Islands (32 40'N, 16 45'W) have an area 
of 496 sq km ( 308 sq ml) and lie 60 nm south west of Lisbon. 
The chief city/port is Funchal (32 38'N, 16 54'W). The two main 
and inhabited islands are Madeira and Porto Santo, while the two 
uninhabited island groups are Desertas and Selvagas. Madeira is 
the largest island, 55 km (34 ml) long, maximium width 22.5 km 
(14 ml) and coastline 145 km (90 mls). Maximium height is found 
at Pico Ruivo de Santana (1,861 m/6,106 ft). The Desertas lie 
11 nm south east of Madeira and consist of 3 main islets. The 
Selvagas (Salvage) lie 156 nm south of Madeira. During the 19th 
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century, Madeira was temporarily occupied by the British 
(Encyclopaedia Columbia, 1966, p.1112; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
1977, Vol.VI, p.468). 
1.4 STRAITS: STATE ATTRIBUTES. 
1.4.1 The Strategic Factor. 
The strategic attributes of the state factor are: 
(a) the number of riparian states represented in the strait 
region, interstate competition, and attitudes towards 
regional hegemonism; 
(b) the extent and kind of sovereignty which a state claims 
over an adjoining strait, and its economic and military 
potential to enforce its viewpoint; and 
(c) the linkages of the riparian states to regional and 
superpower groups. 
Straits of major transit importance bordered by only one 
state are the exception rather than the rule, eg Dardanelles, 
Bosporus, Sunda, Lombok and San Bernadino. The majority of 
major straits are bordered by two or more states (see table 1.1 
and appendix I). Historically there has been competition for 
dominance among the riparian states eg Spain and Morocco in 
relation to Gibraltar, Britain and France in relation to Dover, 
and Iran and the Arab states in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. 
Djibouti and Singapore largely owe their existence as states to 
the fact that they lie astride major international straits and 
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are arguably the creation of the European colonial powers. 
Spain strongly objected to the Gibraltar Constitution Act (1967, 
1969) and other such leglislation in :relation to the Crown 
Colony of Gibraltar, which it claimed was laying the grounds for 
the creation of an artifical state (see chapter 6). In strait 
areas a complex power hierarchy usually exists. Gibraltar, 
Hormuz, Tiran, Mozambique and Kattegat Straits are bordered by 
two states, and Bah el Mandeb by four (see table 1.1; map 1.5). 
According to Bruel (1947, p.45): 
"History shows that the power that 
reaches a strait is inclined to settle down 
on the opposite coast, or at least make sure 
of . a bridgehead . there". 
One of the reasons for the Trojan Wars was the struggle for the 
Hellespont (Turkish Straits), which was strategic in the 
shipment of grain, a role which it still plays today. A cause 
of the war (222 BC) between Rhodos and Byzantium concerned the 
right of the latter to levy duty on vessels transiting the 
straits. Control of the straits of Messina, Sicily and 
Gibraltar was an important factor in the Rome-Carthage Wars (200 
BC) as they were during the World Wars (1914-18, 1939-45). 
Spain's efforts to regain the British Crown Colony of Gibraltar, 
and Morocco's to gain sovereignty over the Spanish North African 
Territories, especially Ceuta, must be seen in this historical 
geopolitical context (see chapters 4-5). Historically, Muslim 
control of the Bosporus, Dardanelles, and Gibraltar Straits was 
aimed at gaining hegemony over all routes between Europe and 
Asia, and North Africa. During World War I, allied attempts to 
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gain control of the Turkish Straits provides a chronicle of one 
of the bloodiest periods in modern history. A major cause of 
the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1967 was transit rights of the 
Strait of Tiran (Wainwright, 1986, p.405). These same straits 
form crucial links in the regional and global balance of power. 
The geography of straits and states are intrinsically 
linked to national politics, which in turn influences 
international relations and the global order (see chapter 7). 
According to Admiral Sir J.A. Fisher (1900); 
"The Mediterranean is of necessity the vital 
point of a naval war, and you can no more 
change this than you can change the position 
of Mount Vesuvius" . 
Gibraltar Strait is the key to the Mediterranean theatre. 
Geostrategically straits constitute choke-points and/or 
gaps. Legal regimes governing passage are only of secondary 
importance, what is essential is the geopolitical environment in 
which transit of straits occurs. The majority of states have an 
interest in the security of straits for international commerce. 
Reciprocal interests are not as strong concerning keeping 
straits open for military transit. Gibraltar is of particular 
importance because of superpower interest in the Mediterranean 
and Middle East and the deployment of Fleet Ballistic Missile 
Submarines (SSBNs) (Pirtle, 1978, p.491). Straits are the 
obvious foci of "sea-denial" forces. 
The military functions of straits are: 
(i) to ensure industrial supplies; 
(ii) to reinforce/resupply national military forces engaged 
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overseas; and 
(iii) to supply wartime economic/military supplies to 
allied states; (Turner, 1974, p.8; Pirtle, 1978, p. 492). 
Thus geostrategy in relation to straits is aimed at "chokepoint 
control" (Turner, 1974, p.8; Holst, 1976, p.4; Pirtle, 1978, 
p. 492). 
Due to the fact that passage through straits can be easily 
disrupted, coastal states have the possibility of controlling 
transit. Hence there is the option of preventing the passage of 
suspected enemies or belligerents as the Arab states tried after 
1948 in the Straits of Bab el Mandeb and Tiran. Strait states 
may also try to prevent certain types of transit considered as 
compromising or non-innocent, as Spain did during the 1967 
Arab-Israeli War. As none of the Maghrebi states officially 
recognize the state of Israel, and the main Moroccan political 
parties are openly hostile to it, the Strait of Gibraltar is by 
no means outside the range of the Arab-Israeli geopolitical 
sphere. In 1975, the US and Israel signed a Memorandum of 
Agreement regarding the Red Sea region (USA: Memorandum of 
Agreement, 1975). Paragraph 14 of the Agreement provides that 
the US regards Bab el Mandeb and Gibraltar as international 
waterways, and supports Israel's right to "freedom of passage" 
and "flights" over "such straits" (Wainwright, 1986, p.400). 
Strait 
international 
states have 
navigation 
the potential of interrupting 
as the mining of the Red Sea (1984), 
and Iraqi and Iranian attacks on neutral vessels in the 
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Arabian/Persian Gulf (1986-1987) illustrate. Strait states may 
try to lever benefits from the international community in the 
form of tolls (eg Denmark until 1857), beneficial agreements, 
political importance and advantageous alliances (eg Morocco-USA, 
PDR Yemen-USSR, Djibouti-France). Strait states may be prone to 
over-assert national pride or nationalism, Spain and Indonesia 
have both been accused of this. 
The corollary is equally applicable. Strait states fear 
being blockaded and unable to launch an offensive, or reduced to 
naval incapacity in terms of commercial and military traffic, 
the position of Turkey is of concern to NATO in this respect. 
Historically the location of the Russian/Soviet empire in 
relation to the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Seas 
illustrates the point. The USSR is "straits bound". Gibraltar 
is the main communications artery for Soviet naval operations in 
the Mediterranean (see chapter 7) (Blake (c), 1983, pp.558-260; 
O'Reilly, 1987, pp.104-105). Though not a riparian state of the 
Strait of Gibraltar, France like Spain has Atlantic and 
Mediterranean fleets and historically both states have always 
had the problem of "linking" the fleets via Gibraltar Strait in 
emergency situations. 
Besides the risk of being blockaded, semi-enclosed sea and 
strait states run the risk of having constraints being imposed 
on them by international restrictions and conventions, for 
instance usage of the Turkish Straits and the Montreux 
Convention (1936). Other examples include the Treaty of 
Commutation of the Sound and Belt Dues (1857) largely dictated 
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by the USA, and the Anglo-French (1904) and Franco-Spanish 
treaties (1904, 1912) in relation to Gibraltar and Morocco (see 
chapters 4-6), (Wainwright, 1985, pp.l25-129; Gregoire, 1977, 
pp.ll5-ll7; De Luca, 1977, pp.503-524; Roberts, 1981, pp. 
581-585; Froman, 1977, pp.681-717). Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1983, 
pp.57-68) suggest that the legal regime of transit passage for 
straits used for international navigation contained in the LOS 
(1982, Part III, Articles 34-44) imposes constraints on strait 
states and thus detracts from their sovereign prerogatives. 
Some strait states, including Spain, Morocco, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Iran fear the effective loss of sovereignty in 
their territorial seas in strait areas. Some strait states 
including Morocco, Albania, PDR Yemen and Indonesia feel a sense 
of frustration, having undergone the colonial experience, and 
now international constraints being imposed on them in the 
post-colonial era (see map 1.5). The whole question of the 
Moroccan colonial experience and continuing territorial dispute 
with Spain over the Plazas in North Africa, and Spain's demands 
for the "decolonization" of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar must 
be viewed in this context (see chapters 4-6). Today the threat 
of pollution in territorial waters by ships in transit in 
straits symbolizes the dialectic between state sovereignty and 
international passage rights (see chapter 3). 
History proves that economic intercourse and balance of 
power strategies are contingent on access to straits. 
Anglo-French rivalry in the Mediterranean, Muslim and Asiatic 
worlds between the 18th century and 1904 offers a geopolitical 
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precedent. Since 1945, the same holds true for the USA and 
USSR. The possibility of blocking off belligerents, including 
strait states, offers maritime powers tactical advantages. 
According to Bruel (1947, p.25), history shows that: 
naval operations will be centered 
in or around straits and surrounding waters, 
which thus becomes the focus of war at sea". 
In order to get the full benefit of the geostrategical 
advantages offered by straits, control of adjacent coasts is 
necessary (see map 1.5). Though a belligerent in World War I 
and neutral in World War II, the history of Turkey illustrates 
this. Spanish neutrality during both World Wars detracted from 
the tactical advantages offered by the Crown Colony of Gibraltar 
to the Allies. Spain's refusal to permit the USA use of it's 
sovereign territory and seas during the Arab-Israeli War (1967) 
and the air-raid on Libya (1986) provide examples of the 
political constraints which may be imposed on the maritime 
powers. 
Belligerent powers entering semi-enclosed seas face the 
possibility of their retreat being cut off, hence the necessity 
of bases and special relationships with strait states or 
friendly countries. In the western Mediterranean, the 
British/NATO base at Gibraltar and US special relationship with 
Morocco and Spain help assure usage of the Strait. From a 
geostrategical viewpoint, British bases in Cyprus and formerly 
Malta, and US base rights in Pantalleria Island (Italy) and Rota 
(Spain/Strait region) illustrate the importance of the 
Mediterranean arena (see chapter 7). Ultimately the USA has the 
48 
possibility of using several of these bases in emergency 
situations. 
When great powers cannot directly control straits they 
inevitably call for some form of internationalization, 
demilitarization or a liberal passage regime. These goals were 
attempted in the region to the Strait of Gibraltar in 1859 and 
1904 (see chapters 2,4,6). Other examples include the 
'Chile-Argentine Agreement' (1881) catering for neutralization 
of the Strait of Magellan. 
According to Bruel (1947, pp.27-28), the basis for: 
II estimating the naval importance 
of straits, their value in this respect will 
in all essentials remain the same 
as before, because the elements upon which 
it is predicated are purely of a 
military-geographical and therefore constant 
nature" (sic) (Bruel, 1947, pp.27-28). 
The institution of special legal regimes for certain straits 
like Gibraltar is an attempt to reconcile the diverging 
interests of strait states and seapowers (see chapter 3). 
Politische Ansammlung or indirect control of straits, is a 
strategy employed when direct control is not possible (Maull, 
1925). This policy aims at controlling straits via weak 
littoral states, as with the Gibraltar and Turkish Straits in 
the historical context. In the case of Gibraltar no single 
regional or global power has been able to control both coasts of 
the Strait continuously. Spanish-Muslim shadow dancing in the 
area (11th-17th centuries) was superceded by Anglo-French 
competition (1704-1904) which resulted in the creation of the 
Crown Colony of Gibraltar (1712) and partition of the Moroccan 
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Kingdom (1912). However Britain remained the dominant force in 
the region (1704-1939). With us involvement during the Second 
World War (1942-43) in the region, the USA established a special 
rapport with Britain and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, and 
eventually set up bases in Morocco and Spain. However the 
relationship between strait states and the superpowers is the 
cardinal factor in the politics of vital straits like Gibraltar. 
Politische Ansammlung may be summed up as indirect rule, 
often linked to complex balance of power strategies. 
Politically strait states have the advantage of being able to 
play off interested powers for political gain. Since the 1970s, 
this has been particularly evident with Soviet involvement in 
PDR Yemen and Ethiopia. The pro-Western stance of the Moroccan 
regime in international affairs, and Morocco's application to 
join the EC (1985-87), less than a year after its union with 
Libya must be seen in this context (see chapters 7-8). 
Strait states run the risk of misjudging their strength or 
role in international affairs and may have to suffer the 
consequences. Attempts by the some Arab states to deny Israel 
and its allies usage of straits in the Gulf and Red Sea area 
have not been successful. There are certain similarities 
between the last example and Indonesia's attempts (1970s and 
early 1980s) to limit the superpowers and Japans' usage of the 
Malacca and Lombok straits. Considering that straits act as 
foci of trade and naval movements, an historical perspective 
helps illustrate a certain geopolitical continuity. "Shadow 
empires" such as Britain and France still work in close harmony 
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with many of their ex-colonies such as Oman, the UAE, Singapore 
and Djibouti; while the major "shadow empires" have cooperated 
closely with the USA since 1945 ((Toynbee, 1963, p.l07: Kinder & 
Hilgemann, 1978; Chaliand & Rageau, 1983, pp.33-51; Kidron & 
Segal, 1984). (see map 1.5). According to President Reagan: 
bases would help the US protect 
vital sea 
choke-points 
lanes that pass through 
would try to close in 
Times, 13 Feb.l986). 
that the Soviet Union 
a conflict" (New York 
Doubtless, the USSR has similar fears about Western strategy. 
From the 18th century until 1945, most of the worlds 
strategic straits were under the control of the colonial powers, 
particularly Britain, France and The Netherlands, and to a 
lesser extent Spain, Italy and Japan. Britain controlled the 
largest empire the world has ever seen. Gibraltar and the Crown 
Colony was a key not only to the Mediterranean but also to the 
Indian Ocean and hence the far flung empire. Control of 
strategic straits was achieved by force, colonization, 
legitimizing treaties and the establishment of bases, as well as 
policies of indirect rule (see map 1.5). 
1.4.2 us Straits Policy. 
The US straits policy of force and diplomacy has a long 
precedent. This was clearly formulated over a hundred years ago 
during the Chile-Argentine discussions on the status of the 
Strait of Magellan (1881). The US declared: 
"that the Government of the USA will not 
tolerate exclusive claims of the Strait of 
Magellan by any nation whatsoever'' (Moore, 
1898; Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, Pt. III). 
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Many similar statements have been made by the US Government in 
the past 20 years in relation to the straits of Hormuz, Bab el 
Mandeb and Gibraltar. (Wainwright, 1986, pp.361-414). "Force 
remains the most effective form of power in many issues and in 
many situations" (Wainwright. 1986, p.367). As early as 1857 
the US was instrumental in forcing Denmark to abolish the Sound 
dues which had existed for centuries. With its superior naval 
power, the USA forced the opening of the Japanese straits in the 
late 19th century (Bruel, 1947, p.277). Since 1945, the USA has 
been active in pursuing a policy of indirect control of straits 
once controlled by the Japanese Empire. The strait strategy of 
the USA in the region includes the bases at Misawa on Honshu, 
astride the Tsugaru Strait and within easy range of La Perouse 
Strait, Sakhalin and Kurile Islands; presently it is the site of 
the largest US base expansion program in the Pacific (Christian 
Science Monitor, 4 April 1986). 
Under US aegis the Egypt-Israel Peace Accords (1979) 
clearly stipulated that the Red Sea straits would be open to all 
nations without distinction of flag. 
Overall us straits policy falls into four 
historical/geographical categories: 
(i) Direct control in the Americas in the 19th century, was 
achieved by force and diplomacy. 
(ii) US involvement outside the Americas possibly began 
with the establishment of US bases in the Philippines from 
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1898 on. 
(iii) Military bases, bilateral and multilateral treaties, 
and privileged relations with strait states throughout the 
world have been established since 1945. 
(iv) The USA has been active in gaining access to strait 
areas once controlled by Britain, either by treaty with 
independent states or agreement with Britain as in the case 
of Diego Garcia (Madeley, 1985) and Gibraltar via NATO (see 
map 1. 5). 
The straits policy of the USA has been greatly influenced 
by the geopolitical theories of Mahan (1890) and Mackinder 
(1904, 1919, 1942) and their "landpower/seapower" concepts (see 
chapter 7). Concerning the Strait of Gibraltar, the USA was 
party to the internationalization of Cape Spartel (1856) and 
Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-56). Since the 19th century, the USA 
has acted as the international champion of the freedom of the 
seas philosophy. This was stressed again and again by US 
representatives during the UNCLOS conferences in the 1970s, and 
in US naval policies in the Mediterranean and Gulf region in the 
1980s, eg Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb. The US still only claims a 
3 nm territorial sea. Significantly in the past 30 years, 
crises in which the USA has been involved include the strategic 
sea areas of the Florida Strait (Cuba), Gulf of Tonkin 
(Vietnam). Sirt (Libya). Tiran and Hormuz. 
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1.4.3 The Soviet Straits Policy. 
Concerning the USSR, historically the development of the 
Russian Empire was constrained by its continental position, 
ice-bound ports and the large number of surrounding states. The 
siting of St Petersburg (Leningrad), Odessa and Vladivostock was 
aimed at Russian access to the seas (see map 1.1a,b). The 
contentious history of the Russian/Soviet Empire with the Baltic 
states, Ottoman Empire/Turkey and Japan is in large part due to 
it's "straits bound" location (see maps 7.1). This thrust 
towards ice-free ports has been well documented in relation to 
the Turkish and Danish Straits (Alexandersson, 1982). Today as 
in the past, Japanese geography forms a barrier to Soviet 
maritime aspirations in north-east Asia. The Sakhalin and 
Kurile Islands dispute symbolises this struggle. Since the 
1960s the Soviets have been following the traditional straits 
policies of the older maritime powers, establishing bases and 
friendly relations with states in the orbit of straits such as 
Cuba, Libya. Algeria, Malta, Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia, PDR Yemen 
and Mozambique. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) 
leaves it within the orbit of the Arabian Sea and Strait of 
Hormuz. Overall, the Soviet policy is one of indirect control, 
and support for the LOS (1982) and the regimes for straits 
(Arts.33-54). Like the USA and Britain, the USSR supports the 
legal regime of transit passage for the Strait of Gibraltar, 
which the riparian states reluctantly accept (see chapter 3). 
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1.4.4 Islam and Straits. 
Since the 8th century, Islam has been a force in the region 
of the Strait of Gibraltar. While its power has waxed and waned 
in relation to the Strait, Islam has always been a crucial 
element in the geopolitics of the region (see chapters 7-8). 
While none of the Muslim states are major maritime powers, 
they are directly involved in the straits question (Amin, No.3, 
1981, pp.387-405; Amin, 1981, pp.1-235). Historically with the 
spread of Islam from the pivot area of Saudi Arabia, the Muslim 
kingdom took control of most of the then known vital straits; 
Gibraltar, Sicily, Otrano, Dardanelles, Bosporus, Bab el Mandeb, 
Hormuz, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. Despite the decline of the 
Golden Age of Islam, the European colonial experience and the 
development of separate states; there is a spiritual and 
cultural unity in the Muslim world which lends it geopolitical 
potential in relation to six of the world's most strategic 
straits (see maps 1.1a,b,c; table 1.1). This situation must be 
seen in the light of the Arab-Israeli dispute and fundamentalist 
reaction to neocolonialism and the superpowers (see chapter 8). 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not signed the LOS 
(1982) as of 1987, however Morocco has. Since the 1940s, the 
Middle Eastern Arab states states have called for the Aqaba area 
to be declared an historic bay/semi-enclosed sea under Arab 
sovereignty. This argument is pursuant to the fact that all 
(save Egypt) do not offically recognize the riparian State of 
Israel. Also, whether offically stated or not most Arab states 
favour Arab dominance in the Arabian/Persian Gulf and Hormuz 
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area. Libya's claim to Sirt is also partially inspired by Arab 
nationalsim. Militant Islamic fundamentalists wish the 
consolidation of Islamic sovereignty over territories and seas; 
this became evident with the mining of the Red Sea (1984) and 
Arabian/Persian Gulf (1987). 
In 1982, at the time of Iran's signing of the LOS, it's 
representative Hodjtaba Mirmehdi, placed on record: 
"(the) understanding that only 
states party to the LOS Convention shall be 
entitled to benefit from the contractual 
rights created therein" . 
He specifically stated that this applied to the right of transit 
passage through international straits (UNCLOS, 10 Dec.1982, 
Declarations and Reservations. Islamic Rep. of Iran). Iran's 
policies have set a precedent for fundamentalist groups in other 
Islamic states including Morocco (see chapter 8). 
The legal regimes for passage of straits catered for in the 
LOS (1982) is an attempt at reconciling the coastal state 
control, and freedom of the seas philosophy. However, as in the 
past, geopolitical factors will continue to determine control of 
straits such as Gibraltar. 
1.5 GEOGRAPHY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA. 
1.5.1 Hegemonism Versus Freedom of The Seas. 
From an historical perspective, states have striven for 
control of territories, and with advances in technology states 
continue to stuggle for sovereignty over the seas. Sovereignty 
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over the waters of straits poses a threat to their use by the 
international community. 
The codification o£ the United Nations Convetipn on the La~'l 
of the Sea (LOS, 1982) did not occur in a conceptual vacuum as 
the theoretical aspects have been debated since Roman times, and 
especially at periods when certain states (seapowers) could 
actively exploit and control the oceans. Traditional Roman law 
held that hydrospace was a community asset open to use by all, 
that is "common ownership" or res communis in the broadest 
sense. In contrast res nullis or the belief that the sea 
belonged to no one, led to the argument that appropriation by 
the state is legitimate. This latter philosophy was enforced by 
Venice in the 13th century with a declaration of sovereignty 
over areas of the Adriatic Sea. Hegemony was enforced by tolls 
on ships or denial of entry. This set the precedent for other 
geopolitical entities like the city state of Genoa and the 
Scandinivian kingdoms to do likewise in the surrounding seas. 
Ever since, res nullis has been a source of debate, war, 
treaties and agreements. because sovereignty on land 
automatically implied to many states de jure control of a band 
of adjacent territorial seas. Until 1982 there was no universal 
agreement as to the width of territorial seas. Claims have 
varied from 1.5 nm to over 200 nm and consequently this has 
affected passage rights through straits. 
Over the centuries power groups have tried to apply the res 
nullis philosophy far outside their claimed territorial sea 
limit. As early as 1493, Pope Alexander VI divided the world's 
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oceans between Spain and Portugal by the Treaty of Tordesillas 
(1494); with Spain claiming sovereignty over the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, and Portugal appropriating the Indian Ocean as 
well as Atlantic waters south of Morocco. The other maritime 
powers of that period, especially Britain, challenged the 
legitimacy of such acts by invoking res communis. 
of the ironies of history that five hundred years 
same states are actively engaged in trying 
Is it not one 
later, these 
to delimit and 
control hydrospace in the region of the Strait of Gibraltar. 
The ageold conflict of hegemonism versus freedom of the 
seas was formulated as early as 1609, when Hugo Grotius under 
the commission of the Dutch East India Company challenged 
Iberia's monopoly with his famous treatise Mare Liberum, 
advocating res communis to be implemented by force if necessary 
(Grotius, 1972; Lapidoth, 1975, pp.263-266; Knight, 1925, 
pp.79-112). The US-Libyan dispute (1970s-80s) over passage 
rights in the Bay of Sirt and adjacent waters re-echoes Grotius' 
arguments. In response to Grotius, John Seldon upheld the res 
nullis thesis in his Mare Clausum (1634), justifying Britain's 
claim to the waters around Britain and Ireland (Lapidoth, 1975, 
pp.266-268; Fulton, 1911, pp.366-367). Seldon pointed out that 
whatever the de jure position may be, many states exercise de 
facto control over appropriated waters. Therefore sovereignty 
over hydrospace existed in practice and thereby in principle. 
This situation is obvious in the Gibraltar region where despite 
de jure problems, Britain exercises de facto control over the 
waters surrounding its Crown Colony. Likewise Spain controls 
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not only waters around its coast, but those off its sovereign 
territories in North Africa; and Morocco is taking an ever 
greater interest in its surrounding seas (RJPEM, Vol.6, 1979). 
From a spatial viewpoint, Seldon and Grotius' arguments are 
not diametrically opposed. Ultimately both accepted the 
imperative of control of coastal waters. The key issue has 
always been the exact extent and nature of state sovereignty 
over these waters. Basically the principle of res nullis was 
accepted for coastal waters and res communis for the high seas. 
In the 1970s, a majority of non-industrialized states proposed a 
form of the res nullis principle to be applied to the deep 
seabed or "area" with its resources and profits to be vested 
under the control of an International Seabed Authority. This 
became a conrtoversial issue in the international community. 
The absolute triumph of mare liberum from the 17th century 
until the 1950s has been eroded because of such factors as: 
(i) the great increase in number of independent states; 
(ii) ever greater widths of territorial seas and other 
zones being claimed by coastal states; 
(iii) the hegemony of the great maritime powers being 
challenged politically and economically; 
(iv) the increasing ability of many coastal states to 
defend their claims militarily; and 
(v) changes in technology permitting greater maritime 
resource exploitation and control. 
In this century the principles of international law have 
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been abused in relation to the oceans, especially in matters of 
right of passage in territorial seas and straits; for example, 
pollution and submerged transit of straits by user states, and 
strait states trying to impose restrictions on transit, such as 
demanding "notification" or "authorization" for the passage of 
ceratin types of vessel. However, concerning international 
conventions, agreement in principle on issues such as the 
breadth of territorial waters and transit rights does not 
automatically imply agreement in detail. 
1.5.2 Territorial Seas and Cannon Shot Rules. 
Historically the first written reference to the cannon shot 
rule was in 1610 during a fishing dispute between Britain and 
The Netherlands. However, in the 17th-18th centuries, the rule 
was popularized and gave rise to the marine league concept. The 
Scandinivan states calculated the marine league as 4 nm while 
other coastal states considered it to be three. By the late 
19th century the majority of states had adopted 3 nm as the 
width of their territorial seas, in which they allowed other 
states a right of innocent passage. Several Mediterranean 
states and the Ottoman Empire claimed 6 nm, and in 1927, the 
USSR claimed sovereignty up to 12 nm. Because of the lack of 
international agreement on the width of the territorial sea, the 
imperative of self-defence and ever-increasing range of cannons, 
this led to contentions. The invocation and different 
interpretations of the cannon-shot rule have been a major point 
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of dispute between Britain and Spain since Britain gained 
control over the Gibraltar colony (1704) (see chapter 6). 
Though the cannon-shot rule may seem somewhat antiquated today, 
it has formed the basis of Britain's claim to waters and the 
isthmus adjacent to the Rock of Gibraltar. Colonel Qadhafi's 
claims to the Gulf of Sirt are in a sense based on a modern 
interpretation of the cannon shot-rule. He has reiterated time 
and again that the presence of foreign naval vessels in the Gulf 
poses a threat to Libyan national security. From his viewpoint 
there are certain ambiguities associated with territorial seas 
and security zones. The US declared "security zones" in the 
Cuba region in 1962, and Britain's security zone around the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands during the 1982 War was a variation on 
a similar theme (Barston & Birnie, 1983, pp.l4-25). In the 
unlikely event of armed conflict between Spain and Morocco in 
relation to the territorial dispute over the Plazas, "security 
zones" could endanger the transit rights of the international 
community through the Strait of Gibraltar (see chapter 5). 
1.5.3 Overlapping Jurisdictions. 
Along with the problem of territorial waters and straits 
many other issues have had to be tackled in relation to 
political control of hydrospace such as regulation of fishing, 
environmental conservation, 
immigration and sanitary 
jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, 
matters, neutrality and security 
outside the territorial sea, and the status of islands and bays. 
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Attempts to codify law in relation to straits have included 
the London Convention (1841) and the Paris Conference (1894). 
In the wake of World War I, it was foreseen that changes in 
world political geography would necessitate a clearer code for 
ocean usage in order to avoid conflict. Attempts in this sphere 
included notably the International Law Association Conference 
for the Codification of International Law (1930) at The Hague, 
attended by 47 states. The issue of a 3 nm territorial sea with 
a 9 nm contiguous zone were on the agenda. While no agreement 
was reached concerning the width of the territorial sea, The 
Hague Conference (1930) did confirm that in those waters of 
straits which constitute territorial seas (generally accepted as 
3 nm): 
There 
it is essential to ensure that in 
time of peace in all circumstances the 
passage of merchant vessels and warships 
through straits between two parts of the 
high seas forming ordinary routes for 
international navigation" (Hague, 1930, 
p.148; Sharma, 1980, p.112). 
were strong differences of opinion in relation to 
warships, but in time of peace, in practice states did allow 
access (Bruel, 1947, p 230). At The Hague (1930) as in all 
subsequent conferences, the economically and militarily weaker 
states obstructed agreement on principles that had been 
developed and imposed in the past by the major seapowers. 
The US Truman Proclamation (1945) to regulate fisheries in 
areas of high seas adjacent to the coast, and imposing 
jurisdiction over the adjacent continental shelf within the 200 
metre isobath, set a precedent for rest of the world. Shortly 
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after, Mexico claimed the same rights as the USA, while in 1946 
Argentina claimed the entire continental shelf and superadjacent 
waters. In 1947, Peru and Chile extended their P~vereignty over 
a 200 nm maritime zone. Since then, states have been claiming 
ever-greater jurisdiction in sea areas. In geopolitical terms, 
this constitutes creeping jurisdiction (Glassner, 1978, pp.1-24; 
1981, pp.1-4). 
The United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea (1982) 
(LOS) is the result of the efforts of the world community to 
standardize international law in relation to the oceans. It is 
based on convention or international agreement and hence is only 
legally binding on signatory states. Conventional law has the 
disadvantage of being dependent on the goodwill of contracting 
parties only. International/conventional law is codified, 
whereas customary law is based on precedent and is more 
flexible. In the past, different state practices in relation to 
the seas led to controversy because of the abuses of the oceans 
and the unilateral nature of sovereign claims to hydrospace. 
Basically, unrestricted usage, intense competition and "creeping 
jurisdiction'' became the cause of disputes in the international 
arena. For instance fishing problems between Spain and Morocco, 
contested territorial sea claims in the Gibraltar area and 
US-Libyan hostilities over the Gulf of Sirt (1980-87) may all be 
quoted. 
1.5.4 Decolonization and The Seas: 1958-1982. 
Until 1946, state competition was mostly oriented towards 
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territorial acquisition, since then the vast increase in the 
number of sovereign states has focussed the state viewpoint on 
the ocean frontier(see map 1.5). Historically, the oceans had 
been the preserve of the seapowers. The scramble for the oceans 
necessitated UNCLOS (1958, 1960, 1973-1982). The 1958 
conference was attended by 86 states and eventually four 
conventions were adopted and ratified on: 
(i) the territorial sea and contiguous zone, 
(ii) the continental shelf, 
(iii) high seas, and 
(iv) fishing and conservation. 
Between 150 and 154 countries participated in the elaboration of 
LOS (1982). The LOS (1982) will enter into force two years 
after ratification by 60 states. 
some states, the Convention 
Despite 
will 
the reservations of 
become established 
internatinonal law (Anand, 1973, pp.13-29; Churchill &. Lowe, 
1983; Koh, 1982; Miles, 1976; Alexander, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1973, 
1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1986; 1988; Focus, 1981). 
The creation of many new states and changes in technology 
since World War II heightened awareness of the diverse uses of 
the seas (see map 1.5). Despite air and space technology, 
navigation continues to affect the economy, security and 
strategy of almost every state. Navigational uses vary from 
merchant ships to fishing vessels, super-tankers, warships, 
submarines and nuclear powered vessels, as well as research and 
intelligence vessels. 
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With the world population explosion, fishing activities are 
highly significant for many states and those not capable of 
exploitation on a large scale wish to gain revenue from selling 
licences, or conserving stocks for future usage; Morocco and the 
Falklands provide classic examples. In the mid-1980s, about 26% 
of world oil was drilled in offshore areas. The recovery of 
manganese nodules (containing at least 27 elements, especially 
manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt) has become feasible (Blake 
(a), 1984, pp 56-60). Offshore areas became sites for greater 
scientific research, waste disposal, recreational pursuits and 
espionage. In the interest of world peace, the LOS attempted to 
leglislate for the oceans and thus to reduce interstate strife. 
Some coastal states including Morocco and Spain wished a 
greater clarification of the law dealing with such contentious 
issues as passage rights in territorial seas, pollution, and 
transit of naval vessels and military aircraft (Clingan & 
Alexander, 1973; Ahmady,1979, pp.73-93; Ouallalou, 1979, 
pp.50-59; RJPEM, Vol.6, 1979; Koh,1982). Spain and Morocco 
wished their territorial seas in the Strait to be subject to the 
same legal regime as other territorial waters (see chapter 3). 
l.Q.Q Legal Maritime Zones. 
The LOS (1982) (Arts.2-33) 
territorial sea up to 12 nm 
permits a state 
over which it 
to 
has 
claim a 
complete 
sovereignty, except for the right of innocent passage which has 
to be afforded to all nations in time of peace and 
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non-belligerents in time of war. This right of innocent passage 
is obligatory as long as it "is not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal state'' (Art.19 (1)). This 
leaves room for a wide latitude of interpretation. According to 
Article 19 (2) (LOS, 1982) passage may not be considered as 
innocent if a vessel engages in: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the coastal State; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of 
any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information 
to the prejudice of the defence or secuity 
of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting 
the defence or security of the coastal 
state; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on 
board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on 
board of any military devices; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any 
commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution 
contrary to the LOS (1982) Convention, (both 
rather vague terms with a perceptual basis 
and difficult to prove); 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey 
activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any 
systems of communications or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal 
State; and 
(1) any other activity not having a direct 
bearing on passage. 
According to Article 20 (LOS, 1982): 
"In the territorial sea, 
other underwater vehicles 
navigate on the surface and 
flag". 
submarines and 
are required to 
to show their 
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However there is much contention over aerial and submarine 
passage of straits. 
submarines must 
While it is stipulated in 
surface navigate and fly 
LOS 
the 
1958 
flag 
that 
while 
transiting territorial waters in straits; there is no such 
expressed provision in the LOS, 1982 in relation to the regime 
of transit ~ to be used in straits used for international 
navigation (Arts.37-45). The legalities of this situation have 
given rise to much debate, but since there is no express 
prohibition in the LOS, 1982 against submerged transit of 
straits like Gibraltar, then this right exists (Reisman, 1980, 
pp.48-77; Moore, 1980, pp.77-121). Arguably, de facto usage 
solidifies this right in legal and political terms. 
According to the regime of innocent passage, 
nuclear-related vessels have a right of passage, but must 
observe specified precautionary measures internationally agreed 
upon (Art.23, LOS, 1982). Sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes may be introduced by the coastal state in collaboration 
with "the competent international organisation'' (Art.22). 
Despite protests, warships enjoy a de facto right of innocent 
passage in time of peace (Art.29-32). In a contiguous zone 
(maximium width 24 nm from the base line of the territorial 
sea), the coastal state may exercise control in relation to 
customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and a right of 
pursuit exists for crimes committed within the state or 
territorial seas (Art.33). 
With the adoption of LOS, 1982, the trend has been towards 
national leglislation implementing the rights and duties of a 12 
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nm territorial sea. By 1986, 27 states had claimed territorial 
seas greater than 12 nm with 15 asserting 200 nm limits. Yet of 
these 27 states, 23 had sj.gned the IDS (1982) and 4 had ratified 
it (Smith, 1986, p.2). This situation is not condusive to 
stability. 
Intrinsically linked to the issue of territorial seas is 
passage rights through straits (Arts.34-54, LOS, 1982). 
According to Louis Alexander (interview, April 1986) there are 
over 300 straits which are used for international navigation. 
Smith (1973) and Koh (1982, pp.24-26) state that there are some 
220 straits which may be classified as international. Usually 
the figure of 116 is quoted when speaking about straits used for 
international navigation, whose waters fall within the 12 nm 
territorial seas of the riparian states, of which 16 are of 
major commercial and naval importance, and 6 are vital (see map 
1b; table 1.1) (New York Times, 13 Feb.1986; Kennedy, 1958; 
Geographic Bulletin (US), 1969, pp.22-27; Elliot, 1947, 
pp.30-35). Depending on the classifications used for analyzing 
straits used for international navigation, and with a minimium 
breadth of 24 nm or less, there may be as many as 133 straits in 
this category (see appendix I). Included in this group are the 
Straits of Gibraltar and Lombok/Ombai-Wetar which are crucial to 
the Western nuclear deterrence system (Pirtle, 1978, p.488). 
Regarding volume of traffic, Gibraltar ranks among the most 
vital international straits (see chapter 2). 
During the discussions (1973-82) leading up to the LOS 
(1982) the developing countries wished to consolidate 
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sovereignty over their territorial waters. They wanted their 
territorial waters, including those waters within all straits to 
be subject to the same legal passage regime. The major maritime 
powers wished to preserve freedom of the seas, reducing state 
control to a minimium (see chapter 3), (Bergsten, 
1973,pp.l02-124; Glassner, 1978, pp.8-l0). 
Many straits historically deemed as international now fall 
within the territorial waters of the riparian states. Depending 
on historical geography and degree of functionality, major 
international straits like Gibraltar are subject to the transit 
passage regime (LOS, 1982, Part 111, Articles 33-44). This is 
basically a compromise position between innocent passage and 
freedom of the high seas regimes. The principal characteristics 
of the transit passage regime regime are: 
(i) It applies only where there is an area 
of high seas or EEZ at both ends of the 
strait, where there is territorial seas at 
one end, only innocent passage applies. 
(ii) Transit passage is the exercise of 
freedom of passage and overflight solely for 
the purpose of continuous and expeditious 
passage of the strait. 
(iii) Submarines are not required to 
navigate on the surface. 
(iv) Sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes may be implemented by the strait 
state, but only with the approval of the 
"competent international organisation". 
(v) There may be no suspension of transit 
passage. 
In straits where there is only territorial sea at one end, or 
where a strait runs between an island and the mainland and there 
is a high seas route or EEZ of similar convenience seaward of 
the island, the transit passage regime does not apply, and these 
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straits are subject to the innocent passage regime, but here 
non-suspension of innocent passage applies, unlike the 
situation in ordinary territorial seas. Concerning the regime 
applicable to "archipelagic sea lanes passage" (LOS, 1982, Part 
IV), this applies when the archipelago forms "an intrinsic 
geographical, economic political entity" (Art.46). In 
this circumstance the normal innocent passage regime may apply 
or the "archipelagic sea lanes passage" regime, which is 
basically the same as the transit passage regime. However if 
the archipelagic state does not designate sea lanes or air 
routes, archipelagic sea lane passage rights may be exercised 
through the routes normally used for international navigation. 
Some observers claim that the LOS (1982) Parts III and IV 
in relation to straits is a labyrinth of semantics divesting 
coastal states of real sovereignty in the territorial seas 
(Tsaltas & Lacatzis, 1983, pp.57-68). What many coastal states 
deem as "prejudicial" to their interests is a viewpoint not 
wholly shared by the major seapowers. According to PR China, 
the Soviet concept of what is "non-prejudicial" to coastal 
states seems to decay with distance from the Eurasian landmass 
of the USSR (Koh, 1982, p.184). The Malacca Straits crisis of 
the 1970s, whereby the riparian states, particularly Indonesia 
and to a lesser extent Malaysia, wished to prohibit the passage 
of VLCCs, and make foreign states "give notification" and "seek 
authorization" for their naval vessels to transit the strait, 
illutrates the extent of what may be consider as "prejudicial" 
by some coastal states (Vertzberger, 1984; Oliver, 1973, 
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pp.23-36; Leifer, 1978). 
Between 1970-80, there were some 22 major oil spills in the 
Strait-Mediterranean-Black Sea region (Couper, 1983, 
pp.170-17l). However none of these were on a scale comparable 
to the Torrey kanyon or Amoco Cadiz disasters. ~he Liberian oil 
tanker Torrey Canyon was fully loaded with 119,000 tons of crude 
oil when it sank in 1967 about 7 nm north east of the Scilly 
Isles. Though outside British territorial waters, in a massive 
effort to curtail the effects of pollution, the RAF bombed the 
wreck in order to try and burn off some of the oil. The Amoco 
Cadiz disaster caused even worse pollution than the Torrey 
Canyon. This Liberian tanker was fully loaded with crude oil 
when it became stranded near Portsal (northern France) in 1978. 
A special commission established that the steering gear system 
of the vessel had failed. But despite this, the tanker could 
have passed to Lyme Bay much further offshore without increasing 
her passage distance or time significantly, and thus increasing 
her safety margin (Couper, 1983, pp.168-170). 
Disasters like the Torrey C~~on oil spill (1967) were seen 
as a poignant example of a threat to national security by 
coastal states. The functional claims of coastal states in 
relation to territorial waters and by implication straits has 
caused great alarm in the international community. By 1986, 29 
states required that warships receive permission for entry to 
these maritime zones, while 9 demanded prior notification and 5 
insisted on similar prerequesites for transit (Smith, 1986, 
p.2). Along with the right of innocent passage for state or 
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military vessels which many coastal states dispute, in 1985, 
Libya began allowing commercial vessels innocent passage rights 
in it's territorial seas only during daylight hours once prior 
information concerning the vessel was given. Evidently certain 
state practices are developing heterogeneously. 
The maritime and industrial powers object to this challenge 
to freedom of the seas and are fearful of further creeping 
jurisdiction to such areas as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
which extends to a maximium of 188 nm beyond the 12 nm 
territorial sea according to LOS, 1982 (Part V, Arts.55-75). 
The international consensus is that non-resource related high 
seas freedoms, such as navigation and overflight should be 
preserved in this zone as codified in the LOS, 1982 
(Arts.55-75). By 1986, some 65 states had claimed an EEZ, with 
9 including designated areas, where states may try to regulate 
passage in accordance with their national pollution 
leglislation, thus affecting transit rights. Several states 
already claim 
within the EEZ. 
security restrictions in a contiguous zone lying 
Therefore straits of all sizes have become 
affected by maritime jurisdiction and diverse interpretations of 
LOS, 1982. 
The width of the territorial sea and EEZ is measured from 
the same baseline as leglislated in the LOS, 1982 (Arts.5-14). 
This baseline demarcates the seaward limit of sovereign internal 
waters. The inclusion of islands and bays within the baseline 
limits may further restrict the area of the high seas and lead 
to disputes, eg the current Libyan claim to the Gulf of Sirt as 
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an historic bay with a 300 nm closing line theoretically 
constituting the baseline. 
With the LOS (1982) not yet in force as of 1987 the eternal 
question of res communis versus res nullis is very evident on 
different spatial scales. Due to the restricted area of the 
Strait of Gibraltar and the contingent geopolitical issues, the 
straits debate is far from being over in the Gibraltar region. 
1.6 CONCLUSION. 
By juxtaposing global 
Gibraltar, we may conclude 
maritime and territorial 
perspectives 
that straits 
interaction. 
on world straits and 
constitute foci of 
Because of their 
geographical heterogeneity, all straits are not of equal 
importance to the international community. Gibraltar's ocean, 
territorial and state attributes give it major geopolitical 
significance as an artery in global trade and naval deployment. 
History shows that straits like Gibraltar are coveted by 
the riparian states, as well as the regional and global powers. 
Hence there is a continuous struggle for control of these 
choke-points. The ageold quest of strait states like Morocco 
and Spain for absolute sovereignty over the waters of key 
straits has been blocked by the colonial powers in the past, and 
the enforcement of the freedom of the seas philosophy championed 
by the UK and USA. Special legal regimes, for straits used for 
international navigation, like that of transit passage for 
Gibraltar (LOS, 1982), provide a compromise between the 
conflicting stances of the strait states and 
seapowers. 
the 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR. 
"By the Law of Nations, navigation is free 
to all persons . Every nation is free 
to travel to every other nation and to trade 
with it". 
Hugo Grotius. 
Mare Liberum (1609). 
"The Sea does not act as a barrier 
the two great continental masses 
and North Africa, but rather as 
which unites more than it divides, 
single world of north and south . 
'bi-continent' . " 
F. Braudel. 
between 
of Spain 
a river 
making a 
a 
(Vol I, 1972, p.117). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION. 
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Volume of traffic has always been a major factor in 
determining the geostrategic importance of straits, and hence 
their political history. As early as 1947, Bruel (p.50) 
suggested that traffic volume should be one of the main criteria 
in deciding which straits should be singled out for a special 
legal passage regime, which he termed "legal" or "international" 
straits. He suggested that Gibraltar should be included in this 
category. Following the 1982 LOS Convention, Gibraltar's waters 
can be legally claimed as territorial seas by the riparian 
states (see chapter 3; maps 3.1-3.2). In the past two decades 
Spain and Morocco have striven for greater jurisdiction over the 
waters of the Strait. This is problematic because of 
Gibraltar's geography, volume and type of traffic, and the 
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number of national flags which transit the Strait (O'Reilly, 
1987, pp.104-105). 
2.2 USAGE. 
2.2.1 Number of Passing Vessels and Data Sources 
Gibraltar ranks among the world's four busiest straits (see 
table 1.1). Because of the massive volume of traffic and 
cargoes, and geopolitical sensitivities, obtaining exact data 
about traffic can prove to be problematic. In order to analyze 
the number, type and flag of transiting vessels, the author 
spent several days (March-April 1985) observing passing traffic 
from the vantage points of Ceuta, Tangier, Cape Spartel, 
Point and the NATO/MOD Signal Hill station (Gibraltar). 
Europa 
At the 
latter, the author was permitted to study traffic in the Strait 
by means of the most sophisticated equipment, including radar 
and radio contact. Thus it was possible to appreciate submerged 
as well as surface traffic. One of the most fascinating 
experiences there was the constant radio contact between the 
authorities and passing ships giving information about the name 
and type of vessel. However it must be noted that all vessels 
do not answer the radio calls. 
As well as NATO/RN-MOD personnel, port and lighthouse 
authorities also offered information. Lloyds Maritime 
Information Services Ltd and A ~ E Appledore Ship Market 
Database proved invaluable to the present study. The following 
analysis is based on the above sources. 
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Taking into consideration the constraints of verbal 
interviews, some of the following statements may seem somewhat 
contradictory, however they serve to highlight the complexity 
and diversity of usage of the Strait. 
According to MOD/NATO representatives interviewed by the 
author (March 1985), some 45%-50% of vessels (over 1,000 GT) 
which transit the Strait, "normally" respond when contacted by 
the Signal Hill station giving the name of the vessel and 
registration. Some 20% "sometimes" respond when "repeatedly 
requested to". However "at least 30%" of transiting vessels 
remain unidentified. This percentage often increases 
substantially in summer because of poor visability. Also 
identification at night poses problems, reducing accuracy. A 
MOD/NATO spokesman also stated that on average the through 
traffic was 150 vessels (over 1,000 GRT) per day, with 
approximately 75 transiting in each direction, but there are 
significant seasonal variations. Shipments of grain into the 
Mediterranean/Black Sea region (Sep-Oct) increase traffic 
substantially. He estimated that about one third of the traffic 
consists of oil tankers. 
The Chief Lighthouse Keeper at Gibraltar (Europa Point) 
stated that at least 250 "sizeable" ships passed through the 
Strait daily, not including yachts. By way of confirmation of 
this, the author observed approximately 10-12 vessels in transit 
including fishing and war ships at any time of day in 
March-April 1985. This would suggest over 240 vessels a day 
pass through the Strait. 
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Based on data supplied by Lloyds for 1981, some 40,077 
vessels passed through the Strait that year (110 per day), but 
this figure does not include small fishing vessels, warships, 
yachts and ferries. However the Times Atlas of the Oceans (TAO) 
suggests the figure of 200 a day (1983, p.l57). In comparison 
some 57 merchant ships a day transited the Dardanelles and 80 
vessels passed through the Suez Canal at the same period. The 
figure for other straits are 50 for Bab el Mandeb, 140 for 
Malacoa and 80 for Hormuz (Couper, 1983, pp.150-157). 
Concerning Dover Strait, Cuyvers (1986, p.55) states that 300 
ships a day pass through, while the TAO (1983, p.156) averages 
some 350 (see table 1.1). 
2.2.2 Energy Supply Route. 
Gibraltar Strait is an important energy supply route, 
through which over 200 million tons of oil are transited yearly 
(Couper, 1983, pp.150-151,157). In 1981 approximately 12 oil 
tankers a day passed through the Strait, 8 through the Suez 
Canal and most of the 80 ships transiting Hormuz were tankers. 
Phosphates, iron ore, liquified natural gas and petroleum gas 
(LNG, LPG), aluminium and bauxite also pass through Gibraltar. 
These are mostly northbound. With reference to southbound 
traffic, the flow of manufactured goods is significant from the 
west European and north American states to the less developed 
countries (Blake (c), 1983, pp.258-260; O'Reilly, 1987, p.105), 
(see maps 2.1-2.5). 
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In 1981, Blake (b) (p.235) estimated that: 
" the strategic significance of Bab 
el Mandeb (was) about to increase, as the 
numbers of tankers in transit rises sharply 
from 500 a year" . 
84 
This would indicate that before the widening of the Suez Canal 
(first phase) less than 2 tankers a day passed through Bab el 
Mandeb. If the second phase of the widening of the Suez Canal 
(originally due for completion in 1988-89), was completed it 
could take all but a few of the world's largest supertankers. 
Increased usage of Bab el Mandeb would have a direct bearing on 
east-west traffic in Gibraltar. 
According to Cuyvers (1986, pp.55-62), some 11.3% of 
vessels transiting Dover Strait in the early 1980s, were oil 
tankers. His research in relation to traffic at Dover revealed 
that: 
the principal traffic flows came 
from Spain and Gibraltar, Africa . 
Cape of Good Hope Rotterdam, 
Antwerp, Scandinavia and Germany". 
Thus in terms of oil tanker transit, it is arguable that 
Gibraltar ranks as the third most geostrategic strait in the 
world after Hormuz and Dover, and within the next decade will 
become even more important. Gibraltar is a major energy artery 
for the international community (Odell, 1983), (see map 1.1). 
The Suez Canal was closed between 1967-75. Between 
1975-1981 enlargement works were undertaken in the Canal. The 
Camp David Accords (1978) reduced contentions between Israel and 
Egypt, and helped bolster international confidence in security 
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of passage of Suez. In March 1981 alone some 45 tankers passed 
south and only 1 north. When phase two of the Canal development 
plan is completed, fully loaded tankers of over 250,000 DWT will 
be able to make transit. Traffic flow at the Canal is 
significantly influenced by Canal charges, fuel costs and time. 
In 1981 some 20,795 vessels transited the Canal; of these 2,921 
were tankers and 190 warships. In the early 1980s, some 70-80 
ships per day passed through the Canal (Couper, 1983, p.153). 
Usage of the Canal by the major maritime nations by flag (net 
RT) was Greece (13.9%), Liberia (12.1%), USSR (7%), UK (65%), 
Norway (6.1%), Panama (5.1%), Japan (4.9%), France (4.5%), West 
Germany (3.8%) and Singapore (2.5%) (Couper, 1983, p.153). A 
significant proportion of this would transit Gibraltar. Besides 
tankers passing through the Canal, those from Algeria and Libya 
also passage the Strait, and those which use the Levant oil 
pipelines (see maps 2.2-2.4). 
Existing and proposed Iraqi trunk lines are the Dortyol 
Line which runs 980 km from Kirkuk (Iraq) to Dortyol on the 
Turkish Mediterranean coast. In 1984, it reached a maximium 
output of 1 million barrels a day (b/d). The Banias Line runs 
850 km from Kirkuk to Banias (Syria) with a spur to the Lebanese 
port of Tripoli; its capacity is 1.4 million b/d. The Haifa 
Line runs 1,000 km from Kirkuk to the Israeli port of Haifa, 
with a capacity for 100,000 b/d, but has been closed since 1948. 
Iraq rejected Israel's proposal of re-opening the line in 1984. 
Iraq has projects for building a 900 km trans-Jordan Aqaba Line 
from Haditha to the port of Aqaba with a projected capacity of 1 
86 
million b/d. In 1987, Iraq began exporting oil by road to the 
port of Aqaba (Jordan) in an effort to avoid Iranian attacks on 
shipping using the Hormuz route. An Iraqi LPG line (capacity 3 
million tons per year) to Dortyol (Turkey) was under 
construction in the mid-1980s. 
Tentative proposals existed in the mid-1980s, to lay both 
an oil and a gas pipeline from Ahwaz (Iran) across Turkey to 
ports on the Mediterranian or Black Seas. Concerning Saudi 
Arabian oil, Tapline runs 1,710 km from Ras Tanura to Sidon in 
Lebanon (500,000 B/d). In the mid-1980s, sections of the line 
in Syria and Lebanon were closed but exports to Jordan's Zarqa 
refinery continued. Egypt's Sumed (capacity, approximately 2 
million b/d) runs 320 km from Ain Sukhna in the Gulf of Suez to 
Sidi Kerir near Alexandria. The Gulf War has heightened the 
strategic importance of Sumed. Israel's Tipline runs 260 km 
from Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashkelon and Haifa on the 
Mediterranean coast. The 42-inch line has a 900,000 b/d 
capacity, but has been closed since 1979 when the Islamic 
Republic of Iran stopped oil deliveries to Israel (Petroleum 
Economist, 1984, p.264). 
Because of the Iran-Iraq War (1980--) and disruption of 
usage of the Strait of Horrouz, it is envisaged (1987) that Iraq 
will try to export greater quantities of oil via pipeline to the 
eastern Mediterranean coast, once again increasing tanker flow 
through Gibraltar. In the 1980s, almost 67% of the world 
seaborne trade in crude oil, passes through Hormuz (Couper, 
1983, p.154). 
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Both Spain and Morocco wish the strict application of a 
comprehensive legal passage regime for Gibraltar, which would 
reduce risk of pollution from oil tBnkers to a minimum. In 
principle the world community supports the ideal of control of 
pollution, howeveT Spain and Morocco are not convinced that the 
LOS (1982) fully caters for their interests in relation to 
pollution (see chapter 3). In the years preceding the LOS 1982, 
there was much research concerning "flag of convenience" vessels 
(O'Connell, 1982). The Singapore Authority passed leglislation 
to remove itself from the category of "open registery states". 
Hence the remaining five are the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, 
Liberia and Panama. In all, there are about 6,000 vessels in 
the open registries, of which about o% are actually owned by 
nationals of those states. The majority of the Cypriot fleet is 
either Greek owned (64.b%), German owned (17.5%), British owned 
(5%) or owned by London Greeks (4%). Some 87% of open registery 
vessels fly the Liberian or Panamian flags. Over 40% of the US 
fleet, almost all of Monaco's and 75% of Switzerlands' fleet are 
under flags of convenience. (APA Database, 1984). The length 
to which a state will go to "protect" vessels flying it's flag, 
or vessels carrying strategic cargoes to particular countries 
has been proven by the action of the USA and Britain in the 
Strait of Hormuz in 1987, by "reflagging", escorting and 
military action. 
uu 
2.3 TR~FFIC ANALYSIS. 
By analysing statistics supplied by Lloyd's Shipping 
Info~rnation Service (1987), it eas possible to calculate that 
some ~0.077 vessels (688,391.63 thousand GT) transited the 
Strait in 1981. The main categories of vessel were general 
cargo, bulk, contaj.ners, ro/ro, oil tankers, LNG/LPG and special 
cargo carriers (see table 2.1; appendix II). In terms of number 
of vessels, general cargo ranked first with almost 49%, followed 
by bulk carriers (17.4%) and oil tankers (11.2%). However in 
tonnage terms, oil tankers ranked first with just over 38%, 
followed by bulk carriers (32.4%) and general cargo vessels 
(16.1%) (see table 2.1; appendix II). To this traffic density 
must be added yachts, local fishing boats and cross-Strait 
ferries. 
2.3.1 General Cargo Vessels. 
General cargo vessels are by far the most common type found 
in the Strait area, averaging almost 49%. However the average 
tonnage of these vessels is less than that of oil tankers and 
bulk carriers. The variety of trades on which these are 
employed is very varied. As with bulk carriers, the Crown 
Colony of Gibraltar acts as a staging point for vessels 
operating on the charter market. General cargo vessels pose 
less threat of pollution to the environment than other 
categories of vessel. 
TABLE 2.1 TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRtiiT OF GIBRALTAR. 
-EASTWARD WESTWARD TOTAL TRANSIT 
Category G.Ton.o % No. % G.Ton.o % No. % G.Ton.o 7o 
-
1 General Car. 38523.45 15.3 9651 49.0 40342.57 17. 1 9891 46.7 78866.62 16. 1 
2 Bulk Carriers 73152.83 29.0 3194 16.1 84980.70 36.0 3798 18.7 158133.53 32.4 
3 Con to i ner Car. 9524.81 3.8 815 4.0 10025.68 4.2 842 4.1 19556.49 4.® 
4 Ro/Ro. 5132.19 2.0 1050 5.3 5538.47 2.3 1075 5.3 16676.66 2.2 
5 Oi I Tanker 108914.95 43.2 2433 12.3 77323.04 32.7 :2043 H'). 1 186237.99 36.1 
6 Liquif.Gasoo 5442.19 2.2 448 2.3 5573.09 2.4 449 2.2 11015.28 2.3 
7 Sp.Car.Caooo 8910.84 3.5 1881 9.5 9393.84 4. 1 1955 9.6 18304.68 3.7 
8 Other Types 2672.75 1. 0 291 1.5 2941.77 1. 2 261 1. 3 5614.52 1.2 
--- -- -- -- ---
TOTAL 252274.01 100.0 19763 100.0 236119.16 100.0 20314 100.0 488393.17 1S6.0 
--- -- -- -- -- -- --
o=Tonnage equal times 1000. 
oo=LNG/LPG Carriers. 
ooooSpacial Cargo Carriero. 
Source: Data for 1981, Lloyd's Maritime lnformat ion Services Ltd, 1987. 
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2.3.2 ~ulk Carriers. 
This category includes bulk carriers, combination carriers 
such as bulk/conta1ner, bulk/oil, ore and ore/oil. In 1981 this 
group represented 6992 ships or over 17.4% of the number of 
transiting vessels and 32.4% of the GT. Some 904 vessels were 
ore and ore/oil carriers representing over 18% of total GT. 
Gibraltar is at the crossroads for a number of bulk carrier 
trades (see map 2.1). The South America to Mediterranean/Black 
Sea route is important, particularly for grain. The Morocco to 
Mediterranean/north Europe route is highly significant in the 
transportation of phosphates. Morocco has the world's largest 
known phosphate deposits on which the EC is highly dependent 
(see chapter 8). The North America to Mediterranean/Middle 
East/Far East route is important for grain, coal and general 
cargo flow. 
In the geopolitics of wheat, the Strait is a lifeline for 
many Mediterranean states, particularly those of the Maghreb, 
and indeed the USSR in the 1970s. Bread-related issues 
including shortages and increase in prices caused serious 
revolts in Morocco and Tunisia in 1983-84 (see chapter 8). 
According to the International Wheat Council (1986, p.35), 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt imported 
approximately 13,000 thousand tons of wheat for the period 
June/July 1984-85 mostly from the USA, Canada and the EC (see 
table 2.2). Almost 50% of the wheat came from North America, 
most of it inevitably transported via the Strait. Over 4,300 
thousand tons came from the EC, transited both via the Strait 
TABLE 2.2 
IMPORTATION OF WHEAT BY THE MAGHREB! STATES AND EGYPT. PRXNCKPALLY VIA 
GIBRALATR STRAIT, JUNE/JULY 1984/85. 
'""" /V"Vco t""'""'~ 
.L!..L.l'. v· "'"""'-"~ 
N. Africa. Austr- Canada. EC. spain-.-- Sweden. - - US-A. Otlb.e:rs. ~rota i . 
ali a. 
Algeria . . . . 472 1,129 3 2]. 539 0 0 0 0 2 918~ 
Libya . . . . 103 305 40 0 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 ~65 
Morocco 8 ••• 0 910 0 0 0 10 3 1,798 0 0 Q 0 29719 
Tunisia .... 14 238 0 0 0 .. 0 0 0 0 57~ 20 843 
Egypt 2,208 461 1,628 50 9 29453 9 69818 
------- ----- ------ ------
_c::z:o, ___ 
------- ----- --------
2,216 1,050 4,210 93 33 59381 29 :39012 
Source: World Wheat Statistics. The International Wheat Council. :936. 
-..o 
,..... 
TABLE 2. ~~ 
OIL TANKER TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR (1981). 
EASTWARD WESTWA"I~-0- TOTAL TRANS~T 
No. G.Ton. * No. G .. Ton.* No. G. Ton. x( 
~------
----------
----- ·--------- ----- -------~--
0-2k 214 293.37 213 295.09 427 588.46 
2-5k 152 576.05 142 535.62 294 111:..67 
5-10k 103 755.95 95 684.81 198 1448.76 
l0-l5k 226 2901.53 218 2808.31 444 5709.84 
l5-25k 456 8678.98 411 7816.53 867 16495.51 
25-50k 484 18181.50 417 15910.31 901 3409:.81 
50-lOOk 425 29013.98 355 23782.85 780 52796.83 
lOOk+ 373 48513.51 192 25489.46 565 74002.97 
-----
----------
----- -- -·------ -----
----------
Total 2433 108914.95 2043 77323.04 4476 186237.99 
•··-·----
---------- ----- -- ··------ -----
----------
*=Tonnage equal times 1000 
Source: L-1-0"yd' s Mariti me Information Sr:!rvi ces Ltd, 1987. 
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Tru.o ~=lag 
Grecco 
USSR 
W. Germany 
Spain 
UK 
Ne"<herlands 
Poland 
Denma.r ~ 
Norway 
I '(a I y 
Hong Kong 
Yugoslavia 
USA 
Japan 
China 
India 
E. Germa.ny 
France 
Rorr.an i a 
Sweden 
Finland 
Bu~garia 
r~~~ey 
UK Greek* 
Sw i t ;z e r I an a 
Others 
Totai 
No. 
516 
393 
258 
219 
210 
160 
159 
152 
142 
134 
117 
112 
106 
84 
77 
74 
74 
63 
61 
56 
45 
44 
39 
35 
28 
710 
4 068 
% 
13 
10 
6 
0 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2.5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1. 5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.5 
17.5 
100 
·=vessels ovmed by London based Greeks. 
Source: APA Database (A & P Appledore, 1983). 
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and intra-Mediterranean routes. 
2.3.3 Oil Tankers. 
In 1981, some 4,476 tankers (about 12 per day) traversed 
the Strait, thus representing 11.2% of the total number of 
vessels and over 38% of the GT (see table 2.3). Of this number 
3,113 were over 15,000 GT, and 565 were 100,000 GT or more. 
During the same period approximately 8 tankers per day passed 
through the Suez Canal. The tanker numbers per day for the 
other major straits were Hormuz (75-80) and Dover (26) (Couper, 
1983, pp.153-4; Cuyvers, 1986, pp.55-62), (see maps 2.2, 2.3). 
2.3.4 Ge1.s Carriers. 
This category includes LNG, LPG and combination LNG/LPG 
carriers. These vessels voyage mainly between Algeria/Libya and 
North America/Europe. Some 897 gas carriers transited the 
Strait in 1981. Though only representing 2.2% of the total 
number of passing vessels and 2.3% of tonnage which passed that 
year, gas is highly significant for the Maghrebi economies and 
their relations with the EC and North America. Algeria 
possesses the world's fifth largest known deposits of natural 
gas (see map 2.4). 
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2.3.5 Container and Ro/Ro Vessels. 
In 1981, 1,657 container and part-container carriers 
transited the Strait; and 2,J.25 ro/ro vessels (Lloyd's Maritime 
Informarion Service, 1987). Though representing almost 9.5% of 
traffic, they accounted for just over 6% of GT. A significant 
number trade the Persian Gulf/Red Sea region from northern 
Europe and North America. Because the Middle East exports 
almost nothing but oil, vessels on these trades tend to be empty 
when egressing the Mediterranean via Gibraltar. (see map 2.1). 
2.3.6 Special Cargo Carriers. 
Included in this category are barges as well as cement, 
vehicle, livestock and fish carriers, fish factories, chemical 
and wine tankers, and refrigeration ships. Both Morocco and 
Spain forbid foreign vessels to fish in the territorial waters 
of the Strait. Soviet fish factories make major use of 
Gibraltar in their journeys between the west African Atlantic 
fishing grounds and the Black Sea. 
Chemical tankers numbered 1,319 (5917.43 thousand GT), of 
which 1,191 were 15,000 GT or less and 128 were over 15,000 GT. 
Like oil tankers, chemical tankers are considered to be in the 
high-risk pollution category by the riparian states. 
The Strait acts as a crossroads for reefers (refrigerated 
cargo vessels). Typically a vessel will finish discharging 
(fruit, meat, dairy produce) in the Middle East and then proceed 
to the Crown Colony of Gibraltar to await orders which could 
take it to south Africa (fruit), south America (meat), Central 
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America (fruit or meat) or northern Europe (dairy produce) to 
load it's next cargo. In 1981, some 1,508 reefers (7582.32 
thous~nd GT) passed through the Strait. 
2.3.7 Other~ of Vessel including Yachts and Ferries. 
Other types of vessel included in the Lloyd's survey for 
1981 are cable, depot, drill, salvage, supply (11), support (4) 
and training ships (1), dredgers, icebreakers, passanger vessels 
(248), pipe layers, pontoons, semi-subs and tugs. Also research 
ships (48 in all, 30 passing east, 18 west) have been included 
in this category. Concerning passenger vessels, many called at 
the Crown Colony of Gibraltar, which averages 10-15 calls per 
month, including many Soviet vessels. The majority are at 
mid-point in their cruises. 
(a) Yachts. 
Though not included in the above global figure for number 
of vessels transiting the Strait, yachts add significantly to 
traffic flow. Along the Spanish coast to the east of Gibraltar 
are a number of major marinas and yacht centres, including 
Sotograde, Puerto de la Duquesa, Estepona, Puerto Jose, Banus 
and Malaga. This is one of the most fashionable areas in Europe 
for owners of large yachts. It has been estimated that there 
are over 1,000 yachts of over 50 feet (1,524 m) length moored in 
the marinas betwen Gibraltar and Malaga alone. This number is 
greatly increased by the regular passing traffic in Spring and 
Autumn. Many yacht owners migrate between the Mediterranean and 
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the Caribbean. Over 5,000 yachts (30-~0 ft/900--1200 m length) 
enter the port of Gibraltar per year. In 1983 alone some 5,573 
yachts called at the port of Gibraltar (Gibraltar Port Handbook, 
1984, p.9). 
(b) Ferries. 
Like yachts, local ferry and ferry/container vessels add to 
the volume of traffic in the Strait. Their number increases 
between April and October when demand is higher. In April 1985, 
the author observed about 27 ferries per day. Providing for 
same-day return journies on all routes save that between 
Algeciras-Melilla, the total was Algeciras-Ceuta (12), 
Algeciras-Tangier (8), Tangier-Tarifa (2), Tangier-Gibraltar 
(4). There may be some 9,000-10,000 N-S crossings per year. In 
comparison, it is postulated that Dover has about 300 ferry 
crossings per day (Cuyvers, 1986, pp.55-60). If one adds the 
estimated number of ferry crossings and average number of yachts 
calling at the Crown Colony, to the total of E-W passages, then 
over 55,000 vessels per year may use Gibraltar Strait. This 
number does not include local fishing vessels (see chapter 4) 
and warships (see chapter 7). 
2.3.8 Number of National Flags Transiting the Strait. 
According to a survey made by Appledore (1983), concerning 
usage of Gibraltar Strait (Oct-Dec 1982) for vessels in the 
500-40,000 GT range, (Panamax beam 32.3 m, the largest size 
which can be dry docked at the Crown Colony), some 4,705 vessels 
passed. through 
quarter of 1982. 
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the catchment area of the Strait in the last 
Of this number 4,068 traversed the Strait and 
637 ue:r.e Atlantic passers .tn the Strait' G catchment <Hea, but 
not transiting it. The corresponding totals for tho Gibraltar 
catchment area, for the same three month period in 1981 was 
4,889 vessels, 4,852 in 1980 and 4,789 in 1979. This would 
indicate that on average some 19,234 vessels in this category 
voyaged in the Strait area annually in the early 1980s, with 
over 16,000 transiting the Strait per year (APA Database, 1983). 
This category (500-40,000 GT) represented approximately 40% of 
the total number of transiting vessels in 1981. According to 
Appledore (1983) the above statistics represent 18% of the 
world's merchant fleet in the 500-40,000 GT size range, and 
indicates that perhaps one ship in six of the world fleet passes 
Gibraltar every quarter. 
In the Appledore (1983) survey period Oct-Dec 1982, of the 
4,068 vessels which passed through the Strait, some 25 national 
flags were predominant accounting for 3,358 vessels (82.5%) (see 
table 2.4). Broken down by country of ownership/true flag, the 
states most represented were Greece (13%), USSR (10%), West 
Germany (6%), Spain (5%) and UK (5%). The Netherlands, Poland, 
Denmark and Norway each accounted for about 4%. Italy, Hong 
Kong and Yugoslavia scored about 3% each and the USA 
approximately 2.5%. Other states accounted for 1% or less. 
Hence roost of the world's major ship owning nations are 
represented. Though Appledore's survey only included some 40% 
of the total passages and does not include VLCCs, this may act 
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as an indicator for total usage by flag. 
Of the 25 states/flags most represented, 9 
Mediterranean/Black Sea countries accounted for 38% of traffic, 
hence some 62% of passing flags were extra-regional. BC states 
accounted for over 42.5% of the total and the USA for 2.5%. 
Seven communist states (regional and extra-regional) accounted 
for about 23% of traffic. Interestingly states as diverse as 
Japan, India and China each represent about 2% of transits. 
While land-locked Switzerland represents 0.5%. Not including 
north-south passages, Spain accounted for 5% and Moroccan 
representation was negligible. 
Hence volume of traffic, diversity of vessels, number of 
states represented, and importance to global trade dictate that 
security and usage of the Strait be assured to all nations. 
Unquestionably the Strait of Gibraltar is international because 
of usage by the world community. Monopoly of the Strait by any 
country or group thereof would result in a serious escalation of 
tensions in the international community. 
2.4 GEOPOLITICAL CONTROL OF THE STRAIT. 
Among the leading maritime powers which have striven for 
control of the Strait are the Phoenicians (1100 BC), Greeks (700 
BC), Carthaginians (600 BC) and Romans (200 BC). The Arabized 
Berber Tarek-el-Zaid led the jihad across the Strait in AD 711. 
Gibraltar is a corruption of the Arabic Djebel Tarek (Tarek's 
Mountain), denoting the famous Rock. With Muslim control of the 
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Strait the north-south axis acted as a bridge for the flow of 
goods, people and ideas, a major stimulus for the Renaissance in 
Iberia and Europe. 
flourished from AD 
The Great 
1100-1400. 
Sahel Mediterranean Gold Route 
However the Moors banned 
non-Muslim transit through the Strait. 
The Spanish retook the northern shore in 1502 and continued 
the Crusade into Africa, establishing Sovereign Plazas and other 
possessions throughout the Maghreb (Braudel, 1972), finally 
gaining control of the northern zone of Morocco in 1912 (see 
chapter 4, map 4.1). Despite the process of Spanish 
decolonization of Morocco since 1956, Spain still holds five 
outposts (see chapter 5, maps 5.1-5.5). This provides a major 
cause of dispute and detracts from Spain's case for the 
"decolonization" of the Gibraltar Crown Colony gained by Britain 
under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (see chapter 6, maps 
6.1-6.3). With the rise of the British Empire and the opening 
of the Suez Canal (1869), Gibraltar became one of Britain's most 
strategic assets. In the 19th century, Spain, France and 
Britain vied for control of the Strait, eventually culminating 
in a hierarchy of tripartite control (see chapter 4). Britain 
intervened in the Spanish-Moroccan War (1859-60) in order to 
prevent France from gaining control of the southern shore. 
The first attempt at internationalizing the Strait came 
with the establshment of the "special status" of the Cape 
Spartel lighthouse (1865) by international treaty, which lasted 
until 1956. The Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 confirmed 
France's interests in Morocco and role in the Strait region. 
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The Algeciras Act (1906) signed by ten states, while reasserting 
Moroccan sovereignty on the southern shore, paved the way for 
the Treat}[ of Fez (1912) establishing the F:r.anco-Spcw.i.sh. 
Protectorate (1912-56). The Franco-Spanish Treaty (1912), like 
the 1904 Declaration, forbade the erection of fortifications and 
strategic works on the southern shore only, but neither the 
dismantling of pre-existing batteries nor the demilitizaration 
or neutralization proper were implemented. The nearest the 
Powers came to this was the establishment of the Tangier Neutral 
Zone (1923-56). During the World Wars, the British possession 
of Gibraltar proved invaluable to the Allied cause, in denying 
passage to enemy shipping, as an assembly point for convoys, and 
in victualling, refitting and repairing ships. It served as a 
key assembly point for the invasion of the Maghreb (Operation 
Torch, 1943), and was also used during the Falkl~nd/Malvinas War 
(1982). Like Singapore, the main geostrategic threat to 
Gibraltar comes from land rather than sea. This was witnessed 
during World War II when the Japanese invaded Singapore by land 
in a matter of days, while the British had been expecting a sea 
attack. 
Today, the Rock provides a base for British and NATO units 
(which could include Spanish forces in the future), and Signal 
Hill serves as a monitoring station. The Mediterranean is an 
extremly important theatre for submarines. US and NATO 
nuclear-powered missile submarines use the Strait as do certain 
Soviet vessels which are not permitted to traverse the Turkish 
Straits as stipulated in the Montreux Convention (1936) (see 
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chapter 7). In order to transit the Turkish Straits. all 
warships must give 8 days notice of transit along with details 
of their characteristics. Some 262 warship passages were made 
in 1980 of which 229 were Soviet and 16 American. Foreign 
aircraft carrj.ers are prohibited from using the Straits, but the 
Soviet carrier Kiev has made the transit as an anti-submarine 
cruiser. Likewise there are restrictions on submarine passage. 
Thus certain Soviet naval vessels may only gain access to the 
Mediterranean region via Gibraltar. The volatile situation in 
the eastern Mediterranean region enhances the strategic value of 
the Strait of Gibraltar as a supply route as was witnessed 
during the 1973 Middle East War (see map 8.5). 
Concerning superpower SSBN deployment, usage of the Strait 
of Gibraltar is an imperative as it connects SSBN operating 
theatres. The only other straits in the world to have such a 
vital geostrategic function are Indonesia's Ombai-Wetar and 
Lombok, and the GIUK Gap (Osgood, 1974, pp.1-36). Spain placed 
an extra burden on US strategists by prohibiting use of it's 
airspace over territorial seas in the Strait area, and use of US 
bases in Spain during the Middle East War (1973), the Iranian 
Crisis when the US decided to send a force of jet fighters to 
Saudi Arabia (Jan.1979), and the air-raid on Libya (April 1986) 
(see chapter 7). 
2.5 THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR. 
Concerning Gibraltar Strait, the opinion of the eminent 
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legal expert Erik Bruel (1947, Vol.II, pp.l92-193) is as 
pertinent today as it was when he made it several decades ago: 
the legal ~cgulation of the 
position of the Strait of Gibraltar is in 
the highest degree fragmentary". 
Unlike the ~urkish, Danish and Magellan Straits, no single 
document or treaty can be cited as rendering the Strait of 
Gibraltar a legal international strait. Nevertheless its legal 
status has been affected by declarations, agreements and LOS 
(1958, 1982). Fundamentally there are three stances concerning 
passage and the international status of the Strait: 
(i) that such was secured by the 
Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 (Colombos, 
1967, p.222; O'Connell, 1967, p.567); 
(ii) that such a declaration (1904) only 
confirmed a right to a free passage regime 
that was already considered to exist (Bruel, 
1947, p.152; Truver, 1980, pp.178-179); and 
(iii) that historical usage, customary law, 
and conventional law (LOS, 1958,1982) render 
the Strait international and thus subject to 
the regime of transit passage, when and if 
60 world states, including Spain and Morocco 
ratify the 1982 Convention. However, this 
is a contentious legal issue as the question 
arises as to whether non-signatory states of 
the LOS (1982) are bound by the rights and 
duties of the Convention (Wainwright, 1986). 
Overall the fragmetary legal instruments concerning the status 
of the Strait are nebulous and the implementation of the transit 
passage regime depends on how the LOS 1982 evolves, and in 
particular upon Morocco and Spain ratifying Part 111 of the 
Convention concerning straits used for international navigation. 
Because the width of the Strait is only 12.5 nm at its 
eastern entrance and 24 nm at the western entrance, decreasing 
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to 7.6 nm between Tarifa and Punta Ciris, effectively these 
waters can be claimed as territorial seas (see map 3.1, 3.2). 
Historically Britain has claimed a 3 nm territorial sea around 
the Crown Colony, while Spain had claimed a 6 nm zone. As the 
narrowest point of the Strait is less than 9 nm Spain has always 
regarded the centre of the Strait as constituting territorial 
waters (Bruel, 1947, p.l46; O'Connell, 1982, p.321). Spain 
reiterated this point at the meeting of the UN Enlarged Seabed 
Committee on 24 March 1972. Now the riparian states save 
Gibraltar, claim a 12 nm territorial sea. 
The de facto manifestations of Spanish sovereignty in the 
maritime area of the Strait have been many over the centuries. 
As early as 1780, during one of the many Spanish sieges of 
Gibraltar, Spain issued navigational regulations for neutral 
vessels stating that transiting ships would not be molested or 
prevented passage provided that they did not try to break the 
blockade; kept to the African shore, avoiding Europe; their 
papers were in good order; and that they did not act 
suspiciously (Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.166; Lapidoth, 1972, p.92; 
O'Connell, 1982, p.321). In essence, these regulations are 
similar to the rights of neutrals traversing territorial seas in 
time of war under customary international law and LOS (1958). 
In former times such eminent jurists as Hautefeuille contended 
that this was prejudicial to the freedom of the high seas 
(Hautefeuille, 1868, p.60); but ultimately it could be argued 
that passage was not forbidden to non-belligerents and Spain was 
reverting to the oldest of all laws, that of self-defence. 
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It must be remembered that for decades Spaj_n insisted ·that 
merchant vessels transiting the Strait fly their flags for 
.i..(len.t.i.fj_catj on pu;:-::oses. 'l'his prB.ctj_co Jc,stco. t.il l 1064 Hhe:o. 
the British ship 'Mermaid' was shelled by Spanish cannons from 
Couta. Seemingly the accident came about because of lack o? 
visibility and human error (Lapidoth, 1972, p.92). A 
British-Spanish commission produced a joint report stating that: 
"Il y avait done eu une simple maladresse de 
tir dont L'Espagne devait supporter les 
consequences, en indeminisant les victimes 
de l'accident" (De la Pradelle & Politis, 
1856-1872, pp.491-497). 
(Simply an accidental shot occured for which 
Spain is responsible and must bear the 
consequences by compensating the victims of 
the accident). 
The practice of merchant vessels having to fly the flag was 
offically abolished by Spain in 1856. 
The centuries old friction between France and Britain over 
dominance in the Strait of Gibraltar was relieved by the Entente 
Cordiale (1904). Article VII of the Anglo-French Declaration (8 
April 1904), basically concerned their respective strategies in 
Egypt and Morocco. Reciprocal gestures concerning both Powers 
in the Suez Canal and Strait of Gibraltar regions were made. De 
jure, the two Powers of that period cannot be said to have 
internationalized the Strait, but rather to have accommodated 
each others' maritime strategies in the region in the scramble 
for straits and colonies, while at the same time avoiding 
confrontation with other powers such as the USA and Germany, 
which had interests in the Strait. Thus the 1904 Declaration 
reaffirmed historic usage of the Strait by the international 
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commu~ty, in essence a free passage regime throughout most of 
the channel. The Declaration stated that: 
"Af .i D. d.' eoSsuror le llb:ro :pansa,go d.u ci.frt:roi t 
de Gibraltar, les deux Gouvernements 
corrviennent de ne pas laisser ~l~ver de 
fort j_f:i.ca:tions ou des ouvrages strategj_ques 
queJ.conques sur la -pa.rt:i_e de la certe 
marocaine comprise e~tre Melilla et les 
hauteurs qui dominant la rive dro:ite de 
Sebou exclusivement. 
Toutefois cette disposition ne 
s'applique pas aux points actuellement 
occupes par l'Espagne sur la rive marocaine 
de la Mediterranee" (De Martens, 1939, 
Vol.32, 2eme serie, p.l5). 
(In order to secure the free passage of the 
straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments 
agree not to permit the erection of 
fortifications or strategic works on that 
portion of the coast of Moroccan comprised 
betwen, but not including, Melilla and the 
heights which command the right bank of the 
Sebou river. 
However, this condition does not apply 
to the places at present held by Spain on 
the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean). 
Hence free passage of the Strait was reaffirmed by bilateral 
agreement and a prohibition against the erection of 
fortifications on the southern shore, excluding the areas within 
the Spanish Plazas (see chapters 4,5). Because of the secret 
annexes to the Anglo-French Agreement (1904). namely leaving 
France a free-hand for the ''pacific penetration" of Morocco, and 
recognising Spain's interest in acquiring the north Moroccan 
zone as a protectorat in the future, this had serious 
implications. It distanced France from direct physical control 
of the Strait, but at the same time gave France a direct say on 
the southern shore. Eventually France would be responsible for 
the foreign affairs of the entire Moroccan Kingdom and 
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consequently treaties between Morocco and other states such as 
Spain. Can such bilateral a~reements be Rccepted as 
internationally bindin~ in relation to the legal status of the 
Strait? 
Spain 'i:la,s presented \'Ji th an Anglo-French fait accompli at 
the time, and states like Germany took exception to the 
agreement. However France succeeded in getting Spain to adhere 
to the Declaration by the Franco-Spanish Declaration (October 
1904) (De Martens, Vol.32, p.57); only after a provisionally 
secret treaty had been signed by the two states (De Martens, 
Vol.V. p.666; Le Matin (Paris), Nov.l911). Unlike France, 
Spain interpreted the secret annexes as securing its control 
over the entire southern shore of the Strait including the 
Tangier reeion (see chapter 4). At the time of tho Anglo-French 
negotiations leading up to the Declaration, neutralization of 
the Strait area possibly embracing parts of Spain, the Sahara 
and Balaeric Islands was proposed, but ultimately only the 
southern shore was mentioned in the agreement. Obviously 
neutralization of the entire Strait area would have necessitated 
a full internationalization of the question, hence involving all 
of the interested states as with the Treaty of 1865 establishing 
the special status of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse (Bruel, 1947, 
pp.l57-159). Overall the usual customary right of passage in 
straits used for international navigation was reinforced and a 
prohibition imposed on the construction of "fortifications or 
strategic works" on the southern shore, but not dismantling of 
existing military associated works, nor demilitarization proper 
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(Bruel, 1947, pp.l49-152). In the event of Spain not being able 
to protect the southern shore, Britain and France undertook to 
cooperate in preventing another state taking possession of the 
area. 
The principles of the 1904 
confirmed by Article VI of 
November 1912 (De Martens, 
Anglo-French Declaration were 
the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 27 
3eme serie, Vol.7, pp.323-341. 
Art.VI, ~.326; Lapidoth, 1972, p.93; Bruel, 1947, p.l55). Thus 
it could be argued that by signing the 1912 Treaty, Spain 
adhered to the principle of "libre passage" (free passage) as 
stipulated in the 1904 Declaration. 
During the World Wars the Allies supervised shipping 
transiting the strait but did not interfere with neutrals. 
German-Austrain U-boats (1914-18) and later (1939-45) 
German-Italian submarines frequently transited the Strait, 
whether submerged or not while in neutral Spain's claimed 
territorial seas is arguable. According to Ramsey (1978, 
pp.40-53), Spanish neutrality was far from impartial, especially 
in the territorial seas adjacent to the British Crown Colony 
(see chapter 6). 
During the Spanish Civil War, there were several 
British-Spanish disputes concerning jurisdiction in the 
territorial seas, especially in the area of the 
Algeciras/Gibraltar Bay (see map 6.3). In 1937 fascist Italy 
and Britain concluded a Gentleman's Agreement taking cognisance 
of "the freedom of entry into, exit from and transit through" 
the Strait (O'Connell, 1982, p.322; Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.191). 
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All the above mentioned accords, treaties and declarations 
confirmed freedom of passage in the Strait of Gibraltar based on 
the assumption that it was international because of it's 
geographical characteristics, usage by many states, and balance 
of power strategies of the seapowers. Besides these, what are 
the present day implications? 
The 1904 and 1912 Declarations stipulated freedom of 
passage of the Strait and that fortifications would not be 
constructed on the southern shore by the contracting states. 
They also agreed to prevent other states establishing themselves 
in the area and from erecting fortifications on the southern 
shore. The 1912 Franco-Spanish Convention was signed after 
Morocco became a French Protectorate, unlike the 1904 
Declaration. With Moroccan independence (1956), did Rabat 
legally inherit the obligations concerning the Strait agreed 
upon by France in it's name? (Rowny, 1969, pp.89-123, esp. 
111-112). 
France and Morocco signed the Rabat Accords on 20 May 1956. 
In this document Art.II could be interpreted as englobing the 
1912 agreement: 
"Le Maroc assume les obligations resltant 
des traites internationaux passe par la 
France au nom du Maroc, ainsi que celles qui 
resultent des actes internationaux relatifs 
au Maroc, qui n'ont pas donne lieu a des 
observations de sa part" (RGDIP, 1956, 
Vol.60, pp.481-483). 
(Morocco accepts the obligations resulting 
from international treaties engaged in by 
France in the name of Morocco, as well as 
those consequent to international acts in 
relation to Morocco, which did not occassion 
Moroccan reservations). 
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De jure France signed the 1912 Treaty in it's own name. Then as 
in 1956, Morocco made no reservations concerning the Strait nor 
militarization of the Moroccan coast. Lapidoth (1972, p.94) 
interprets this as meaning that Morocco is legally bound by the 
Treaty of 1912 by virtue of the Rabat Accords (1956), concluding 
that: 
"l'interdiction en question n'est pas 
incompatible avec l'independence". ( 
the prohibition in question is not 
incompatible with independence). 
Be that as it may from a legal viewpoint, the modern 
geopolitical realities of Morocco would render such arguments 
academic. Since Moroccan independence (1956) the nationalist 
Istiqlal Party has been pursuing a policy of recuperation of 
territories claimed on historic grounds by Morocco but not 
returned by Spain in 1956. To date the heavily militarized 
bastions of Ceuta and Melilla have not been regained. If these 
Spanish outposts were returned to Morocco, it is unlikely that 
they would be demilitarized. Anyway their militarization is 
catered for in the 1904 and 1912 Treaties. Besides the de jure 
aspects, the realities of decolinization, nationalism and 
extention of sovereignty up to 12 nm in territorial seas, render 
the legal aspects somewhat theoretical. With the often cited 
Article 51 of the UNO Charter concerning the right of 
self-defence, a more radical regime in Morocco could deem that 
it has no legal obligation to maintain the status quo which has 
existed since 1956. With independence, Morocco once more 
regained full sovereign control of the international Tangier 
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Neutral Zone at the western entrance to the Strait and the Cape 
Spartel Lighthouse, both having been controlled by international 
committees. 
The leader of the Moroccan delegation at the UNCLOS 
sessions at Geneva (1975) stated that the legal regime for 
transit of the Strait of Gibraltar was anarchaic because: 
sous pretexte de liberte de 
passage, tire son essence non pas d'une 
pratique internationale norroalement et 
pacifiquement etablie, mais d'un acte 
colonial reroontant au debout du 20 erne 
siecle et trouvant son expression dans les 
accords franco-britannique et 
franco-espagnol de 1904 et franco-espagnol 
de 1912" (UNCLOS, OT, VOl.IV, 17 March 1975 
& 10 May 1975; pp.77-78) 
(. under the pretext of freedom of 
passage, the present regime is not based on 
international practice normally and 
pacifically established, but rather on a 
colonial act dating from the beginning of 
the 20th century, expressed in the 
Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish Agreements 
of 1904, and Franco-Spanish Agreement of 
1912). 
2.6 CONCLUSION. 
Undoubtedly Gibraltar is one of the roost strategic straits 
in ths world from the viewpoint of energy supply, international 
trade and naval deployment. Many questions remain as to future 
security in the region and the regime of transit passage. 
Throughout the UNCLOS negotiations, both Morocco and Spain 
insisted that the waters of the Strait be categorized as 
territorial seas, and strove for the regime of innocent passage 
to be applied, or an amended form of the regime of transit 
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passage (LOS 1982). However this did not imply a simple 
adherence to the LOS (1958) with its rather unclear definition 
of innocent passage. Both states wished clearer criteria to be 
established in matters of type of vessel, cargo and purpose of 
transit of the Strait. For instance it is common knowledge that 
states signatory to the 1958 Convention often transit the Strait 
submerged, though this was prohibited. Despite the riparian 
states belief that the new transit passage regime is not 
satisfactory, Morocco signed the LOS (1982) in 1982 and Spain 
did likewise in 1984. As of 1987, neither state had ratified 
the Convention. Hence the legal status of the Strait is as 
ambiguous as it ever was. Lack of clarity on Spain's part in 
relation to the Strait debate complicates the issue hindering de 
jure agreement. Also the question of the Spanish Sovereign 
Territories in Morocco is contingent to the problem (see chapter 
5). 
Professor Bernard Oxman, a US representative and Chairman 
at several UNCLOS sessions informed the author (interview 1985) 
that despite de jure pretentions and contentions: 
"the USA (and indeed USSR) will go through 
the Strait of Gibraltar, how and when it 
wants to, particularly as the situation 
demands, regardless of all the rhetoric . 
and we (USA) consider the straits 
question as settled" . 
Nonetheless, most strait states would disagree. While the major 
maritime powers have not ratified LOS (1982), ironically they 
expect Spain and Morocco to abide by the regime of transit 
passage (LOS 1982). In the 1980s, the Reagan and Thatcher 
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admini s t :rat .i. ons have constantly spoken about international 
morality, and law and order; yet they have not provided 
exemplery leadership in relation to the establishment of the LOS 
(1982) by ratifying it. From the viewpoint of many strait 
states and the developing countries, they are becoming sceptical 
of international institutions and conventions; because of the 
perceived flagrant betrayal of their principles by the very 
states which were instrumental in establishing them. For 
instance the USAs' withdrawal from UNESCO, refusal to abide by 
ICJ and World Court decisions in relation to Nicaragua, and 
violation of international norms in relation to Grenadan, 
Nicaraguan and Libyan sovereignty (Christian Science Monitor, 7 
April 1986, While denouncing war and terrorism, the 
Reagan Administration has been involved in supplying arms to 
Iran and the Contra forces in Nicaragua. 
Because of its geography, the Strait of Gibraltar remains a 
coveted arena. Although it necessitates a special treaty to 
establish it de jure as a special international Strait once and 
for all, it is unlikely that treaties similar to those of 
Montreux (1936) or the Suez Canal (1869) will come about in the 
future. In the interests of security in the region the maritime 
powers must ratify LOS (1982), thus securing the regime of 
transit passage and giving a lead to the riparian states to 
follow suit. To strengthen the legal regime of transit passage, 
global leader states and the riparian countries of at least the 
16 most geostrategic straits should work towards the 
establishment of a separate UN agreement to support the LOS 
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(1982). The support accords should take oognj.sance of the 
unique geography of certain straits like Gibra:L ta,J:', guaranteeing 
a right of non-suspendable innocent passage to neutrals in time 
of war, where some or all of the riparian states are 
belligerents, and otherwise the regime of transit passage. The 
main point of such an agreement would be to bolster the LOS 
(1982) with the geopolitical power of the UN in the form of UN 
armed forces. These forces could be committed to protect 
Gibraltar Strait in the event of being asked to do so by the 
Strait states or if threatened by outside forces. In the event 
of hostilities between Spain and Morocco, UN forces would have a 
right to protect and supervise the passage of neutral vessels. 
In the Gulf War. on 1R t·fay 1987, the frigate USS Stark came 
under attacked by an Iraqi Exocet. The "accident" resulted in 
the death of at least 37 crewmen and the vessel was crippled. 
The previous day, a Soviet oil tanker, Marshal Chuykov (leased 
by Kuwait) hit a mine off Kuwait, blowing a large hole in the 
hull. Also on 17 May 1987, the Norwegian owned supertanker, 
Golar Robin, was set ablaze in an attack by Iranian boats 
(Guardian, 19 May 1987, p.1). Between 1980 and June 1987, a 
total of 280 merchant ships, mostly tankers, were attacked by 
Iraq and Iran in the Hormuz/Gulf region. At least 2 of the 5 
British merchant ships which were attacked were apparently cases 
of mistaken identity (Guardian, 23 June 1987). From 
January-June 1987, the Royal Navy "accompanied" 119 vessels, 
flying the British flag or substantially owned by British 
companies through the Strait of Hormuz. This represents four 
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times as many as the US accompanied in the same period. British 
warships are authorized to "exercise their right of 
self-defence'', while as of May 1987, the US Navy is under 
instruction to shoot at aircraft or vessels which merely 
demonstrate "hostile intent" (Guardian, 23 June 1987, p.5). 
This precarious situation is reminiscent of the 1965 attack in 
the Gulf of Tonkin which justified President Johnson's 
declaration of war against North Vietnam. 
With the escalation of hostilities in the Gulf War neutral 
vessels have been shelled by both Iran and Iraq. The idea that 
one superpower or combination of allies appoint themselves as a 
police force to uphold the LOS is fraught with danger in the 
regional and global contexts. Certain riparian states may see 
this as an act of war, or commitment to one of the belligerents; 
while other seapowers may interpret this as expansionism or 
imperialism. The Gulf dilemma provides a clear indication that 
the legal regimes pertaining to straits like Gibraltar catered 
for in the LOS (1982) must be supported by further conventions 
guaranteeing the commitment of UN armed forces, with the backing 
of the UN Security Council. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE QUEST FOR A LEGAL REGIME FOR GIBRAL'rAR. 
"It .is a \vell kno"V-m principle that princes 
and states are not bound to observe a treaty 
contra,T.y to their interests". 
3.1 INTRODUCTION. 
Cardinal Alberoni 
(1664-1752). 
Political Testament. 
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The legal regimes for straits are based on physical, 
historical and political criteria. Legal regimes are a 
compromise position between mara liberum and mare clausum 
stances (see chapter 1). Broadly there are three juridic 
categories of straits; those which have high seas running 
through their entire length; those in which the entire width or 
at least part of the strait is within the internal waters of one 
state; and those where the entire width or part of is in the 
terriotorial seas of one or more states. Traditionally, a 3 nm 
territorial sea was claimed by Morocco and the Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar, and 6 nm by Spain in the Strait area. Historically 
the international community only recognized a territorial sea of 
3 nm. Hence there was a high seas corridor running throughout 
Gibraltar, even at its narrowest breadth (7.6 nm). Vessels 
making transit of the Strait through the high seas corridor were 
completely outside the jurisdiction of the riparian states and 
therefore not subject to any of the regimes applicable in the 
sovereign territorial seas. Internationally the trend has been 
towards the creation of a 12 nm territorial sea limit (see maps 
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3.1-3.3). 
(1982): 
~his fact was recognized in Article 3 of the LOS 
".t:very state has the r.i..ght to establish its 
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 
12 nautical miles". 
3.2 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT. 
International concerns in relation to the establishment of 
judicial regimes for straits are to ensure maximium mobility for 
all vessels, goods and persons in the interests of trade, 
self-protection and deployment. Security interests including 
navigational aids and light houses are also vital. 
Juxtaposed with these factors are the major interests of 
strait states. These include: 
(i) security; 
(ii) national economic interests; 
(iii) environmental protection; and 
(iv) securing the national image in relation to regional 
and world powers. 
However it is difficult to leglislate comprehensively as 
all straits do not play the same role in terms of commercial and 
naval traffic. All categories of vessel make transit of 
Gibraltar (see chapter 2, table 2. 1). 
(a) Regular commercial vessels as opposed to vessels with 
high pollution potential (eg oil tankers) or "special 
circumstances" vessels (eg nuclear-powered ships and research 
vessels), or warships, constitute the greatest volume of 
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shipping. Here the pollution threat comes from marine litter 
and oil spills. Vessels in this category may be responsible for 
the transportation of contraband, which is a major problem in 
the Gib:ra1 tar :region. J .. i.kewise this category may be used to 
carry out activities in territorial seas in contravention of 
international agreements such as neutrality, sanctions and 
embargoes. The use of neutral waters for the transport of 
goods, ammunitions, political leaders or technicians of 
belligerent states or their allies may compromise the neutrality 
of the strait state. Disputes of this nature occurred during 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Other examples are incidents 
of sanction and embargoe busting whicch occurred during the UN 
blockade of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1966-68). 
(b) The second major category of vessel includes those with 
high pollution potential, especially oil tankers. Over 38% of 
vessels transiting Gibraltar are tankers. Included in this 
category are vessels transporting liquified natural gas (LNG) 
and petroleum gas (LPG), for which Gibraltar is a major artery 
(see tables 2.1 & 2.3). 
(c) Grey area or "special circumstance" vessels include 
nuclear-powered ships and submarines, oceanographic research 
vessels, and craft known to be of a highly dubious nature, such 
as the infamous Soviet intelligence collecting vessels often 
desguised as fishing vessels. A collision took place between a 
Soviet "fishing vessel" and a submerged Soviet submarine 
transiting Gibraltar in 1984. The USS Pueblo alleged spying 
incident in North Korean claimed territorial waters (1968) has 
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made coastal states ever more vigilant (Akinsanya, 1975, pp. 
48o-500). 
(d) The last significant group is naval vessels and 
submarines. Differing vim·JS are expressed by expe:.cts and states 
as to the respective dangers posed by submerged as opposed to 
surface transit. However the vast majority of strait states are 
opposed to these vessels being in their sove:reign waters. 
3.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENT LEGAL REGIMES. 
3.3.1 Historical Perspective and the "Usage" Criterion. 
Special category straits covered by regulation prior to the 
LOS (1982) have received attention in international law writings 
and treaties over the past three hundred years, yet Gibraltar 
cannot be termed a treaty strait like the Turkish, Danish and 
Magellan Straits. A sample of treaties concerning the Bosporus 
and Dardanelles is the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainnardji (1771) 
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Anglo-Turkish 
Treaty (1809), and the Treaties of Adrianople (1829) and Paris 
( 1856). All these treaties laid the bases for the Conventions 
of Lausanne (1923) and Montreux (1936). According to Article 35 
(c) of the LOS (1982) Gibraltar is not subject to: 
"the legal regime in straits in which 
passage is regulated in whole or in part by 
long-standing international conventions in 
force specifically realting to such straits" 
As early as 1947, Bruel (1947) pointed out the necessity 
for special regimes for legal or international straits in which 
1.23 
he .i_nclucioci G.i.hJ:>[JJ.tar. Among the key uri tori..a which he proposed 
\vas ~ of the strait. He suggested that the juridic status 
be determined on the basis of such factors as: 
the number of ships passing 
through the strait, their total tonnage, the 
aggregate value of their cargoes, the 
average size of the ship and especially 
whether they are distributed among a greater 
or smaller number of nations all of 
which seem to give good guidance, no single 
factor, however being decisive 
(Bruel, 1947, Vol.I, pp.42-43). 
Bruel concluded that only certain straits like Gibraltar which 
were vital to international commerce should have the special 
regime deemed necessary for international/legal straits. 
He defined an international strait as one whose u~o is 
"worldwide". This concept had already been expressed by other 
authorities in terms like "routes maritimes indispensable", 
"routes maritimes necessaires ala navigation", "grandes routes 
maritimes", "passage habituel", "international highways", 
"highways for international traffic" and "natural traffic 
routes" (Bruel, 1947, p.43; O'Connell, 1982, Vol.I, pp.301-306; 
Pharand, 1984, p.92). Hence by the 1950s, it was apparent that 
all straits could not be governed by similar legal regimes; 
straits like Gibraltar had to have a special status in 
international law. However the riparian states objected to such 
a move. The dilemma was highlighted by the famous Corfu Channel 
dispute (1948) between Albania and Britain over passage rights. 
3.3.2 The Corfu Channel Case: Prelude to the LOS (1958). 
Albania challenged the dominance of the seapowers and the 
mare lib~_:_c1,J._Ii\ ~philosophy. The 
International Court of Justic~ (ICJ) 
124 
legal findings of the 
in this case provide a 
nrecedent ~nd hasis for the legal reg5.me of straits like 
Gibraltar. The Corfu Channel dispute j_s significant in the 
history and geopolitics of straits in that it was the forerunner 
to attitudes and stances of strait states which were to manifest 
themselves in the following decades. It provided a signal that 
the pre-World War II or colonial global order was 
disintegrating; no longer could seapowers presume an absolute 
right of transit in straits bordered by weaker riparian states. 
Armed conflict in the Corfu Channel led to leglislation 
concerning international usage of straits and only predated the 
Geneva Convention LOS (1958) by a decade. This may suggest that 
military force may precede legitimizing international treaties. 
In the tense geopolitical context of the Balkans and Aegean 
Sea during the 1940s, and sovereignty disputes between Albania 
and Greece, Albania contested the right of the British Navy to 
transit the Corfu Channel. On 15 May 1946, British warships 
entered the Channel and were fired on by Albanian shore 
batteries. Britain had warned the Albanian authorities that 
they were exercising the right of innocent passage. Albania 
argued that foreign vessels entering its territorial waters had 
an obligation to request prior authorization. Opposing stances 
led to deadlock. To test Albania's resolve, on 22 October 1946, 
Britain sent a naval squadron through the Channel without prior 
permission. Several crew members were injured or killed due to 
contact with anchored automatic mines. On 13 November 1946, 
---------------
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British minesweepers cleared the North Corfu Channel of 22 
moored mj_nes. There was no evidence to prove that Albania had 
laid them, but the JC:d hold that it had coD.stnwt.i.vo J.<::noulcdge 
of their presence by virtue of its supervision of the Channel, 
some 30 nm long and narrowing to 6 nm. At that time both Greece 
and Albania claimed a 3 nm territorial sea with the midline 
principle being used in the Channel. 
In presenting its case before the ICJ, Britain stated that: 
However: 
the character of the channel as 
an international route depends on the fact 
that it connects two parts of the open sea 
and is useful to navigation; not on the 
volume of traffic passing through it" (ICJ, 
Corfu Ch. Case, Pleadings, 1949, Vol.II, 
p.242; Pharand, 1984, p.92). 
apart from coastal traffic, it 
(Corfu Channel) is a commonly used route for 
traffic from the heel of Italy on the north 
Adriatic ports plying to Greece or the east 
Mediterranean. For navigational reasons 
many types of ships prefer a coastwise route 
in this area" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, 
Pleadings, 1949, p.21) 
The British representatives also stated that the Channel: 
has long been used, frequently 
and unrestrictively, by shipping without 
distinction of flag as an international 
highway. It was for that reason that the 
North Corfu swept Channel was so quickly 
re-established as a maritime highway 1n 
1944, and notified as such to the Government 
of Albania . As such the Strait is 
subject to the principle of the freedom of 
the seas . (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, 
Pleadings, 1949, p.23) 
Britain highlighted the international nature of the Channel 
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by producing evidence that during an eight month period in 1937, 
some 2,884 vessels of 7 different nationalities had called at 
thu po£t of Corfu; and stated that this number did not include 
the many other vessels which transj.ted the Strait without 
putting into Corfu, for which statistics were not available. 
Britain also indicated that it had been using the Strait for 
over 80 years as had other navies. The aim here was to 
emphasize international usage and historic ~~. 
Albania countered that the Channel was not a major or only 
route for connecting the high seas, it was not a "grande route" 
but an alternative byroad, "une voie laterale et secondaire". 
For the first time, geographical constraints, customary 
practice, navigational imperatives and the territorial seas 
issue in straits were presented in a legal setting. 
A major question the ICJ had to consider was had Britain: 
under international law violated 
the sovereignty of the Albanian People's 
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal 
Navy in Albanian watetrs . and is 
there any cause to give satisfaction" (ICJ, 
Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, p.6). 
The judges held that: 
"It is . generally recognized and in 
accordance with international custom that 
States in time of peace have a right to send 
their warships through straits used for 
international navigation between two parts 
of the high seas without the prior 
authorization of a coastal State, provided 
that the passage is innocent. Unless 
otherwise prescribed in an international 
convention, there is no right for a coastal 
state to prohibit such passage through 
straits in time of peace" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. 
Case, (Merits), 1949, ICJ Rept. p.25). 
12'7 
By a majo~ity of ll vo~es to 5, the Cou~t held that Albania was 
responsible under international law for the explosions and loss 
of lifo. The Court .ins:i.sted. on the:r:'o :bo:t:o.~ :n.o requ.ire:ment Qf. 
X2rio:c. notifj_cation, but takj_ng in·to account the exceptional 
circumstances (ALbania-Greek dispute), Albania would have been 
justj_fj.ed. in issuing regulations in respect of passage of 
warships through the Channel. As Britain was not technically at 
war with Albania, the Court concluded that the :manner of passage 
of the RN was in accordance with the right of self-defence. 
However the ICJ found that the minesweeping operation and 
gathering of a large number of naval vessels for such was a 
violation of Albanian sovereignty. 
Concerning the question "whether the test is to be found in 
the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in the 
greater or lesser importance for international navigation"; the 
Court stated that: 
"the decisive criterion is rather its 
geographical situation as connecting two 
parts of the high seas and the fact of its 
being used for international navigation" 
((sic) ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Reports, 1949, 
p.28; Pharand, 1984, p.93). 
The official and authorative text in French reads: 
"Le critere decisif parait plutt>t devoir 
~tre tire de la situation geographique du 
Detroit, en tant que ce dernier met en 
communication deux parties de haut mer, 
ainsi que du fait que le detroit est utilise 
aux fins de la navigation internationals" 
(ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, Reports, 1949, p.28; 
Pharand, 1984, pp.92-93). 
The official French text arguably attributes less importance to 
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the fact 
than to the 
that the Strait is used for international navigation 
geographical features. Tho English translation 
seems to give equal weight to the usage criterion. The debate 
as to the semantics of the texts J.n French and English has led 
to scholarly dispute 0ver since. 
The importance of the Corfu Channel Case in defining 
international straits and relevant regimes as opposed to other 
types of straits is: 
Thus 
all 
(i) international straits were defined as those which 
connect the high seas and were used for international 
navigation, regardless of alternative routes; and 
(ii) it was established that warships like merchant vessels 
had a right of innocent passage through straits. 
the right of innocent passage was upheld, and the right of 
nations 
reinforced. 
to transit territorial seas in straits was 
Also it would seem that the 'usage' or 'functional' 
criterion was taken into account, though many observers dispute 
the latter point. The findings of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel 
Case helped lay the foundations for conventional law pertaining 
to straits as found in the LOS (1958, 1982). For henceforth, a 
strait of more than the legally accepted width of the 
territorial seas and used for international navigation could be 
considered as a legal strait, if the high seas route in the 
middle was not suitable or convenient enough for navigation 
(Art.36, LOS, A/CONF.62/122, 1982; Pharand,1984, p.90). Also it 
could be argued that because of the precedent set in relation to 
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the ICJ's decision on the issue of minesweeping in the 
territorial seas of straits, several navies including those of 
the USA and Britain participated in the mine-clearing operations 
in the Red Sea in 1984 (Wainwright, 1986). In 1987, the USA 
tried to enlist the aid of Western navies in clearing the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf of mines, so as to avoid allegations of 
non-innocent action as happened in the Corfu Channel Case. 
There were calls at the UN for concerted naval action under the 
auspices of the UN Security Council. The British government 
stated that such joint action involving the maritime powers of 
the West and East would be impossible to coordinate. 
Despite the major break-through brought about by the ICJ 
(1949), in relation to the legal right of the international 
community to transit straits like Corfu, no clear definition of 
usage was established for types, tonnage, cargoes, aggregate 
value or number of flag-vessels. Instead the vague terms 
international and considerable usage were used. De Visscher 
(1969, p.142) who had participated in the Corfu Channel Case, 
stated in 1969 that some of the data produced were not 
conclusive but mentioned that the four cardinal factors were: 
(i) the number of ships using a strait; 
(ii) tonnage; 
(iii) cargo value; and 
(iv) number and diversity of flags represented. 
O'Connell (1970, p.497) also emphasises the functional element: 
the test of what is a strait, 
is not so much geographical, therefore 
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as functional". 
Some of the dissenting judges in the Corfu Channel Case 
expressed doubts as to the legal definitions for international 
straits and the issue of codifying global laws for a 
geographical phenomenon which is quite unique for each 
individual strait, because of differences in geographical 
characteristics such as coastlines, indentation, breadths and 
lengths. Judge Alvarez noted that apart from the existence of 
special rules governing certain straits such as the Dardanelles 
and Bosporus, that are applicable under certain conventions, 
there was no special regime for straits and their position was 
assimilated into that of the territorial sea. 
"Some writers consider that the wide 
differences between one strait and another 
prevent the adoption of any general rule" 
(ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 1949, 
p. 104). 
Another dissenting judge, Krylov, stated: 
" that there is no such thing as a 
common regulation of the legal regime of 
straits. Every strait is regulated 
individually" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, 
(Merits), 1949 p.74; Butler, 1967; Koh, 
1982, p 30). 
Nonetheless Judge Alvarez stated that he favoured: 
the adoption of a general regime 
for straits of a "certain kindS" , 
supplemented by special rules for individual 
cases" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, (Merits), 
1949, p.104). 
This viewpoint was supported by the majority of judges. 
Basically the ICJ wished it to be clear that the regime for 
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territorial seas and straits could not be identical. In the 
context of the Strait of Gibraltar, Judge Alvarez's opinion is 
pertinent. 
As the findings of the Corfu Case were to set precedents, 
perhaps more attention could have been paid to the viewpoints of 
the dissenting judges. Since 1948, many newly independent 
strait states like Morocco, and older sovereign states like 
Spain have contested the passsage regime for straits used for 
international navigation (see map 1.5). However the ICJ 
established the legal precedent that: (a) a strait which joins 
two parts of the high seas, and (b) is used for international 
navigation must be deemed an international strait. This was 
particularly relevant to straits like Gibraltar. The ICJ (1948) 
had laid the bases for the establishment of legal regimes for 
international straits in LOS I and II. 
3.3.3. The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone (1958). 
Article 14 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone provides for innocent passage in straits so 
long as it is non-prejudicial to the interests of the strait 
state, but stipulates that submarines are required to surface 
navigate and fly the flag. Agreement could not be reached 
concerning the transit of warships, so the Convention remained 
ambiguous on the issue, as customary international law had been. 
In 1927, Jessup (p.120) maintained that: 
"(warships) should not enjoy an absolute 
legal right to pass through territorial 
waters any more than an army may cross the 
land terri tory" . 
In 1947, Bruel (p.108) found that: 
"the legal position of straits as regards 
the right of passage in time of peace 
(is) the right of innocent 
passage for both merchant vessels and ships 
of war, the right of the latter, however, 
(is) not yet fully established". 
In 1949, the ICJ stated that: 
"It is . generally recognized and in 
accordance with international custom that 
States in time of peace have a right to send 
their warships through straits used for 
international navigation between two parts 
of the high seas" (ICJ, Corfu Ch. Case, 
(Merits), 1949, ICJ Rept. p.25). 
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By 1985, eight Mediterranean states required advance notice 
or authorization for military vessels to enter their territorial 
seas, and two of the eight require permission for the entry of 
nuclear-related vessels (Limits, 1985). 
Whatever the de jure ambiguities of the 1958 Convention may 
be on the issue, de facto naval vessels continued to transit 
straits without coastal state permission (Thorpe, 1985, pp1-25). 
A major breakthrough of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone (1958) was Article 16 (4), which stated: 
"There shall be no suspension of the 
innocent passage of foreign ships through 
straits that are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial sea of a foreign state" (UN 
Treaty Series, 1958, Convention on the 
Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone. 
Vol.DXVI, p.205). 
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The criteria which emerged for defining legal international 
straits with the Geneva Convention (1958) (LOS I) fall into 
three categories. 
Firstly, actual usage, but inherent in this is an 
historical stance not catering for future changes and a 
feeling of discrimination or loss of sovereignty by those 
strait states most affected. 
Secondly, the strait does not have to be a necessary route 
for international navigation but can be a secondary one. 
Thirdly, the strait must have a continuous history of 
usage. 
by Canadian-US 
(Pharand, 1984, 
The LOS (1958) did 
This leaves room for dispute as is evidenced 
contentions over usage of Polar straits 
Financial Times, 12 Sep.1985; Dudley, 1984). 
not make any reference to the number of vessels or national 
flags transiting straits, which might act as a guideline for 
considering them as international, as had been hoped by some 
states. 
3.4 GIBRALTAR AND THE LOS (1982). 
By 1982, there was a general acceptence by the 
international community of a 12 nm territorial sea. The LOS 
1982 covers at least five categories of international straits 
and provides for four different legal regimes. This leaves a 
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certain scope for diverse interpretation. 
As with previous conventions, the maritime powers strove 
for a special regime for straits used for international 
navigation, basically a free passage regime, akin to freedom of 
the high seas in matters of navigation and overflight. The us 
draft articles for straits at the UN LOS discussions in 1971 
provided that: 
"In straits used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the 
territorial sea of a foreign State, all 
ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy 
the same freedom of navigation and 
overflight, for the purpose of transit 
through and over such straits, as they have 
on the high seas" (UN Doc. A/AC. 138/SC 
II/L.4, (30 July 1971); Pharand (1977) p,73; 
Koh, 1982, p.103). 
Of course this meant freedom of passage for warships and 
submerged transit for submarines akin to the high seas regime. 
This was the stated stance of the USA, if it was to recognize ~ 
12 nm territorial sea; the issue of submerged passage and 
warship transit not having the backing of the Geneva Convention 
(1958). The transit proposals of the USSR presented at the 1972 
UNCLOS sessions were almost identical: 
"In straits used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas, all ships 
in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of 
navigation, for the purpose of transit 
through such straits, as they have on the 
high seas" (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC II/L.7 & 18 
(25 July 1972)). 
Significantly the Soviet proposal did not include straits 
joining the high seas and territorial seas eg Tiran. 
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To counter the free transit lobby, Spain and Morocco along 
with Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Yemen, 
introduced a proposal entitled "Draft A,..ticle__s_ pn N_avigation 
Through the Territorial Sea, Including Straits Used for 
International Navigation" (UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC. II/L.18 (27 
March 1973)). Fundamentally they wished to keep their straits 
linked to the territorial seas regime, in many aspects similar 
to the 1958 Convention, allowing for the right of 
non-suspendable innocent passage but requiring prior 
notification for the transit of warships, nuclear related and 
dangerous vessels. Some of the most contentious articles were 
those dealing with the transit of oil-tankers and pollution. 
Other provisions included compulsory insurance for vessels and 
prerogative for strait states to designate traffic lanes. 
The deadlock between these opposing groups was broken 
somewhat by the compromise articles introduced by Britain at the 
UNCLOS session at Caracas in 1974, entitled "Passage of Straits 
Used for International Navigation" (UN Doc.A/Conf. 62/C.2/L.3 
(3 July 1974)). In essence this is what appeared in the LOS 
1982. The new term transit passage replaced the more 
contentious wording of the superpowers; "freedom of navigation 
as on the high seas" became "transit of international straits". 
The proposal limited the application of the transit passage 
regime to straits joining two parts of the high seas and 
retained innocent passage for straits joining one part of the 
high seas with the territorial sea of a foreign state. Though 
incorporated into the LOS 1982, many coastal states do not fully 
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support the new transit passage regime. 
The LOS (1982) is not as clear on the straits issue as many 
international jurists would like it to be. The following 
classification of regimes for "international straits" is based 
on the 1982 Convention. 
(i) Nothing in the Convention affects 
"the legal regime in straits in which 
passage is regulated in whole or in part by 
long standing international conventions in 
force specifically relating to such straits" 
(Article 35 (c)). 
For example, the Turkish Straits. 
(ii) High seas or EEZ routes through straits 
used for international navigation or 
"routes of similar convenience" 
within them will be subject to freedom of 
navigation and overflight as on the high 
seas or EEZ. "Similar convenience" refers 
to "navigational and hydrological 
conditions" (Art. 36). 
(iii) International straits with a route of 
high seas or EEZ not of "similar 
convenience" will be governed by the right 
of transit passage (Art. 38). Such straits 
are provided for by implication in article 
36 which states that 
"this part does not apply to a strait used 
for international navigation if there exists 
through the strait a route through the high 
seas or EEZ of similar convenience". 
According to Pharand (1984, p.96); if the 
condition for the exclusion of such straits 
is not met, then they are included in the 
application of Part 111 on international 
straits and therefore subject to the right 
of transit passage; these straits join parts 
of high seas or EEZ's. 
(iv) With reference to transit passage, 
Articles 37 and 38 apply to straits which 
"are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or EEZ and 
another part of the high seas or EEZ" (eg 
Gibraltar). "All ships and aircraft enjoy 
the right of transit passage which shall not 
be impeded, except that, if the strait is 
formed by an island of a State bordering the 
strait and its mainland, transit passage 
shall not apply if there exists seaward of 
the island a route through the high seas or 
EEZ of similar convenience with respect to 
navigational and hydrological 
characteristics" (Art. 38). 
Hence the right of non-suspendable innocent 
passage is applicable here. 
(v) International straits joining one part 
of the high seas or an EEZ with the 
territorial sea of a foreign state are 
governed by the right of non-suspendable 
innocent passage (Art. 45, 1b and 2). 
(vi) International straits joining a part of 
the high seas or an EEZ to another part of 
the high seas or EEZ and not included in the 
previous categories are subject to the right 
of transit passage regime. 
(vii) There is also the possibility that a 
strait composed exclusively of internal 
waters might be used for international 
navigation, eg in Greek, Canadian and 
Indonesian waters. If such arises due to 
the establishment of straight baselines, 
then these territorial waters would become 
subject to the "the regime of archipelagic 
sealanes passage" (Part IV, Arts. 46-54). 
Essentially, this may be either the regimes 
of transit or innocent passage, unless the 
waters are internal by reason of historic 
title. 
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The regime of innocent passage is applicable to foreign 
vessels which do not pose a threat to the "peace, good order or 
security" of the coastal state. The regime of "transit passage" 
(Arts.37-44) is applicable to Gibralatr, as the Strait joins the 
high seas to EEZs (Art.37). Acording to Article 38 (LOS, 1982): 
1. "all ships and aircraft enjoy the right 
of transit passage, which shall not be 
impeded . " 
2. "Transit passage means the 
freedom of navigation and overflight solely 
for the purpose of continuous and 
expeditious transit of the strait . 
however . .(this) does not preclude 
passage through the strait for the purpose 
of entering, leaving or returning from a 
State bordering the strait, subject to the 
conditions of entry to that State" . 
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Thus all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage of 
Gibraltar, and access to Spanish and Moroccan ports, as well as 
the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Territory of Ceuta 
in North AfricaJ. 
Article 39 lays out the duties of shj.ps and aircraft during 
transit passage. 
(Both 
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the 
right of transit passage shall: 
(a) proceed without delay through or over 
the strait; 
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of 
States bordering the strait, or in any other 
manner in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of 
the United Nations; 
(c) refrain from any activity other than 
those incident to their normal modes of 
continuous and expeditious transit unless 
rendered necessary by force maieure or by 
distress. 
2. Ships in transit shall: 
(a) comply with generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and 
practices for safety at sea, including the 
International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at sea; 
(b) comply with generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and 
practices for the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution of ships. 
Spain and Morocco feel that "generally accepted 
international regulations" in relation to pollution are not 
comprehensive enough). 
3. Aircraft in transit shall: 
(a) observe the Rules of the Air established 
by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization as they apply to civil 
aircraft; state aircraft will normally 
comply with such safety measures and will at 
all times operate with due regard for the 
safety of navigation; 
(b) at all times monitor the radio frequency 
assi~ned by the competent internationally 
designated air traffic control authority or 
the appropriate international distress radio 
frequency. 
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(Spain and Morocco would like greater clarification of the term 
"normally apply" C 3 (a)) . 
Article 40 stipulates that research or surveys are 
forbidden without authorization from the strait state. Article 
41 stipulates that sea lanes and traffic separation schemes used 
for international navigation may be designated by the coastal 
state in accordance with the "competent international 
organization" . However the International Maritime QKganization 
(IMO) or other relevant bodies are not actually named. A 
traffic separation scheme is already in force in Gibraltar (see 
chapter 1). 
Article 42 covers the duties of the coastal state. They 
may "adopt laws and regulations" in relation to "the safety of 
navigation and regulation of maritime traffic" as provided in 
Article 41; and the "prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution". Strait states may also "prevent" fishing, and the 
loading or unloading of "any commodity, currency or person" in 
contravention of national laws. According to Article 42(5) 
"The flag State of a ship or the State of 
registry of an aircraft entitled to 
sovereign immunity which acts in a manner 
contrary to such laws and regulations or 
other provisions of" Part III (Straits Used 
For International Navigation) "shall bear 
international responsibility for any loss or 
damage which results to States bordering 
140 
straits". 
Observers point out that Article 42 is highly dependent on the 
good will of the "flag State" or "State of registry". 
Article 43 concerns navigat~onal aids and pollution control 
and states that the "user States" and :riparian states "should by 
agreement co-operate". Perhaps the most important article of 
the LOS (1982) in relation to Gibraltar is Article 44: 
"There shall be no suspension of transit 
passage". 
Overall in straits used for international navigation, the regime 
of transit may be that of transit passage, non-suspendable 
innocent passage or innocent passage depending on the geography, 
history and state sovereignty in the strait area. 
3.5 MARITIME JURISDICTION: MOROCCO, SPAIN AND THE CROWN COLONY 
OF GIBRALTAR. 
No part of the Mediterranean Sea region lies outside the 
sovereignty of one of the surrounding states, whether in the 
form of territorial seas, contiguous zones, or EEZs. For the 23 
straits in the region, the various legal regimes apply. 
There are 18 sovereign states in the Mediterranean, and the 
British sovereign possessions of Gibraltar, and the Cyprus 
bases. The application of the LOS (1982) has led to disputes 
between Greece and Turkey, Cyprus and Turkey, Spain and Britain, 
Libya and the USA, and Israel and it's neighbours. Future 
disputes are inevitable, possibly in the Gibraltar region, 
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particularly in relation to Morocco. All Mediterranean states, 
except Albania and IsraAl, have sj_gnod the LOS 
(1982); Algeria, France and Greece made 
"decla,ra,tions" at the time of signing (Limits, 1985) 
3. 3). 
Convention 
qualifying 
(see map 
In relation to Spain and the LOS, on 25 Feb.l971, Spain 
became party to the 1958 Convention on the Territortal Sea an_<;l 
Contiguous Zone. By Governamenta.l Act (no 1011977) a 12 nm 
territorial sea zone was proclaimed. By royal decree (no 
2510/1977), Spain made corrections to it's straight baseline 
system, for which leglislation had been enacted in 1976. 
Consequently, Spain defined the straight baselines in the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. In the latter case, the 
longest stretches from Punta Carbonara, east of Gibraltar to 
Cabo de Salou, south of Tarrogna. Two short segments link 
Barcelona to Arenys de Mar and Cabo Bagur to the French boundary 
line. Overall these baselines do not push Spain's claims 
seaward. Straight baselines have been drawn around the Balearic 
Islands, with Ibiza and Formentera being joined. As the coasts 
are not deeply indented nor fringed around the above mentioned 
islands, this action is not easily justifiable. By Law No 
15/1978, Spain laid the limits of the EEZ to be drawn from 
archipelagic baselines established in 1977 for island groups. 
Concerning the contiguous zone, Spain declared it to be 12 nm in 
1968, and leglislated for customs jurisdiction. Perhaps Madrid 
had the Crown Colony of Gibraltar and waters of the Strait in 
mind at this significant date (see chapter 6). Concerning the 
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continental shelf, tardedly Spain became party to the relevant 
1958 Convention in 1971. In 1974, boundary agreements with 
France (Bay of Bascay) came into force. In J.983, incidents in 
this area J.ed to French naval vessels shelling Spani.sh fishing 
boats. Boundary agreements were also signed with Po~tugal 
(1976), and others accords entered into force with Italy in 
1978. With reference to fishing, a 6 nm zone was established in 
1964 and extended to 12 nm in 1967. Spain is also a signatory 
to the European Fishing Convention. In 1978, a 200 nm EEZ was 
created by Spain. Madrid signed the LOS (1982) in Dec.1984, but 
to date has not ratified it. With Spanish entry to the EC, 
Community maritime laws and agreements will become effective by 
the early 1990s. Spain has not enacted specific leglislation in 
relation to the Strait of Gj.braltar. nor made reference to 
special provisions concerning the Strait. The non-peninsular 
areas of the Spanish state are covered by the above mentioned 
leglislation. Spain lays claim to the territorial waters around 
it's North Africa Territories, including Ceuta (Limits, 1985, 
pp.158-159) (see chapter 5). 
The laws relating to maritime zones which have been 
promulgated and registered with the UN by Morocco are fewer in 
number than those of Spain. A 12 nm territorial sea was 
implemented in 1973, and by decree (1975) limits in the Strait 
of Gibraltar by coordinates were specified, according to the 
Median line principle (Ahamdy, 1979, p.74). Straight baselines 
were established by decree in 1975. In 1981, a 24 nm contiguous 
zone was instituted. In 1958, Morocco declared its continental 
shelf jurisdiction to 
depth of exploitation. 
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be to 200 metres '\o7ai~e:r depth or to the 
Boundary agreements concerning the shelf 
were signed with Mauritania in 1976, at that time both states 
were becoming embroiled in the West Saharan War (see chapter 8). 
Concerning exclusive fishing zones, Morocco declared a 12 nm 
zone in 1962, and specified 6 nm in the Strait of Gibraltar. In 
1973, the fishing zone was extended by national law to 70 nm, 
and a 200 nm EEZ was decreed in 1981 (Limits, 1985, p.120). 
This led to sabre rattling in Ceuta and Melilla, and an 
ostentatious display of Spanish naval power in the Ceuta area 
(see cahpter 5). Neither of the latter laws made specific 
mention of the Strait. Morocco signed the LOS Convention in 
December 1982. As of 1987, Morocco had not ratified the LOS 
(1982). 
Traditionally, Britain claimed a 3 nm territorial sea 
around the Crown Colony of Gibraltar in accordance with the 
straight baseline and equidistance principles. Historically 
Spain has always contested Britain sovereignty over the Crown 
Colony, together with British juristiction over the isthmus 
joining the Rock of Gibraltar to the mainland proper and the 
runway projecting into the Bay of Algeciras/Gibraltar. The 
latter two areas have the effect of pushing seaward Britain's 
claim to territorial waters. The only laws promulgated and 
registered with the UN which apply to Gibraltar are the 
Territorial Waters Jurisdictional Act (1878), which incorporates 
the global clause that the Act applies to all British 
dependencies (Limits, 1985, p.179). According to the UK 
Territorial Sea Act (1987): 
"the breadth of the ter:rito:rial sea adjacent 
to the UK shall for all purposes be 12 
nautical mLl.es" (Terri to:cial Ser2, Act 198'7; 
1(a), p.l) 
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It is stipulated that this Act caters for Northern Ireland 
(4(1)), and the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man ((4(4)). 
Unlike the TerritoLial Waters Jurisdictional Act (1878), it is 
not stipulated that the 1987 Act applies to "all dependencies". 
As late as 1985, when the author asked the Port Authorities 
and other government agencies in Algeciras, Ceuta, Tangier, 
Rabat and Gibraltar, for official maps of the Strait area 
showing maritime boundaries, the situation was far from clear. 
The Moroccan authorities willingly showed maps dating from the 
1960s, without definite boundaries in the Strait, but informed 
the author that the Ministry of Marine Affairs (Rabat) was 
engaged in research, whereby Morocco's maritime area had been 
divided into 7 regions, 6 of which had been carefully mapped, 
but the seventh (the Strait and Mediterranean) had yet to be 
completed. The Spanish authorities spoke of their 12 nm 
territorial seas, median lines, equidistance and so on, but were 
unable to provide maps clearly indicating their maritime 
jurisdiction in the Strait region. The Gibraltarian authorities 
showed the author a map of the area (dated 1969), which 
ostensibly was an official map but also contained lines drawn 
in, in pencil and ink. The pencil marks indicated 
areas/demarcations open to dispute, which while being held to be 
Gibraltarian demarcatory lines were treated with a certain 
145 
sensitivity by the local authorities. The lines drawn in ink, 
were considered to be contentious but were not open to 
discussion, because of de facto Gibraltar1an control of those 
areas. 
3.6 MEDI~ERRANEAN STATES AND STRAITS. 
Despite tb.e restricted area of the Mediterranean Sea there 
are at least 23 straits with different functional usage, and 
used by the international community. The nine most used straits 
of the western Mediterranean are Gibraltar, Minorca, Bonifacio 
straits, the Corsica-Elba, Elba-Italy, and Giglio-Italy straits 
(::;ee table l.l). The straits of Messina, Sicily, and 
Pantelleria-Tunisia are also key arteries. These straits fall 
wholly or partially within the territorial seas of Spain, 
Morocco, Italy, France and Tunisia. The remaining straits of 
the central and eastern Mediterranean zones are bathed by the 
territorial waters of Italy, Malta, Tunisia, Albania, Greece, 
Cyprus and Turkey. Many Mediterranean strait states with the 
exception of France and Italy feel that the LOS (1982) in 
relation to regimes for straits was a denegration of the right 
of innocent passage, largely dictated by the USA and USSR. 
According to Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1985, p.59); 
the . majority of jurists 
still consider the implications of its (LOS 
1982) provisions to be somewhat doubtful". 
Tsaltas and Lacatzis (1985, p.60) state that because of US and 
Soviet naval strategies, the superpowers strove for free transit 
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regime principles, trivializing coastal state jurisdiction; and 
that some Mediterranean states feel that: 
"trans.it passage" is "an inherent and 
inseparable complement of the freedom of 
navigatj_on and overflight of the high seas". 
Miterranean strait states like Spain, Morocco, Cyprus and 
Greece feel that "since the principle of innocent passage is 
applicable in regard to the territorial sea, it should also be 
applied in the case of straits used for international 
navigation". They declare that their sovereignty extends to 
those straits that form part of "their territorial seas" 
(Tsaltas & Lacatzis, 1985, p.60). In line with the evolving 
political ideologies of the 1970s; Dupuy (1975-76, p.31) argues 
that in the international community: 
"current practice in UNCTAD, the 
Declaration on the New Economic Order, and 
the Charter on the Economic Rights and 
Duties of States resulted in the 
proclamation of the principle of 
compensatory inequality, (thus 
this). extends to the LOS, which is 
above all situational law, which takes into 
account the geographical locations of States 
and the resulting consequences thereof". 
Strait states argue that they should not be penalized because of 
their geographic configuration. 
Many developing states support the Spanish and Moroccan 
stance on territorial seas and straits. Strait states fear that 
the transit passage regime used for international navigation 
poses a threat to their independence, as it means "the exercise 
of the freedom of navigation and overflight . of 
the strait" (LOS 111, Art 38 (2)). Unlike LOS 1958, it is not 
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stipulated that submarines should surface navigate, and it is 
stipuJ.ated that there is a right of overflight. A radical 
change in the Moroccan power structure, would argu~bly wish to 
reassess the transit ~ regime for Gibraltar. 
Spain and Morocco like the other Mediterranean strait 
states are aware that Article 45, LOS (1982) precludes the right 
of innocent passage of straits used for international transit. 
The regime of innocent passage applies only to straits used for 
international passage which are excluded from the regime of 
transit passage, but these are the very straits that are used 
for the bulk of international navigation like Gibraltar and 
Sicily. Yet if a strait connects the territorial sea of a 
coastal state with the high seas, it is automatically 
the legal waters of that state (Depuy, 1975-76, 
Mediterranean strait states believe that they have lost 
of sovereignty over their territorial seas. 
part of 
p. 66). 
aspects 
3.7 SPANISH AND MOROCCAN ATTITUDES TO THE NEW TRANSIT PASSAGE 
REGIME. 
The legalities of the transit passage regime (LOS 1982) for 
straits used for international navigation have now been under 
discussion for more than a decade. Though Spain and Morocco 
have signed the LOS (1982), it is interesting to look at their 
proposals during the UNCLOS conferences (1970s) and see the 
respective national stances and possibly how this will shape 
J.1:8 
future events in the Strait region. At all stages Spain and 
Morocco opposed the introduction of the transit ~assa~~ regime. 
At the UN Sea-Bed Committee meeting (16 March ~072), the 
Spanish representative stated that: 
"'l'he traditional sc;tfeguard of coastal states 
had become more urgently necessary with the 
growing demonstrations of naval power in 
certain waters and with technological 
development, since warships, nuclear-powered 
vessels, giant tankers and ships carrying 
dangerous goods represented a potential 
threat to the peace, good order and security 
of the coastal states. After all, to go 
beyond the present regime would amount to 
requesting of non-innocent passage" (sic) 
(UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.48, p.l3; 16 
March 1971). 
Spain and Morocco vehemently supported the arguments of Canada 
(A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.54, p. 12' 24 March 1971)' Indonesia 
(A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.4-23, p.113, 13 August 1971) and Malaysia 
(A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.4-23, p.88, 12 August 1971) in relation to 
the need for greater protection under the regime of innocent 
passage against pollution, which endangers the security of the 
state. Spain was particularly concerned about threats to its 
fishing industry. 
Morocco and Spain in conjunction with Cyprus, Greece, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Yemen were instrumental in 
the preparation of Draft articles on navigation through the 
territorial sea including straits used international 
navigation ( (sic) UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18; 27 March 1973). 
The proposal comprised 23 articles. The following 
considerations were taken into account. 
Firstly, navigation through the territorial sea and straits 
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used for international navigation should be dealt with as 
an entity, since the straits in question are or form part 
of the territorail sea. 
Secondly, regulation of navigation shoul.d establish a 
satisfactory baJ.ance between the particular interests of 
coastal states and the general interests of international 
maritime navigation. This is best achieved through the 
principle of innocent passage which is the basi.s of the 
traditional regime for navigation through the territorial 
sea. 
Thirdly, regulation must contribute to the security of the 
coastal state and international maritime navigation. This 
can be achieved by the reasonable and adequate exercise by 
the coastal state of its right to regulate navigation 
through its territorial sea, since the purpose of the 
regulation is not to prevent or hamper passage but to 
facilitate it without causing any adverse effects to the 
coastal state. 
Fourthly, the regulation should take account of the 
economic realities and 
developments which have 
requires the adoption of 
scientific 
occurred in 
appropriate 
and technological 
recent years; this 
rules to regulate 
navigation of certain ships with special characteristics. 
Fifthly, the regulation should meet the deficiencies of the 
LOS Convention (1958), especially in relation to passage of 
warships (Koh, 1982, p.l15). 
The draft adopted made no distinction between the 
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territorial seas regime to be applied in coastal areas, 
including straits used for internatj_onal :navigation, with the 
exception that there would be no suspension of innocent passage 
in these straits. Thus non-suspension of passage was ~eliant on 
the fa.ct of _;_ t :being "innocent". As the LOS ( 1958) \'laS unclear 
as to the definition of innocent passage, neither the strait 
states nor the maritime powers could agree on a clear definition 
of the principle, particularly in relation to pollution and 
passage of naval vessels. Concerning the draft article, the 
Spanish representative stated that any attempt to set up 
separate regimes for the territorial sea and for straits would 
clearly violate the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of 
the coastal state over it's territorial sea 
(A/AC.l38/SC.II/SR.60, p.l88; 4 April 1973). The eight-nation 
draft was criticized by many delegations, including the Ukraine 
SSR, which pointed out that it would give some 12 to 15 states 
control over most of the world's shipping. Also it would 
subject the international community to the decisions of 
individual coastal states and the convenience of military and 
political groupings (A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.71, p.24; 8 August 1973). 
Doubtless, 
priorities, 
the Strait 
because of 
riparian states. 
of Gibraltar was 
the geopolitical 
on the list of 
orientations of the 
Before the Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT) was 
drafted in 1975, there were some 12 proposals submitted to the 
Second Committee of the Third UNCLOS, dealing with straits. 
However none of these were comprehensive enough to resolve the 
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straits dilemma (UN Third UNCLOS, Off. Records, Vol.3. UN, New 
York, 1975). Among the groups whioh contributed proposals were 
Spain ( 10 July J.974), Pr~ft ~.rtiQ.les _pn the l.l<hl;ur~ Ji:O.d 
cha.:ract~:ristics of the ter:r ltoriaJ sea; ~.falays.i.a, Morocco, Oma,n, 
Yemen ( 22 c::ruly 1974) Draft a,rticles on navigation through tho 
territorial sea, including straits used for international 
navigation; Algeria (23 July 1974), Praft_ article_s_ on straits 
used for international navigation; semi-enclosed seas; Algeria, 
Libya, Tunisia et al. (7 Aug.l974) Draft articles on 
definitions of straits used for international navigation. While 
none of these proposals were comprehensive enough nor wholly 
supportive of the US or Soviet position, those of Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya clearly highlighted their locational viewpoint 
as littoral states bordering a semi-enclosed sea. They did not 
wish the strait states to wholly dictate their usage of 
Gibraltar. However they were in favour of making the 
Mediterranean into a zone of peace, closed to the warships of 
the superpowers. 
The Oman proposal (UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.16; 22 July 
1974), was sponsored by Morocco as well as Malaysia and Yemen. 
Its standpoint was based on the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), but with 
elaborations on the concept of innocent passage, the rights and 
duties of coastal states and the regulation of warships and 
vessels with special characteristics. Provision was made for 
the regulation of navigation, sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes. It dealt with territorial seas and straits as a single 
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entity. Prior notification or authorization might be required 
for the passage of warships (Part I, Art.l5); they could be 
requi:red ·co pass through certain scalanes (Art. 16). 
Non-compliance might result in the suspension of the right of 
passage of warships in territorial seas (Art.l7), but this would 
not apply in straits. Once again this illustrates the crux of 
the matter. If territorial seas and straits were to be treated 
as an entity, then the provisions of Article 17 are less than 
clear. It was also unclear as to what degree this would apply 
to Gibraltar Strait. However, Article 22 stated that a coastal 
state would not be permitted to discriminate, in form or in 
fact, against the ships of any particular state or against ships 
carrying cargoes or passangers on behalf of any particular state 
in the territorial seas of straits. Likewise the coastal state 
would not be permitted to obstruct channels by placing 
facilities, structures or devices on the seabed. 
Included in the list of non-innocent activities were acts 
of propaganda, espionage, information gathering and research 
(Art.3(2)); which had not been present in the British proposal 
for a transit passage regime. Another modification to the 
British proposal was that the words "such as" (Art.3(2)) were 
included, indicating that the list of activities considered as 
non-innocent was not exhaustive. In other words, while the 
non-suspendable right of innocent passage in international 
straits was retained (Art.22(2)), non-innocent passage could be 
prevented. 
Unlike the UK proposal (UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3; 
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Art.18(2)(a); 3 July 1974) which contained a general prohibition 
against any laws and regulations applying to design, manning or 
equipment of foreign ships, the Moroccan proposal made no 
mention of such provisions. For nuclear-related vessels the 
coastal state might require notification or authorization for 
passage in the territorial sea (Art.8(2)). For research and 
hydrographic vessels II authorizat.i.on II might be required 
(Art.8(3)). Oil and chemical tankers, or those carrying noxious 
liquids or nuclear-related materials might be required to make 
passage through designated lanes in the territorial sea. Most 
significantly, no provision for overflight was made in the 
proposal; it was not contemplated! The proposal had the support 
of the Group of 77, which comprized over 100 developing states 
(Koh, 1982, p.137-8) (see map 8.2c). 
Kuwait, speaking also on behalf of the UAE, favoured the 
single innocent passage regime only for straits connecting two 
parts of the high sea (UN Third UNCLOS, OR,Vol.2. p.139, 23 
July 1974). China claimed that under the guise of the innocent 
passage regime, the USSR deployed warships and nuclear 
submarines to implement its expansionist policies in such areas 
as the Mediterranean, thus endangering peace, good order and 
security (UN 3rd UNCLOS, OR Vol 2, p.133). In 1974, Morocco and 
Spain as well as Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen and other 
strait states still favoured 
straits. States in favour 
certain straits (including 
Israel, USSR, UK and USA. 
an innocent passage regime in 
of the transit passage regime in 
Gibraltar) were Algeria, Iraq, 
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With developments and refinements of a dual regime for 
straits (1974-79), and the eventual triumph o? the transit 
passage regime for certain straits used for international 
navigation, Spain tried to reopen the issue. At the 1978 UNCLOS 
sessions held in Geneva, the Spanish representative stated that 
the straits articles contained in the Informal Composite 
Negotiati~ Text (ICNT) (1977) were the outcome of negotiations 
in which a number of states directly concerned had not 
participated, and that the negotiating group had made only a 
general study of the question and had not engaged in any genuine 
negotiations (UN Third UNCLOS. OR, Vol.9. 17 April 1978, UN New 
York 1980). The USA insisted that the issue had been settled 
and could not be reopened. Despite this, Spain and Morocco 
submitted substantial informal suggestions to amend the straits 
provisions (Koh, 1982 p.145). Though they were not incorporated 
into the ICNT 1979, which was the blueprint for the sections on 
straits in the LOS 1982, they clearly reflect the attitudes and 
reservations of Spain and Morocco. 
The Spanish delegation suggested amendments to the ICNT 
1977 as follows: 
- Aircraft should not enjoy a right of 
transit passage under Article 38. 
- The scope of Article 38(3) should be 
widened to include the application of "other 
rules of international law" to any activity 
which is not an exercise of the right of 
transit passage. 
Article 39(1) should include the 
prohibition that ships "refrain from any act 
of propaganda or act intended to collect 
information to the prejudice of the defence 
or security of the coastal state, or 
intended to interfere with its 
communications or any other facility or 
installation". 
Article 39(2)(a) and (b) dealing with 
compliance of ceratin regulations and 
procedures of ships in transit, should 
include "as \"lell as \vi th those established 
by the coastal state, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 42". 
·· Article 39(3), which deals with aircraft 
in transit should be deleted. 
States bordering straits should be 
empowered to make laws and regulations under 
Article 42(1) regarding "the protection of 
navigational aids and facilities, of cables 
and pipelines, and of other facilities and 
installations in accordance with Article 
44". 
- States should ensure that: 
(I) ships flying their flag are provided 
with adequate insurance to cover any loss or 
damage which they may cause in the exercise 
of the right of innocent passage; 
(II) recourse is available in accordance 
with their legal systems for prompt and 
adequate compensation in respect of any loss 
or damage caused by ships flying their flag 
in the exercise of the right of transit 
passage. 
"Overflight" should be excluded from 
Article 44. (Informal Meeting C.2/I.M./4 of 
26 July 1978; Platzoder, 1978, p.929; Koh, 
1982, p.145-6). 
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Spain also proposed an amendment to Article 234 of the ICNT 
1977, that the sentence "Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 of this 
Part of the Convention shall effect the legal regime of straits 
used for international navigation" be deleted or replaced by the 
wording "Nothing in sections 5, 6 and 7 of this part of the 
present Convention shall effect the legal regime of transit 
passage through straits used for international navigation" (UN 
Third UNCLOS, OR, Vol.10, New York (undated) p.185). In effect 
this would mean that any measure and enforcement taken by Spain 
or Morocco could affect the legal regime of Gibraltar. thus 
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widening the scope of the coastal states ~owers. 
At the same DNCLOS session, Morocco submitted infoTmal 
The most significant in relation to Gibraltar was 
tb.e:t Article 39 ( 2) (a) of the ICNT 1977 (duties of ships and 
aircraft during passage) be amended so as to included extra 
prohibited activities. 
- Exercise or firing practice of any kind. 
- The use of weapons of any kind. 
The taking off or landing of aircraft on 
board. 
Hydrographic surveys or other research 
operations. 
- Any deliberate acts of pollution. 
- All fishing activities. 
Any act designed to interfere with the 
telecommunications system or other 
installations of the state bordering the 
strait (Second Committee, Informal Meeting 
C.2/I.M./4 of 28 April 1978; Platzoder, 
1978, p.959; Koh, 1982, p.147). 
Morocco also proposed that ships maintain radio contact with the 
coastal state during passage of the Strait with a view to 
informing the state of damage, any unforeseen stop made in the 
strait, or any measure rendered necessary by force majeure. 
Clearly the obligation of continuous radio contact would have 
imposed an extra burden on vessels, and would have had 
wide-ranging geopolitical implications not only for the 
superpowers and NATO, but also regional powers like Spain, 
Algeria and Israel. 
In relation to aircraft in transit, Morocco suggested 
amendments to Article 39(3). It was proposed that: 
Aircraft in transit were to: 
(a) Refrain from the following activities in 
the strait zone: 
(i) Exercise or firing practice of any 
kind; 
(ii) The use of wea~ons of anv kind; 
(iii) The taking of-photographs; 
(iv) Low altitude flights over 
shipping; 
(v) Dive-bomber flying; 
(vi) Refuelling while in flight; 
(vii) Any act to interfere with the 
telecommunications system or other 
installations of the State bordering 
the strait. 
(b) Observe the Rules of the Air established 
by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization as they apply to civil 
aviation. 
(c) Take proper care not to violate the 
regulations governing air corridors and 
altitude of flight above the strait as fixed 
by the State bordering the strait, and to 
avoid flying over its territory rising above 
the water, insofar as the air corridor 
established by the State bordering the 
strait does not provide for such overflight. 
(d) Maintain radio contact at all times with 
the air traffic control tower of the State 
and follow its instructions, in the light of 
the air safety requirements, in the exercise 
of the transit passage. 
(e) At all times monitor the radio frequency 
assigned by the appropriate internationally 
designated air traffic authority or the 
international distress radio frequency. 
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Morocco proposed a widening of the powers of the strait 
States to make laws and regulations under Article 42(1) on the 
protection of navigational aids and other installations, the 
protection of cables and pipelines, the conservation of living 
resources and on marine scientific research and hydrographic 
surveys (Koh, 1982, p.l48). 
Morocco also wished to add to the duties of states making 
use of straits by adding three new provisions to Article 44, 
ICNT 1977: 
A: States shall enact such leglislation and 
regulations as may be required to ensure 
that all ships flying their·· flag and all 
aircraft registered in those States shall, 
when exercising the right of transit 
passage, carry adequate insurance to meet 
any claim in respect of loss or damage 
caused to the State bordering the strait. 
B: Any damage done to States bordering a 
strait, their nationals OJ:> legal entities as 
a result of the transit passage of ships 
shall create liability for redress by the 
owner of the vessel or any other person 
responsible for the damage, and failing 
them, by the flag State of the vessel. 
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The stipulations of C were similar to those of B but in relation 
to aircraft. These provisions were intended to erode the rights 
of the transit passage regime and did not find their way into 
the ICNT 1979 nor LOS 1982. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that some 
implications of the LOS (1982) and the transit passage regime 
are still causing contention. Transit passage is not subject to 
any form of notification or authorization. There is no specific 
provision in the transit passage regime (LOS 1982) for surface 
navigation of submarines, unlike the LOS 1958. This is still a 
contentious issue in Spain and Morocco as are the ~ areas 
concerning pollution leglislation and the mechanisms for 
implementing legal and compensarory action against offenders for 
crimes committed while transiting Gibraltar. 
3.7.1 State Preference on Regimes 
Straits. 
By cross-tabulating certain geopolitical 
International 
indices for 
J.59 
Mediterranean states such as location astride international 
straits, importance of merchant marines, dependence on seaborne 
trade, location in :r'BlB.tion to oemj_-enclosod ooao, and st:ratGg.ic 
dependence on naval mobility; it is possible to get an overview 
of the attitudes of these states on the straits issue. 
States which favour the non-suspendable right of innocent 
passage are Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, Malta, 
Monaco, Syria, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. States in favour of 
transit passage are France, Israel, Italy and Britain 
(Gibraltar). Morocco would prefer the regime of innocent 
passage only, in international straits. The position of Spain 
and Greece is somewhat less clear. Neither are satisfied with 
the transit passage regime, yet both are well aware that the 
regime of innocent passage for all straits is not possible. 
Besides, submerged passage and overflight of Gibraltar and other 
straits has been in practice for decades, some argue that this 
in itself constitutes "rights" under customary international law 
(Wainwright, 1986). As well as being a strait state, Spain has 
a large merchant marine, is dependent on seaborne trade, and is 
strategically reliant on naval mobility. 
3.8 CONCLUSION. 
Legal regimes for straits are an attempt at reconciling the 
interests of the international community and those of strait 
states. Because of the diverse geographical nature of straits 
there are several types of legal regimes. 
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Although many states including Morocco and Spain have not 
ratified the LOS (1982), arguably Gibraltar i.s subject to the 
transit ~ regime_. The rights of this :regj_me have been .t:o. 
effect in practice (if not in theory) ovor tho past decades, 
including submerged passage and overflight. Thus the LOS (1982) 
could be viewed as legitimizing what was already de facto 
practice or customary law in the Strait of Gibraltar. For 
instance a 12 nm territorial sea with right of "innocent 
passage" was tacitly accepted by most maritime states, but the 
waters of the Strait, especially outside 3 nm from the 
respective Spanish and Moroccan coasts were not viewed as being 
subject to a similar regime by the international community. 
Though Spain and Morocco signed the LOS (1982), they have 
not ratified it and have reservations as is evidenced by their 
proposals and informal suggestions during the LOS negotiations 
before 1982. In effect international treaties such as the LOS, 
are instruments which serve to legitimize the de facto practice 
of power protagonists. Regional powers like Morocco and Spain 
may yet take contentious actions to redress the situation in 
the Strait of Gibraltar, but most likely initially in relation 
to contingent issues such as territorial disputes or change of 
political regime in Morocco. 
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PART TWO. 
HISTORY AND STRAIT POLITICS. 
The Crown Colony of Gibraltar and the Spanish Territory of 
Ceuta are the keys to control of the Strait of Gibraltar and 
historically they have constituted the pillars of the 
geopolitical organization in the area. 
During the colonial era, possession of the Crown Colony by 
Britain, and the Sovereign Territories in North Africa (Plazas) 
by Spain, functioned in the spatial and political contexts to 
reduce instability to a minimium and guarantee security of 
passage of the Strait to all states. However at present, the 
continuing territorial disputes in the area constitue a threat 
to stability. Historical forces have established the present 
territorial and political arrangements in the region and 
consequently the contentions which exist there. 
Decolonization in the Gibraltar region is essentially a 
matter of decolonizing territories rather than peoples. The 
decolonization of Gibraltar and the Plazas must come about in an 
ordered manner catering for the legitimate 
states and communities involved. Also 
aspirations of the 
the interests of the 
regional states and international balance of power must be taken 
into consideration. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY: THE LEGACY. 
"The past exists in the present and the 
present only exists because it makes way for 
the future" . 
James Joyce, 1914. 
"The unique distinctive idea under which the 
shores of the Straits are organized has been 
the strategic need of Great Britain, the 
dominant naval power of Western Europe, to 
control the area or to keep it in the 
possession of a weak power. The geographer 
may profitably inquire whether either 
Gibraltar or Tangier can effectively control 
the Straits and whether no other point has a 
comparable advantage". 
Norman Pounds, 1952. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION. 
A geopolitical analysis of the Gibraltar 
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region 
necessitates an historical perspective (i) to see how the past 
has created the present geopolitical environment; (ii) to 
evaluate policies or models which may influence future 
organization; and (iii) to formulate general deductions 
concerning the geopolitics of straits. 
The power mosaic in the Strait area is essentially the 
product of historical rivalry between Islam and Christianity. 
This dialectic has been responsible for the development of 
strong cultural distinctiveness on opposite shores of the 
Strait, embodied in powerful nationalistic sentiments in Spain 
and Morocco. The fact that Spain is a fragmented state 
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consisting of most of Iberia, the Balearic and Canary Islands, 
and the Sovereign Territories in North Africa, is partly due to 
Spain's history as a strait state. Spain's offsho~G possessions 
lie in close proximity to the Strait (see maps 4.1, 5.1, 5.2). 
Morocco and Spain were once the weste~n cornerstone of the 
Islamic Empire, with hegemony over the Strait (711-1462). With 
the decline of the Pax Islamica, Spain Reconquered the northern 
shores in the 15th century, and established bases on the 
southern shore. Though Morocco was the last country in the Arab 
world to come under the direct control of imperial European 
powers (1912), its independence (1956) was incomplete with Spain 
maintaining colonies and territories in the Sherifian kingdom. 
Historically both decaying empires were superceded by Britain 
and France in the 18th century. Britain's Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar is a mirror image of the Spanish Sovereign Territory 
of Ceuta. The Crown Colony and Ceuta probably offer the two 
best strategic sites for guardianship of the Strait. Since 
antiquity, these Pillars of Hercules as they were once known 
have been coveted by nations, and particularly seapowers wishing 
to control the keys to the Mediterranean. The military bases on 
the respective prornontaries are the physical expression of 
balance of power strategies. The possession of these coveted 
bases offers Spain and Britain geopolitical "clout" in the 
strategic Mediterranean theatre and the Arab world. By a 
combination of war, legitimizing treaties, and skilful 
statesmanship, Britain and Spain established themselves in the 
territories, gradually consolidating their hold and expanding 
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their jurisdiction on both land and sea. The populations of the 
Crown Colony and Ceuta were created by Britain and Spain not as 
settler communities or colonists but rather to serve the needs 
of the naval bases. Their roles as free-ports was to reduce 
central government expenditure, 
bureaucrats and powerful families, 
provide funds for local 
and perhaps a certain 
chauvinistic rivalry between them. 
(1956), France, Britain and the 
Since Moroccan independence 
USA have maintained close 
relations with the Moroccan government. 
The geostrategy of creating bases in the Strait area has 
thus left a legacy of "interrupted" and disputed sovereignty, as 
well as the problem of minority populations. This has affected 
the internal politics of Morocco and Spain, their bilateral 
relations, and rapport with Britain. In turn normal relations 
between them and the supranational organizations to which they 
belong has been affected (see chapters 7-8). 
In looking at the different historical periods of the 
Strait, it is possible to see constants such as geopolitical 
competition for control of the strategic locations of Gibraltar, 
Ceuta and Tangier, not to mention Cadiz, Tarifa and Melilla. 
Freedom of passage for all nations through the Strait has been 
ensured by Britain since 1704 from the vantage point of the 
Gibraltar Colony. This was reinforced by the 
internationalization of the Cape Spartel lighthouse (1865-1956) 
and Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-1956), reflecting geopolitical 
models developed by major powers. The LOS (1958, 1982) 
attempted to guarantee freedom of passage through the Strait for 
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all nations, in the internationalist tradition of Britain and 
the USA. Will the historic model of military bases (Gibraltar, 
Ceuta, Melilla) lead to increased militarization in tho Strait 
area? If there are sovereignty transfers, will Morocco 
automatically use Ceuta and Melilla as bases? After 1956, 
Morocco did not militarize Tangier or other areas on the 
northern coast under its jurisdiction. Historically within the 
Strait area there are micro-models of neutralization and 
militarization spatially juxtaposed. Tho problem of 
decolonization and potential for major political upheaval in 
Morocco render the Strait a potentially volatile area. 
4.2 HISTORY AND CONTINUITY: THE SOUTHERN SHORE. 
The history of the southern shore of the Strait has created 
a legacy of territorial disputes. This increased competition 
between the respective riparian states, and between them and 
outside powers, leading to micro-spatial fragmentation. A 
hierarchy of geopolitical power arose, which despite inter-state 
and inter-allied contentions, managed to create a certain 
stability in the area. The power equilibrium was strengthened 
by historical inertia and international approval of the status 
quo. The international community tacitly accepted the Spanish 
presence in the North African Territories, and Britain's 
sovereignty over the Gibraltar Colony (see table 4.1, appendix 
III). Since the 1950s, with the reassertion of national 
independence and greater claims to maritime jurisdiction, Spain 
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and Morocco are now leader states in the western Mediterranean 
region and feel that they have a greater role to play in the 
Strait's politics (see chapters 7-8). 
4.2.1 Geopolitical Models and the Strait. 
Monopoly. When Islamic powers controlled both coasts of 
the Strait (711-1462), passage was forbidden to non-Muslim 
vessels between the 8th and 13th centuries. Between the 16th 
and 17th centuries, Spain assured safe transit to friendly 
states. Since 1704, British policy enforced from the Crown 
Colony of Gibraltar, has pursued an internationalist policy. 
This strategy ensured that neither a Muslim power nor Spain 
would fully control both shores of the Strait. The Spanish 
Protectorate Zone in northern Morocco (1912-56) did not include 
the Tangier Neutral Zone nor Cape Spartel, and besides, Spanish 
policy was largely dictated by the French Protectorateship. 
King Hassan II of Morocco, believes that the international 
community and especially the USSR will not allow Spain to 
control both keys to the Strait, Ceuta and Gibraltar (Le Grand 
Maghreb, 1985, no.37, p.21; ibid, no.38, p.87). In claiming 
sovereignty over these two bases, Spain is pursuing an age old 
quest for monopoly. 
The dual control model. Bipartite control in the real 
sense has never existed. The nearest the Strait came to being 
under dual control was in the 15th and 16th centuries, when 
Christian Spain and Muslim Morocco struggled towards a power 
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equilibrium. This model was fraught with strife and instability 
in Spain's constant effort to establish monopoly. Because Spain 
and Morocco are extremities of several systems, diametrically 
opposed, -geographically, economically, culturally and 
politically- Spaj_n :r.emai:o.ed the dom:i.na.nt force 1 g '1 .. e:u e .. y because 
of its control of the northern shore of the Strait and the 
Plazas on the southern shore (see map 4.1). 
Morocco is presently at a level of development not suitable 
for direct dual control with Spain, unlike the dual 
British-French model operating in the Dover Strait area. The 
British presence in Gibraltar since 1704, and French strategy in 
the Maghreb since 1830 ensured that Morocco and Spain maintained 
a Strait policy in keeping with the mare liberum philosophy (see 
chapters 1,3). This was reinforced by the fragmented nature of 
territorial control on the southern shore in the form of 
internationalization, attempted demilitarization, protectorates 
and Plazas (see map 4.1). Theoretically, the weaker power, 
Morocco, was nominally in control of roost of the southern shore, 
and so Spanish attempts at monopoly there were frustrated. 
Tripartite control model. This has only existed in so far 
as Britain, Spain and Morocco controlled the Strait (1704-1912, 
1956--). Spanish and Moroccan activities in the area were only 
permitted in so far as they did not jeopardize British policy 
and freedom of passage. Their power was contingent on that of 
Britain. By a combination of force and diplomacy (legitimizing 
bilateral and international treaties), Britain acted as a 
moderating influence, containing Spanish and Moroccan ambitions, 
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limiting French influence, and keeping the strait open to 
international navigation. Britain did not monopolize control of 
the Strait, but the power of the riparian states and 
international Powers was contingent on British support or 
approval (see table 4.1, appendix III). Britain remained 
effectively at the apex of a power hierarchy there, between the 
18th and mid-20th centuries. This could be termed the 
geopolitical principle of hierarchical contingency. 
The contingent hierarchical model. This was based on 
fragmented spatial control of the territories bordering the 
Strait and a pyramidal power system with Britain at the apex and 
Morocco at the base. The international powers, especially Spain 
and France 
could gain 
formed the intermediary levels. As no single power 
absolute control over the Strait area, it was 
fragmented on macro and micro scales, with the establishment of 
bases, including the Spanish Plazas. and Britain's short sojurn 
at Tangier, and later permanent establishment at Gibraltar (see 
map 4.1). Spanish and Moroccan power in the Strait region was 
contingent on British supremacy until the late 19th century. 
Thereafter, Britain had to reach a compromise with France (1904 
and 1912), the international Powers (the Treaty of Algeciras 
1908) and the USA (Cape Spartel Treaty, 1865; Tangiers Neutral 
Zone 1923, 1946). This led to further fragmentation in the form 
of zones rather than bases at Cape Spartel, Tangier, and the 
French and Spanish Protectorates. 
The internationalization of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse 
(1865) was a watershed in the geopotitical history of the 
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Strait, as fragmented control thereafter became a truly 
international pursuit; thus appeasing the demands of the 
international powers, preventing the riparian states from 
gaining monopoly and guaranteeing Britain's stewardship from the 
Crown Colony. With Moroccan independence (1956) and the 
vicissitudes of Spanish politics since the 1930s, stability in 
the Strait area was maintained because of the precedent set by 
the international models of Cape Spartel and Tangier, and 
especially British stewardship. While good relations have 
existed between the USA and the riparian states in this century, 
British Gibraltar has remained invaluable in the US and NATO 
context (see chapter 7). 
The major maritime powers found the stance taken by Spain 
and Morocco concerning the Strait in discussions leading up to 
the LOS 1982, less internationalist than they would have liked 
it to be (see chapter 3). Hence the question remains if there 
are sovereignty changes on both shores of the Strait, will the 
complex spatial and power equilibrium be replaced by an equally 
workable system and who will be at the apex of the power 
pyramid? Would the system revert to the dual control model? 
With sovereignty transfers in the disputed territories, there 
would be a certain power vacuum. Ironically, the disputed 
territories arguably form the bases of the contingent 
hierarchical model which has guaranteed safe passage of the 
Strait since the 18th century. 
The principles of decolonization, territorial integrity of 
the state, and right of socio-political groups such as the 
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Ceutis, Melillinese and Gibraltarians to some form of 
self-determination has to be juxtaposed with the above mentioned 
models, especially that of hierarchical contingency. 
4.2.2 Gibraltar and Other International Straits. 
Spanish monopoly of the Strait is hardly feasible in the 
light of the lessons of history. The maritime powers are 
unlikely to support the development of a situation in Gibraltar 
whereby Spain could dictate international usage of the Strait. 
Historically the fragmentation of sovereignty in the Bab el 
Mandeb region mirrors to a certain extent the Gibraltar 
experience. In the 19th century scramble for strategic straits, 
Britain, France and Italy established themselves in the region 
and created the Djibouti (French) and Aden (British) bases (see 
map 1.5). With the decolonization of the region, Aden was 
integrated into PDR Yemen, and Djibouti ostensibly became an 
independent state. One of Spain's main concerns is that the 
creation of the artifical state of Djibouti may have set a 
precedent for the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (see chapter 6). If 
under the sovereignty of a more militant Moroccan regime, the 
Ceuta base could pose a threat to Western interests. Soviet 
activities in Aden are closely monitored by the Western powers. 
Overall, the geopolitical models that were experienced on 
the southern shore of the Strait of Gibraltar since the 18th 
century were 
security of 
pragmatic, 
passage. 
minimizing instability and ensuring 
This has implications not alone for the 
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future of Gibraltar but also other international straits. The 
principle of contingent hierarchy in the coastal area of 
Gibraltar will continue to operate in one form or another 
because of the matrix of geographical factors. Because of 
superpower competition and ever-increasing 
influence and awareness of the Strait states, 
dialectic in the Gibraltar region will continue. 
geopolitical 
the power 
4.3 EUROPE VERSUS ISLAM IN THE REGION. 
Control of geostrategic straits such as Gibraltar and long 
cycles of global politics are intrinsically linked. Between the 
8th and 15th centuries Dar al Islam (The Islamic Kingdom) 
encompassed the Atlantic shores of Iberia and the Maghreb, while 
the eastern frontier of the Pax Islamica was the Pacific Ocean. 
Thus at the zenith of Islamic power, all geostrategic areas 
connecting Europe, Africa and Asia were under Muslim control. 
The Maghrebi scholar Ibn Khaldoun in analysing history and the 
organization of Muslim society, theorized that 
definite lifespan leading to a cycle of 
age 
empires have a 
growth, powerful 
(Megherbi, 1980). maturity and inevitable decline in old 
The Christian Reconquest of Iberia in the 15th century and 
establishment of bases in the Maghreb, caused a major trauma in 
Dar al Tslam, signifying the beginning of the end for Muslim 
hegemony on the Atlantic frontier. Since the 1970s, militant 
Muslims have been trying to re-establish Islam as a global 
geopolitical force (see chapter 8). 
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In Modelski's (1978, 1986) theory of "long cycles in world 
poli ti.cB,l a,ffa.irs and their spatial ortenta tion" he states that 
long cycles are a macro-picture of world politics. He 
postulates that rhythms exist within global political systems. 
The study of these rhythms is termed chronopol.i tj.cs e:wd is based 
on an analysis of war, hegemony, and political and economic 
control. Modelski's global sytsem begins in 1500 and develops 
in a cyclical manner. Each cycle is of approximately 100 
duration. Within each cycle, there are four major stages. 
cycle is associated with a world power whose core area 
state. This state is associated with over half the 
keeping" functions of the global system (Taylor, 1985, 
is 
years 
Each 
the 
"order 
p. 51). 
Modelski's analysis only covers the 16th to the 20th centuries, 
and thus the Islam Empire is not included. According to the 
Modelski framework, Portugal dominated the 16th century and the 
Netherlands the 17th century; both powers being successors to 
Islamic hegemony in Africa and Asia. Britain is unique in 
having dominated two cycles in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
while the USA has dominated the cycle in the 20th century. The 
stages within each cycle are clearly defined: 
Stage One: because of a weak global 
organizational structure there is severe 
political competition which leads to war; 
Stage Two: the victor is able to restructure 
the international political system; 
Stage Three: legitimizing treaties lend 
respectability to the victor and formally 
set in progress the new world order; and 
Stage Four: the development of bipolar and 
consequently multipolar systems leads to 
decline, competition and war; and the cycle 
begins again (see table 4.l & appendix III). 
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For almost eight centuries before what Modelski terms cycle 
I, the Strait of Gibraltar lay wj.thin the Muslim sphere of 
influence, the largest and strongest global leader of the 
period. With the decline of the Pax Islamica in the Strait 
region, this marked the end of the closed door policy, and 
thereafter free passage for the world community evolved. In 
Iberia's rise to power, strategic locations on the Maghrebi 
shore were acquired. Significantly one of the lines of 
demarcation of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) ran through 
Penon de Velez de la Gomera, which remains a minor Spanish 
possession on the Moroccan coast (see map 5.5), and another 
demarcatory line ran just south of the Canary Islands. In cycle 
II, the Mare Liberum philosophy triumphed, and in cycle III, 
duing Britain's rise to empire, an Anglo-Dutch force conquered 
the Gibraltar peninsula (1704). The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) 
provided Britain with a key to command of the seas. In cycle 
IV, Gibraltar remained a lynchpin in Britain's control of the 
oceans. In cycle V, though the Mediterranean is no longer the 
centre of the global system, the USA has cultivated strong links 
with the riparian states of the Strait, and because of the 
"special relationship" with Britain, and NATO commitment, the 
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USA has access to the Gibraltar base. Under NATO auspices the 
USA may have access to the Spanish North Afr~aan bases at Geut~. 
and Melilla in an emergency situation (see chapter 5). All 
global powers listed in the Modelski modal have had strong 
historical, military and treaty associations \vith tho Strait. 
Because Modelski's political framework of long cycles of global 
power is constructed on vast temporal and spatial scales, it is 
somewhat reductionj.st. Nonetheless it is a valuable aid in 
analyzing Gibraltar's role in world geopolitics (see chapter 7). 
Comparing the history of the Strait region and the Modelski 
model, at present the USA may be seen as the "world power" 
ultimately guaranteeing security of passage of the Strait in 
"the global order" (Stage Three). However besides the bipolar 
contentions of the superpowers, regional powers like Spain, 
Morocco and Algeria are competing for dominance in the region 
(Stage Four), (see chapter 7). 
History would suggest that global powers maintain their 
hegemony in a pyramidal power structure. They gain the active 
or passive support of former or "shadow empires" (Toynbee, 
1963), often by imposed treaties or agreements tilted in favour 
of the dominant power. The complex series of treaties (18th 
century) between Britain, The Netherlands and Spain in which the 
status of the Gibraltar peninsula is mentioned corrobrates this 
viewpoint (see appendix III). This situation affords the 
dominant power a modus operandi and the "shadow empires" a modus 
vivendi, while both collaborate in the control of a whole 
hierarchy of weaker political entities. 
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In the context of the Strait, absolute Muslim hegemony 
ceased in the late 14th century. Theoretically both Spain and 
Morocco controlled the Strait until the 18th century, with Spain 
being the dominant military force. From 1713 until 1945, 
Morocco, a shadow Muslim empire and Spain a rapidly declining 
global power had to pursue Str1it policies within a framework 
largely dictated by Britain. Britain was instrumental in 
shaping policies in the region, because of it's naval strength 
and eventually the Entente Cordiale with France (1904), which 
helped determine future French treaties with Spain and Morocco. 
The latter two states were more or less presented with a fait 
accompli. 
international 
Britain 
control 
was 
over 
instrumental 
the Cape 
in 
Spar tel 
establishing 
lighthouse 
(1865-1956) and the Tangier Neutral Zone (1923-1956). With the 
involvement of the USA in both World Wars and its rise to 
Superpower status, significantly the Gibraltar base was used in 
Operation Torch (1943-44) which led to the liberation of the 
Maghreb and western 
acted as a prelude to 
states. Since 1945, 
Mediterranean from the Axis Powers, and 
national independence in the Maghrebi 
the USA has established several treaties 
with Morocco and Spain, and within the NATO context has access 
to the Gibraltar base (see appendix III). 
Out of some 105 major treaties, protocols, 
declarations between 1462 and 1987 in 
agreements 
relation to 
and 
the 
territories or seas of the Strait area, and its hinterlands, 
such as the Crown Colony, Plazas and Tangier, the international 
participation has been very significant. There were some 326 
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permutations of inter-state action or agreement in relation to 
the Gibraltar area. Of these 326 variables, Spain accounted for 
21%, Britain for 17%, France for 17% (including Protectorate 
responsibilities for Morocco 1912-1956), Morocco for 10%, 
Portugal for 9%, the Netherlands for 8%, the USA for 7%, 
Russia/USSR for 3%, the concerted Colonial Powers (1860-1956) 
for 6%, and others 2%. Between 1701-1987, Britain has been 
involved in some 44 of these instruments and between 1919-1987, 
the USA has been active in some 21 (see table 4.1, appendix 
III). 
4.4 THE SOUTHERN SHORE: TANGIER. 
Tangier (35 47'N, 5 50'W) (pop.300,000, 1986) situtated at 
about 14 km from Cape Spartel to the west and 10 km from Cape 
Malaba to the east, is sited on a beautiful bay at the western 
entrance to the Strait. From the 18th century on: 
"it became a pillar 
retain Tangier in 
preferably Berber 
p. 166). 
of British policy to 
the hands of a weak and 
power" (Pounds, 1952, 
To counter French and Spanish influence on the southern shore, 
Britain supported the creation of the Tangier Neutral Zone 
(1923-1956) (see map 4.2). Since 1956, Morocco's pro-western 
regime has not developed Tangier into a major base, nor offered 
important naval facilities to foreign powers (see chapters 7-8). 
In the future, an unfriendly regime in Morocco, could radically 
alter the dynamics of security in the area by developing 
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Plate 4.1 Fishing Village at Cape Spartel 
Photograph: J. G. o•Reilly, 1985. 
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Plate 4.2 
Photograph: J. G. O'Reilly, 1985. 
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Tangier's naval potential. 
Because of its geostrategic location many powers have 
sought control of Tangier, yet all have recognized that its 
location and natural advantages are less than those of Ceuta or 
the Crown Colony of Gibraltar. Tangier's relatively greater 
distance from the European coast has rendered it less important 
in the geostrategy of the Strait than the latter. Tangier is 
more exposed to attack by land and sea than Gibraltar or Ceuta. 
A strong power ensconced in Tangier would have lessened greatly 
the dominant power of Britain. "Tangier must remain in the 
hands of a neutral power like Morocco" , wrote Lord Nelson, "or 
England must own it" (Pounds, 1952, p.l67). 
Because of its location and mild climate, Tangier became 
the unofficial diplomatic capital of Morocco in the 19th 
century. In the 20th century, it provided a significant example 
of internationalization and neutralization strategies for the 
Strait. Being relatively cut off from the Moroccan power cores 
of Rabat and Casablanca, Tangier has declined economically and 
politically since 1956. This chronically underdeveloped city at 
the western entrance to the Strait and on Europe's doorstep is a 
seedbed of social and political discontent, which could be 
exploited by forces with a vested interest in causing 
instability in the Strait region (see chapter 8). 
4.5 TANGIER BEFORE 1923. 
Tangier is Morocco's most northerly city and hence closest 
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to Europe. Some 27 centuries ago, the Phoenicians established 
the trading port of Tingis there. Like their successors the 
Carthaginians, they were absorbed by the local Berber population 
(Laroui, 1976). Under the Romans, in AD 42, the port city 
became the military and administrative capital of the North 
African colony of Mauritania-Tingitana. This is consistent with 
the fact that it was only in 1969 that King Hassan II of Morocco 
formally recognized the state of Mauritania, thereby 
relinquishing his historic claim to those territories. After 
the Roman era, the city was successively occupied by Vandals, 
Byzantines, Visigoths and the Christian city was invaded by the 
Arabs in AD 682. The Arab city of Tanja served as one of the 
bases for Muslim expeditionary forces to Spain (711). In the 
12th and 13th centuries, it was a flourishing Muslim Berber 
trade and naval base. The Crusading Portuguese captured the 
city in 1471. It became Spanish in 1580 and was returned to 
Portugal in 1640. 
that: 
In 1657 the English General, Monck wrote 
"There is a castle in the Streight's mouth 
which the Portugals have called Tangar, on 
Barbary Side, and which, if they would part 
with it withal, it would be very useful to 
us, An hundred men will keep the 
castle and half a dozen Frigates there would 
stop the whole trade in the Straights to 
such that shall be enemies to us" (Pounds, 
1952' p. 167) . 
Just four years later England acquired the geostrategic 
site. It was given as part of the dowry of Princess Catherine 
of Braganza to Charles II of England in 1661. The English base 
was constantly under siege by the local Rifians with the 
184 
collusion of Spain. In 1684, England destroyed the city before 
evacuating it. Because of the r:i.valry of Portugal and Spain for 
control of the southern shore, the English evacuation had 
repercussions which have influenced the Strait's geopolitical 
mosaic ever since. Britain took the Gibraltar peninsula in 1704 
and Tangier never again came under the control of a powerful 
state. Because of the Muslim occupation of the city, it was 
bombarded by France three times between 1684 and 1737. In 1743, 
Tangier lost its autonomous status and became subject to the 
Moroccan Sultan. By a combination of war and diplomacy, Spain 
and France vied for control of the city, but with the Treaty of 
Tangier (1844) (Moroccan-Spanish Wars), Britain dashed French 
hopes of effectively gaining possession. Britain and the USA 
pursued a policy of upholding the Sultan's sovereignty there. 
During the Moroccan-Spanish War (1859), Britain let it be known 
that it would protect Tangier. By this time Tangier (not Fez) 
was effectively the diplomatic capital of Morocco, and the 
consular system in operation there was changed to that of 
legations. During Moroccan attacks on the city in 1891, Britain 
let other concerned powers know that it would accept partition 
of the kingdom, if it were to receive Tangier in return (Stuart, 
1955, p.13). In an attempt to forestall the dismemberment of 
the Kingdom by the European powers, the Sultan offered Morocco 
as a protectorate to the USA (1871). The Sultan greatly feared 
for the security of the northern region: 
"especially Tangier, a place commanding 
great measure the entrance to 
Mediterranean Sea . (Archives of 
American Legation at Tangier, Dispatch 
in a 
the 
the 
Book 
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1864 187~. Dispatch No.30. 29 June 1871). 
The USA declined the Sultan's offer. By the early 20th century, 
Tangier was the home of all foreign diplomats to Morocco, though 
it was not the seat of Moroccan government. The foreign 
community largely controlled life in the strategic city, which 
in large part was owned by them. All these attributes tended to 
confer a special character on Tangier. 
Different states strove for diplomatic pre-eminence, and 
sought the most favoured nation clause in agreements with the 
Sultan. It was awarded to the USA (I837), Britain (1856), Spain 
(1861) and France (1863) at different stages. The foreign 
powers often abused the protege system whereby many Muslims and 
Jews in the area obtained the diplomatic protection of foreign 
state missions. Effectively many Moroccan protege's sought 
foreign nationality, and were thus outside the control of the 
Sultan. At the Madrid Conference (1880), (attended by Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Spain, the USA, Belgium, France, Britain, 
Italy, Morocco, The Netherlands, Portugal, Norway and Sweden), 
Britain, the USA and Morocco were in favour of abolishing the 
protege system. France, supported by Germany and Italy managed 
to have it retained. With the Madrid Convention (1880), all the 
Powers were placed on an equal footing in Tangier. The foreign 
powers began to organize and cooperate on municipal committees 
dealing with such issues as sanitation and health, although 
strong rivalry continued. In a journal of the time, La 
Republique Francaise, it was stated that: 
"Europe will do wise to keep a close watch 
over Great Britain's policy at Tangier. The 
maintainance of the European Equilibrium 
imposes on her the duty of resisting the 
intrigues of a nation whj.ch would willingly 
make Morocco a second Egypt" (Times, 
(London) 10 June 1892; Stuart, 1955, p.40). 
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In 1899, Britain and France delimited their zones of 
influence in North Africa, and with the Entente Cordiale (1904), 
France gained a relatively free hand in Morocco. Though not 
stated, it was understood that Tangier constituted a special 
case. It was agreed that if there were any major changes in the 
politics of the region, Spain was to be allowed to extend 
control around its Plazas. With the secret Franco-Spanish 
Treaty (1904) agreeing on the partition of Morocco, the 
internationalization of Tangier was mentioned. Both states had 
little choice considering the historical and political geography 
of the Tangier area and Britain's Strait policy. Indeed, "every 
governor of Gibraltar" was instructed "to keep ready to occupy 
Tangier, the city as well as the country district" (Die Grosse 
Politik der Europa ischen Kabinette, 1922-27, XVII, p.312; 
Stuart, 1955, p.56). 
The first official statement in relation to a special 
status for Tangier appeared in a draft treaty between France and 
Spain (1902), which Spain ultimately refused to sign. Article 4 
declared that: 
"The two High Contracting Parties, 
recognizing the importance of the city of 
Tangier with reference to the necessary 
freedom of the Strait of Gibraltar would not 
oppose the eventual neutralization of the 
city" (Becker, 1915, App.I). 
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According to Article 9 of the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1904): 
"Tangier was to keep the special character 
which the presence of the diplomatic corps 
and its municipal and sanitary institutions 
have given it" (British & Foreign State 
Papers. CII, p.432; Stuart, 1955, p.44). 
This was the first time that Tangier was given a "special 
character" in a ratified treaty. However, in spirit, neither 
Spain nor France ever relinquished hope of gaining control of 
Tangier. Article VII of the Anglo-French Treaty (1904) catered 
for free passage of the Strait. The Algeciras Conference (1906) 
did nothing to advance the question of the internationalization 
of Tangier. With the Treaty of Fez (1912) establishing the 
French protectorateship over Morocco, Britain and France 
prepared preliminary drafts for the internationalization of the 
city and its region, essentially based on the concepts of 
non-fortification and international control. 
During his famous visit to Tangier (1905), the German 
Kaiser declared that he would defend the Sultan and Islam, and 
upon German insistance the Algeciras Conference (1906) was held, 
much to France's displeasure. While the Conference ostensibly 
concerned the future of Morocco, the international community was 
getting a greater say in shaping the future geopolitics of the 
Strait region. With the famous gunboat diplomatic mission of 
the German Panther vessel to Agadir (1911), many feared the 
outbreak of a major European war. In return for a free hand in 
Morocco, France ceded over half its Congo territories to the 
Kaiser (1911). 
The process of internationalizing the Tangier area was 
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retarded by World War I. During the war, Primo de Rivera, the 
leader of neutral Spain, let it be known that his country would 
renounce claims to Tangier and other points in Africa (probably 
Ceuta) in exchange for the British Colony of Gibraltar. Britain 
refused. According to The Times (London) (11 Oct.l917) because 
of the Spanish Zone in Morocco which encircled Tangier, the 
covert pro-German sympathies were: 
"not only a threat to the present, but will 
prove a danger to the peace in Europe in the 
future". 
The French parliament also asked it's president, Clemenceau, 
"to give particular attention to the 
political destiny of Tangier, whose 
importance is very great for France and for 
the French position in Africa, the 
Mediterranean, Islam and the world" 
(L'Afrique Francaise, Nov. 1918, p.381; 
Stuart, 1955, p.69). 
These statements were classic indicators of the development of 
French geostrategy and it's Eurafrica policy (see chapter 8). 
But Spain had similar ambitions. 
According to the Spanish Ambassador to Britain, speaking 
before the Royal Geographical Society (1920): 
"Tangier belongs geographically, 
ethnologically, psychologically, and 
therefore logically to the Spanish Zone. It 
is as Spanish as other towns in 
(Spain). Spanish is spoken by the high and 
the low, Europeans, Moroccans and Jews. 
Thought and feeling, life and sentiment 
there, are Spanish. The names of the 
streets, the money, the press, the theater, 
and the songs of the children are Spanish . 
(L'Afrique Francaise, March 1920, 
p. 92). 
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Similar sentiments were reiterated by roost Spanish politicians, 
the army and press. Osorio Gallardo, a Minister of the Maura 
Cabinet (1920) stated: 
"Tangier is for Spain the 
security of the interior and 
the neutrality of the Strait" 
p. 72). 
key for the 
guaranty for 
(Stuart, 1955, 
The Heraldo de Madrid advocated taking Tangier by force in 1920, 
"similar to d'Annunzio's march on Fiume (Trieste)" (Interviews 
from El Dia, quoted in Stuart, 1955, pp.71-72). The efforts of 
the Protectorate powers (France and Spain) to gain control of 
Tangier were blocked by Britain with international support. 
4.6 TANGIER 1923-1956. 
The Tangier Statute (1923) was a formal diplomatic 
instrument drawn up by Britain and France. The Statute became a 
Convention in 1924 and hence legally binding on all signatory 
states. The main difference between the 1914 and 1923 texts was 
the retention of sovereignty over Tangier by the Sultan. 
However the Sultan did not have independence of action, but had 
to act under French auspices, because of the protectorate status 
of Morocco since 1912. Though opposed at all stages to the 
internationalization process, Spain signed the Convention in 
1924. It was eventually signed by all signatories of the Treaty 
of Algeciras (1906) (see above), except Austria, Germany, Russia 
and the USA. The administration of the 170 sq ml Zone was 
placed under international administration, providing for 
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permanent neutrality, demilitarization of the port of Tangier, 
and adherence to the open door pr.inciple in trade (see map 4. 2). 
The Sultan's legal sovereign prerogative over Moroccan citizens 
living in the Zone was exercised by his official representative 
to the International Zone, the Mendoub; but actual authority was 
held by a Committee of Control, made up of delegates of the 
signatory states. In 1928, it was revised to include Italy as a 
principal controlling power beside France, Spain and Britain 
(Spencer, 1980, pp.102-103). With the 1928 revisions, Spanish 
public opinion remained disillusioned and frustrated in its 
aspirations to create a Spanish Tangier. 
The international government of the Tangier Zone was 
regulated by the 1923 Statute. It is interesting to note that 
at this time conventions were also being prepared for the 
Turkish Straits. The Tangier Convention (1924) was revised in 
1928, abolished by Spain between 1941-1945, temporarily 
reintroduced in 1945 and finally revised in 1952, before its 
abrogation in 1956. Political competition took precedence over 
financial and administrative matters. Spain like France 
believed that it was just a question of time before they would 
gain control of the Zone. Effective international 
administration was virtually impossible because of the diverse 
interests of the powers. According to Article 25 of the Tangier 
Statute ( 1923) : 
"The autonomy 
the sovereign 
Sultan". 
of the zone cannot prejudice 
rights of His Majesty the 
As the Sultan's representative, the Mendoub was responsible for 
almost 75% 
indirect control. Until 
population. 
1945, the 
191 
Hence France was in 
Assembly comprised 26 
members: 4 French, 4 Spanish, 3 British, 3 Italian, 1 Belgian, 1 
Dutch, 1 Portuguese, 6 Muslim and 3 Jewish subjects of the 
Sultan. The USA had the right to send one representative, but 
not having signed the original Statute did not take its seat 
until after World War II. France being the Protectorate power 
in Morocco controllled not only the French seats in the Assembly 
but also the Muslim and Jewish seats. 
There were major difficulties encountered in tFying to 
balance the administrative budget of the Zone as well as 
controlling the contraband trade because of the almost open 
frontier. Another major problem was the organization of the 
judicial system, trying to accommodate the laws of the Christian 
states and those of the Muslim Sharia and Jewish Rabbinical 
courts. with the population accountable to the respective court 
systems, and a complex combination thereof. The USA kept its 
own consular court and protege system. However the codes were 
largely based on those of France and Spain. The very limited 
success of the judicial system offers a poignant example of the 
almost insurmountable problems encountered in trying to 
leglislate for a multinational and multireligious population. 
If some form of condominium were set up in the future in any of 
the disputed territories in the Strait area as has been 
suggested, a major lesson to be learned from the Tangier 
experience is the herculean problem of catering for permanent 
residents of different nationalities in terms of the judiciary 
which 
(see 
conseqently 
chapter 4). 
192 
affects economic and political organization 
It thus seems highly unlikely that an 
accommodation of Islamic and Spanish law would satisfy the 
legitimate aspirations of the Ceutis and Melillinese. Likewise 
the political alliegences of the Tangierines led to mutual 
distruct and concern to the Powers, which came to the fore 
during during World War II. 
As Spain never lost its desire to take control of Tangier, 
Britain and France were suspicious of its intentions in the 
Zone. Because the member powers of the Zone were at war and 
neutral powers like Belgium became impotent, this left neutral 
Spain in the strongest position. All powers feared a German 
invasion, including Mussolini who coveted the Zone for Italy. 
In 1940, Franco informed the French Ambassador to Madrid of his 
intention to ocupy the Tangier Zone temporarily, ostensibly to 
forestall an Italian invasion. In order to lend legality to the 
act, the Spanish Caudillo delegated the occupation to the 
military forces of the Khalifa, who invaded on 1 June 1940. 
Spain made every effort to have the Tangier Zone incorporated 
into the Spanish Protectorate Zone. 
In 1940, a Consul General of the Third 
established in Tangier to spy on Allied activity in 
Reich was 
the Strait 
region. In 1941, Spain facilitated the escape of three Italian 
submarines via its territorial waters. which had been supposedly 
interned in Tangier harbour. Spain supported propaganda 
activities against Britain and tampered with the local British 
press and postal system. In 1944, because of covert Spanish 
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activities, the USA suspended oil shipments to Spain, which were 
being indirectly sold to Germany. Subsequently, Spain agreed to 
close the German consulate in Tangier and to expel German agents 
and saboteurs. The Tangierines had not forgotten the Kaiser's 
theatrical defence of Islam in 1905 (see above), and the latent 
anti-Jewish sentiments of the Muslim population facilitated 
Spain in flagrantly abusing the neutral status of Tangier. This 
lesson was not forgotten by Britain or the USA. 
In 1946, Spain released an official publication entitled 
"Tangier under the Protective Action of Spain During the Second 
World War" (Stuart, 1955, pp.146-l47), in which Spain proudly 
pointed out its investment in medecine and achievement in 
introducing compulsory primary education. With the Allied 
invasion of North Africa, Spain was willing to hand back Tangier 
to international control, but wanted it to be understood that 
Spain would be the dominant power as France had lost its 
prestigious international image. 
In 1944, both Britain and the USA produced plans for the 
future of the Zone, which were similar in essence: (i) to keep 
the zone international, though in a revised form to the pre-1940 
situation, and (ii) to make Spain end its occupation. Britain 
proposed a strengthening of the 1923 Agreement with the USA and 
USSR ratifying it. In 1945, the USA, Britain and France met in 
Paris to discuss the future of the Zone. Stalin made it clear 
that he would not support Franco at the helm in Tangier. 
Although the 1924 Convention was more or less reactivated and 
applicable to those who had signed the Algeciras Convention 
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(1906), Article I gave the USA and USSR r8presentation on the 
Committee of Control and International Leglislative Assembly, 
with each receiving three seats. They were on a par with 
Britain, while Spain was deprived of all administrative posts. 
The USSR issued a unilateral declaration stating that Spain 
should not be admitted to participate in the permanent 
administration of the Zone as long as its government remained 
fascist. The Soviets also wanted to exclude Spain £rom the 
interim arrangements. Despite some condemnations of the Franco 
regime by the other powers, they insisted on permitting Madrid 
to participate in the provisional government, as the largest 
percentage of the European population in Tangier was Spanish and 
most food supplies came from Iberia. With Spanish withdrawal 
from the Neutral Zone in October 1945, the USA appointed its 
representatives to the governing body, but the USSR did not. 
The USSR did not send representatives to the Committee or 
Assembly; sections of the new Statute were therefore prepared by 
the USA and then ameliorated in consultation with the other 
governments. Because of the Soviet absence, no effort was made 
to secure Soviet approval (Stuart, 1955, p.153). The new 
Tangier Statute afforded greater advantages to the local 
inhabitants, reasserting that sovereignty resided in the Sultan 
and that equality of commercial opportunity was open to all 
nations. Some of the proposed changes were: 
(i) the delimitation of exact boundaries, a process started 
in 1925 and never completed; 
(ii) cooperation with the UN Security Council in securing 
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the Zone; 
(iii) diplomatic agents with military, naval and air 
attaches to replace the consular corps; 
(iv) freedom of speech, assembly, press and religion; 
(v) the establishment of educational institutions by 
interested Powers; and 
(vi) a new form of representation for the Muslims. 
US involvement in the Zone marked a major milestone in its 
rise to power as a global maritime leader and in its straits 
politics. From then on, the USA partially achieved indirect 
control of the Strait via Britain and Morocco. The USSR then, 
not being a major maritime power, missed a golden oppertunity of 
gaining influence in the Strait area. Stalin's ideological 
intransigence regarding participation with Francoist Spain was a 
gamble which did not pay off. The Soviets like France, believed 
that the Allies would not permit a fascist regime to remain in 
power in Spain. 
In the post-World War II period, Tangier prospered as an 
international banking centre, smuggling entrepot, refuge for 
Moroccan nationalist leaders and headquarters for the Voice of 
America (Spencer, 1980, pp.102-103). The American presence in 
the Maghreb during World War 11 offered local nationalists 
greater hope for independence. During the Casablanca Conference 
(1943), President Roosevelt had supported Mohammed V's demands 
for Moroccan independence. 
In 1944, the Istiqlal Party was set up in Morcco with its 
manifesto being based on many Allied declarations, such as the 
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right to self-determination, and the Atlantic Charter. The 
Istiqlal also stressed the value of the Moroccan war effort in 
support of the Allies. Under the orchestration of the Istiqlal, 
the Sultan, Mohammed Ben Youssef publicly demanded the 
independence of his country at Tangier in 1947, and spoke with 
praise for the Arab League as champion of all Muslim Arabs. The 
international community heeded the warning, and Morocco began to 
receive diplomatic support. The Sultan pursued a policy of 
obstructionism, while France intensified its military control. 
In 1951, the four main Moroccan political groups signed the Pact 
of Tangier. This called for independence from France, 
collaboration with the Arab League and a policy of 
non-collaboration with the communist party. This fiercely 
anti-communist stance in relation to internal politics was 
maintained after independence (see chapter 8). 
In 1952, during celebrations commemorating the 40th 
anniversary of the Treaty of Fez which established the 
Protectorate, rioting broke out in Tangier in which 9 Moroccans 
were killed and over 80 wounded, and cars belonging to the 
foreign community were damaged. The Committee agreed that 
reinforcements of police and troops be brought in when necessary 
from the Spanish and French Zones. By 1952, the population of 
the Tangier Zone had grown to 172,300 people, made up of 105,000 
Moroccan Muslims, 15,000 Moroccan Jews and 52,000 Europeans and 
others. 
In 1952, subsequent to a dispute between France and the USA 
concerning US base activities in Morocco, the International 
197 
Court of Justice (ICJ) reaffirmed that under the Treaty of Fez 
(1912), Morocco was a sovereign state. By inference this 
included the Tangier Neutral Zone. With the Moroccan case being 
debated in international fora such as the UN and Arab League, 
the days of the Zone were numbered. With the end of the 
Moroccan Protectorate, the Tangier Statute was abrogated in 
1956. A special Royal Charter was granted to cover the transfer 
of powers back to Morocco (1957-59). All international controls 
were formally abolished. 
4.7 OVERVIEW: THE TANGIER NEUTRAL ZONE. 
As a model of neutralization astride the Strait, the Zone 
was a success in that an actively belligerent power did not gain 
control of the area nor was it used as a base to obstruct 
international passage, despite the dubious activities of Spain 
during World War II. It formed part of a complex geopolitical 
symbiosis and the ending of its international status left a 
certain power void which to date has not been exploited by 
hostile forces. The abrogation of its special status enhanced 
the importance of the Crown Colony of Gibraltar for the 
international community. As Morocco has often pointed out, the 
present international balance of power could not tolerate 
Spanish control of the Gibraltar peninsula and bases on the 
southern shore also (LeGrand Maghreb, no. 37, p.21; ibid, 
no.38, p.87). 
Despite Tangier's limited port facilites, and the Zone's 
198 
limited natural resources including water, international 
cooperation made it functional. Although there was active 
cooperation in many spheres, the Zone was never completely 
international in the same sense as Danzig was under the League 
of Nations (1919-1939). It was more like a territory under the 
sovereignty of the Sultan and the Powers, but the Sultan's 
actions were dictated by France. In turn French policy was 
limited by treaty obligations and Paris had to act within the 
limits agreed upon with Britain (1904). In turn Spanish action 
was determined by France (1904,1912), and consequently 
indirectly by Britain. 
British policy since the 18th century had dictated that 
Tangier be either British, Moroccan or international. In real 
terms the participation of other states in the administration of 
the Zone (save the USA after 1946) reinforced Britain's Strait 
policy. The fact that the Zone was taken over by Spain 
(1940-45) so easily shows the weakness of the international 
community to uphold Tangier's special status. Britain's efforts 
to have the Soviet Union participate in the administration of 
the Zone after 1945 shows that there was a genuine desire to 
reinforce the ideal of Tangier as a neutral international Zone. 
With the setting up of the UNO (1945), the US Ambassador to 
Portugal suggested that Tangier be chosen as the home of the 
organization. Besides struggles for prestige and the varying 
objectives of the administering states, the ultimate result was 
that the Zone enhanced security of the Strait and aided in 
guaranteeing freedom of passage for all nations. However this 
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security was primarily contingent on Britain's Crown Colony. 
With the demise of the Zone, Britain continued to play its 
traditional role of guaranteeing free passage to the 
international community and ensuring that a strong hostile power 
did not establish itself in Tangier. Britain has also continued 
to act as an indirect mediating force between Spain and Morocco 
in relation to the Strait, Spanish decolonization, and the 
Plazas. Though Tangier was not militarized after 1956, there is 
no guarantee for the future. The "union" which took place 
between Libya and Morocbo in 1984 vas viewed with alarm by 
states as diverse as Algeria and the USA. Despite the fact that 
it was obvious to most observers that the union would neither be 
harmonious nor long-lived, and that it was primarily a Moroccan 
strategy to gain Libyan support against the Polisario Liberation 
Front and counterbalance Algeria's strong system of regional 
alliances, there was apprehension in the international 
community. The union came to an end in 1986. However the union 
was symptomatic of the precarious nature of intra-Maghrebi 
politics (see chapter 8). 
During the international period, the local population of 
Tangier was not exploited in the traditional colonial manner, 
but neither were the people treated as equals by the foreigners. 
In fact the 1923 Statute effectively defranchized them. However 
their standard of living was higher than in most areas of 
Morocco. 
rarely 
Today Tangier is one of the poorest Moroccan cities, 
visited by King Hassan, and having no royal palace or 
university so evident in other cities patronized by the monarch. 
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The Tangierines regret their lost prosperity, and the Zone now 
forms part of the local mythology. In general the author found 
that the King was far less popular in Tangier than in other 
areas of Morocco (interviews March-April 1985). When there are 
violent upheavals in the future, Tangier is most likely to be a 
centre of agitation. 
4.8 TANGIER: 1987. 
In general researchers tend to view Tangier from an 
historical viewpoint 
Tangier disappeared 
Eurocentric vision 
only. 
in 1956. 
of world 
One is almost led to believe that 
Perhaps this is due to a 
history and the fact that the 
international community tends to think only of the Crown Colony 
of Gibraltar when the Strait is mentioned. Because of the base 
and Britain's ability since the 18th century to guarantee 
freedom of passage, there is a tendency to forget that Tangier 
is also a key to the Strait. With the rise of regional powers, 
nationalism and militant Islam since the 1970s, Tangier can no 
longer be viewed as an historical vestige nor quaint touristic 
attraction, particularly when the sovereign status of the Crown 
Colony and the Plazas may be changed in the future. Tangier's 
spatial and political symbiosis with the northern and southern 
shores of the Strait in the 1980s must not be dismissed. 
Tangier is a city where myth, legend and and history have 
nurtured political intrigues and ongoing fiction. The politics 
and economy of the city are elusive and yet as real as in any 
Graham Greene novel. 
has drawn attention 
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The urban amphitheatre setting on the bay 
throughout the ages, ranging from the 
Phoenicians to the Americans, coming as artists, merchants, 
tourists and soldiers. Tangier's most recent golden age 
(1923-1956) has left an environment full of colourful vestiges. 
The city in Dickensian manner is full of great expectations, 
waiting for something to turn up. Besides the day-trippers 
discovering Africa from the hotels of the Costa del Sol and the 
Crown Colony, and the ~ourist through-traffic; the Moroccan 
secret police, like the staff of the 14 consular missions are 
all waiting for "something" to turn up there or in the Strait. 
Tangier is a city which abounds with rumours. Free-enterprise 
is evident everywhere with the trafficking of counterfit 
artifacts, kif/hashish, cocaine, sex and currency. There is 
some good real estate along the coast between Tangier and Cape 
Spartel, much of which is owned by non-nationals, especially 
from the oil rich Gulf states. Some Tangierine youth spoke 
disdainfully of the rich landowners and stated to the author 
(1985) that their co-religionists are not loyal to the precepts 
of Islam (see chapter 8). 
Outside the traditional Muslim areas -the Grand and Petit 
Soccos Csouks)- and the kasbah, are the old Jewish sectors and 
the decaying Rococco-like European areas. On the outskirts, 
bidonvilles have mushroomed since the 1960s, augmented by the 
rural exodus, especially from the Rif. Beni Makada (locally 
referred to as Beni Makadam), once a small suburb is now a vast 
slum area, a microcosm of the infamous bidonvilles of 
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Casablanca. To the east of Beni Makada is sited Casa Barata 
(Cheap House), equally poor but a little less miserable. Some 
of the youth here, like their contemporaries on Moroccan 
university campuses, feel that militant fundamentalism might 
offer them and Tangier a better future (see chapter 8). 
Tangier is an important regional port, and traffic there, 
especially from Atlantic passers (which do not actually traverse 
the Strait) is significant in increasing traffic density at the 
western entrance to the Strait. Tangier is the sixth port of 
Morocco, with artisanal fishing and -industr~al activities as 
well. The free port zone localized within the port area has not 
drawn traffic away from the ports of Ceuta and Gibraltar as was 
intended by the Moroccan administration. Tangier draws most of 
its livelihood from tourism and associated activities. In the 
early 1980s about 270,000 passangers arrived annually at the 
local airport, and approximately 1 million by sea (Fauvel et al, 
1981. p. 75). 
The port is situtated about 1.6 km from the town and 12 km 
from the airport, and has sufficient water for the largest of 
vessels. The outer mole has a length of 1,219 metres. There 
are five quays; numbers 1, 2 and 3 have a length of 522 metres, 
and depths of 6.1 m, 8.23 m and 10.67 m respectively. Numbers 4 
and 5 have a length of 250.1 m, and depths of 3.96 m and 4.88 m 
respectively (Lloyds, 1984, p.48). There are crane facilities, 
one 50/75 ton, seven 6-t. two 3-t and one 2-t (Lloyds, 1984, 
p.48; Pilot, 1978). Ro/Ro facilities are provided, but bunker 
facilities are not available. Only minor ship repair services 
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are obtainable. Fresh water, meat and other provisions are 
available in plenty. Pilotage is cumpuJ__sory. 
Though situtated between the waters of the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, local authorities state that Tangier is not 
self-sufficient in fish, large quantities of which have to be 
brought in by sea and road from Rabat, Alhocima and M'diq. Of 
the 1,902 tons of fish which were offically landed at the port 
in 1984, 1,613 tons arrived in locally registered vessels 
(Andaloussi, interview, 1985). According to the local 
authorities, the fishing sector of the economy has been steadily 
growing since the late 1970s. In 1981, the number of fishing 
boats registered at Tangier was 67, 68 in 1982, 73 in 1983, and 
76 in 1984. Between 1983 and 1984, the fish catche increased by 
14.51%. Also the number of visiting ships rose from 97 in 1983 
to 116 in 1984 (Andaloussi, interview, 1985). 
Despite several fishing 
Morocco since 1956, there are 
agreements between Spain and 
fish-related problems in the 
Tangier orbit. In 1973, there were exchanges of gunfire between 
Spanish and Moroccan warships over fishing rights, and incidents 
continue (Couper, 1983, p.233). On average between 1975 and 
1985, the Tangierine authorities were responsible for the arrest 
of about 9 Spanish fishing vessels annually. In 1984, 9 Spanish 
trawlers were captured and catches confiscated, and in January 
1985 alone, 3 such vessels were impounded (Andaloussi, 
interview, 1985). The main fishing areas for the Tangier region 
are Ras Kebdand near Saida, and the seas off Nador and Al 
Hoceima (adjacent to the Spanish territory of Alhucemas) (see 
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maps 5.1, 5.2, 5.5). Coral gathering takes place in the Al 
Hoceima-M'diq area. Smaller artisanal fishing ports are located 
at Ksar Seghir between Ceuta and Tangier, Oued Dalila, and Ben 
Younich where coral gathering is important to the local economy. 
Tangier is trying to develop an ice-factory/refrigeration centre 
to encourage the fishing potential, but government investment is 
comparatively low in contrast to other Moroccan ports, despite 
plans for greater development of fishing activities not only in 
the Tangier area but also that of Melilla. 
Tangier (1985) hosts several types of fishing vessel: (i) 
trawlers using simple net techniques, of which about 9 fish the 
surrounding waters; (ii) some 10-12 sardiniers engage in surface 
and pelagic fishing at night; and (iii) various types of small 
boats, 82 of which have outboard motors, with 300-400 of a more 
traditional design. About 75 Moroccan trawlers work the Strait 
zone and also venture into Atlantic waters. The locals want 
greater investment in the industry and feel that some of the 
richest fishing grounds are in the Ceuta and Alhucemas areas 
(Andaloussi, interview, 1985). 
Resolving the social and political problems of 
could yet prove to be a task more onerous than 
decolonization in the area. 
4.9 INTERNATIONALIZATION: THE CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE. 
Tangier 
that of 
The Treaty of 31 May 1865, relating to the neutralization 
of the lighthouse on Cape Spartel, some 14 km from Tangier, 
offers another example of the efforts of the international 
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community to secure safe passage of the Strait (see maps, 4.1, 
4. 2). This has helped reinforce the international character of 
Gibraltar Strait. 
As early as 1852, a British diplomat to Morocco recommended 
to his government the erection of a lighthouse at Cape Spartel 
shortly after the stranding of the British vessel Calpes there. 
When the Britain government did not act, the initiative was 
taken by Spain after the loss of a Brazilian corvette in 1860, 
with the loss of over 125 lives off the Cape Spartel promontory. 
With the Spanish-Moroccan Commercial Treaty (20 November, 1861), 
Spain had a clause inserted in Article 43, in which the Sultan 
undertook to build and maintain a lighthouse at Cape Spartel 
(Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.157). 
The erection of the lighthouse began in 1861, under French 
direction and became operational in 1864. Immediately Britain 
began to have misgivings: 
"if for no other purpose than to prevent the 
latter power (France) having the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a work occupying such a 
commanding position and so near Gibraltar" 
(Archives of the American Legation, Tangier, 
Despatch Book 1848-1861, p.97). 
During the construction period, Britain proposed to France and 
Spain, that a petition should be made to the Sultan for a 
regulation guaranteeing the neutrality of the lighthouse in time 
of war. The potential of the lighthouse as a navigational aid 
and signalling station was obvious to all. The Sultan was 
agreeable in principle to this request, if the powers agreed to 
bear the costs. After negotiations, the 1865 Treaty was signed 
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Plate 4.3 The Cape Spartel Lighthouse (1985) 
Photograph: J.G. o•Reilly, 1985. 
207 
by Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, 
Portugal, Sweden, Norway, the USA and Morocco, who gained 
supreme co:o:c:rol and administration of the lighthouse. While the 
costs were borne by the powers, paying equal sums (1,500 French 
francs), the Sultan was responsible for repai:t:>S and 
reconstruction if necessary. The Sultan undertook to guarantee 
security in case of internal or external aggression. The powers 
agreed to respect the neutrality of the lighthouse in time of 
peace and war. 
In 1892 a semaphore was installed by Lloyds. France and 
Britain agreed that it be placed under the special regime 
already in existence for the lighthouse, except that the 
signatories would be entitled to have it closed down in time of 
war (Rouard de Card, RGDIP, Vol.II, p.319; Brriel, 1947, p.159). 
This ambivalent agreement somewhat diminished the neutral status 
of Cape Spartel, as the protection afforded to the semaphore was 
-less than that given to the lighthouse. In 1905 fog signals 
were installed. Later France strongly objected to British plans 
for the establishment of a wireless station there (Documents 
diplomatiques francaises, 21eme serie, Vol.III, No.75, p.101; 
Bruel, 1947, Vol.II, p.159). 
With the establishment of the French Protectorate (1912) 
over Morocco, there was no significant change in the legal 
status of Cape Spartel, since the treaty obligations entered 
into were not altered by the Protectorate. According to Bruel 
(1947, Vol. II, p. 159), up to World War I the administration of 
the lighthouse worked extremely satisfactorily and proved: 
that a really international 
administraion, where it concerns a 
purely technical institution, is quite 
possible if only the community of interests 
of which it is the expression is strong 
enough". 
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The neutrality of the lighthouse was respected during both 
World Wars. After 1918, Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia 
ceased to pay their contributions; Morocco (under French aegis) 
took on this obligation. Obviously this policy was pursued by 
France with the intention of gaining more power in the proposed 
Tangier International Zone, in which Cape Spartel was enclaved 
(see map 4. 2). Article 53 of the Tangier Statute (1923), 
describes the 1865 Treaty as only being provisionally in force. 
In 1926, a proposal of the Sultan suggested that after 
modernization the lighthouse should be placed under the 
supervision of the technical section of the Tangier 
administration. In essence this meant under a Frenchman. Italy 
and the USA blocked this attempt to undermine the neutrality of 
the lighthouse on the grounds that the Tangier Statute (1923) to 
which they were not signatories could not abrogate in any form 
the provisions of the 1865 Treaty, "res inter alios acta". This 
problem was resolved within the context of the 1865 Treaty. 
On the whole the Cape Spartel model of neutralization 
worked somewhat better than that of the Tangier Neutral Zone. 
Because of the difference in area and purely technical aspects 
of the administration, there was less scope for rivalry on 
significant matters. With independence (1956), Morocco regained 
Cape Spartel and responsibility for the lighthouse, which has 
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functioned ever since without major problems for the 
international community. The historical and political geography 
of the Cape Spartel lighthouse is significant because it 
represents yet another attempt to enhance the international 
character of the Strait. 
4.10 CONCLUSION. 
From the 18th century until 1956, Britain with the 
collaboration of the 
Tangier's geopolitical 
international community ensured that 
role did not pose a military threat to 
international usage of the Strait, and reinforced its 
international character. The Neutral Zone like Cape Spartel 
enhanced security and the international ethos of the area 
reinforcing the philosophy of freedom of the seas. The models 
of internationalization at Tangier and Cape Spartel only worked 
because of their spatial juxtaposition within the geopolitical 
power hierarchy with Britain at the apex. The Lighthouse and 
Zone experiments were in keeping with imperial policies of the 
period, as is evidenced by passage politics and treaties in 
relation to the Suez and Panama Canal Zones, and the Turkish 
Straits. However the Tangier model was probably the most 
developed and successful in internationalization experiments in 
territories adjacent to straits. Significantly in 1956 Morocco 
regained control over the Zone, and Egypt nationalized the Suez 
Canal (often seen as the first step in the Islamic resurgence of 
this century); while within a few years Turkey was drawn into 
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the NATO alliance. With the ending of international control of 
the Zone, it proved once and for all that internationalization 
of territories adjacent to Gibraltar was a lost dream, and once 
more that there was no de facto legal instrument catering for 
the Strait's international status. Thus security of passage had 
to be guaranteed by a strong power upholding the 
internationalist tradition, with the legitimizing support of the 
world community. After 1956 Britain reverted to the original 
Strait policy which it had employed in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. By 1958, the international community was ready to 
debate the straits issue in the UN forum. 
The Tangier model is clearly no longer feasible in the 
post-colonial era. It is doubtful whether Tangier will remain 
demilitarized, especially if Gibraltar is retroceded to Spain. 
Sovereign security of strait states like Morocco is perceived to 
be more vulnerable than that of other types of states. After 
1956, Morocco re-asserted it's sovereign prerogatives in 
reclaiming Ceuta and other Spanish Territories in North Africa, 
and laid claim to 12 nm territorial waters. Like Spain during 
the third UN conferences on the law of the sea (1967-82), 
Morocco sought to have the waters of the Strait equated with 
territorial waters subject to the legal regime of innocent 
passage, which was blocked by the maritime powers (see chapter 
3). Since the 1970s, Morocco has been actively engaged in 
promoting the idea of a trans-Strait bridge in the Tangier area 
(see chapter 1). Morocco has sought membership of such 
supranational organizations as the EC (1987), stressing the 
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advantages of its geostrategic location. In terms of distance, 
Tangier is the closest African, Arab and Muslim city to the EC 
(see chapter 3). 
The poverty and corruption evident in Tangier is 
symptomatic of Morocco's present social and political problems, 
which the army or fundamentalists may yet try to redress. 
Exploitation of Tangier's geopolitical and strategical 
advantages in threatening security of the Strait would be a 
major card to play in attracting international attention in a 
revolutionary situation. 
Like the Rifians, the Tangierines earn a substantial part 
of their livelihood from illicit trade with the Crown Colony and 
Ceuta (see chapters 4-5). An increase in food prices and 
stricter customs controls on the Moroccan side of the Ceuta 
frontier led to serious rioting in December 1983 and January 
1984. Decolonization of the Spanish Plazas and particularly 
Ceuta will prove to be far more problematic than that of the 
international Zone in 1956. 
The present geopolitical mosaic of the Strait region is the 
result of the historical competition between Morocco and Spain 
for control of both coasts of the Strait, and interaction 
between them and extra-regional global powers such as Britain. 
The spatial juxtaposition of micro-models of neutralization and 
militarization within the region, with British stewardship from 
the Crown Colony assured security of usage of the Strait from 
the 18th to the mid-20th centuries. From this it may be deduced 
that the spatial organization and hierarchy of power control in 
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the area assured the major powers and international community 
security of passage of the Strait. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
'.r:B:E SPANISH .S_llVBRt:lGN J'ERRITORIES IN NORTH AFRICA. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Since the 15th century, Ceuta on the southern shores of the 
Strait of Gibraltar has been disputed by Spain and Morocco. 
With the establishment of British power at Gibraltar (1704), 
Moroccan-Spanish contentions were limited by British strategy, 
and Spain's imperial designs were circumscribed by Britain's. 
Both Spain and Morocco claim sovereignty over five territories 
(Plazas) on Morocco's northern coast (see maps 5. 1-5.5). Spain 
claims them on historical grounds, right of conquest, terra 
nullis principles, longevity of occupation, national security, 
territoritial integrity of the state, and the fact that the vast 
majority of residents there are Spanish. Morocco counter-argues 
that the Spanish presence is anachronistic, the "territories" 
are the sequestrals of colonialism; they obstruct economic and 
political independence; the bases threaten the security of the 
state being legitimate targets in a dispute to which Spain is a 
party and Morocco not, hence the territorial integrity principle 
applies (UN General Assembly Res. 1514(XV), parag.6); and 
Spanish arguments for the recovery of the British Colony of 
Gibraltar substantiate Moroccos' to the Plazas (see appendix V). 
Because of the intensity of Spanish actions in trying to recover 
the Gibraltar Colony since the 1960s, and powerful global 
re-assertion of Islamic independence since the 1970s, Morocco 
wishes to regain the geographical advantages offered by its 
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northern coast. 
Islam failed to secure permanent sovereignty on both coasts 
of the Strait, unlike the situation at the Bosporus and 
Dardanelles. During the Crusades, Christian Spain reconquered 
not only the northern shore but established several bases on the 
southern shore of the Strait. Those still held are the two 
Major Plazas de Soberanina or Sovereign Territories of Ceuta and 
Melilla, and three Minor Plazas, Pen6ns de Velez de la Gomera, 
Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands. Collectively they cover 
an area over 31 sq km (see maps 5.1-5.5). 
Usually only Ceuta and Melilla are discussed because they 
are the largest, and Ceuta is geostrategically situtated at the 
eastern entrance to the Strait. Sometimes these territories are 
referred to as Presidios, so called because of their original 
function as penal colonies. They are commonly referred to as 
enclaves. While Ceuta and Melilla are enclaved from a 
territorial viewpoint, the Minor plazas are not. All the 
territories have access to the sea and are therefore not 
enclaved entirely by the Moroccan state. As the Plazas de jure 
form an integral part of the Spanish state, the 1958 and 1982 
LOS Conventions would substantiate Madrid's claims to 
jurisdiction over adjacent territorial waters (UNCLOS, UN 
A/Conf.62/122, 1982, Arts.3-15). Thus ingress and egress to the 
Plazas is not legally dependent on Morocco. None of the Plazas 
are economically viable. They cast a shadow over 
Moroccan-Spanish relations and could yet be a cause of 
instability in the Strait region. After centuries of rule, 
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Spain still finds itself in the position of having to defend its 
sovereign claims legally, politically and militarily. 
Spain vehemently asserts its right to sovereignty over the 
Plazas, yet protests at the British presence in the Crown 
Colony. This paradox is a result of the complex historical 
geopolitical organization of the Strait area and the cultural 
conditioning of a once imperial people now reduced to being a 
shadow empire state. There are social, economic and political 
problems in the Plazas which are affecting not only 
Spanish-Moroccan relations but will eventually have geopolitical 
repercussions on the entire region. 
In 1956, Tunisia gained independence receiving ill-defined 
frontiers. Algeria won independence (1962) within disputed 
boundaries, especially to the west and gained mammoth 
hydrocarbon-rich areas in the Sahara. Morocco achieved 
independence (1956) with a fragmented territory. Morocco was 
left with the problem of trying to reconstruct its territorial 
integrity. With the ending of the French and Spanish 
Protectorates (1956), Spain only relinquished the protectorate 
territories. It took Morocco over 20 years to regain Tarifya 
and Ifni from Spain, and withdrawal from the Western Sahara 
(1976) has led to a bloody war between Morocco and the Saharawi 
people (see chgapter 8, maps 8.4.a,b,c). The Spanish Plazas on 
Morocco/s northern frontier give access to the Mediterranean 
Sea. The two major ones possess natural harbours with the 
consequent negative economic, political and naval effects on the 
Moroccan state. In Spain, Ceuta is often referred to as the 
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Pearl of the Mediterranean. Throughout history, most major 
powers have vied for control of these bases. 
5.2 THE PLAZAS. 
The Balkanization of Morocco's northern frontier, and 
apartheid organization within the Plazas can no longer be seen 
as a purely bilateral issue, as contentions pose a threat to 
security of the Strait. The dispute has negative effects not 
only on geopolitical relations between Spain and Morocco but 
also the supranational groups to which they belong such as the 
EC, NATO, Arab League and Islamic Conference (see chapters 7-8). 
The frequently-reported violent uonflicts between Muslims and 
Europeans in the Plazas (1985-87) could easily escalate (Le 
Monde 30 Jan.1986, p.4; ibid, 13-14 April 1986, p.xiii; ibid, 
22-23 June 1986, p.5; Economist, 28 June 1986, p.60; ibid, 22 
Nov.1986, pp.62-63; Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2; Times, 18 
Nov.1986, p.9; ibid, 9 Feb.1987, p.6; Guardian, 1 Feb.1987, p.6; 
Observer, 8 Feb.1987, p.10). 
5.2.1 Spain Vs Morocco. 
Spanish strategy in the Plazas has always had the dual 
function of being offensive and defensive: 
(i) to defend Iberia against the jihad; 
(ii) to control the Strait; 
(iii) to enhance its prestige as a Mediterranean power; 
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(iv) to influence Morocco's Strait policy and that of other 
interested states; 
(v) to strengthen Spain's "crusade" and Christian "mission" 
in the Maghreb (historically the Plazas furnished refuge to 
Christian ships); 
(vi) to make use of the bases during its colonial wars 
against Morocco (1859-60, 1909-1923); and 
(vii) to enhance Spain's position in relation to global 
leaders, ranging from the Portuguese to the British, and 
currently NATO. 
One of Morocco's main arguments in demanding sovereignty 
over the Plazas is that of the territorial integrity of the 
state. Physical and historical geography would support this 
contention. 
Historically Moroccan strategy in trying to regain 
sovereignty over the Plazas has been a mixture of: 
(i) direct attack and siege mounted by the Sultan's army; 
(ii) attacks mounted by the Rifian tribes, often with the 
covert aid of the Sultan; 
(iii) treaties with Spain, affording Morocco time to mount 
other campaigns; 
(iv) diplomatic activity via third parties such as France 
and Britain; and 
(v) monitoring the balance of power in the Strait, in the 
belief that any change in status of the Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar would be the signal for a change of sovereignty 
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in the Plazas. 
It was only in 1906 that the Presidios lost their status as 
penal colonies. With the Spanish offensive during the Rif War 
(1909-27), Madrid tried to use the Ceuta and Melilla bases as 
"bridge-heads" in penetrating the Protectorate Zone which 
necessitated heavy investment in port and military 
installations. The great Arab-Berber leader, Abd el Krim, 
became a legendary international figure during the Rif War. To 
the Arab/Muslim world he was seen as leading the jihad against 
Spain and France, but his struggle was also one for independence 
in the historic tradition of the Berbers, he was not fighting on 
behalf of the Sultan. The great independent spirit of the 
Rifians has been manifest throughout history and as recently as 
January 1984, during riots in the Melilla region. Berber-Rifian 
nationalism, despite an Islamic identity with other Maghrebis is 
based on ethnic and cultural roots. The grinding poverty of the 
Rifians stands out in sharp contrast to King Hassan's Arab 
oligarchy. For many decades the Rifians have depended on the 
freeports of Ceuta and Melilla for a substantial part of their 
livelihoods. With the Spanish-Moroccan Convention of Fez 
(1866), customs frontiers were organized, which have since 
greatly affected the Moroccan hinterlands. 
5.2.2 Population. 
One of Spain's major arguments in justifying its continued 
sovereignty over the Major Plazas is that 
continuously occupied for centuries by Spaniards 
majority of the population. 
they 
who 
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have been 
form the 
In 1986, Ceuta had a population of about 55,000 Spaniards 
and approximately 15,000 Muslims. Melilla had a population of 
45,000 Spaniards (including a 15,000 strong military garrison), 
with perhaps 27,000 Muslims, half of whom are technically 
illegal immigrants (Economist, 28 June 1986, p.60). It is 
estimated that there are some 20,000-27,000 Spanish troops 
stationed in Plazas (Heiberg, 1983, p.20; Le Monde, 13 Nov.1986, 
p.4) Both Plazas are military strongholds, freeports and centres 
for smuggling. Most of their area lies within prohibited 
military zones, the civilian population crowding together on the 
remaining land. Smuggling and trafficking at the official 
cross-border posts and the frontiers riddled with gaps is rife. 
Although the Plazas are some 500 km apart, most Spaniards see 
them as an entity. Ceuta being only 30 km from Algeciras is 
embedded in the culture and economy of Andalucia. Because of 
distance from Iberia, Melilla has a closer economic and cultural 
symbiosis with Morocco, but this has not led to a harmonious 
relationship between the Europeans and Muslims. The negative 
effects of the siege mentality (racism, intransigence, and 
residual fascism) are more evident in Melilla than Ceuta, 
presumably because the Melillinese feel more threatened. 
Ceuta and Melilla were sparcely populated until about 1906 
and thereafter grew continuously until 1940. The population 
rose substantially between 1950-62, receiving an influx of 
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Europeans or Pieds Noirs, from the newly independent states of 
Algeria and Morocco. Since the 1970s, the European population 
has been decreasing. 
The civilian population of the Chafarinas Islands (60.7 ha) 
fell from 500 in 1950 to 38 in 1973, with a garrison of 195 
service people (150 males and 45 females) (Rezette, 1976, p.73). 
The military presence has decreased and by 1987, the civilian 
population had dwindled to a few fishermen. 
The main link between the Chafarinas and the outside world 
is via Melilla, which is administratively and militarily 
responsible for the Minor Plazas. The Minor Plazas have no 
economic activities to sustain a sizeable population. 
Pen6n de Velez de la Gomera (3.9 ha) has experienced a 
demographic trend similar to that of the Chafarinas. It's 
civilian population fell from 500 in 1950 to 8 in 1973 and a 
garrison of 71 people (66 male and 5 female) (Rezette, 1976, 
p.73). By 1987, Velez was almost deserted of civilians, and had 
only a token garrison presence. 
Alhucemas' (1.2 ha) population fell from 322 (1950) to 3 in 
1973, hosting a garrison of 63 people (61 males and 2 females) 
(Rezette, 1976, p.74). By 1987, there was only a token military 
presence. 
The residual port petrol products industry at 
the mining industry at Melilla is in decline. 
Ceuta, like 
Most of the 
locals earn their 
industries. Like 
livelihood from fish and tourist related 
military spending, legalized smuggling under 
the regime of free ports furnishes an artificial economic 
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activity (Rezette, 1976, p.75; Memoria Anual, Puerto de Ceuta, 
1982, p.l9). Like Gibraltar, Ceuta has to import everything 
from abroad. 
(a) The Ceutis. 
The Ceutis are mostly of Andalusian origin, with the 
majority employed as merchants, sailors and fishermen. 
Fish-related industries, such as canning and drying are the main 
employers. Muslims work in the fish plants and stores. The 
number of Jewish and Asiatic merchants was substantially 
augmented by inmigration from the Tangier Neutral Zone in 1956. 
With the ending of the Spanish Protectorate Zone (1956), the 
Plazas were heavily militarized. Everywhere religious and 
military symbols attest to the fact that Ceuta is a frontier 
town. 
The demography of Ceuta has greatly fluctuated over the 
centuries, with population expansion constrained by the limited 
area. In the late 18th century, Ceuta's population numbered 
about 7,000 people, of which over 50% were prisoners or 
soldiers. By 1900 the population had risen to about 10,000. In 
1970, there were 73,000 residents, with about 4,000 not being 
officially registered. Of this number 5,000-10,000 were 
military personnel (Rezette, 1976, p.70). In 1987, the 
population was estimated to be about 70,000 people (Economist, 
28 June 1986, p.60). The number of military personnel is 
estimated at about 12,000. Accurate population statistics are 
not readily available for Ceuta. This is partly for political 
reasons but also the fact that it is difficult to enumerate the 
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number of people living in the Muslim bidonvilles of Benzou and 
Prince Alphonse. When Franco bestowed Spanish nationality on 
many Muslims who had served in the Spanish army, the Muslim 
population of Ceuta offically doubled to 6,000 (1960). There 
are three legal mosques. 
The largest inmigration of Jews dates from the 1860s. 
Indian and Pakistani inmigration occurred mostly via the Crown 
Colony of Gibraltar and the Tangier Neutral Zone. The majority 
of these people are engaged in trading activities. The Jewish 
and Asiatic groups constitute about 1% of the population, but 
are extremly important to the business life of the community. 
Nowadays, the majority of young Ceutis go to mainland Spain for 
educational and work opertunities, while those coming to Ceuta 
are not longterm residents. 
(b) The Melillinese. 
Like Ceuta, Melilla has demographic problems. In 1860, the 
population was about 1,880 persons, but the excessive poverty of 
1867-68 reduced numbers by 50%. With Spanish penetration of the 
Rif region (1893-1909), the population rose steadily numbering 
some 41,000 by 1910. By 1950, there were 81,000 Spanish 
nationals in the Plaza. This number fell to 79,000 by 1960 and 
58,000 by 1974 (including 2,000-3,000 garrison personnel). 
Since then there has been a drop in births and marriages in the 
area. In 1974, some 1,200 Jews were listed as permanent 
residents, mostly inmigrants from Algeria and proteges of 
France. In 1974, officially over 90% of the population was 
Spanish and 3.5% consisted of assimilated Jews (Rezette, 1976, 
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p.72-3). In 1987 it was estimated that the population numbered 
about 60,000. According toLe Monde (22-23 June, 1986, p.5), 
there are about 27,000 Muslims j,n Melilla and 45,000 others. 
According to the official Spanish census (1986), the Muslim 
population was found to be only 17,000, instead of the usual 
estimate of 27,000. However between 5,000-10,000 Muslims may 
enter and leave daily (Financial Times, 30 Sep.l986, p.2). 
In 1985-86, violent intercommunal strife flared up in the 
Plaza because of Madrid's new aliens laws, which directly 
affected most of Melilla's Muslim population. In 1986, about 
6,000 Muslims were awaiting decisions on their applications for 
Spanish nationality; while only 4,500 hold Spanish passports, 
2,400 have residence permits and 4,800 hold "special status 
cards''. The latter cards do not entitle holders to travel 
freely. draw social security or rent a house (Financial Times, 
30 Sep.1986, p.2). Madrid attempted to introduce an 18 month 
integration plan for the Muslim community (1986) but this 
encountered major problems as its scope was limited in real 
terms, for instance Muslims born in Melilla do not automatically 
receive Spanish citizenship. For naturalization 10 years 
residence has to be proven, with the onus on the individual, 
rather than the administration to clarify the bureaucratic 
procedures, which has denied the legitimate presence of many 
Muslims for decades. 
Concerning the Melillinese Muslims demand for Spanish 
citizenship, only 418 were granted Spanish nationality in 1986, 
out of a total of 17,000 requests. The Muslims say that they 
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will print their own identity documents, if Madrid does not 
grant official ones. "In their view the ideal would be joint 
Spanish-Moroccan nationality for all the inhabitants of Ceuta 
and Melilla" (Economist, 22 Nov.1986, pp.62-63). On 8 November 
1986, during a general meeting, they passed a resolution 
affirming "the Arab and Maghrebi character of Melilla". For the 
first time in history, the Plaza's Muslim population formally 
demanded reunion with Morocco. Arguably these events in Melilla 
are a forewarning of possible future scenarios in Ceuta. 
In 1987, the leader of the Muslim community, Omar Mohammed 
Dudu urged parents to withdraw their children from Spanish 
schools, unless they were taught Arabic and the Quran, and 
suggested that a parallel administration be set up if the local 
authorities continued to represent "only one of the city's two 
communities" (Economist, 22 Nov.l986 62-63). In January 1987, 
Dudu, claiming that his life was in danger fled to Morocco to 
take up temporary self-imposed exile. On 31 January 1987, 
rioting broke out in the Muslim quarter of Melilla when a group 
of people marched through the streets chanting: "Get out of 
here. This land is ours" (Guardian, 2 Feb.1987 p.6). A special 
contingent of riot police were flown in from Spain to restore 
order. 
Because of Muslim attempts to get a fairer deal, there has 
been a backlash from the Christian population with Francoists 
gaining support. In 1986, the leader of the Spanish National 
Party of Melilla, Juan Diez de la Cortina, was allegedly 
involved in terrorist plots and there was much speculation about 
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the organisation of paramilitary groups. This is reminiscent of 
the OAS (Organisation Armee Secrete) which plunged Algeria into 
an ethnic-religious bloodbath (1958-62) aimed at destroying the 
social and economic infrastructure before European withdrawal 
(Horne, 1977; Alleg, 1981). 
The non-Muslim population fear that any type of franchise 
for Muslims will be the death knell for their supremacy. 
Frustrated by the local administration and the ambiguous 
attitudes of Madrid, Muslims are looking towards Rabat for 
support. In 1986, Spain pledged over E40 million for 
infrastructural projects; the first investment on this scale in 
over 50 years (Financial Times, 30 Sep.1986, p.2). Yet about 
40% of the residents have acquired houses in mainland Spain. 
This clearly indicates how uncertain the Melillinese feel about 
their future (Cambia, no.16, 1986; Le Monde, 13-14 April 1986). 
The Muslims of Melilla and Ceuta are found in the menial 
jobs and are ostracized from the mainstream of life. This has a 
spatial representation in the bidonvilles. Many of those who 
commute daily to work from Morocco have to go through a complex 
sociology of relationships with officials on both sides of the 
frontier. Trafficking is carried out on all scales and is 
facilitated by the backsheesh system (bribes and reciprocal 
obligations). Thousands of women and children transport the 
illicit merchandise. 
Unless positive long-term action is taken by Madrid, 
greater polarization of the different communities will take 
place, with the possibility of Ulsterization. Since the Muslims 
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have begun to make their demands as an organized group, the 
Christian majority has become more mobilized, with extreme 
rightwing candidates winning a majority in local elections. In 
January 1987, rightwing nationalists in Melilla, fearing that 
Madrid would eventually give in to pressure from Rabat and hand 
over the Plaza to Morocco, appealed to the British Prime 
Minister for support, asking Margaret Thatcher ''to convince 
Madrid to follow her example in the Falkland Islands and 
Gibraltar'' (Guardian, 2 Feb.1987, p.6). A demonstration 
organized to this end with the waving of British flags and 
pro-Thatcher slogans was forbidden by the authorities. The 
Spanish National Party of Melilla, led by Juan Diez de la 
Cortina has made no secret of its anti-Moroccan stance, based on 
anti-Muslim and racist sentiments. In Melilla one of the main 
topics of conversation is the organization of extremist 
rightwing paramilitary groups. 
5.3 CEUTA/SEBTA. 
Ceuta has an area of about 19 sq km (see map 5.3). The 
Ceuta peninsula narrows to an isthmus before broadening into the 
Almina peninsula to the north east upon which is sited Mont 
Hacho (181 metres) which is of volcanic origin. Almina/Mont 
Hacho is 
located on 
chiefly a military zone. 
the isthmus and western 
The civilian settlement is 
part of the peninsula 
broadening into the mainland. There are 20 km of sea coast and 
8 km of land boundaries. Spain claims territorial waters 
Plate 5.1 
Photograph: N. Drury, 1987. 
View of the Strait of Gibraltar from Ceuta 
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Plate 5.2 
Photograph: l l. Drury, 1987. 
One of Ceuta's many Milita ry Establishments 
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extending to 12 nm around the territory. 
J~ing to the north of the isthmus is the land-locked 
harbour protected by two breakwaters, with an area of 340 acres, 
leaving an entrance of 416 metres in width, depth 14.02 metres 
(Lloyds, l984, p.45). Ceuta has 5 wharves, a fishing port and 
free port. Water displacement at low tide is about 17.70 m. 
Maximium tide amplitude is less than 1.40 m. The port is 
subject to dominant east and south-east winds. Currents are 
less than 1 knot in the area. 
The anchorage north-west of the harbour is in depths 
ranging from 18.3-22.14 m, at about 416 m off breakwater, but 
vessels have to leave this anchorage when there are strong east 
winds. The bottom off the north-west side of Dique de Poniente 
is mostly rocky. The largest vessel size capacity is 220 m 
long, 10.2 m d (Lloyds, 1984, p.45). Concerning accommodation, 
the West Mole hosts vessels with a maximium length of 220 m. 
Number 1 berth is not used because of shallow depths, no. 2 has 
ice, cold storage plant and bunkering facilities for fishing 
vessels. No. 3 berth is used for discharge and delivery of 
bunker oil grades (max. depth 10.21 m). No. 4 berth is used 
for loading and discharging goods and bunker oil grades. There 
are three warehouses on this berth with a surface area of 1036 
sq m, (max. depth 9.7 m). No. 5 berth is used for general 
goods and petroleum products (max. depth 9.45 m), attached is a 
warehouse (1,036 sq m) for storing containers. Three electric 
3/6 ton cranes and one 20/30 ton crane travel along berths 
numbers 4 and 5. The East Mole hosts vessels with a maximium 
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Jength of 180 metres (max. depth 9.45 m), and is used for 
loading and discharging petroleum products. Espana Pier (max. 
8.84 m d) is used for loading and discharging general 
merchandise, and as a ferry berth. Three warehouses are 
attached, each with a surface area of 1,036 sq m. The pier is 
equtpped with four 3/6 ton electric cranes. Canonero Data f}uay 
(798.5 m length) has a total capacity of 2,700 cubic metres of 
refrigrated chambers. There is one ro/ro ferry berth without a 
gangway (8.84 m d) and four ro/ro ferry berths with car gangways 
(7 m d). There is one LNG berth available. Concerning repair 
facilities, there are no dry docks, but one small shipyard with 
slip, can take ships up to 400 ton net. Fresh water supplies 
are available. The nearest airports are Tangier (96 km), 
Gibraltar and Malaga. Ceuta's limited natural resources are 
compensated for by proximity of supplies from Spain. 
5. 3. 1 History. 
The Phoenicians used Ceuta and Melilla as relay centres 
which were supplemented by Carthage. Ceuta derives its name 
from the Latin septem fratres, because of the seven hills which 
dominate the peninsula; the Latin Septa was Arabized to Sebta 
and Hispanized to Ceuta. With the Muslim penetration of the 
Maghreb in the 8th century, Arab geographers often referred to 
the ocean beyond the Strait as the "Sea of Shadows", from the 
vantage point of Ceuta. 
Apart from Fez, Ceuta is the most chronicled city in 
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Morocco. Islamic savants such as Cadi lyyad, Hadrami, Ibn 
Khamis Imam, Mahamed Ibn Qacim, Al Ansari, Bekri, Ibn Khaldoun, 
Idriss~ and Ibn Idara have all spoken about the historic city. 
Ceuta was the point of passage for the "Golden Route of the 
Sudan'' linking Aoudaghost, Sijilmassa, Fez and Cordoba. During 
the Muslim period, Ceuta was a centre of export to most 
Mediterranean and Maghrebi cities, reaching its apogee in the 
12th and 13th centuries, with about 1,200 Christians enjoying 
freedom of worship there. In 1260, the Pope created the 
bishopric of Ceuta. The port's naval and military organization 
was essential in holding off the Christian reconquest of Iberia. 
In the 9th century, Abou-1-Fida Ismael stated that Ceuta had 
been the "terminal point of Morocco and portal of the jihad". 
In the 15th century Al Ansari stated that Ceuta had a thousand 
mosques, 62 libraries, 43 zaouias and ribats, and was a thriving 
university city, a major culture core of Islam (Naciri, Istiqca, 
pp. 111-144, Rezette, 1976, p.27). The inter-Muslim disputes 
of the 14th century encouraged partisan Christian powers to 
support different factions, thereby furthering their own 
interests on the southern shore of the Strait (see map 4.1). 
In 1415, Juan I of Portugal took Ceuta by force in the name 
of Christendom. It became the first permanent Christian Crusade 
settlement in the Maghreb (and will possibly be the last). 
Neighbouring Tangier and Ksar el Seghir on the Strait were 
captured in 1458 by Portugal, but liberated by Ismael and his 
mujhaidin in 1691. The bloody capture of the Presidios prompted 
one governor to state: 
"it is a battle that will last 
centuries". (Ceuta and Melilla, 
Official Spanish Brochure, p.26) 
for 
1964, 
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Though Ceuta was taken by Portugal in 1415, it became 
Spanish by the union of the Iberian crowns in 1580. With the 
dissolution of the union (1640) and the treaty of 1663, the 
Ceutis opted to remain with Spain. Five years later, Ceuta was 
definitively incorporated into the Spanish state. For almost 
two centuries after that, Ceuta was subjected to sieges and 
attacks. In classical colonial manner, Spain tried to eradicate 
everything Muslim there, putting its own cultural imprint on all 
Islamic vestiges; the present Plaza de Africa was once the 
centre of the old medina with its mosques, palaces and medersas. 
Originally Ceuta and the other territories served as 
fortresses. In the 17th and 18th centuries, they were used as 
prisons (Presidios) for political and common law prisoners. It 
was only in the 19th century that they gained economic 
importance. One of the great Muslim sieges of Ceuta was helped 
by a blockade mounted with the aid of Britain's Admiral Rooke, 
who was also instrumental in establishing British control over 
the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (see chapter 6). Muslim attacks 
were strongest against Ceuta between 1727-28, 1732 and 1770-71. 
The mujahidin also besieged Melilla several times, 1694-96, 
1774, and 1775, in the latter siege Britain aided the Muslims. 
5.3.2 Economy. 
Though made into free-ports in the 19th century, it was 
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only in the early 20th century that there was substantial 
investment in the ports of Ceuta and Melilla. Fundamentally 
this was necessitated by the need to send reinforcements of 
soldiers, materials and supplies during the 1908-09 War. During 
the Protectorate era (1912-56), these ports were Spain's direct 
entrance to the Northern Zone. The geostrategical position of 
Ceuta is mirrored in the ports history as a general port (Law of 
7 May 1880, Royal Decree, 1928), as a free port (Law of 7 May 
1880, Royal Decree, 1929, law of 1955), and as a major fishing 
port (Ministerial Decree, 1935). Since the 1950s, considerable 
reconstruction has taken place at the commercial port (see 
above). 
In 1953, Ceuta was Spain's first port; it is now often 
referred to as Spain's second port. In 1972, of the 11,720 
ships that docked there, 6,689 came from or were going to other 
countries, and 5,031 were involved in coastal trade (including 
that of the mainland). Of the 614,000 tons of merchandise 
landed and loaded, 346,000 tons were international and 268,000 
tons were domestic (Rezette, 1976, p.77-81). 
In 1982, some 9,253 vessels docked at Ceuta. Of this 
number 5,696 were Spanish (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, pp.15, 
55, 66). Vessels bearing the flags of some 63 states called at 
Ceuta (see table 5.1). Concerning numbers of vessels per 
nation/flag, Spain accounted for almost 62%, followed by the 
USSR with just over 5%. The USA accounted for just over 1% and 
Morocco for a little over 0.5%. Concerning tonnage Spain ranked 
'IAAl.t S. 1 
'?,/;, :1. 
NUY.BF.R OF WSSHS t'JH I CH DOCK(:]) A'l Ct=Vf A IN 1 @82, BY FLAG. 
Flag. No.of Vessels /:( % 'fonnage (GT) ~ ~ 
Spnir. 5,696 (6i.9G>3) 16.~11,72!) ( tfl. 9S56) 
Morocco sa (0.637o) 105,385 (®.2956) 
Al!S trio 31 (0.337o) 79,456 (0.2?.56) 
BoiCJium 61 (0.69%) 96,960 (0. 2753) 
Brax i I 11 (0.117o) 31,303 (0.97%) 
1:3u Igor i a 27 (0.277o) 101,312 (0.287o) 
ChinCJ 16 (0.177o) 76,699 (El.~17a) 
Cyprus M (0.91%) 278,329 (0.'1137o) 
CzechoslovakiCi Hl (0.19?o) 11.739 (9.33%) 
Donfiltll'k 237 (?..575&) 36'/,024 (1.04%) 
Finland 40 (0.43%) Hi5,171 (0.29%) 
France 175 (1 .99?o) 6HIJ, 799 (1. 73%) 
t;J.Gerfilany 215 (2.33%) 723,927 (2.1115%) 
E. Ge many 66 (0.71%) 293,1913 (e.577o) 
Gre<aee 324 {:!1. 525l) 3,408,375 (9.667.) 
Iceland 15 (0.167.) 15,300 (0.43%) 
lndiCi 1B (0.197.) 266,277 (0.757.) 
Ireland 23 (0.25%} 29,582 (0.83%) 
Italy 57 (0.61%) 300,417 (0.85%) 
Japan 34 (0.36%) 22B,1BB (0.64%) 
Liberia 156 (1.6956) 1 ,539. 491 (4.36%) 
Mol to 26 (0.2~) 101,664 (0.28%) 
Netherlands 127 (1.3~) 250,408 (0.717o) 
Nort'lay 54 (0.5~) 254,774 (0.727.) 
No nama 225 (2.44?.) 1.184,259 (3.35%) 
Phi I i pp i nes 36 (0.3956) 156,038 (0.44%) 
Poland 127 (1.~) 658,413 ( 1. 86%) 
Portugal 31 (0.33?.) 63,766 (0.18r.) 
Singapore 44 (0.477.) 301 ,667 (0.85?.) 
StoJedcn 29 (0.31?.) 44,666 (0.12%) 
StoJi tzer I and 42 (0.45?.) 66,912 (0.187o) 
Turkey 49 (0.537o) 415,082 (1.177o) 
UK 337 (3.667.) 763,059 (2.16%} 
USA 97 (1.057.) 346,421 (0.98%) 
USSR 477 (5. 18%) 3,999,084 ( 1 . 34%} 
Yugoslavia 119 (1.29%) 707,796 (2.00%) 
Others (27 flags) 76 (0.39%) 454,954 (9.167o) 
---
9,253 35,262,594 
Source: M~RIA ANUAL 1982, Puerto de Ceuta, ~u. Direction 
General de Puertos y Costas, Ceuto. 
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first with almost 48%, followed by Greece (9.66%). Some 571 
tankers docked at Ceuta in 1982. Of these, 326 were Spanish 
(1,115,143 GRT) and 245 foreign (2,144,588 GRT) (Memoria Anual, 
Ceuta, 1982, p.67). In the early 1980s, the port annually 
handled over 3 million tons of petrol-related products. In 
1982, this included 843,136 tons of combustible liquids. 
Significantly, some 368 Spanish military vessels (282,425 GRT) 
also used the port that year. 
In 1982, over 183 Spanish fishing vessels (5,607,25 GRT) 
used the port facilities, and 46 foreign fishing vessels (4,471 
GRT). That year, there were some 64 vessels (910 GRT) 
registered in Ceuta. In 1982 over 1,572,367 kilos of fish were 
landed (molluscs 79,066 kg, crustaceans 53,480 kg and other 
types 1,439,821 kg). This amounted to over 165 million Pesetas, 
with the crustaceans accounting for over 17 million Pesetas of 
the total (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, pp.69, 83). Melilla's 
catch averages twice that of Ceuta. 
In terms of merchandise handled by the port (1982), after 
mainland Spain (2,598,483 ton), the USSR landed 92,346 tons, 
followed by the Netherlands (70,710 tons) and West Germany 
(70,447 tons). Officially 45,645 tons of British merchandise 
were landed at the port (1982) and 46,087 tons were offically 
embarked for Britain: this would strongly suggest a strong 
linkage with the Crown Colony of Gibraltar (Memoria Anual, 
Ceuta, 1982, p.79). Between 1981-82, there was a 44.33% 
increase in tonnage from foreign navigation, mostly due to the 
importation of combustible fuels (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, 
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p.15). The private commercial sector of the port activities 
brought in 9,984,884 Pesetas (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, 
pp. 4'(~59). Over 19.5 tons of alcohol and associated products 
were landed in 1982. Tobacco, cacao and coffee amounted to 
1,356 tons and imported automobiles came to 380,855 tons. 
Official statistics do not include a clear breakdown of types 
and number of vehicles imported (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, 
p.78). Hence Ceuta is a major port in the region, valued by 
Spain and coveted by Morocco. 
The ferries, Victoria and Virgen de Africa (100 vehicle 
capacity); and Ciudad de Tarifa (150 vehicle capacity) make 
connections between Ceuta and Cadiz, Melilla and the Canary 
Islands as well as Algeciras (see chapter 2). The number of 
passengers using the port in 1970 was 1,943,000 and vehicles 
numbered some 147,000 (Rezette, 1976, p.80). In 1981 and 1982, 
the port received over 2.5 million passengers annually, with 
1,316,751 entries and 1,252,642 exits in 1982. For the same 
year the port handled 290,551 vehicles; with 156,834 entries and 
133,717 exits (Memoria Anual, Ceuta, 1982, p.15). Most of these 
figures for passengers and vehicles represent through traffic en 
route for Spain or Morocco. Ceuta is also an oil port used to 
resupply vessels. Morocco has made it national policy to use 
the port of Ceuta as little as possible, in an effort to further 
the economy of Tangier and detract from Ceuta's economic 
dominance. Thus Ceuta is not only important from a geopolitical 
viewpoint, but it is also a commercial and fishing port of 
stature in the regional context. 
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Antimony is mined at Ceuta. The outcrop deposit is some 8 
by 2 km. There are six exploitable beds in the Plaza and 
surrounding mountain region, but since 1956, the Moroccan-Ceuta 
border has retarded the development of the industry, 
particularly on the Moroccan side. In Ceuta the only 
exploitable deposit left, at San Pancrasio is derisory, with 
only 125 tons extracted in 1969 and 60 tons in 1973 (Rezette, 
1976, p.93). Between 1973-1986, production varied from 50-100 
tons per year. 
5.3.3 Administration. 
Throughout the centuries Ceuta has been more closely 
integrated into Spain than the other Plazas. In theory, 
administration in the Plazas is civil, but in practice it is 
military, regulated by statutes (1955) and decrees (1962, 1964, 
1973). Ceuta is administered by a Delegate of the Government, a 
Major General, "Commander Gerneral of Ceuta", Chief of the Army 
of North Africa. Command of the Strait is under the military 
zone of Cadiz. A commander general in Melilla is responsible 
for the Minor Plazas. Most of the administration is linked to 
Granada. Ceuta's court of justice is in Seville and Melilla's 
in Granada. Ceuta hosts the consulates of Britain, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Panama, Portugal, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. 
Politically the Ceutis and Melillinese are conservative. 
It is not surprising that the signal for the Falangist coup came 
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from these Plazas on 17 July 1936, one day before armed conflict 
on the mainland. Francoist iconography and ethos is prevalent 
in both cities. The Plazas are represented in the Cortes by 
mayors. 
Since the crusades the religious administration of Ceuta 
and Melilla has been firmly entrenched in Cadiz and Malaga. 
Melilla has one mosque, but both cities had as many as 10 in 
former ages. The way of life in the Plazas reflects the 
inhabitants' siege culture. Emblems of Spanish prestige 
perpetuate the legendry hispanidad in Africa at great expense to 
Madrid and international relations (see chapter 8). 
5.4 MELILLA. 
Melilla has an area of only 12 sq km, with 3.9 km of 
coastline and 10 km of land boundaries (see map 5.4). As with 
Ceuta, Spain claims territorial waters up to 12 nm (see maps 
3. 1-3.2). The territory lies to the south of the geostrategic 
Spanish Island of Alboran (see map 1.4). Despite the extremely 
nationalistic Hispanic sentiments of Melilla, it is economically 
dependent on Morocco. Its sea port is not as good as that of 
Ceuta. The port entrance is 625 metres wide and has a water 
displacement of 9.80 m; currents do not exceed 2 knots and full 
tide is less than 0.6 m. The port offers 73,380 sq metres of 
anchorage and 11,654 sq metres of pier. The harbour depth at 
entrance is 12 metres. The North East Pier hosts vessels up to 
10.67 metres depth. The Setolazar pier has 2 berths of 100 m 
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for 9.14 metres depth, and two 7 ton cranes and one 10 ton 
crane. The second extension of the No:rth East pier is l9'i' m :i_n 
length, 8.53 metres depth, with two steam c:ranes. Villa:O.U0VB, 
{~uay is 210 m with 8. 53 metres deyth. Hibere, (.)ua)l has two 
berths, one of 167m with depths of 5.79-8.53 metres, and one 
205m with depths ranging from 4.88-7.62 metres. Campania Minas 
del Rif is a private loading quay some 246 m long, 11.89 metres 
depth (Lloyds, 1984, p.46). 
There is warehouse space of 7,300 sq m, plus 2,000 cubic m 
of refrigrated space. Containers are handled by mobile cranes. 
Bulk cargo facilities are available. There are tanker terminals 
where discharge of fuel is effected through underground 
pipelines. Bunker facilities are available. Shiprepair 
services are available with a small slipway for vessels up to 
250 tons. Pilotage is cumpolsory. Hospital facilities are 
available. Traffic in 1982 included 1,092 vessels of over 
2,900,000 GRT (Lloyds, 1984, p.46). Tahuima airport is some 17 
km from the city and is located on Moroccan territory, but is 
used jointly by Spain and Morocco. A new airport is under 
construction some 2 km from the harbour. From a geostrategic 
and commercial viewpoint, Melilla's geographical advantages are 
less important than those of Ceuta. 
Melilla gives the impression of being a conglomerate of 
towers, high walls, ditches, flags, and military and Christian 
iconography. The feelings of the city are encapsulated in a 
large inscription over the local museum: 
"Melilla was Spanish 
kingdom of Navarre 
18 years 
became so; 
before the 
162 years 
before Le Roussillon became Spanish; 279 
years before the birth of the United States 
of America" . 
5. 4. 1 Histor_:x. 
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Melilla is of Phoenician origjn. The city was colonized on 
the orders of the Roman Emperor, Vespesian, in AD 70. Genseris, 
a Vandal chief ravaged Melilla and Ceuta in AD 429-432, also 
taking Hippone/Annaba (AD 430), Carthage (439) and Rome (455). 
There is little documentation concerning the history of 
Melilla. Some decades after the Muslim conquest, the small town 
was destroyed by the Normans (859) but it was recaptured by the 
Caliph of Cordoba (926). After that, Muslim dynasties struggled 
for control, especially the Fatimids of Ifriqua/Tunisia, and the 
Omeyyads of Spain. Between the 8th and 14th centuries, Melilla 
grew with Sijilmassa, the leading city of Tafilalet, both were 
linked by a caravan route. Melilla acted as the main port for 
Fez and Taza, trading with such city states as Genoa, Venice, 
Pisa and Aragon (Fauvel et al, 1981, p.l85). Eventually it was 
taken by the Spanish in 1497. Since then it has witnessed many 
sieges and blockades, the most famous being in 1774. Melilla's 
geostrategic location on the Mediterranean coast and offering 
access to the Rif region has meant that it has had to defend 
itself from attack by sea and land. Like Ceuta, Melilla served 
as a penal colony until the early 20th century, and has been 
continuously used as a military base, which acted as a major 
"bridge-head" 
( 1908-1923). 
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in the Spanish penetration of northern Morocco 
Because of its bloody history over the past five 
centuries, it is doubtful that tho p:i:osent i:o.h&,bi·c&,:.J.ts would 
agree to a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute in 
~orocco's favour. 
5.4.2 Economy. 
Melilla is not as strategically located as Ceuta and in the 
colonial era had to compete with the ports of Nemours and Oran 
(Algeria). It is about 185 km (115 miles) from Malaga and 200 
km (125 miles) from Ceuta. Melilla is subject to the north and 
north-west winds, especially the Levanter which has severely 
damaged the port several times, notably in 1914 and 1945. 
Between 1946-1963, there was extensive investment in dredging, 
wharfage and so on. Melilla became a freeport by law in 1902 
and by Royal Decree in 1928. Essentially, in this century 
Melilla was a mining port with rail links to the Rif iron 
deposits. During the Protectorate (1912-56), it exported over 1 
million tons of iron ore annually from the Beni Bou Ifrour 
region. Maximium activity was attained in 1960, when over 1.5 
million tons of ore were extracted. In its drive to build 
economic independence, Morocco refines some of the ore and 
exports the remainder via Nador. Besides ore, thousands of tons 
of clay and kaolin used to be exported via Melilla. Since the 
1970s Melilla's percentage of Rif mine exports has been steadily 
declining as Nadors' develops. 
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Passenger traffic is much lower at Melilla than Ceuta; in 
the 1980s it averaged about 307,000 annually and vehicle t~affic 
ave~aged about 19,000. In the oarly 1980s about 1,000 families 
earned their living from fishing and associated activities. 
Crustaceans (mostly shrimp) amounted to almost 10% of ·Lhe total 
catch, but accounted for 25% of the total value. Profitable 
control of the fishing industry in MelilJ.a is concentrated in 
much fewer hands than in Ceuta. There are eight fish plants. 
Morocco's extension of its exclusive fishing 7.0ne from 12 nm to 
70 nm (1970) and EEZ (1981), despite several fishing agreements 
with Spain has had a negetative effect on the local industry. 
Like Ceuta, Melilla's tertiary sector and tourist trade is 
derisory. While both cities, especially Melilla, have a certain 
exoticism and rich mixture of cultures and history, they hold 
little potential for mass tourism. Melilla is very remote, and 
only the most adventurous tourists travel in the surrounding Rif 
region. Ceuta's touristic potential is limited by lack of space 
and fresh water supply. It is unlikely that either city will 
hinder the Crown Colony's rapidly developing tourist industry in 
the future. In both cities property is 15%-30% more expensive 
than mainland Spain. However there is a plentiful supply of 
cheap Arab labour. Unlike Ceuta, Melilla has an airport. It is 
constructed on Moroccan sovereign territory. Though used 
jointly by Spain and Morocco, the history of the airport is 
reminiscent of the British-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar 
airport. Ceuta and Melilla are linked by ship and road. 
There is high inflation in the Plazas, and the cost of 
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living is higher than in mainland Spain. Melilla depends on 
Morocco for supplies of water and basic foodstuffs, but provides 
the surrounding Moroccan hintorlando with electricity. 
5.5 THE MINOR PLAZAS. 
5.5.1 Velez. 
Pen6n de Velez d~ la Gomera is a barren rock and with the 
adjoining 'Isleta' (Islet) is about l/20 sq km or 15 acres 
(Geog. Rept. Spain, 1963, p.8), (see map 5.5). It is a 
conical island, 86 metres high in the north, with a fortress and 
white buildings. The island is connected by a rocky ridge to 
the islet (21 metres high) and is easily identified from west to 
north (Pilot, Vol.I, p.125). On the north-west extremity stands 
a lighthouse backed by a single-storied building. During low 
water periods, Velez is a tombola, becoming attached to mainland 
Morocco by a sand spit some 100 metres long. It is situtated in 
a beautiful site. 
In former times Velez acted as a relay station between 
Ceuta and Melilla, being approximately half way between them. 
With the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), the Pope divided Maghrebi 
waters between the Iberian powers, with the median line running 
through PeB6n de Velez de la Gomera, the west was to be 
Portuguese and the east Spanish (see chapter 1). Both parties 
disputed ownership of Velez, but it was occupied by Spain in 
1508. The dispute was settled in Spain's favour by the Treaty 
of Cintra (1509). 
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In 1554 Velez was captured by the Turks and provided an 
ideal base for Corsair attacks on Spa~ln. However soon it 
reverted to Spain. On the Moroccan coast stands the hamlet of 
Badis, which was formerly prosperous. In the M:.id.d.le Ages Badis 
acted as a port for Fez trading with Venice and other 
Mediterranean ports. It declined in 1508 with the Spanish 
conquest of the Pen6n. Badis was retaken by the local 
population several times and most notably in 1522. Velez was 
beseiged innumerable times and its earthen fort was raised to 
the ground in 1702. During the Spanish Protectorate (1912-56), 
it was used as a prison ( Fauvel et al. 1981, p. 180). Though 
the fort was never rebuilt, Spain managed to retain the rock. 
Like other towns in the hinterlands of the Presidios, Badis has 
declined. 
5.5.2 Alhucemas. 
Alhucemas Pen6n (170 by 80 metres) is situtated west of 
Melilla in the Bay of Ajdir and is about 4 km from the Moroccan 
coast, and a few kilometres from the Moroccan town of Al 
Hoceima, a notable tourist centre (see map 5.5). Less than 27 
metres high, the 3 little islands lie some 155 km from Ceuta and 
22 km east of Pen6n de Velez. Ila de Mar and Isla de Tierra are 
adjoining low, rugged and uninhabited islets lying approximately 
2.5 nm south-east of Cabo Nuevo. Closest to Ila de Mar, the 
northern islet, there is a shoal with a depth of 4 metres. 
Pen6n de Alhucemas lies 3 nm south south-east of Cabbo Morro 
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Nuevo. At its northern extremity stands a ruined fortress, 
which once held a garrison of over 300 men. La Pulpera rock 
adjoining the PenOn serves as a cemetery. The depths between 
PeB6n do Alhucemas and mainland Morocco are less than 5.5 metres 
and the channel is slowly silting up. Small craft can anchor 
south of Alhucemas. To the north-east anchorage can be obtained 
at depths of 13 metres (Pilot, Vol.I, p.l26). 
The village of Alhucemas is carved out in a cavern formed 
by an enormous overhanging rock. Because it is within sight of 
the Al Hoceima touristic complex, it is particularly 
embarrassing to the Moroccans and symbols of Spanish sovereignty 
are not as overtly displayed as in Ceuta and Melilla. 
Spain occupied PenOn de Alhucemas in 1673: 
"It was voluntarily ceded to Charles II on 
the condition that Spain prevent the Turks 
from occupying strongholds on the 
Mediterranean coast of Morocco" (Rezette, 
1976, p.43) 
5.5.3 The Chafarinas. 
The Chafarinas consist of 4 archipelagic islands with an 
area of about 2.5 sq km, which are located some 3.5 km from the 
Moroccan coast, 26 km to the east of Melilla and approximately 
35 km from the Algerian-Moroccan frontier (Geog. Rept. Spain, 
1963, p.4), (see maps 5.5, 1.4). 
Isla Congresso lies to the west and is the largest of the 
islands. It has an elevation of 137 metres, but the eastern 
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slope is more gentle. Punta del Faro to the south offers a 
landing site. The northern and eastern coasts are rock-fringed. 
The island iB uninhabited except for tho lighthouse keeper at 
Punta del Faro. Just north-east of the northern extremity of 
the island lies Banco Congresso, a rock with a depth of just 3 
metres over it. 
Isla de Isabel II lies east of Congresso. from which it is 
separated by a deep channel. It is about 40 metres high and is 
the only inhabited island. It has numerous buildings and a 
hospital, and regular sea communications with Ceuta. Torres de 
la Conquista in the north attains an elevation of 57 metres. On 
the north-west extremity is situtated Punta Espana lighthouse. 
Isla del Rey lies closest to Isabel II, to which it is 
connected by a mole which has been breached near its centre 
(Pilot, Vol.II, p.l30). The island's maximium elevation is 31 
metres in the north. The eastern coast is cliffy and indented, 
the southern part is used as a cemetery by the inhabitants of 
Isabel II. The island's port was destroyed by a storm in 1914 
and was never rebuilt. 
The Chafarinas afford the only natural anchorage which is 
suitable for all classes of vessel off the Moroccan coast 
(Pilot, Vol.II, p.l30). Anchorage south of Isabel II is 
possible in waters of 10-16.5 m. The best anchorage is found 
south of Isabel II. These strategic islands are surrounded by 
fish rich waters. 
Historically the sovereign status of these islands has 
never been clear, a fact noted by all the riparian states. 
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Spain's excuse for occupying the islands (1848) was that France 
had previously sent scientists to explore the area and was 
planning to occupy the strategic Chafarinas so close to its 
Algerian territories. Thus Spain pre-empted the Pronch move. 
The Chafarinas were made into a freeport zone in 1863. 
As with the Major Plazas, Spain considers the Minor Plazas 
to be an integral part of the Spanish state, and hence subject 
to all international laws applicable to Spain. Thus the 
Chafarinas archipelago, Velez and Alhucemas are catered for in 
Part VIII of the LOS (1982) "Regime of Islands". According to 
Article 121 of the LOS (1982), islands must be "naturally 
formed" and "surrounded by vmter, which is above water at high 
tide" (121 (1)). Hence the territorial sea and other maritime 
zones may be "determined in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention (1982) applicable to other land territory (121 
(2)). Article 121 (3) also stipulates that: 
"Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf". 
The rocks and reefs of the Minor Plazas lie close to the islands 
which have been inhabited by Spanish civilians and military 
personnel for centuries. Nonetheless because of the very 
limited areas of Velez and Alhucemas, and their proximity to the 
Moroccan coast, it would be difficult for Spain to enforce its 
maritime claims in these two areas. 
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5. 6 LEGTTIMIZ]J'1G 'J'REATIES. 
The ~anish-Moroccan Peace Treat~ of 1776, attempted to 
settle questions pertaining to the Presidios, especially 
Articles 10 and 19. The Treaties of 1782 and 1799 dealt largely 
with the boundaries of Ceuta. The Muslims continued to attack 
the Presidios, similar to Spanish tactics with the British in 
Gibraltar. Where relations of force are not equal, inevitably 
treaties are imposed and cannot lead to longterm stability. As 
early as 1706, the Sultan, Moulay Ismail sent a letter 
requesting the English parliament to aid him in retaking Ceuta. 
Britain declined the offer. A similar proposal was made to 
France (1709) with Moroccan assurances that they would help 
France take Gibraltar from the British. 
Because of the many wars and treaties, especially from the 
19th century on, Spain on every occasion tried to secure de jure 
confirmation of its "sovereign rights" over the Presidios and 
tried to expand jurisdiction on lands around the historic 
citadels. For instance Ceuta's land boundaries were determined 
by the Treaty of Larache (1845); and those of Melilla by the 
Moroccan-Spanish Convention (1862), and Treaty of Tetouan 
(1860). Between 1863-71, Spain tried to supplement agreements 
on boundary protocols. Because of incidents at Melilla (1893) 
over construction works which Moroccan tribesmen saw as being on 
their lands, this necessitated another Treaty (1894) and 
Convention (1895). Along with the new boundaries, a neutral 
zone (500 metres) was established. The Sultan was responsible 
for maintaining it, as the agreement already provided for a 
Mehalla. o~ desert camp so 
against dissident tribes. 
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designated to protect the Spanish 
In 1908, the Spanish abolished the 
Mell_al_lJ3- and also reg:ues·l;ed ·!.;he Sultan to g:rant aut;ho:r:lzatio:a for 
the occupation of the Mar Chica, a lagoon or sandy strip 
stretching in front of Melilla. The Sultan refused. 
Nevertheless the Spanish occupied it and Restingua, an ancient 
Roman port, east of the Mar Chica, with the excuse that the 
occupation would be of a temporary nature, aimed at preventing 
contraband in arms. 
With the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1904) in mind, Spain used 
the tribal disturbances to the east of Ksar el Kebir (1911) as 
an excuse to send in cruisers, landing troops at Ksar el Kebir 
and Larache, pre-empting the partition of Morocco (1912) (see 
chapters 2, 4). Throughout the Rif War (1909-27), the Plazas 
came under attack resulting in massive casualties. 
The majority of Arab and developing states support the 
Moroccan contention that the Plaza issue must be settled within 
the context of decolonization, as the Plazas have been the keys 
to Spanish imperialism in Morocco for centuries. 
5.7 THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN DILEMMA. 
In the contemporary context, two essential issues must be 
borne in mind concerning the question of sovereignty. Firstly, 
many of the historical and judicial arguments presented by Spain 
are defensible. Secondly, for geographical and political 
reasons complemented by modern law in relation to decolonization 
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and the right to territorial integrity, Morocco has a strong 
case which to date Spain has made little genuine effort to 
appreciate. 
Like Gibraltar and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the 
question of sovereignty over Spain's North African Sovereign 
Territories does not fall within the classical category of 
decolonization that has emerged since 1945. Gibraltar, Ceuta 
and Melilla are essentially military bases. Fundamentally there 
is a dispute between two sovereign states over ownership of 
territories and not liberation of peoples from an imperial yoke. 
Similar to Spain's arguments for the retrocession of Gibraltar, 
Morocco's case is primarily based on the principle of the 
territorial integrity of the state; but present populations 
being the product of former colonial policies do not wish their 
sovereign links with the states which created them to be 
dissolved. Like the Gibraltarians and British; the Spanish, 
Ceutis and Melillinese are very attached to these remaining 
fragments of lost empire. Besides their geostrategic national 
functions, they represent the 'heirlooms' of Spain's historic 
drive for national unity, and the crusade imperialism of its 
golden age. They form part of the national historical, cultural 
and political psyche, symbolizing Toda par la Patria as 
inscribed on every public building in Cadiz, Tarifa, Algeciras, 
La Linea, Ceuta and Melilla. There are few members of the 
Spanish military forces, including the majority of Spanish 
citizens who do military service, who have not been based in the 
Plazas at some stage in their careers. 
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F~om the Moroccan stance. the Spanish presence retards 
economic development and independence, and is a constant 
reminder of the Balkanization of the nation and defeat brought 
about by Christian and European imperialism. In 1985, Colonel 
Qadhafi reaffirmed that: 
"These enclaves used to be Arab towns and 
consequently there is no reason for Spain to 
keep them" (Maroc Soir, 12 April 1985, p.1). 
This statement was made in the context of Arab unity and the 
"Arab Nation" (see chapter 8). 
Unlike Algeria and Tunisia, Moroccan independence (1956) 
was only partial in that Spain did not withdraw from territories 
claimed by Morocco, which Madrid had held prior to the 
establishment of the Protectorate (1912) (see maps 5.1, 8.4). 
The newly independent state only regained about 20% of its 
historic claim. The nationalist vision included Tindouf, La 
Saura, Touat, Gourara, Tidikelt (an oases region, some 300,000 
sq km in western Algeria); Saquiet el Hamra (150,000 sq km) and 
Rio de Oro (94, 300 sq km), loosely referred to as the Spanish 
or Western Sahara, territories stretching to the Niger river, 
encompassing the modern state of Mauritania (only officially 
recognized by Morocco in 1969), Ceuta, Melilla and the Minor 
Plazas (see chapter 8). 
In Morocco's struggle for independence and territorial 
integrity it has pursued a policy of liberating the different 
types of territorial entities within a framework of real 
potitik. Within the limits of its national capacity -economic, 
military and diplomatic- Morocco has regained control over 
259 
terrj.tories in order of spatial and economic importance. Rabat 
won the core area of the French (and Spanish) Protectorate 
(1956), the international Tangier Zone and Cape Spartel (1956), 
the Spanish colonies of Tarfaya (1958) and Ifni (1969); and 
Spanish withdrawal from the Western Sahara (1976). In contrast 
to this mammoth effort of liberation, the Plazas were spatially 
too small to divert the nation's energies. Inevitably in the 
light of Moroccan policies since 1956, it will use all means at 
its disposal to gain sovereigny over the Plazas once the issue 
of the Western Sahara has been settled (see chapter 8). 
Morocco's policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Spain 
over the Plazas is ''explained by the impossibility of the 
Moroccan Government to engage Spain in a show of force" and also 
its disputes on the eastern frontier with Algeria (De La Serre 
et Marais, 1968, p.348). Indeed some Moroccan nationalists were 
ready to trade the Plazas indefinitely to Spain in 
support in liberating the French Zone in the 1950s. 
return for 
The leader 
of the Democratic Party for Independence, Hassan el Ousanni 
actively aided by the Spanish authorities from 1953 on. 
could not have taken place without an understanding that 
Plazas would remain Spanish (Rezette, 1955, pp.232-233). 
was 
This 
the 
The 
Moroccan Army of Liberation was occupied with the freeing of the 
south, Ifni and Western Sahara and could not divert attacks on 
the Plazas. The revolutionary, Allal el Fassi, founder of the 
nationalist Istiqlal party, father of the modern state of 
Morocco and architect of the official map of Greater Morocco 
(1956), included the Plazas within his plan of the modern state. 
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Sj.nce 1956, claims to the Plazas have usually been reaffirmed 
when relations became embittered with Spain, and played down 
once ~hey improved. 
Despite Morocco's failure to gain sovereignty over lands 
disputed with Al~eria and the establishment of Mauritania 
(1960), Allal al Fassi's Greater Morocco vision is a lynchpin of 
Moroccan nationalism (see maps 5.1, 5.2, 8.4). These sentiments 
are shared by all Moroccan parties. At Alhucemas in 1957, the 
first head of the newly independent cabinet stated that: 
"Morocco will be intransigient and will not 
cede a single inch of the territories 
included within its natural boundaries" (Del 
Pino, 1983. p.8). 
5.8 THE SPANISH ARGUMENT. 
In justifying its presence in the Maghreb, Spain invokes 
the classical argument of right of conquest, reiterating that 
Morocco was not a kingdom at the time of the Spanish occupation. 
Madrid also asserts that its rights were consecrated by 
treaties, length of occupation and the fact that the vast 
majority of the population in the Plazas are Spanish. 
In the historical context, conquest bestows de jure rights 
of sovereignty in international law. But the question of the 
Plazas is more complex. Ceuta was ceded to Spain by Portugal, 
Melilla was occupied by force, Velez was occupied with spurious 
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reference to the Treaty of Tordesillas, Alhucemas was given by 
the Sultan in order to ward off the encroaching Ottomans, and 
the status of the Chafarinas is not clear. Tho argument that 
Morocco was not a kingdom before Spanish incursions there does 
not hold much weight with the international community. ~rom the 
Moroccan perspective some form of Moroccan state has existed 
since the 8th century, and besides under El Sharia (Islamic 
law), the Plazas were an integral part of Dar al Islam (the 
Kingdom of Islam) with the umma (Muslim community) residing 
there under the rule of Muslim monarchs (see chapter 8). 
Despite these historical arguments, the problem must be 
appreciated in the modern geopolitical context of the Moroccan 
state and Strait region. 
With reference to Spanish arguments of continuous military, 
civil, administrative and economic occupation over the 
centuries, de ~ this argument may be quite valid. However 
Spain held them by force, as Morocco continuously failed to win 
them back militarily. Thus in real terms Morocco did not 
renounce its claim to them. In justifying its continued 
presence in the Plazas, Spain also makes reference bilateral and 
international treaties. But how valid are colonial treaties? 
History shows that imposed treaties tend to last until an 
offensive can be launched. Since 1945 and the demise of 
European imperialism, the myth of the morality of treaties 
signed in the historical colonial context is no longer common 
coinage. 
According to Article 15 of The Peace and Trade Treaty 
(1767) between Morocco and Spain: 
"The law is absolutely opposed to any 
enlarging that His Catholic Majesty might 
ask ·to carry out in the four Presidios. 
Ever since these places have been occupied 
by Spain, their imperial Majesties have set 
their limits according to the opinion of 
their tolbas and ulemas and have promised 
not to change anything". 
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The 1767 Treaty entrusted the representatives of their Majesties 
with the task of: 
renewing the boundaries of the 
Presidios and making them with pyramids of 
stone" (quoted in Rezette, 1976, p.124). 
However before the stones were laid, Moroccan forces besieged 
Melilla. The Sultan argued that there were lexicographical 
differences in the Spanish and Moroccan texts. 
The ~reaty of Me~nes (1799), renewed the 1767 Treaty and 
confirmed the 1782 Agreement on: 
the boundaries of the camp of 
Ceuta and the extent of the pasturage for 
the flocks of the said place" (quoted in 
Rezette, 1976, p.124). 
The Treaty recognized that the Moors of "Melilla, Alhucemas and 
Pen6n (de Velez) were unruly and troublesome" and were "a 
disturbance" . The Sultan agreed that if he could not control 
them: 
"the Spanish fortresses were within their 
rights to use cannons and mortars in case of 
offensive action, experience having shown 
that musket fire was not adequate to impose 
reason on such people" (Rezette, 1976, 
p. 124). 
Tribal attacks almost resulted in a war in 1844, but the Larache 
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Convention (1845), confirmed the 1799 Treaty and saved the 
situation. After serious lncidents i.n 1859, the C.Qpvent~o:n. 
Tetouan (1859), gained for Spain an extention of Melilla's 
territory, "as far as necessary for the defence and tranquility 
of thls Presido". The limit was to be set at "24 cannon shot" 
(Art.2) and "a neutral zone" was to be established on Moroccan 
territory (Art.4). The Sultan promised to place forces on 
Melilla's frontiers to curtail attacks by the Rifians (Art.5). 
Similarly a Caid and troops were to be placed near Penons de 
Velez de la Gomera and Alhucemas: 
to enforce respect for Spain's 
rights and effectively to enforce free entry 
into these towns of necessary foodstuffs and 
supplies for its garrisons" (Art. 6). 
Within three months the Spanish engineers fired their cannons 
which laid the limit at 2,900 metres to the south of the town. 
This acted as the point for minute demarcation of the 
north-western and eastern limits. The neutral zone was set at 
500 metres. The Act delimiting the Sovereign Territory of 
Mel ill a was only signed at Tangier in 1862. As a result of the 
Moroccan-Spanish War (1859-60), Ceuta's current boundaries were 
demarcated in a similar manner to those of Me1illa. 
The Peace and Friendship Treaty of Tetouan (1860), brought 
the Moroccan-Spanish War to an end. Article 2 prescribed the 
extension of the: 
territory under the jurisdiction 
of Ceuta as far as necessary for the safety 
and complete defence of its garrison". 
Article 3 defined in detail a zone "ceded in full possession and 
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sove:rcighty" to Spain, de:ma~:r:catcd by por;tr; and. markers. A 
"neutral camp" ~vas defined as extending from the opposite slopes 
of the ravine to the mountain summits on both sides of the sea 
(R~zette, 1976, p.l27). The Treaty also noted that the 1859 
Convention had not been ratified by the Sultan and reaffirmed 
that guards of the Sultan's army were to be posted at the edge 
of the neutral ground of all the PeR6ns. Article 7 granted to 
Spain unlimited rights to build fortifications and defence 
installations to ensure safety. The Convention (1859) and 
Treaty (1860) defined the boundaries which exist today. It must 
be noted that the Chafarinas Islands were not mentioned. These 
islands are the only "jurisdictional territories" without any 
sovereign status decreed by convention between Spain and 
Morocco. 
The sovereign status of the Plazas was confirmed by other 
conventions in 1864' 1866' 
instruments did not contain any 
1871, 
new 
1895 and 
territorial 
1910. These 
clauses but 
dealt with customs and problems caused by the Rif tribes. While 
the ink was still wet, Morocco disputed most clauses. 
Besides right of conquest and bilateral treaties, Spanish 
sovereignty over the Plazas was recognized by the great Powers 
in such instruments as the Franco-British Declaration (1904) 
(Art.8); the Franco-Spanish Convention (1904); and the Treaty of 
Fez (1912) catered for Spain's territorial possessions on the 
Moroccan coast (see chapter 2). 
Spain also invokes the demographic argument, which in this 
case is irredentist as the vast majority of the population is 
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ethnically and culturally Spanish. However Spain chooses to 
overlook the fact that these territories were historically 
populated by Muslims who were driven out or killed by the 
Spanish armies. The rapidly increasing Muslim communities of 
Ceuta and Melilla, though not vehemently pursuing unionist 
policies with Morocco, are treated as second class citizens and 
hence their situation is colonial. Possibly at some future 
date Madrid will hold a referendum on the future status of the 
Plazas in Ceuta and Melilla, following the example set by 
Britain in Gibraltar (1967). Being assured of a landslide 
victory for continued union with Madrid, such referenda in the 
context of sovereignty disputes in the Strait area do little to 
defuse tensions. 
Because the Sovereign Territories are an integral part of 
the Spanish state, with the majority of the population being 
Spanish, they were not inscribed on the list of non-autonomous 
territories drawn up by the UN in 1947. Spain claims that the 
UN Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 covers both Gibraltar and the 
Plazas on the grounds of "territorial integrity" of the state 
(see chapter 6, appendix V). 
5.9 THE MOROCCAN ARGUMENT. 
Despite de jure arguments concerning right of conquest and 
sovereignty, since 1945 the majority of world states no longer 
favour claims to sovereignty based on criteria of annexation or 
imposed treaties, in the form of conquest, colony, union or 
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protectorate, which were the classic tenets of territorial 
acquisition by colonial powers. Throughout the centuries, Spain 
like other states has struggled to establish secure 
physiographic boundaries; the Pyrenees Mountains offer a salient 
example. Historically the process of state-building in Morocco 
was interrupted by European imperialism. The annexation of the 
Plazas, and especially Ceuta and Melilla, led to the 
implantation of a European population. Ceuta and Melillas' 
boundaries are essentially anthropogeographic rather than 
physiographic boundaries. In Morocco as elsewhere this has led 
to inter-ethnic strife and interstate conflict. Since the 1960s 
the UN tends to favour the legal principle of territorial 
integrity. Morocco contends that this principle is essentially 
the same as the geographic concept of natural or physiographic 
boundaries. 
As long as the Spanish Sovereign Territories in North 
Africa exist, Morocco will be denied the right of territorial 
integrity. The gravity of the situation for Morocco is 
augmented by the fact that Spain holds the most strategic 
locations on the shores of its northern frontier. Ceuta, 
Melilla and possibly the Chafarinas Islands are among the most 
geostrategically advantageous locations on Morocco's coast, with 
great economic possibility, if integrated into their natural 
hinterlands. Because of Spanish control of Ceuta and Melilla, 
Morocco has had to divert a substantial percentage of national 
investment into the northern ports of Tangier and Nador, with 
duplication of facilities. 
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Despite these facts, Madrid has continuously rebuffed 
Moroccan arguments, yet in all international fora has insisted 
that the British military base in Gibraltar poses a major threat 
to Spain's national security, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Yet Spain denies that its own military installations 
in the Plazas constitute a threat to Morocco. Morocco is 
closely monitoring Spain's integration into NATO and is 
concerned about any future role the Plazas may play in the 
Alliance. In any conflict to which Spain is a party and Morocco 
not, the Plazas become legitimate targets (see chapter 7). 
Along with Spanish military dominance in the Plazas and its 
implications, the bases are a constant reminder of Morocco's 
colonial inheritance, a blight on its national self-image 
internally and in the Arabo-Muslim world, and the geographical 
expression of its military and economic weakness. 
Smuggling in the region of the Plazas is responsible for 
the loss of millions of dinars to the Moroccan exchequer. About 
$800 million worth of illegal merchandise enters Morocco via 
Ceuta and Melilla annually (Kroner, 1985, p.9). The contraband 
trade has also created powerful barons and clans in the Rif. 
While the trade is advantageous to the local economy, it poses a 
threat to the central government, as was proven during revolts 
in the area in response to economic reforms and tighter customs 
controls in 1983-1984. The Plazas have created a false economy 
in the Moroccan hinterlands, detracting from national economic 
integration and complementarity. 
Spanish insistence on territorial waters around the 
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Sovereign Territories rich in fish and possibly other resources 
is greatly resented by the Moroccans and is seen as further 
territorial annexation. The Spanish claim to maritime 
jurisdiction obstructs Morocco's efforts to regulate its sea 
space, and despite official accords on such issues as fishing 
there are continuous di.sputes. As the Pla::::;as de jure form an 
integral part of the Spanish state, Article 1(1) of the LOS 
Convention (1958) as well as Articles 2, 3 and 15 of the LOS 
Convention (1982) lend support to the Spanish case, whereby: 
"The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond 
its territory . to a belt of sea 
adjacent to its coast". 
While the equidistance principle may be implemented in relation 
to the Major Pla~as (see maps 3.1-3.3), the situation in the 
Minor Plazas is more problematic because of their limited area 
and distinctive geography. Interestingly, Spain does not 
officially recognize British claims to territorial waters around 
the Crown Colony (see chapter 6). In the Strait area, the 
Spanish claim to territorial waters around Ceuta further 
balkanizes maritime jurisdiction and detracts from Morocco's 
power and prestige. The Spanish presence on both sides of the 
Strait has denied Morocco its natural advantages as a strait 
state. 
International public law specifies that for sovereignty to 
be legitimate, the actual occupation of territory should be 
peaceful and uninterrupted. Spanish occupation of the Plazas 
has been rarely if ever pacific. History would suggest that the 
present peace in northern Morocco is tenuous, and that it is 
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only a matter of time before Morocco deploys greater efforts for 
the recuperation of the Plazas. This largely depends on the 
outcome of the Western Saharan War (1974--), (see chapter 8). 
Historically the Spanish occupation has not been uninterrupted 
and all the Plazas save Ceuta have been cut off for months at a 
time from Spain. Also while the Plazas are considered as an 
integral part of the Spanish state, they are officially referred 
to as "North African Territories under Spanish Supervision", 
"Plazas de Soberania" and "Presidios". 
Similar to Anglo-Spanish treaties concerning the Crown 
Colony, treaties in relation to the Plazas have not always been 
respected. Spain occupied the neutral zones on Moroccan 
sovereign territory around Ceuta and Melilla, particularly after 
1908, despite the protests of the Sultan and France. Ceuta and 
Melilla acted as points d'appui for Spanish penetration of 
northern Morocco (1912-56), and as supply routes for Franco's 
occupation of the Tangier Neutral Zone (1940-45). In the 20th 
century, Spain's Africanista policy envisaged an empire 
stretching from the Pyrenees via Tangier to the Senegal River 
(see map 7.3), including the western region of Algeria and the 
Saharan Territories (see chapter 8). 
Several times in their history (especially 1868-1937), 
Spain made overtures to exchange Ceuta for British Gibraltar. 
This detracts from Spain's arguments of the hispanicity of the 
Plazas. It is unlikely that Spain would ever consider trading 
Cadiz or Tarifa for the Crown Colony. 
In presenting its case, Morocco has not yet insisted upon 
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fact that a growing percentage of the populations in the Plazas 
are Muslim. However the Maghrebis r·ecognise 
historically responsible for the diaspora of the 
community) of Ceuta and Melilla (see chapter 8). 
that Spain is 
umma (Islamic 
Discrimination 
against Muslims resident in the Plazas will inevitably lead to 
greater conflict, making Rabat nationally and internationally 
responsible for their future. 
5.10 CEUTA: PILLAR OF HERCULES OR THE WEST'S ACHILLES HEEL? 
In the 1950s, while in exile in Cairo, the Moroccan leader, 
Allal al Fassi, advocated his Greater Morocco theory 
highlighting the international and Muslim implications of 
decolonization. Since then, several Maghrebi leaders, including 
Colonel Qadhafi have supported Morocco's claim to the Plazas (La 
Presse de Tunisie, 12 Dec.1982, p.1; Maroc Soir, 12 April 1985, 
p.1). As early as 1955, the historic Bandung Conference, 
forerunner of the Non-Alignment Movement and Group of 77, 
affirmed "Morocco's independence and integrity within its 
natural boundaries" (Rezette, 1976, p.150), (see maps 8.2). All 
Afro-Asian and African conferences have also mentioned the 
dispute, especially the Cairo Conference (1957) and pan-Maghrebi 
Tangier Summit (1958) (see chapter 8). From 1956 on, the 
Committee of the Arab-Maghreb issued several declarations in 
support of Morocco. 
In 1961, Morocco asked the UN General Assembly to recognize 
its rights over the towns and islands of the north occupied by 
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Spain. In 1961, Hassan II brought up the Plaza question at the 
Non-Aligned Nations conference in Belgrade stating that: 
the Spanish colonists continue to 
occupy entire southern regions of our 
country, and maintain enclaves and 
bases in the north, in Ceuta and Melilla" 
(Rezette, 1976, p.151). 
In 1961, in retaliation for Moroccan endeavours on the 
diplomatic front, Spain introduced stricter border controls and 
many Moroccans were expelled from the Plazas. In 1962, Spain 
enraged the Moroccans by publishing a bulletin at its Rabat 
embassy entitled "Ceuta, the Second Port of Spain". In response 
Morocco forbade its nationals and Spaniards working in Morocco 
to reside in Ceuta or Melilla and vice versa. At that period 
Morocco also stopped cooperating with the tourist through 
traffic via Ceuta and Melilla. This policy has been interrupted 
many times since. On 29 June 1962, the Moroccan government 
demanded the return of Ceuta and Melilla. The next day Morocco 
extended its territorial waters from 6 nm to 12 nm. Spain 
fortified the military bases and sent warships to protect 
fishing vessels in the disputed waters. This act mobilized 
public support in Morocco for the government. In 1962, the 
Spanish Foreign Minister declared that: 
as far as Ceuta and Melilla were 
concerned, Spain had nothing to negotiate" 
(Rezette, 1976, p.152). 
The War of the Sands between Algeria and Morocco (1962-63) 
interrupted Rabat's offensive on the Plazas as well as its 
efforts to recuperate Ifni and the Western Sahara. In 1962, 
while inspecting the military at Ceuta, General 
proclaimed that: 
the entire nation and its army 
\WUld defend Ceuta and Melilla if necessary" 
(Rezette, 1976, p.153). 
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Alonso 
On 6 July 1963, Hassan II and Franco met at Madrid's 
Barajas airport. There is little written evidence as to what 
both leaders agreed upon, but it was widely believed that Franco 
wished to abandon the Minor Plazas and Ifni in return for 
Hassan's promise to respect the status quo in the Major Plazas. 
In 1967, the Istiqlal party restated Morocco's right to 
"the liberation" of all of Morocco including "Ceuta and 
Melilla". The Moroccan monarchy pays close attention to the 
wishes of the nationalist Istiqlal which had mobilized the 
masses for national independence and founded the modern Moroccan 
state. 
At the UN, Morocco has continuously supported Madrid's 
claim to the British Crown Colony of Gibraltar and thus 
indirectly its own claim to the Plazas. In a press conference 
in 1975, Hassan II stated that: 
"(he) supposed that sometime in the future, 
England will logically restore Gibraltar to 
Spain. If the English restore Gibraltar to 
Spain, the latter should restore Sebta and 
Melilla to (Morocco)" (Maroc Soir, 26 
Nov.1975, pp.1-2). 
Hassan II stated that: 
the day that Spain comes into 
possession of Gibraltar, Morocco will of 
necessity get Sebta and Melilla. No power 
can permit Spain to possess both keys to the 
same Strait . Gibraltar-Sebta-Melilla 
is of necessity a Spanish-Moroccan affair, . 
for the faster the 
Gibraltar (immediately and 
Morocco will get Sebta 
(L'Opinion, 26 Nov.1975). 
Spanish recover 
automatically) 
and Melilla" 
In 1985, in an interview with King Hassan for 
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Spanish 
television, (the passages relating to the Plaza question were 
censored for transmission in Spain), Hassan stated that if Spain 
recuperates Gibraltar: 
the equi-l-ibri-um in the 
Mediterranean would be seriously affected". 
He stressed that if Spain tried to retain the Plazas thus 
controlling both sides of the Strait, the USSR: 
could not tolerate a NATO member 
state controlling all the keys" (Le Grand 
Maghreb, No.38, p. 87). 
With the waxing and waning of Moroccan-Spanish relations 
concerning the evacuation of the Western Sahara in the 1970s, 
Hassan II let it be known that the issue of the Plazas would not 
be forgotten. In a Moroccan memorandum sent to the UN in 1975 
concerning the Spanish presence in Morocco, it was addressed to 
the 'Chairman of the Decolonization Committee in reference to 
Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas Islands'. The memorandum 
referred to the five Plazas as being among "the last vestages of 
colonial occupation" , and reiterated the need for the 
restoration of Morocco's "territorial integrity" (UN. Doc. 
A/AC-109-475, 31 Jan.1975). Morocco stated that: 
"Spain wants to perpetuate its colonial 
presence on what is properly speaking 
Moroccan territory, at the same time 
instituting international action to liberate 
Gibraltar which is in an identical position 
from all points of view as the Presidios". 
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Thus Morocco formally asked the UN to place the Plazas on the UN 
list of non-autonomous territories and to apply resolution 1514 
on decolonization. 
Spain replied to the UN, stating that the Plazas were 
culturally and ethnically Spanish (UN. Doc. A/AC-109/477, 13 
Feb.1975). Spain laid title to the Plazas as successors of 
Rome, Byzantium and the Visigoth kingdoms; and added that even 
when Spain was Muslim, the Plazas were part of a Spanish-Muslim 
state. This line of historic reasoning illustrated an 
entrenched chauvinism and Eurocentric vision of geography, 
reminiscent of France's arguments in annexing Algeria (1830-71). 
The Spanish representative laboured to point out that there were 
no similarities between the Gibraltar issue and the Presidio 
dispute; with Ceuta being ceded by Portugal to Spain, Melilla 
being almost deserted of its Muslim population at the time of 
Spanish occupation, Velez being conquered from Turkish pirates 
and not Moroccans, Alhucemas being ceded by the Sultan to Spain 
in order to prevent Ottoman occupation and the fact that the 
Chafarinas were sovereignless and unoccupied at the time of the 
Spanish penetration; unlike Gibraltar where the natives were 
driven out by invading armies. Spain insisted that the Plazas 
were "sovereign territories" unlike the "Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar" and hence not "non-autonomous territories" (Moroccan 
Memorandum to UN, 7 March 1975; Spanish Memorandum to UN, 18 
April 1975). Spain's diplomatic defensive at the UN did not 
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strengthen its case. 
On 8 February 1975, Spain sent two escort vessels, two 
troop transporters, a batallion of marines and tanks, a 
submarine and armed helicopters to the Plazas in a show of 
strength. Later that month at an OAU Conference in Addis Adeba, 
some 25 states lent their diplomatic support to Morocco (see map 
8.2). On 15 February 1975, the Arab Ministers of Information 
met in Cairo proclaiming: 
their support of Morocco in its 
current fight for the liberation of its 
territories occupied by the Spanish, 
including Sebta and Melilla as well as the 
other islands off the Moroccan coast" 
(Rezette, 1976, p.160). 
In June 1975, several bombs exploded in Ceuta and Melilla 
killing one person and wounding two others. Some 400 Moroccan 
nationals were summoned for interrogation at Ceuta (June 28-29) 
and several Moroccan notables were forced by the authorities to 
take Spanish nationality or be expelled from the Plazas along 
with several dozen Moroccan families. The Moroccan government 
protested. Tension was further heightened in July 1974, when a 
young Muslim sweet vendor in Ceuta was shot in the head by a 
Spanish policeman. (L'Opinion, 8 July 1975; Le Matin, 10 July 
1975). Perhaps it was a coincidence that the victim had 
recently acted as a guide to the editor in chief of Radio Monte 
Carlo while compiling a report on Ceuta. Morocco lodged a 
protest with the Secretary General of the UN denouncing: 
commited 
Moroccan 
stated) 
violations of the rights of man 
by the Spanish authorities in the 
enclave of Sebta (and 
.if such practices continue, 
the Moroccan government will be constrained 
to take the necessary measures to protect 
tho rights and interests of its nationals" 
(UN.Doc. A/AC. 109/498, 18 July 1975). 
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As a result of the events at Ceuta in 1975, the Ceuti refugees 
in Tetouan sent messages of thanks to Hassan II for the efforts 
made to assist them "when they were expelled from (their) town", 
along with declarations of loyalty to the Moroccan state and its 
struggle for the liberation of the Plazas (L'Opinion, 6 
Sep.1975, p.1). On 30 August 1975, the Non-Aligned Countries 
demanded that Spain enter into direct negotiations with Morocco 
for the immediate return of the Plazas. On 7 October 1975, at 
the UN General Assembly, Morocco once again requested Spain to 
enter into negotiations on the issue. Thirteen days later, 
Spain closed the Ceuta land boundary when 400 Moroccans twice 
attempted to invade peacefully; similar to Morocco's 350,000 
strong Green March on the Spanish Sahara (1975), which helped 
speed up the Spanish evacuation there (see chapter 8). 
Tension decreased in November 1975, when Spain, Morocco and 
Mauritania signed an agreement on the Western Sahara. However 
Spanish ambiguity in relation to the future of the Western 
Sahara, and intransigence on the Plaza issue only postponed the 
problem rather than settling it. Along with these problems, 
Morocco felt that Spain was not honouring the fishing accords 
(1975, 1977) and vigorously protested at Madrid's negotiations 
with the West Saharan, Polisario Liberation Front (1978) for the 
release of eight Spanish fishermen. Rabat also looked with 
suspicion upon Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez's official visit to 
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Algeria (1979) during which he met the Secretary General of the 
Polisario. 
After 1975, Morocco intensified efforts in international 
fora, stressing the importance of national territorial 
integrity. The Western Sahara and Plaza issues acted as 
national rallying cries, taking some of the pressure off Hassan 
II for constitutional change in Morocco. Between 1975-1978, 
there was an attempt at democratization within Morocco, the 
monarchy being obliged to placate the nationalists, whose 
relationship with the Crown had been strained because of the 
tripartite accords signed between Hassan II, Algeria and 
Mauritania in relation to the Western Sahara (Hodges, 1984; 
Thompson & Adloff, 1980). In essence the 1977 legislative 
elections were a pretence at democracy; nevertheless all party 
manifestoes included calls for the recuperation of Ceuta and 
Melilla (DelPino, 1983, p.12). All parties called for Spanish 
withdrawal with a new intensity when Adolfo Suarez visited Ceuta 
and Melilla in 1980. 
Besides the question of the Plazas and Gibraltar, in 1978 
there was much talk in the Maghreb about the status and 
hispanicity of the Canary Islands, with the question being 
addressed at an OAU Conference in Khartoum. The OAU and Algeria 
also held talks about the hispanicity of Alboran Island and the 
surrounding sea. The ambiguities of the Moroccan-Spanish 
fishing accords led to many incidents at sea between 1978-82. 
With the election of the Spanish Workers Socialist Party 
(PSOE) in 1982, Morocco expected that the new government would 
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overtly support the Plazas and Algeria at Hassan's expense. 
Instead Sr Moran took a more conciliatory stance on the Plaza 
dispute, possibly influenced by British-Spanish experiences over 
Gibraltar. Moran advocated greater cooperation between the two 
states, especially in relation to economic development in Ceuta, 
Melilla and their Moroccan hinterlands as well as the ports of 
Beni Ansar and Nador. He advocated a liberalization de jure and 
de facto of the status of the Muslim populations in the Plazas. 
Of course Spanish aspirations for the economic development of 
Ceuta and Melilla would have bilateral repercussions helping to 
defuse the situation, but it must also be seen as part of 
Madrid's strategy for entry to the EC. Besides, these towns are 
not economically viable without the complementarity of the 
Moroccan hinterlands. Liberalization policies aimed at the 
Muslim populations of Ceuta and Melilla were also an imperative 
rather than a purely conciliatory gesture in the light of 
Spain's new democratic image. Pragmatic PSOE self-interest 
policies in the Plazas did not undermine Morocco's territorial 
claims. 
In 1982, Morocco put its case before most international 
organizations and in particulr the Arab League, Islamic 
Conference and OAU (see maps 8.2). The Moroccan strategy 
included talk of petrol embargoes, a minimization of major 
economic agreements with Spain, and the possibility of including 
on international agendas the theme of the "dubious" hispanicity 
of the Canary Islands as well as the threat of non-renewal of 
bilateral fishing agreements with Spain. Hassan II enlisted the 
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help of the Moroccan ulemas, getting the support of the highest 
religious councils in the state, with overtones of Islamic 
Kingdom (Dar al Islam) and jihad indirectly implied. Morocco 
intensified its economic isolation of the Plazas and introduced 
a tax (500 Dihrams) for Moroccan passage from Ceuta or Melilla. 
With the temporary reconciliation between Morocco and Algeria 
(1983-84), in the context of the Union of Arab Parliamentarians 
at Rabat (1983), Algeria and all other Arab states lent support 
to Morocco's stance on the Plazas. A resolution passed by the 
representatives of the Arab Nation called for an end to 
colonialism, cooperation among Mediterranean states, and 
especially Spain and the Arab world; along with security and 
stability in the region with a "definitive and just solution to 
the question of Ceuta and Melilla" by negotiations restituting 
Moroccan "sovereignty" to all the Presidios (Del Pino, 1983, 
p. 17). 
The Moroccan mass-media presents in detail Spain's evolving 
strategy in pursuing its claims to Gibraltar, and Spain's 
support of Argentina's claims to the Falkland-Malvinas Islands. 
As Al Alam, the daily newspaper of the Istiqlal party puts it, 
Morocco expects a more positive approach from the PSOE in 
relation to sovereignty, than that of previous Spanish 
Governments (Al Alam, 21 Dec.1983, p. 1). 
5.11 THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN DILEMMA. 
Spain continuously treats all issues pertaining to the 
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Plazas as internal, and is reluctant to accept that it is a 
bilateral problem, intentionally ignoring the international 
dimension in all official statements. Despite rumours of secret 
understandings between Rabat and Madrid, especially in 1956, 
1963 and 1975, and unofficial reports that King Juan Carlos 
supports discussions on the sovereignty issue; Spanish 
intransigence could lead to further instability in the Strait 
region. It is believed that Juan Carlos committed himself to 
the restitution of the Plazas to Morocco in 1981. It would seem 
that this engagement was undertaken by the King in a letter 
transmitted to Hassan II by the intermediary of the Sherifian 
Minister of Tourism during a ministerial visit to Madrid in May 
1979. When news of this (non-officially verified) secret 
correspondance was leaked, the Ceutis, Melillinese and Spanish 
army reacted with alarm. In an effort to calm the situation the 
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs then stated that Ceuta and 
Melilla would automatically be included in any future agreements 
between Spain and NATO (Gaudio, 1981, p.87), (see chapter 7). 
Thus the Cortes has less room for diplomatic manoeuvres in 
resolving the dispute due to the military's commitment to 
maintain the Plazas within the Spanish state. 
It is unlikely that the Spanish military establishment 
would actively repress the extremist groups in the Plazas which 
have been organizing since the early 1980s, especially in 
Melilla. There is the possibility of the "Algerianization" of 
the sitution with extreme polarization of the ethnic communities 
and autonomous action on the part of the military. Whatever the 
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internal perspectives within Spain concerning the Plazas may be, 
the overall attitude is that of traditional strait state 
politics, with Spain wishing to hold the geostrategic areas on 
the northern and southern shores for offensive and defensive 
reasons. 
Along with the national arguments, Morocco has laid great 
emphasis on the international aspects to the dispute. For 
instance, Morocco emphasizes the precedents which may be set by 
a British-Spanish resolution of the Crown Colony dispute, 
East-West relations and Soviet perception of the balance of 
power in the Strait region (LeGrand Maghreb, No.37, p.21), and 
the Maghrebi, Arab-Muslim, African and Third World viewpoints on 
the issue (see chapter 8). In 1985, in relation to the Plazas, 
Colonel Qadhafi of Libya stated that: 
"Nobody in the world has the right to oppose 
the legitimate Arab aspirations to 
liberation, unity and self-defence . 
(and in relation to those who denigrate the 
Arabo-African Union) such an 
attitude can only be taken up by the enemies 
of unity, but such people will be surpassed 
by the flow of events and their destiny is 
suited to the dustbin of history" (Al 
Bayane, 12 April 1985, "La Conference de 
Presse de Colonel Khadafi: Reaffirmation de 
Marocanite de Sebta et Melilla et de leur 
necessaire reintegration a la mere 
patrie/L'Union Arabo-Africaine, Noyeau de 
1 'unite Arabe" ; pp. 1, 3). 
In 1985, according to the Moroccan daily, Al Charq al Awsat, 
Hassan stated: 
there can only be a peaceful 
solution; unless the Spanish take an 
altogether different initiative; that is to 
say, a military one. In such circumstances, 
Morocco will be forced to defend itself" 
Amid 
(quoted in Le Grand Maghreb, 1985, No.37, 
p:21). 
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rumours and conflicting press releases, it was 
understood that Hassan had set January 1983 as the deadline date 
for recuperating Ceuta and Melilla, (Radio Report, "Cadena Ser", 
11 Dec. 1982; Diario 16, 11 Dec.1982; La Presse de Tunisie, 12 
Dec.1982, p.1). This may have been a tactical manoeuvre on 
Morocco's part to warn Spain and the international community 
that any change in the sovereign status of the Crown Colony 
would have to cater for changes in the sovereign status of the 
Plazas. The Spanish daily, Diario (11 December 1982), reported 
that Hassan II's main problem is to know just how far the 
Spanish Government is prepared to go to defend Ceuta and 
Melilla. However Diario emphasized that sources close to the 
socialist government had stressed that Ceuta and Melilla were 
not negotiable. 
A peaceful resolution of the Plaza question is of major 
importance to stability within the Spanish state because of the 
Franco heritage which is still strong in the army. In October 
1984, the Captain General of the Saragossa Military Region, 
Manuel Alvarez Zalba, was dismissed from his official duties by 
the government for making "explosive statements" concerning the 
Maghreb. He deplored the Morocca-Libyan Union (1984-86) 
affirming that: 
this treaty in reality affects 
(Spain and was) without doubt the reason for 
the government's decision to elaborate a new 
national strategic plan" (Le Monde, 2 
Nov.1984, p.5). 
Analyzing Ceuta and Melilla in this context he stated that: 
"(Spain was) not sufficiently 
prepared to defend these two towns from the 
interior in the event of a Moroccan 
occupation; (and could) only hold them by 
launching an attack (itself)". 
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He pointed out that the USA could not support Spain in an armed 
conflict with Morocco because of its close relations with Rabat: 
". . besides the USA did not allow us 
(Spain) to use our M-48 tanks during the 
Green March (Western Sahara, 1975), which 
obliged us to use French made AMX-30s" (Le 
Monde, 2 Nov.l984, p.5). 
The Captain General was voicing the opinion of sections of the 
army disillusioned with the loss of Spanish imperial possessions 
in Morocco, and in particular the government's last minute 
complicity with Rabat in facilitating the success of the Green 
March (1975) leading to a peaceful withdrawal by the Spanish 
forces. Alvarez's statements greatly embarrassed the Spanish 
Government, which at that period was trying to establish 
bilateral military accords and joint manoeuvres with Morocco. 
However, since late 1984, joint manoeuvres have taken place in 
the Strait zone. 
The monarchy, ulemas and all political parties in Morocco 
are in agreement on the Sherifian Kingdom's right to the Plazas 
on the northern frontier within the historical and natural 
boundaries as laid out by Allal Al Fassi in the 1950s. Since 
1956, the gradual decolonization of Morocco has absorbed much of 
the national effort, but has reinforced nationalism in the 
state. While Morocco cannot risk open conflict with Spain, 
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Hassan cannot relinquish claim to the Pla7.as because of the 
strength of the Istiqlal party and nationalistic spirit of the 
masses. Also in an economically and politically volatile state 
like Morocco, the Plaza dilemma serves as a national unifier. 
Despite the fact that Morocco is deprived of its two most 
important Mediterranean ports, the local populations benefit 
greatly from the contraband trade. Disturbances in Ceuta and 
Melilla resulting from the unfair treatment of the Muslim 
community have led to the development of Spanish extremist 
groups as well as Islamic fundamentalist organizations 
(Economist, 22 Nov.l986, pp.62-63). Such disturbances are 
putting greater pressure on Rabat to take a more aggressive 
stance on the issue. However King Hassan's regime is aware that 
Britain's future role in the Strait area, and by implication 
that of the superpowers will largely determine the future of the 
Plazas. In essence a micro dominos situation exists. 
Hassan's meeting with Franco at Madrid airport (1963) 
produced the "spirit of Barajas" or a tacit understanding that 
Morocco would respect the status quo in Ceuta and Melilla in 
exchange for the resolution of other sovereignty disputes such 
as Ifni and the Western Sahara. Neither the Istiqlal nor the 
Moroccan Left supported this agreement. At a national congress 
in 1972 and many times since, the Moroccan socialist party has 
proclaimed: 
Moroccan 
Melilla 
demand a 
position 
strategy 
the necessity to mobilize the 
people for the liberation of Ceuta, 
and the Chafarinas Islands, and to 
clear definition of the government 
in this respect (and especially its 
for the) liberation of these 
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colonies" (DelPino, l983, p.l2). 
The Moroccan Left also emphasizes Spain's relationship with NATO 
and the implications of this (see chapter 7). The Plazas are 
historically connected with Franco and are shrinos of the 
Phalangist movement; the Ballesta Plan for their defence against 
Morocco is taken quite seriously by many Spanish military 
leaders. When the Saharan War comes to an end, undoubtedly 
Morocco will put all its national efforts into the liberation of 
the Plazas. 
Those Spanish political organs which support peaceful 
withdrawal from the Plazas are hindered not only by the burden 
of history and the army but also by the Spanish constitution, 
which was approved by the nation in 1978. Articles 62.2 and 
69.4 expressly mention the Spanish sovereign status of Ceuta and 
Melilla. Articles 2, 8.1, 61.1 and 63.3 confer on the military 
forces the mission of guaranteeing the sovereignty and 
independence of the Spanish state and to defend its territorial 
integrity. Articles 167.1, 167.3 and 1.2 proclaim that national 
sovereignty resides within the Spanish people. This may be 
interpreted in two ways, either the Ceutis and Melillinese have 
the right to veto any of Madrid's actions concerning possible 
changes in their sovereign status, or the people of the Spanish 
state as a whole by referendum have the right to make amendments 
to the constitution and consequently decide on the future of the 
Plazas. 
Spain's second major problem hindering discussions with 
Morocco is the presence of a substantial resident Spanish 
286 
population. Though created by colonial opertunism, they do not 
wish to be decolonized and consequently involw their :rights as 
Spanish citizens within the Spanish state. 
Concerning the regime of free ports created in 1863, Spain 
has not seriously approached the problem of establishing a new 
fiscal regime. This could be undertaken immediately, aside from 
any negotiations concerning sovereignty, as an act of good will. 
Ironically the clandestine trade has negative effects on 
southern Spain as well as Morocco. The duty-free and contraband 
trade originating in Ceuta and Melilla, enters the Spanish 
mainland via Algeciras, Tarifa and Gibraltar. In 1985, as many 
as 800 women were engaged in trafficking between Ceuta and 
Algeciras. On average there are about 15 arrests per day at the 
port of Algeojras, sometimes reaching a peak of 200 (Kroner, 
1985, p.9). While according to Moroccan estimates as much as 
$800 million worth of illegal merchandise enters Morocco via the 
Plazas (Del Pino, 1983, p.23). By implication since 1 January 
1986, this is also a problem for the EEC. 
5.12 THE FUTURE. 
5.12.1 Possible Future Scenarios. 
(a) Plebiscite. Depending on local and bilateral 
developments, it is possible that at some future date Madrid 
might follow Britain's example in Gibraltar (1967) by holding a 
referendum in the Plazas on the question of sovereignty. The 
main problem posed here would be the possibility of 
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gerrymandering, and the creation of the myth of a "permanent 
majority" by preventing Muslims f:rom takj_ng an active :role in 
the community. 
Though possibly feasible in the longterm, a referendum 
would not resolve the present contentions. In the light of the 
British experience in relation to the referendum in Gibraltar, a 
similar procedure in the Plazas would be of little constructive 
value in defusing the situation. To be sure, Madrid could 
claim that the procedure was in the democratic tradition (even 
though the Plazas are constitutionally part of the Spanish 
state, unlike the British relationship with the Crown Colony), 
but in the longterm Madrid would find that its field of 
manoeuvre was further restricted, as is the case with britain in 
relation to the Gibraltarians and Falkland Islanders. As an 
exercise in international relations, this type of referendum in 
areas of disputed sovereignty has borne little fruit. 
(b) Intensified diplomatic action. If Britain retrocedes 
Gibraltar to Spain, Morocco has made it quite clear that it will 
take control of the Plazas by diplomatic means, or by force if 
necessary. In January 1987, Hassan II sent a personal letter to 
Juan Carlos via the Spanish Interior Minister, who was on an 
official visit to Morocco. Hassan described the Plazas as "an 
anachronism" and suggested a negotiating committee be 
established to discuss their future. Spanish officials were 
categorical in rejecting the invitation, stating that: 
"There is 
either the 
discussing 
(Guardian, 
not the slightest possibility in 
short -or the medium- term of 
the futures of the enclaves" 
2 Feb.l987, p.6). 
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Morocco has pointed out that it has the support of most 
Arab, Muslim, and developing countries, and enjoys good 
relations with both superpowers. Hassan has stated his belief 
that the USSR would find it hard to permit Spain, a NATO member 
to control both Gibral.tar and Ceuta. 
Though never officially confirmed it has been suggested by 
Spanish sources, that Madrid might consider trading Melilla and 
the Minor Plazas with Rabat in exchange for Moroccan acceptance 
of Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta (Guardian, 2 Feb.l987 p.6). 
It is improbable that Rabat would accept this as a longterm 
solution. Nonetheless, the Moroccan strategy of gradually 
reintegrating territories into the state, renders this approach 
possible in the Plaza context. 
Considering the history of treaty relations between Spain 
and Morocco, Rabat might well follow precedent, recuperating 
Melilla and the Minor Plazas, and then concentrate national 
energies into the Ceuta campaign. Overall, Ceuta remains the 
epicentre of the Plaza dispute because of its overriding 
geostrategic advantages, the future of the other Plazas is 
directly contingent on that of Ceuta. 
If frustrated by Spanish inaction, a Moroccan military 
invasion would have the support of the masses as well as several 
Arab regimes. 
of 
(c) Military Action. 
(i) Paramilitarism: Local groups with the possible 
sections of the Spanish armed forces might 
support 
try to 
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"Algerianize" the situation (HoJ:>ne, J.977, Alleg, l98J.). 
However, such action could only lead. to short-term confJJct, but 
would endanger safety of passage through the Strait. Muslim 
groups within the Plazas might also be supported covertly or 
overtly by the Moroccan army or other interested states. 
(ii) The Greater Maghreb Union: In any form of future Arab 
union, within the context of the Greater Maghreb ideal or 
Qadhafi style unions, it is possible that the liberation of the 
Plazas could be undertaken by military action (see chapter 8, 
maps 8. 1 . 8 . 2) . 
(iii) Invasion: 
March" ( 1975) and 
Hassan organized the celebrated "Green 
it was led brandishing the Quran; it was a 
pre-cursor of events which were to take place some years later 
in Iran. Both events showed the international community the 
power of Islamic leaders to mobilize the masses, and the force 
of militant Islam. If forced by Spanish inactivity or 
complacency to tackle the Plaza issue, particularly if his 
throne becomes endangered, Hassan has a valuable card to play in 
uniting the Moroccans behind the descendant of the Prophet 
Mohammed in liberating Muslim territory. It will be remembered 
that in 1982, the Argentine junta tried to save its power by 
uniting the nation with the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas. 
In the event of Hassan being deposed, a revolutionary 
government would most likely be tempted to play the Plaza and 
Islamic cards in uniting the nation. 
the part of Madrid and the 
accommodate Moroccan aspirations 
Lack of greater initive on 
international community to 
could lead to a violent 
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backlash against Spain and its allies. The present low level of 
development and chronic poverty in Morocco could lAad an 
exasperated youthful population, (whether tempered by 
fundamentalism, a military regime, or the Left) to take the 
Plazas by force. In such a sj.tuation, the vestiges of Spanish 
imperialism would be identified with Western interests. Hence 
the Ceuta base could be used by revolutionary guards or a 
hostile foreign power to threaten passage of the Strait. 
5.12.2 Models and Solutions. 
(a) Economic j.ntegration with Morocco. The model set by 
Britain and Spain in Gibraltar since the lifting of the blockade 
in February 1985 may offer some possibilities (see chapter 6). 
Penons de Velez de la Gomera and Alhucemas are of no 
economic or military importance to Spain. Because of their 
limited size, it is doubtful whether Spain will seriously press 
its claims to territorial waters around these possessions, 
unless forced to do so in relation to asserting sovereignty over 
the other Plazas. History, nationalism and pressure from the 
military, Ceutis and Melillinese, and perhaps some minor 
bargaining power in future negotiations would seem to be the 
reasons why Madrid does not transfer sovereignty of these Minor 
Plazas to Rabat immediately. The Chafarinas which were once of 
geostrategic importance to Spain and France in their spheres of 
influence in the Strait region, still hold possibilities for the 
riparian states and Spain in the NATO context. Sovereignty over 
291 
these islands would extend the riparian states territorial 
waters. If Spain p~esscs claims to ma~itjme jurisdiction around 
the Chafarinas, which may hold certain economic possibilities in 
natural resources and tourism, this would involve coterminous 
boundaries with Morocco and Algeria. However Spanish intentions 
are not clear at present. As there are almost no civilian 
Spanish nationals living in the Minor Plazas, Madrid does not 
have the problem of catering for the aspirations of local 
populations. 
Some 17,000-27,000 Muslims temporarily or permanently 
reside in Melilla, (Le Monde, 22/23 June 1986, p.5). This is a 
clear indicator of the symbiosis between the Plaza and the 
Moroccan hinterlands. It is recognized by both Madrid and Rabat 
that Melilla can only survive euonomically if there is bilateral 
cooperation in mining, industry, transportation, fishing and 
tourism. Real cooperation is something of a utopia ideal 
because of Melilla's European heritage and standard of living, 
largely based on its free-port status in sharp contrast to the 
economic and political culture of the Rif. 
Being geographically closer to Spain, Ceuta is more 
integrated into the Iberian economy, and most Ceutis feel that 
its economic future lies with Spain rather than Morocco. Like 
Melilla, Ceuta depends on its free port-trade, contraband and 
military-releated spending, as well as its offshore resources. 
With the vast differences in the Moroccan and Spanish 
economies, it is unlikely that there could exist the free flow 
of goods, persons and vehicles between the Plazas and Morocco, 
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as is evolving between Spain and the Crown Colony. Suggestions 
of large-scale bilateral development projects are more quixotic 
than realistic and would only favour Madrid's stance on 
maintaining control over the Plazas, obfuscating the real issue 
of disputed sovereignty. Effective economic development in the 
region may only be possible within the context of an EC-Maghrebi 
development plan (see chapter 8). 
(b) The Andorra Model. Autonomous Andorra has a relatively 
high standard of living and is not handicapped by political 
strife; its sovereignty is jointly vested in the head of the 
French state and the Bishop of Burgos. While the human problems 
are different in the Plazas, the Andorra system could be 
partially used as a model for the future status of Ceuta and 
Melilla if the present deadlock cannot be broken. Sovereignty 
could be vested in both the Spanish and Moroccan Crowns, with 
the Ceutis and Melillinese being responsible for local 
administration under the aegis of Madrid. Rabat and Madrid 
could share responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and 
fiscal matters. Rabat would probably be more receptive to such 
an approach than the Spanish army or local non-Muslim 
populations. Nevertheless it would break the present impasse. 
If not advancing a longterm solution, it could serve as an 
interim step. 
(c) Condominium. Joint sovereignty in the most extensive 
form, including dual nationality, is a remote possibility. This 
would be difficult to achieve considering the internal conflicts 
within the Spanish state in relation to the Plaza issue. With 
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the increasing Muslim population of the Plazas, historical 
latent racism and disguised administrative apartheid, Madrid is 
f~uing a crisis situation. Because of Muslim unrest in 
Melilla, and Madrid's 18 month integration plan (1986-87) for 
Muslim residents being delayed by bureaucratic obstructionism. 
There were sectarian-racial riots in May, June and September 
1986. Frustrated by Madrid's ambiguous policies towards them, 
the Melillinese Muslims are being forced to set their hopes in 
the direction of Rabat. For the first time, in June 1986, 
tracts were circulated in Melilla advocating union with Morocco 
(Le Monde, 22/23 June 1986 p.5). 
While Spanish nationality would offer Muslims greater 
economic and political opertunities, it is doubtful that Spanish 
nationals in the Presidios would wish to be granted the rights 
and duties of Moroccan nationals, being linked to a state which 
is chronically underdeveloped, undemocratic and having a dubious 
human rights record. It is difficult to foresee condominium 
providing a solution to the present impass. 
(d) Hong Kong Model. A treaty or lease could be drawn up 
between Rabat and Madrid, with a specified 
guaranteeing Morocco future sovereignty over the 
time scale, 
Plazas. The 
present Spanish administration could be guaranteed over a period 
of one to two generations, offering the local populations time 
for economic and cultural adjustment; saving Moroccan and 
Spanish honour, and offering both governments time to reconcile 
internal dissentions within their respective political and 
military establishments. If and when there is any change in the 
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sovereign status of Gibraltar, sovereignty transfers could be 
scheduled to take place simultaneously for reasons of internal 
stability in the respective states and to allay fears in the 
international community concerning the future of the Strait. 
(e) NATO. It is possible that Morocco may establish closer 
links with NATO. Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas could be 
further developed as military bases within the NATO mantle and 
jointly staffed by Moroccan and Spanish forces, thus obscuring 
the obvious aspects of Spanish sovereignty and defusing 
contentions surrounding the issue. The Gibraltar NATO base may 
act as a model in the future. 
5.13 CONCLUSION. 
Both Spain and Morocco present legitimate historical and 
"territorial" arguments in claiming sovereignty over the Plazas. 
Until recently the essential issue was one of decolonizing 
territories rather than peoples. However Muslim agitition in 
Melilla (1986-87) has now added an extra dimension, that of 
liberating a "repressed" minority. The question of Melilla and 
the Minor Plazas must be treated with sensitivity by Spain as 
part of the process of decolonization in the ante-penultimate 
stages of traditional European colonialism. It might be in the 
interests of Spain and the international community to study 
closely the policies of Charles De Gaulle and processes of 
decolonization which he implemented in Algeria between 1960-62. 
A refinement of De Gaulle's policies in implementing a 
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negotiated withdrawal supervised by the civil and military 
authorities, with adequate compensation for those members of the 
population who wish to be repatriated to Spain is advisable. 
Despite historical and demographic arguments concerning 
Ceuta/Sebta, the issue now as it always has been, is the fact of 
Ceuta's geostrategical location, with a commanding base 
providing a key to the Strait. King Hassan has reiterated time 
and again that Morocco and other interested states will not 
permit Spain to control both keys to the Strait in the event of 
Britain retroceding Gibraltar. While Ceuta remains a thorn in 
the flesh of Moroccan-Spanish relations, arguably its 
decolonization should be viewed as a longterm project, rather 
than an action to be taken in haste. Spanish withdrawal from 
Ceuta could be seriously considered once Spain is fully 
integrated into NATO, and once the Crown Colony dispute has been 
settled. With future economic and political development in 
Morocco, a negotiated resolution of the Ceuta dispute could be 
facilitated by EC and NATO organs. This would also depend on 
future relations, treaties and base agreements between Morocco 
and the USA. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE BRITISH COLONY OF GIBRALTAR. 
"Tarek took Gibraltar, empty and undefended, 
in a matter of hours. The Spanish took 150 
years to oust the Moors for good. Britain, 
considering the counter-attacks and 
repulsions spent eighty years in conquering 
and consolidating the conquest of 
Gibraltar". 
J.D. Stewart (1967). 
"Tangier has a negative role: its function 
is to do nothing in the political field. 
Gibraltar, on the other hand is not bound by 
treaties". 
N. Pounds (1952). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION. 
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Both Britain and Spain claim sovereignty over the strategic 
Gibraltar peninsula at the eastern entrance to the Strait. 
Spain claims it on principles of decolonization and territorial 
integrity of the state. Britain contends that it was ceded to 
the Crown by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (confirmed in 
subsequent treaties) (see appendices III, IV). Longevity of 
occupation, and the democratically expressed wish of the 
Gibraltarians to remain under British rule are also key 
arguments used by Britain. The issue is further complicated by 
micro-spatial disputes within the area of the Colony, including 
the isthmus, the airport constructed on it, and territorial 
waters (see plates 6.1-6.3). 
In international fora, many states, particularly former 
colonies, support the Spanish case. Nevertheless, Britain from 
the vantage point of the Colony, has ensured free access to the 
Plate 6.1 
Photograph: J.G. O'Reilly, 1985. 
View of the Rock from the Centre of the Strait 
N 
~ 
-.....! 
Source THE SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTAR: Documents on Gibraltar Presented to 
the Spanish Cortes by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1·1adrid, 1965. 
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Strait for all nations since 1704. Though not a superpower; 
Britain is still a major seapower with global commercial and 
naval interests as was proven during the Falklands/Malvinas War 
(1982) and escort and mine-clearing operations in the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf (1987). The Gibraltar base is still seen 
by many as being vital to Britain and it's NATO allies. Being a 
founding member and cornerstone of NATO, Britain has furthered 
the Alliance's interests in the region by securing passage of 
the Strait for all classes of vessel. As well as being a major 
base within NATO's geographical boundaries, due to the ''special 
relationship" between Britain and the USA, the Gibraltar base is 
an asset to Western interests in the Middle-East and Indian 
Ocean regions. Spain's historic quest for control of both 
coasts of the Strait, North African Territories, neutrality 
during the World Wars, Francoist heritage, and contentious 
stance concerning territorial waters and passage rights in the 
Strait have adversely influence international opinion, in 
contrast to Britain's excellent record in the region. 
A peaceful resolution of the dispute must be found, 
catering for the legitimate aspirations of all parties. 
International interests in the security of passage of the Strait 
must be reinforced, and NATO concerns catered for. The Strait 
is vital as an energy supply route and is crucial to Western 
commercial interests (see chapters 2, 7). In an emergency 
situation, if the NATO states were threatened by the USSR, or 
on a more regional scale if the superpowers became engaged in 
armed conflict as a result of tensions in the Arab world, the 
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Strait would be crucial for deployment, as was proven during the 
Arab-Israeli War in 1967 (see chapter 7). Without falling into 
the pitfall of historical determinism, the fact must be 
recognized that the southern shore of the Strait is as volatile 
now as in former centuries, particularly because of 
underdevelopment, the rise of fundamentalism and Maghrebi 
inter-state rivalry (see chapter 8). The historical dialectic 
between the riparian states for control of the Strait is still 
being played out in the Plazas, and possibly in the future 
Islamic fundamentalism will challenge the status quo in the 
area. Being a relatively new member of NATO (1982), Spain still 
has to prove its credentials to the Alliance concerning the 
implementation of NATO policies and usage of the Strait. 
Britain and Spain must accommodate these interests. Bilateral 
agreements in the form of retrocession are unlikely in the near 
future. However understandings concerning civilian and military 
spaces, and the isthmus and airport could be achieved. In the 
EC context, Gibraltar and Spain may become integrated over 
several generations, and already Spaniards have an absolute 
right to buy property and reside there. Spaniards may 
eventually become a majority, and by that time Spain should be 
firmly integrated into the NATO alliance. Yet because of the 
acrimonious nature of the dispute, and British reluctance to 
'discuss' the sovereignty issue, tensions remain high. 
Although the simile "solid as the Rock of Gibraltar" has 
become universal coinage, in the present geopolitical climate of 
the region there is a certain "rocky feeling" because of the 
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intensity of sovereignty disputes concerning Gibraltar and 
Spain's North African Territories. To date British policy has 
ensured that the southern shore of the Strait would not fall 
under the control of a strong or hostile power. 
Gibraltar's geostrategic location, imposing appearence, 
historical associations, (Hercules, Tarik ibn Zaid, Nelson, 
Churchill, Franco) and relationship with Spain and Britain 
render it unique. Gibraltar has become a symbol of power, 
geopolitical continuity and contention. Gibraltar was called 
"the Key to Spain" by Queen Isabella during the Reconquest. In 
the 19th century, at the zenith of the British Empire it was 
dubbed "the Key to the Mediterranean". History since the 17th 
century would suggest that the power which controls the Rock, 
largely controls the Strait, and the power which controls the 
Strait, controls access to the Mediterranean. 
Despite Gibraltar's limited area, lack of water, artificial 
economy, controversial military advantages, and problematic 
relationship with NATO and the EC, it is still coveted by Spain 
and Britain. It is a thorn in the flesh of bilateral and 
international relations. Its decolonization is a complex 
process having ripple effects and causing speculation as to what 
the future of the Sentinel of the Strait will be! 
6.2 GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW. 
The Crown Colony covers some 597 hectares (2.3 sq ml), and 
the peninsula rises to a maximium elevation of 426 m (1,398 ft) 
MAP 6 1 THE CROWN COLONY OF GIBRALTAR 
I Approltimote urea of land above 90m. (300ft.) Built-up area 
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Fondak ; 
'\fl'(!),. 
MOROCCO STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR 
Source: House of Commons, Seventh Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Session 1980-81. 'Gibraltar: The Situtation of Gibraltar and UK Relations with 
Spain'. London: HM Stationary Office, 22 July 1981. 
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(see map 6.1), (HC. Rept. 1981, p.vii). The Rock is linked to 
the rest of Spain by a low lying sandy isthmus. The west coast 
and Bay area is about 4.8 km (3 miles) long with the town and 
port nestled into the famous rock slopes. The east coast is 
steep and inhospitable. The land boundary with Spain is some 
800 metres long. Gibraltar's claimed territorial waters are 3 
nm. Spatially Gibraltar is less than 4.8 km (3 miles) long and 
1.6 km (1 mile) wide, with over 30% of the land sloping at more 
than 30 degrees. Gibraltar is the second most densely populated 
area in Europe and ranks fourth in global terms. 
6.3 SPANISH AND BRITISH PERCEPTIONS. 
The mass media have made much of the fact that Spain closed 
its borders with the Crown Colony between 1969-1985, and engaged 
in other hostile acts. Throughout history, Spanish statesmen 
have considered Gibraltar as Spanish. There is a misconception 
abroad that attempts at recoupment are a Francoist heritage. 
The Spanish Republican Government was in the process of 
reactivitating its claim to Gibraltar when the Civil War 
(1936-39) broke out in the Algeciras region. The restrictions 
imposed by Franco on Gibraltar, received even the approval of 
the Republican Government in exile. 
Until the Lisbon Agreement (1980), Gibraltar's laws forbade 
Spanish nationals the legal right to stay overnight, acquire 
property, run a business or defend themselves before a judge if 
arbitrarily expelled from the Colony. Spaniards did not receive 
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the same wages as Gibraltarians or Britons there. Basically 
economic apartheid existed. Yet during World War II, as many as 
13,000 Spaniards were employed in Gibraltar. This type of 
discrimination ensured that Spanish nationals would never 
constitute a majority. Though disguised, similar policies exist 
in the Spanish Plazas in North Africa (see chapter 5). Like the 
Plazas, the Gibraltar dispute is one of sovereignty contested by 
two states and not a question of decolonizing a population. 
Though Spain only had sovereign control of Gibraltar for 
242 years, it represents a golden period in Spanish history. It 
symbolizes the Reconquest, Spain's golden age of nation-state 
building, and its decline from empire. For many reasons 
Gibraltar remains a keystone in Spanish national sentiment. 
Based on archaeological evidence, some researchers claim 
that western Europe was first peopled by way of Gibraltar from 
the Maghreb (Stewart, 1967, p.24). Gibraltar holds great 
politico-religious significance for Spain. Via Gibraltar, Tarek 
led the first jihad into western Europe (AD 711), ferrying over 
500 horses and 7,000 foot soldiers across the Strait (Stewart, 
1967, p.24). During the Reconquest, the Muslim armies, Moorish 
peasants, and Jews were expelled via Gibraltar. The Moorish 
mosque of Gibraltar was transformed into the Cathedral of St 
Mary the Crowned. By 1704, there were 18 religious 
establishments there. 
lamps was the first 
The shrine at Europa Point with its many 
lighthouse in the region. Historically 
Spain's maritime prowess was associated with ports in the Strait 
region. The British penetration of Gibraltar was seen not only 
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as a politico-military defeat but also as a blow to Roman 
Catholicism, a cornerstone of Spanish nationalism. The invading 
armies (1704) desecrated the Europa Point shrine symbolically 
facing the Islamic southern shore. The Franciscan Convent was 
transformed into the seat of British power, the governor's 
residence. The British base has always been seen as a threat by 
Spain, and has overshadowed Spain's geopolitical advantages in 
the Strait area. From the Spanish viewpoint, Gibraltar should 
complement the geostrategic advantages of its Ceuta base on the 
Moroccan coast. 
Gibraltar was conquered by allied Anglo-Dutch forces in the 
name of the Hapsburg claimant to the Spanish throne (1704). In 
the evolution of international politics over the following 
decade, Britain became the dominant force and effective 
occupier. With this fait accompli Spain negotiated an overall 
peace treaty lending de jure recognition to the British 
presence. This was not unusual in the history of international 
relations of the period. Contemporary moralizing arguments 
based on historical facts tend to obfuscate the present problem 
and do little to resolve the dispute. 
"For a variety of reasons the very name 
Gibraltar arouses great passion and feelings 
in some sections of British public opinion 
as evidenced by parliamentary concern" (HC. 
Rept. 1981. p.xli). 
Some reasons for Britain's stance on the dispute include: the 
imperial hertitage of a colonial people; historical and human 
links to the Crown Colony; an historical vision of territorial 
control/sovereignty embedded in its world viewpoint; national 
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geopolitical interests, including commitment to NATO and role in 
the international balance of power; a sense of responsibility to 
-
the Gibraltarians; and an excellent record as sentinel of the 
Strait. 
Despite official statements concerning the immediate future 
of Gibraltar and de jure arguments based on history such as 
legitimizing treaties (Utrecht 1713, Seville 1729, Vienna 1731, 
Aix la Chapelle 1756, Paris 1763, and Versailles 1783); there is 
evolving a body of opinion that the present situation cannot be 
maintained. The problem must be approached by all parties in 
the context of contemporary geopolitical realities. Britain 
recognizes that it has broken every condition of Article X of 
the Treaty_Qf Utrecht (1713) but not that of offering Spain 
first option of recovering the Colony, if Britain decides to 
relenquish it (HC. Rept, 1981, p.pxli). 
While being proud of their British nationality and special 
relationship with the UK, the Gibraltarians recognize that they 
are of multi-ethnic origin, and share many culture traits with 
Spain. It is commonly accepted that Gibraltar's role as a 
military base, and duty free zone ensured them a higher standard 
of living than in the neighbouring regions. Gibraltarians fear 
retrocession, believing that Spain will not respect their 
distinctive culture, and that there will be a dramatic drop in 
their living standards. To many Gibraltarians. Spanish 
political culture is associated with Francoism and sieges. Some 
Gibraltarians feel betrayed, believing that Britain will 
eventually transfer sovereignty of their territory to Spain. 
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Man_y Gibral tarians feel that they c.u·e being aJbandoned by the 
British administration which created them, but are very 
selective in "analyzing" the historical and colonial aspects of 
the dispute. They also remember that in 1966, Britain leased 
the island of Diego Garcia as a base to the USA; and in 1968, 
the local population (1,200 people) was transferred to Mauritius 
against their wills (HC. Rept, 1981, pp.135-136). Yet a 
majDrity of Gibraltarians believe that as long as they remain 
united, they can block any deal between London and Madrid (Kyle, 
1980, p.201). 
6.4 HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY: TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION. 
6.4.1 Gibraltar Before the British. 
Gibraltar's political geography is a pentimento of 
historical relationships between Mediterranean peoples and great 
powers such as Britain and France. The pre-Muslim, Muslim, 
Spanish and British legacies are closely interwoven in the area. 
Mythology tells us that Gibraltar promontory was a portion 
of the mountain split by Hercules in order to create the 
Gibraltar Channel. The southern portion of Mons Calpe 
(Gibralatr) was known as Mons Abyla in Roman times, and today as 
Djebel Mussa or Mont Hacho, near Ceuta. Although several powers 
controlled the Strait area, the Phoenicians (1100 BC), Greeks 
(700 BC), Carthaginians (600 BC) and Romans (200 BC); Gibraltar 
was not one of their strategic bases. In AD 711, when Tarek Ibn 
Zaid led the jihad across the Strait, Gibraltar was under the 
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control of the Visigoths. From this period on the area became 
known as Diebel Tarek, literally meaning Tarek's Mountain, from 
which the word Gibraltar is derived. From the 8th century on, 
Gibraltar began to play a significant role in world affairs. 
During the Muslim occupation of Gibraltar (711-1462), Tarek 
had a castle constructed on the north-western slope of the Rock 
overlooking the isthmus. The town was founded in 1151 below the 
castle and occupied by the Moors until the Spanish took it in 
1309. Gibraltar was disputed between Christians and Muslims, 
but also by different Muslim power groups. In 1146, the 
Almohads of the Maghreb launched a fundamentalist jihad against 
the Spanish Almoravid Muslim dynasty and Iberian Christians. 
With victory, the Almohad rulers ordered the destruction of 
Gibraltar's fortifications (1160). 
The following century was one of intense Muslim-Christian 
strife, but Tarifa and Algeciras were the centres of battle 
rather than Gibraltar. With the Reconquest, Tarifa was taken in 
1294, and shortly afterwards Algeciras (1309) and Gibraltar 
(1310) fell. Although Gibraltar only possessed a small town at 
the time in the proximity of the Moorish Castle, Ferdinand IV 
ordered the construction of defensive works there. Between 
1309-1462, Gibraltar underwent eight separate Muslim sieges. 
After the third siege (1333), it fell to the Sultan of Fez. In 
1462, it came under the control of Granada and remained in 
Spanish hands until 1704. 
During the Moorish period, non-Muslim transit of the Strait 
was prohibited. It is the only time in history that one power 
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succeeded in effectively gaining control of both coasts of the 
Strait. By 1502, the northern coasts of the Strait had been 
reconquered by the Spaniards who continued the Crusade into the 
Maghreb (see map 4.1). 
The Spanish period (1462-1704) was shorter than that of 
Islam. During the 15th century the municipal boundaries of the 
town were extended to include the territories of Algeciras, and 
the Campo de Gibraltar developed. Because of struggles between 
Spanish royal families, the town was beseiged twice in the 15th 
century (1466-67 and 1506). With the unification of Spain under 
Isabella, Gibraltar was taken firmly under the control of the 
Despite its geostrategic potential, the Spanish Crown in 1502. 
Crown did not enhance it with fortifications. Gibraltar was 
sacked in 1540 by Algerians under Turkish command and subjected 
to other Corsair raids. 
In 1693, British vessels under the command of Admiral Sir 
George Rooke took refuge from the French fleet at the allied 
Spanish port of Gibraltar. The British found it necessary to 
bring guns ashore as Gibraltar was not adequately fortified. 
During the Spanish period ownership of Gibraltar changed 
hands five times, including two Muslim occupations. It was 
besieged twice and subjected to raids. Its reputation for 
impregnability only came about with the British occupation. 
6.4.2 The British Period (1704/13 to ?}. 
Several times during the 17th century, England expressed an 
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interest in gaining control of Gibraltar. As Oliver Cromwell 
stated: 
"wheither any other place be attemptable, 
espetially that of the towne and castle of 
Gibraltar, which if possest and made tenable 
by us, would it not be both an advantage to 
our trade, and an annoyance to the Spanyard, 
and enable us without keeping soe great a 
fleet on the coast with six nimble friggotts 
lodged there, to doe the Spanyard more harme 
then by a fleet, and ease our own charge 
(The Protector to his Generals at 
Sea, Blake and Montagu, 28 April 1656, in 
Thurloe, 1742, ch.4; Levie, 1983, p.lO). 
In 1683, during the English evacuation of Tangier, there was 
speculation about taking Gibraltar in compensation (see map 
4.1). Several other times during the 17th ceutury, Britain 
expressed an interest in gaining control of Gibraltar (Levie, 
1983, pp.7-9). The War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) 
afforded an ideal opportunity. In 1700 King Charles II of Spain 
died without leaving an heir, the succession was disputed 
between two claimants. Prince Philip V of Bourbon, a grandson 
of Louis XIV was backed by France and Spain, and the Austrian 
Archduke Charles was supported by Austria, England, Holland and 
the Holy Roman Empire. Fearing French control of the Spanish 
Crown, England declared war on France and Spain. 
In 1704 a combined Anglo-Dutch force under the command of 
Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt took Gibraltar, after the 
eleventh recorded siege in its history. The Spanish military 
forces were allowed to leave. The civilians had the choice of 
remaining. Because of the atrocities committed in the town and 
desecration of religious buildings, about 4,000 Gibraltarians 
Source THE SPANISH RED BOOK ON GIBRALTAR: Documents on Gibraltar Presented to 
the Spanish Cortes by the iinister of Foreign Affairs. Mad rid , 1965. 
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left and only 70 remained. It was agreed tha~ those remaining 
would continue to enjoy the same civil status and free practice 
of religion as previously enjoyed. The refugees settled near 
the Hermitage of San Roque, a few mj.J.es north of the town of 
Gibraltar, and founded a :o.e~;v town there buj_lt with stones taJ5:en 
from the ruins of the Roman town of Carteria. Spain has 
historically viewed the residents of San Roque as Gibraltarians 
in exile, and legitimate heirs to the town and Rock of 
Gibraltar. Despite tb.e international character of the seizure 
of Gibraltar, it must be remembered that the action was taken 
within the context of a Spanish dynastic dispute, and not in the 
name of England. 
In 1704, the Anglo-Dutch force raised the flag of the 
Hapsburg claimant, and proclaimed him King of Spain. Years 
later the story arose that Admiral Rooke lowered the flag of 
Charles III and replaced i.t with the British standard claiming 
Gibraltar in Queen Ann's name. Several sources cl.aim that the 
British flag was raised, for 
pp.12-13, 149-150) suggests 
varying 
that the 
reasons. Levie (1983, 
myth was an historical 
inaccuracy perpetuated by scholars working from the same source. 
Some Spanish sources may have lent credence to the story in an 
effort to challenge Britain's claim to Gibraltar in so far as 
the town was taken in the name of an Anglo-Dutch force under the 
command of a German officer in the name of the Austrian 
Hapsburgs, with legitimate claims to 
hence Gibraltar would be technically 
the Spanish throne and 
Spanish. The British 
sources may have perpetuated the idea in order to advance the 
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theory of right of conquest to buttress its claims. As Levio 
(1983, p.l3) s·tates: 
":8ven if the story were t~cuo, which it 
clea.:c:i.y is not, it '1as no effect o:tl the 
~o:cese:ot "():coblem with :r.es·;oect to the future 
·o· -_r-_·· ~~"" · ·b ·· lt · ·"" ·· d·: ·· b ·· t' ·1 ' f' ·· · h 
'>.:;1.. ra. ;a:r. .l t.. \vou.l .oe .. e.!.p .. tL. J.. .om:;_ 
sides, S:pa:o.:i.sh and H~rl.'Lish, would leave it 
in the obscu:city ~·1h:l.ch :i.t prope:dy 
deserves". 
Between 1704-13, Gibraltar was Spanish sovereign territory 
under allied military oc<J·upatio-n in tho name of a claimant to 
the Spanish throne. Yet it is popularly believed that the 
British period began in 1704. In 1705 a joint French-Spanish 
force unsuccessfully laid siege to Gibraltar. the twelfth in its 
recorded history. In 1711, the British Governor of Gibraltar 
was ordered to eliminate all foreign troops. By 1713 this had 
been completed, much to the displeasure of the Dutch. During 
negotiations with France, Brltain made it cle~r that it wished 
to retain Gibraltar and also Port Mahon in Minorca. These 
bilateral discussions were held in secret, despite vague 
assurances which England had made to its Dutch partners that 
Gibraltar would remain an allied issue. 
In the years leading up to the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), 
demands, refusals and diverse interpretations of proposals arise 
in the correspondence between British and Spanish officials that 
have recurred ever since in relation to Gibraltar. This type of 
"doublespeak" is still evident in all negotiations and 
declarations about the future of Gibraltar. In negotiations 
prior to 1713, Britain sought control of lands around the 
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Gibraltar settlement extending to a distance of "two cannon 
shot'' (see chapte~ 1). Spain constantly refused. Xn 1712, King 
Phil:i.p of Spain bluntly refused B:ei·cish do:mands, stating that: 
"His Hajcsty consents to :>deld. Her :British 
Majesty the ~owne and Castle of Gibraltar 
with its port and bay but without any other 
land than that which is contained within its 
walls and fortifications, and without any 
communication by land with the continent of 
Spain all intercourse and commerce therewith 
to be had by sea . " (Apostiles to 
Lexington, 28_ Oct. 1712, Public ReQ~rds 
Office, State Papers, 105/277; Levie, 1983, 
p. 24). 
With the culmination of British-Spanish negotiations in the 
Treaty (1713), it was still ambiguous as to what area had 
actually been ceded. Depending on the state of British-Spanish 
relations ever since diverse arguments have been produced by the 
contending parties. 
"Unfortunately the Treaty did not provide a 
map defining the area so described, thus 
giving both parties the opportunity to 
interpret the wording as it suited them, 
causing much controversy in later years" 
(Ramsey, 1978, p.2). 
Under Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) (see 
appendix IV) the Spanish Crown ceded: 
to the Crown of Great Britain the 
full and entire property of the town and 
castle of Gibraltar, togeather with the 
port, fortifications, and forts there-unto 
belonging; and he gives up the said property 
to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all 
manner of right forever, the above 
named property be yielded without any 
territorial jurisdiction, and without any 
open communication by land with the country 
round about". 
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Thus the Rock of Gibraltar was ceded to Britain in absolute 
sovereignty, but the tex·t would suggest that the j_sthmus between 
the Rook and tho rest of Spa~.n was not. 
The question of territorial ju~~.sdi.ct1.nn and. communications 
with Spain is covered in Article X, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
Treaty. It is provided that should adverso weather conditions 
or other unforeseen causes endanger tho survival of the 
population of Gibraltar by making it impossible to obtain 
supplies by sea, then despite the treaty prohibiti.on against 
open land communication, supplies may be purchased for ready 
cash from Spain via the land route. Provision was made that 
goods would not be imported from Gibraltar into Spain. Hence 
Madrid was never legally bound to maintain a permanently open 
land fronteir with Gibraltar according to the terms of the 
Treaty. However over the centuries land communications 
developed, establishing a precedent that became almost 
sacrosanct in Britain's view. Trafficking and smuggling became 
an integral part of the relationship between Gibraltar and the 
Campo de Gibraltar, leading to many disputes. With Spanish 
membership of the EEC (1986), it is obliged to maintain open 
frontiers with member states of the Community for the free flow 
of persons, goods and vehicles (Art.49, Treaty of Rome). 
Despite the stipulations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain invoked time and 
again the cannon shot rule, in claiming juristicion on land and 
sea (see chapter 1). From the 18th century on Britain was among 
the powers which wanted this rule to become an established part 
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of international law. This accounts in large part for British 
cJaims to the isthmus and teTritorial waters. 
A:r."Gj_cle X of the ')~rea;c:;,;: of Utrecht stipulates that: 
in case it shall hereafte~ seem 
meet to the Crown of Great Britain to grant, 
sell, or by any means to alienate therefrom 
the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, 
that the preference of having the same shall 
always be given to the Crown of Spain before 
any others" . 
Thus if Britain ever wished to sever its ties with Gibraltar, it 
-
could not legally transfer sovereignty to another sta-to wi-thout 
Spain getting first option. To date Britain has honoured this 
section of the Treaty. This suggests that Britain like Spain 
would not tolerate the establishment of an independent city or 
port state like Singapore. In 1830, Britain changed the legal 
status of Gibraltar from a "possession or territory" to a Crown 
Colony. 
From the time of the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713) until the present, Spanish leaders from Philip V to 
Franco and King Juan Carlos have called for the restoration of 
Gibraltar. On many occasions, not without justification, Spain 
has accused Britain of violating Article X of the Treaty (1713), 
while Britain has accused Spain of not complying with certain 
provisions of the Treaty. The Gibraltar problem has obstructed 
Anglo-Spanish relations for over two and a half centuries (see 
map 6. 2). 
6.4.3 Gibraltar's Impregnability. 
On several occasions Spain has tried to recoup Gibraltar by 
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force, but failed. The base proved invaluable to Britain during 
it's ooloniaJ. adventures and tho World Wars. 
"Of all the strongholds in tho \vorld, 
Rock of Gibraltar is probably the 
s'Grlki:o.g and impressive" (Abbott, 
J?. 2). 
tho 
most 
1935, 
The Spanish laid siege to Gibraltar in 1727, and the Rock proved 
impregnable for the second time in its British history. 
Gibralt-a!' ·Has a mr;tj or cause of \'HUS _b_et·ween Britain _and Spain 
(1718-21, 1727-29). In the Franco-British War which began in 
1754, Britain lost Minorca, so the geostrategic importance of 
Gibraltar was enhanced. France offered the island to Spain in 
an effort to win an alliance, and Britain did likewise with 
Gibraltar. Spain refusod both offers in order to maintain its 
neutrality (Levie, 1983, p.15). The Spanish blockaded Gibraltar 
~rom land and se~ durlng the Great Siege (1779 1783). the 
fourteenth siege in Gibraltars history is well documented and 
still spoken about today by the Gibraltarians (Ellicott, 1975, 
pp. 25-38). Its symbolism in Gibraltar is as potent as the 
Battle of the Boyne (1690) in Ireland or the Great Siege of 
Malta (1565) (interview, Ellicott, April 1885). The Great Siege 
of Gibraltar (3 Sep.1779-12 March 1783) witnessed more than 
200,000 cannon shot and shell being fired, and the tunnelling of 
the Rock with the construction of defence galleries in the north 
side, facing Spain. The Upper and Lower Galleries consist of 
main communication tunnels 2m wide by 2.5 m high (7 ft by 8 ft) 
with embrasures and firing points at intervals. Traditionally 
cannons were used from these points and later they were adapted 
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for modern weapons (~amsey, 1978, p.l5). 
In 1787, the Spanish Foreign M~.n~ste~ YJ.or~dablanca 
prepared a memorial iil which ho reitorated Spanish aspirations 
for the recovery of Gibraltar either by negotiation or force. 
He outlined plans for hindering not only land but also maritime 
communications with Gibraltar. Spain once again found itsel.f as 
an ally of France (1795-1803) during the Revolutionary period. 
Th~s was tbe last time in modern history that Britain and Spain 
went to war. 
When the Spanish people revolted against the French and 
their new king (Napoleon's brother) in 1808, Britain and Spain 
found themselves as allies. Defences on Gibraltar on the 
British side were oriented towards the north, and some 1,500 
metres away, Spanish defences were oriented south, facing the 
traditional enemy, the British. The La Linea line of 
fortifications stretched from Fort San Felipe in the west to 
Fort Santa Barbara in the east. In 1810, having informed the 
Spanish authorities, the British destroyed the La Linea 
fortifications to prevent them being used by the French. 
However with time Spanish historians have interpreted these 
actions as expansionist (see maps 6.2, plates 6.2-6.3). This is 
difficult to accept considering the geostrategic imperatives of 
the situation (see Levie, 1983, pp.53-55). From the time of 
the Napoleonic Wars until 1963, Spanish efforts to regain 
Gibraltar were limited to the diplomatic sphere. 
During World War I, Spain offically remained neutral. In 
the Gibraltar context, this was largely respected by Spain and 
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Britain. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Britain choose 
a neutral s·tance. However the Government of the Second Spanish 
Republic (1931-39) banned the sale of farms to foreigners in the 
Campo, and deployed an infantry batallion permanentJ.y at the La 
Linea garrison. In 1942 Spain formally occupied 650 metres of 
what had come to be known as the Neutral Ground in order to 
prevent further British encroachment on the territory of the 
isthmus (de L-a &::lrna, 19fH, p.160). Unlike Napoleon, Hitler 
understood the strategic importance of the Crown Colony to the 
British Empire and tried to win Franco as an ally in conquering 
the base. The aim of Hitler's master plan, Operation Felix was 
to deny Britain control of the Strait (Ramsey, 1978, pp.24-35). 
Though negotiations took place between Spain and Germany about 
the future of Gibraltar, Franco procrastinated in order to keep 
Spain out of the war. Nouetheless Spain pArmitted German and 
Italian espionage activities to take place in the 
Gibraltar/Algeciras area. Spanish neutrality is questionable 
because of the activities of Italian saboteurs based in the Bay 
area, with the mission of harrassing the Crown Colony (Ramsey, 
1978, pp.45-53). 
In spite of official denials, there is a body of historical 
evidence which suggests that in 1940 Sir Samuel Hoare, acting at 
the behest of Winston Churchill, was ready to discuss 
retrocession of Gibraltar in return for Spanish support in the 
war (Cordero Torr~s. 1961, pp.357-359). Similar bargaining 
positions were taken by Britain several times. For instance, in 
1917 Lloyd George renewed the offer of retrocession if Spanish 
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would support the war effort (Hermet, 1968, p.336). Several 
times Spain offered to trade some of its Plazas for the Crown 
Colony, especially in 1915 and 1935. 
During World War II, a massive sys·tem of tunnels was 
constructed in the Rock. The gangue was dumped into the Bay to 
form the foundations for the seaward extension of a runway. The 
purpose of tunnelling was to provide accommodation sufficient to 
allow the garrison to live underground and resist a siege for up 
to a year. Prov.isions include~d water supply, electricity, 
sanitary arrangements, hospital and laundry facilities in 
addition to normal accommodation, arms cachets and a military 
dump. Communications tunnells included pedestrian and normal 
sized roads. 
Land Rover. 
celebrated 
All the communications tunnels can be traversed by 
After 1945 tunnelling did not come to an end; the 
Molesend Way was only completed in 1968. There are 
some 55 km of tunnels (Ramsey, 1978, pp.l5-20). 
Spain argues that the isthmus upon which the airfield is 
built, like the maritime area, was not ceded to Britain under 
the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), (see maps 6.2). 
Although there was a massive armaments buildup, Gibraltar was 
not heavily bombarded during the war (Ramsey, 1978, pp.36-44). 
Yet the base proved an invaluable naval asset to the Allies as 
it had done during World War I. The military organization made 
it almost impossible for German and Italian vessels to transit 
the Strait, but German submarine activity proved difficult to 
curtail. Gibraltar was chosen as the command post for Operation 
Torch (the Allied invasion of the Maghreb), due to its proximity 
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to North Africa and the possibility of air support for sea and 
landing operations in Morocco and Algeria. Tho Allied 
:liberation of tho West Mediterranean was largely due to usage of 
the British base. As recently as 1982, Gibraltar was used as a 
base for operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War. 
6.4.4 The DisP-uted Neutral Ground .. 
According to the Spanish interpretation of Article X of the 
Treaty of Utrecht ( 1713} the terri·i7ory yi@lded to -B:rita,.i.n was 
limited to the land: 
"which is contained within (the) 
walls and fortifications (of) the 
town and fortifications of Gibraltar, 
together with the port, fortifications and 
forts thereunto belonging". 
Britain interpreted this as meaning it had control over an area 
equivalent Lo the distance of 'two cannon shot', despite Spanish 
protestations to the contrary. Between 1713-1909, the British 
moved northwards of the town and castle claiming an area of 850 
metres, of the total 1,450 metres strip of the isthmus (see maps 
6.2a,d,h). 
In 1713 British troops occupied the Devils' Tower and Mill, 
some 100 and 600 metres respectively north of the actual town 
and fort of Gibraltar (see map 6.2b). This action was 
undertaken on the grounds of self-defence. Later the occupation 
of these buildings was justified by arguments that they formed 
part of the fortifications of Gibraltar. With time, between 
these two posts the British army planted gardens (1720-23). 
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Spain protested both actions. 
In 1730, Spain ordered the construction of a defencive line 
a~ the northern end of tho isthmus, some 1,500 metres from the 
HB,lls of Gibraltar, La ,.uinea Qg Gibra,Jt<u (see map 6. 2c). Spain 
refused to concede to British protests about the construction of 
the Line, indicating that it was on Spanish sovereign territory, 
and that the sandy isthmus was Spanish, and that the Line was 
built to limit smuggling. Later the British constructed a 
cemetery on the isthmus, and Spain lodged a complaint. In 1766, 
the British Governor began referring to the land between 
Gibraltar and La Linea de Gibraltar as the neutral _ground. In 
1810, the Anglo-Spanish alliance against Napoleon gave the 
Governor of Gibraltar the opportunity of eliminating the Spanish 
forts of San Felipe and Santa Barbara on the northern boundary 
of the neutral ground. The forts were demolished with other 
stone banquets and guard houses of the Spanish Line, in an 
effort to prevent them falling into French hands (Ramsey, 1978, 
p. 2). 
The beginning of the dispute over the isthmus stems 
directly from the yellow fever epidemic of 1815. The Spanish 
authorities agreed to allow the British to construct an 
isolation camp outside the fortress walls (Ramsey, 1978, p.2). 
Largely because of epidemics aminating from visiting slave 
ships, quarantine camps were established on the neutral ground 
and subsequently these became temporary villages. By 1828 these 
had a permanent population of over 1,000 people (Levie, 1983, 
p.67). In 1829. the Colonial Office ordered the removal of the 
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village. Subsequently gardens, a well. slaughter house and 
drill grounds were established. In 1854 further quarantine 
village were built. By 1863, a zone of territory some 731 m 
(800 yds) from the walls of Gibraltar had been effectively taken 
under British control. rn November 1898 shortly after an 
armistice agreement between Spain and the USA, Britain continued 
to voice its displeasure about the Spanish defenses which had 
been installed on the shores of the Bay and proposed that 
Spanish "fort-i:f-ications-''-, "batteri.Bs" or "mount guns" ::>lrou1.d not 
be permitted within a "radius of seven geographical miles from 
the Moorish castle of Gibraltar (Red Book, 1965, p.266). 
Because of Spain's weakened position after the war (1898), 
Britain succeeded in gaining the neutralization of an arc of 
Spanish coastal territory around Gibraltar equivalent to the 
range of the largest naval gun of the time (Levie, 1983, p.76). 
6.4.5 Th~ Infamous Fence. 
In 1908 the Britain Ambassador in Madrid informed the 
Spanish Minister of State "as an act of courtesy" of Britain's 
intension to erect a fence along the British edge of the neutral 
ground with the object, mainly, of reducing sentry duty. The 
letter explained that: 
"The fence . which will in no way 
partake of the nature of a military or 
defensive work, is to be constructed of 
steel, and of an unclimbable pattern, about 
seven feet high and will be topped with 
three strands of barbed-wire, thus bringing 
the total height to nine feet. It is 
proposed to fix netting to the fence in 
order to prevent the passing of articles 
through the bars. A gap will be left across 
the main road leading to Linea and gates 
provided across the Eastern Road and at the 
Western Beach, the former for cattle and the 
latter, which will be in full view of the 
guard room, for the passage of those persons 
in possession of Beach passes" (Ramsey, 
1978, p. 2). 
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Work began on the Fence despite Spanish protests. The 
Fence was constructed a few feet from the British sentry line, 
once again increasing British jurisdiction. Spain continued to 
protest that it considered the zone as neutral ground but within 
the sovereign territory of Spain in conformity with the Treaty 
of Utrecht. 
Once and for all the Fence laid the limits of Britain's 
creeping jurisdiction. By the 1970s the neutral ground had been 
effectively "shrunk to 6 inches" (Ramsey, 1978, p.3). This 
action was grteatly resented by Spain and features in aJl 
Spanish arguments in defence of recovering sovereignty. The 
Fence has been referred to as the "Wall of Shame" (Red Book, 
1968, p.373) and the "Berlin Wall". On 12 July 1966, Britain 
affirmed its sovereignty on that part of the isthmus it had 
confiscated, invoking the principle of acquisitive prescription; 
however this mode of acquiring territories is not universally 
recognized by international law and besides Spain protested the 
action (Rezette, 1976, p.141). In July 1976, Britain extended 
the Fence, 9-12 m (30-40 ft) into the sea at the eastern end "to 
make it animal proof to stop rabies then moving south from 
Spain, from entering Gibraltar" (Ramsey, 1978, p. 3). A 
twenty-man platoon patrols the border which is flood lit at 
night. Two watch towers are found at either end of the of the 
domarcatory fence which is now constructed of green, plastic 
covered chain link, moshtoppcd with barbed wire coils. 
Prior to and >.vith the signing of the T:reat)l of UtJ:>ecbt 
(1713) Britain was unsuccessful in gaining jurisdiction over an 
area of land embracing the distance of 'two cannon shot' which 
it desired on the isthmus north of the Rock. This is proven by 
Article X of the Treaty and the successive protests lodged by 
Spain concerning British activities on the isthmus. 
After 1713, the military governors of Gibraltar obtained de 
facto what diplomats had failed to get de jure, sites on the 
isthmus, and gradual movement northwards of the original British 
line. Hence the neutral ground came into being by creeping 
jurisdiction. Subsequently Britain claimed the southern part of 
the neutral ground as sovereign territory. 
De facto usage and administration lent an air of legitimacy 
to British control of the isthmus in the international 
community, despite the Spanish contention that: 
"All the territory which the British are 
occupying in advance of the town gates 
belongs to Spain and constitutes a neutral 
zone indicated provisionally by the 
Government of His Catholic Majesty without 
prejudice to Spanish sovereignty" (Spanish 
protest note to the British Government, 
1909, quoted in Red Book, 1968, p.78). 
6.4.6 Territorial Waters. 
The mouth of Algeciras/Gibraltar Bay is about 5 miles (8 
km) wide between Point Algeciras and Europa Point (see map 6.3). 
From the midpoint of this line to the Spanish mainland is just 
over 6 miles (9.5 km). Spain contends that Br~.tain has no right 
to waters, except for a small portion in the port area. Tn 
Decembe:r l 957 , 
"Britai:u. fully reserved its rights with 
regard to British territotial waters on the 
Gibraltar side of the median line in the 
Bay". (Gibraltar: The Dispute with Spain, 
BIS COI, 1969, Cmd 715615, p.l8). 
During the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of 
Utreo:Ut. Britain soug.ht-to have the the 'two cannon shot' theory 
applied. Gradually the words 'port' and 'roadsteads' of 
Gibraltar became incorporated into the discussions. However 
Article X only speaks of the "port" and nothing more with 
reference to maritime jurisdiction. 
Spain contends that in ceding only the town, castle and 
port of Gibraltar, with no jurisdiction over waters other than 
"those which are c.:umprised by the actual port" (Red Book, 1965, 
p.238); and consquently Britain does not have a right to 
territorial waters (Red Book, 1968, p.493). Yet customary and 
conventional international law would seem to support the British 
claim to territorial waters as: 
Since 
"the fact that only the port of Gibraltar 
was specifically ceded to Great Britain 
under the Treaty, without any mention of a 
cession of territorial waters, is 
irrelevant; since it has long been the 
position that a cession of territory 
automatically carries the cession of the 
appurtenant territorial waters unles the 
contrary is specifically stated" (Gibraltar: 
Talks with Spain (May-Oct.l966), BIS COI, 
Cmnd. 3131, p.ll7). 
the 18th century, cessions of territory and 
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internat~onal treaties corroborate this viewpoint, as does the 
UN :ca~:J of the Sea ( J_jOS). Artj_cle 1 ( :t.) of the Convention on the 
n ·;. . l S "Cn"·;-,·; ·6',, <:7 ('.1.05'8) t • 
.lerT.J_"t.,OTlm- __ ea, ,!':l.no. ~ous. I',..Qne ..., s a-ces: 
"The sovereignty of a State e:Kt.ends, beyond 
its territory and its internal waters, to a 
belt of sea adjacent to :U:.s coast, described 
as the territorial sea " (516 UN Treaty 
Series 205, 15 UST 1606). 
According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982): 
"The sovereignty o-f 
beyond its land 
waters and, 
sea, descr~bed as 
(Article 2 (1)). 
a coastal state ex-tends, 
territory and internal 
to an adjacent belt of 
the territorial sea" 
"This sovereignty extends to the airspace 
over the territorial sea as well as to its 
bed and subsoil" (Article 2 (2)). 
"Every state has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding twelve nautical miles, 
measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with the Convention" (Article 3) 
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite 
or adj~uent to each other. neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement 
between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial seas of each 
of the two States ~s measured". "The 
above provis~on does not apply, 
where it is necessary by reason of historic 
title or other special circumstances to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two 
States ~n a way which is at variance 
therewith" (Article 15). (UNCLOS, 1982, 
A/CONF.62/122, 7 Oct.1982, pp.3 & 6), (see 
map 6. 3). 
International Law of the Sea (LOS) treaties between states 
also include dependent territories such as colonies. The 
evidence would suggest that British sovereignty over Gibraltar 
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carr1es an inherent legal right to territorial waters. The 
extent of these waters is not at alJ. clear because of cree~ing 
,ju.TiscLlcJ;_;_Lon on the j_sthmus and. the changes which have taken 
place in the maritime space in the immediate area of the Colony 
since 1713. The exact proportions of the port of Gj.braltar as 
of 1713 are difficult to specify. Concerning the area between 
the Old (North) Mole and ·the New (South) Mole, the waters 
bathing the shores were included in the cession, as if it were 
part of the port. The major problem is that Britain invoked the 
cannon shot theory as legitimizing its sovereignty in the Bay 
area. If this line of argument is accepted, then Spain could 
also lay claim to the entire bay using the cannon shot 
principle. In the restricted area of the Bay both claims 
overlap. In these circumstances, it is customary for the waters 
to be divided along the median line. No detailed authoritative 
map exists for the 18th century, of the caRtl.e, town, harbour or 
waters of Gibraltar. 
The Admiralty Dockyard with its harbour of over 178 
hectares (440 acres), protected by three moles was constructed 
on land reclaimed from from the sea between 1895-1905 (Ramsey, 
1978, p.2). The 
Spain, but over 
without Spain de 
practice, Britain 
issue was never settled between Britain and 
the centuries a modus operandi developed, 
jure conceding to the British claim. In 
claims a 3 nm territorial sea around 
Gibraltar, but the median line in the Bay area is in dispute 
(see chapters 1-3). 
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6.5 MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION. 
Historically what alarmed the Spanish authorities most was 
the inc~ease in British jurisdiction to the north of the fort 
and town of Gibraltar and consequently that Britain would invoke 
the cannon shot theory with respect to the surrounding waters, 
eventually usurping the historic Bay. In 1851 and 1852, the 
Spanish Minister of State, proposed to the British Ambassador 
that their respective governmen~s: 
"enter into an agreement in respect of the 
boundaries of the Fortress and Port of 
Gibraltar" (Red Book, 1965, pp.182, 186-7). 
Spain proposed: (i) to establish the sea and land boundaries of 
Gibraltar as laid down in Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht 
(1713); (ii) to declare the ground between Gibraltar and the 
fortifications along the San Felipe Line to be "neutral" with 
some common waters; and (iii) both parties to renounce the use 
of this neutral ground. Britain did not deem it necessary to 
enter into such negotiations at the time. Lord Palmerston 
stated that: 
this right (to extensive 
jurisdiction over coastal waters) touches 
Great Britain's interests too closely for 
her to renounce it by peaceful negotiation; 
she will not yield to force in time of war, 
so long as the military and naval resources 
of Great Britain shall suffice to maintain 
it" (Palmerston to Hawden, 16 Dec. 1851, 
quoted in Red Book, 1965, p.188, p.193; 
Levie, 1983, p.69). 
Spain proposed that the dispute be referred to the other 
European governments for a decision. Britain did not answer the 
proposal. 
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During the Spanish-American War (1898), Spain implemented 
military const~uction works in tho Algociras area. The British 
Ambassador informed Madrid that: 
With the 
":it might relieve the Spanish Government 
from solicitude on this point if 1 inform 
them that Her Majesty's Government are quite 
ready to give them an assurance that no such 
operations (by US forces directed against 
Spain) would be permitted to be carried on, 
or even attempted, from any point within the 
territorial waters of Great Britain in the 
bay" (British Ambassador to the Spanish 
lUnister of' State, 19 Aug~. 1898, PRO, · CO 
91/421; Red Book, 1965, p.259). 
ending of Spanish-American hostilities, Britain 
continued to object to the Spanish constructions in the Bay area 
and eventually obtained neutralization of the Spanish coastal 
area. 
Part of Spain's reason for the idea of constructing a 
~panish Line to the north of the isthmus as early as 1730 was 
the fear that with British expansion from the town and castle, 
it would lay claim to the contiguous waters of the Bay by 
creeping jurisdiction; and Spanish vital communications between 
Algeciras and Ceuta would be endangered. In 1852, the Spanish 
Minister of State, explained why the Spanish government had had 
the Line construct in 1730: 
it was not only in order to cut 
off communications by land with the 
stronghold, but to command the bay in order 
to prevent English ships from anchorage 
outside the quays of the Rock, for if that 
were tolerated through lack of firmness on 
the part of Spain, the English would end up 
by claiming it as a right. A foreseeing 
preventive measure, whose justification is 
shown by what occured since the forts (of 
the Spanish Line) fell into ruin " (de Lis 
to Hawden, 11 Dec.l852, quoted in Rod Book, 
1965, pp.l95-197; Levie, ·1983, p.86). 
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T:he Heste:r:>n ·i;o:cmi:o.al of the Spc.,nish Line, )?o:rt San J:=·olipo, 
Spai:r.l 
attemp·ted the construction of a mole to which n~~tain objected, 
l'o:r sJtj_ng B. Cf.l.:o.no:n. Unde:r d11.:ress Hhich included ·ch:ceat o.l: \v<:Lc, 
Spain c:wquj.esed.. Hence the >:Jaters in that area were more or 
less neutraJ..i 7.erl.. B:r.i.tain too!.l: advantage of the situa:cio:o. by 
introduced a Quarantj_ne Anchora_g_e_ Zone bet\veen Fort San Felipe 
-and Gib:ealtar' s Old Mole, but extending to a point north of due 
west of San Felipe. This marked the beginning of British 
encroachment in the waters of the Bay and is most lj.kely the 
origin of the disputed 'Loop'. 
In 1825 during a storm two British merchant ships were 
driven onshore from their anchorage in the Bay. Spain objected 
to a violation of its territorial waters as the Royal Navy had 
gone to their assistance. In response to this, the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1826) stated that he 
would: 
proceed to point out the limits 
of the Bay of Gibraltar as universally 
recognized not only by the inhabitants of 
Gibraltar, but by the Spaniards themselves" 
(Canning to Alcudia, 30 Nov.l826; Red Book, 
1965, p.180). 
He claimed British sovereignty over waters to the north of the 
most northern limit of any territorial claim on land (see maps 
6.2f,g). 
In 1851, after another maritime incident Spain challenged 
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the Dr:Ltis~o. cla,:i..m. Up ·co tha:t pe:r:i..od c>.:i ffA:ri.:o.g vim·Ys co:o.cer:o . .i.ng 
the extent of British sovereignty had also been expressed by 
seve:ral Britj_sh officials, as fo:r example in 1831, tho Xin~·s 
1.\d.vocc;;te u:rote a.:o. op:Lu.io:a for ·cb.e [;ol Ort:i.aJ. Off:Lce stating that: 
His Majesty has supreme and excl.usive 
authority over the ~own and 
Fortress of Glbraltar . beyond those 
limits He does not possess the rights of 
sovereignty; and that foreign ships lying in 
the Bay or in anchorage Ground, beyond the 
limits of the port, are not amenable to 
Brlt:i.sh jurisdiction . " (Opinion of 
the Kings Advocate, 24 May 1832, FRO, CO, 
CII/123; Levie, lG83, p.87). 
To the contrary, the Captain of the Port of Gibraltar replied 
that: 
"Punta Hala forms the natural boundaries of 
the Port of Gibraltar and that the Spaniards 
can have no Claim to any part of the bay to 
the Eastward of that point below water mark, 
for there is no other point by which the Bay 
of Gibraltar can be defined as ceded by the 
Treaty of Utrecht (1713)" (Sheriff to 
Lieutenant Governor of Gibraltar, 15 July 
1831. Desp.97, PRO, CO. 91/114). 
Despite Spanish offers to negotiate fixed boundaries in 1851, 
the issue has never been settled. While Spain disputes British 
rights to territorial waters in the Bay area, British 
sovereignty over waters to the south and east of Gibraltar have 
been less disputed though never formally recognized by Spain. 
Consequently the controversy concerning sovereignty over 
territorial waters also entails the question of air-space 
especially in the Bay area (see map 6.2e, plates 6.2-6.3). The 
dispute is complicated by the fact that Spain is fighting the 
issue on two levels, that of British sovereignty over the 
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GibraJ.tar Colony, and British rights to any territorial waters. 
and that of a micro-maritima dispute ir tho Hay area, ~he 
}H'Od.u.ct of ::3:cit:i.sh e:o.c:coachlil81lt on la:o.d. o..nd sea. 
Conce:c:oj_:o.g the ma.:ci·i;ime dlspute, the H:c.i.t<Lsb. co:ccospo:ndenco 
of 1826 and 1851 claim the wate~s of the Bay as far north as 
Punta Mala, claiming that they were included in the cession of 
the Po:rt of Gibraltar (1713), partly upon the cannon sh_pt 
doctrine. Spain points out that it never accepted thA cannon 
shot argument j_n relation to Gibraltar; but that even if the 
theory were applied, the cannon range of 1712 was inferior to 
that of British claims applying the same theory in the first 
half of the 19th century. If the cannon shot doctrine is 
equitably implemented between adjoining states, it has to be 
applied perpendicular to the coast, hence the maritime boundary 
line would run as an extension of the land bouiluary of 
Gibraltar's walls or the Fence. 
Britain claimed that all of the waters of the Bay to the 
east of a line drawn from Punta Mala, (far to the north of any 
land territorial claim ever made by London), to the Old (North) 
Mole in Gibraltar were encompassed within the term "Gibraltar, 
together with the port thereunto belonging", as 
appearing in Article X of the Treaiy of Utrecht (1713) (Levie, 
1983, p.90). This stance taken in 1826 and vigorously supported 
by successive British governments encompasses waters far beyond 
British land jurisdiction. In 1858 and 1873, Spain proposed 
negotiations on the drawing of formal boundaries, but Britain 
felt that the claims which had been lodged in 1828 were 
established and did not feel a need for revision. 
Since tho 1950s, Bri.tain has modified its position 
somewha~. and has tri.ed to conform to the LOS (Art.l2 l95B & 
Art. :t5 :1.982). An official rna.p publ:;_s:h.ed Lo. J 96R ( YJ· ·'- i ·'-1 d ,,O.L .• L .. 8. Map 
of the Bay of Gibraltar, Compiled and Drawn by D.I.S. Map), 
uses tho Fonco as the line for seaward projection east and west, 
and then follows the median line principle in a south-east 
direction, dividing the Bay roughly in half, with the exception 
of 'the Loop' . 'The Loop', some 2 miles on the line of the 
Fence, extends a quarter of a mile to the north of the line (see 
maps 3. 2, 6. 3). 
6.6 THE AIRBASE AND RUNWAY. 
In 1876, on the orders of the Governor of Gibraltar the 
fruit and vegetable gardens on the neutral ground were destroyed 
and replaced by public gardens, and subsequently a race course 
was constructed. This was at a period when excellent relations 
existed between the authorities at Gibraltar and the Spanish 
administration in the Campo. By 1914, it was generally accepted 
that the North Front or sandy area to the north of the Rock was 
a British possession. During World War I, experiments with 
seaplanes were carried out from the harbour, but attempts to use 
the racecourse as a landing ground were stopped following 
Spanish protests because of a crash on the Spanish side of the 
Fence (Ramsey, 1978, p.4). 
In the 1920s, the governors of Gibraltar and Algeciras 
formulated a joint plan for the construction of an Anglo- Spanish 
airfield on the Spanish side of the Fence. Madrid and London 
did not approve ·~he scheme. In 1931, a local aircraft company 
\.Yas givo:u pe:r:'mi.ss:Lo:o. to "l:tse the :caco ooui·se as a:o. Edrfield for 
use in services between Gibraltar and Tangier; however the air 
company closed down after three and a half months. 
In 1932, the Governor was given j_nstruotions from the War 
Office in the form of a secret me.mo:rGJ,ndu.m issued by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, in which it recommended that 
plans should be worked out for the establishment at short notice 
of an airfield on the North Front. Inevitably this included the 
race course area. The Governor submitted his plans to the War 
Office (12 May 1932). It was then submitted to the Colonial 
Office, the latter expressed doubt as to the international 
validity of the sitution as Spain had always ul~imed sovereignty 
rights up to the foot of the Rook. The Governor replied that: 
(he was) strongly of the opinion 
that it would be a great mistake to open up 
any discussion on this point, in any case, 
(he) would hesitate to express an opinion on 
the matter without very careful research. 
There is much old correspondence on the 
subject in the archives in the Secretariat 
and elsewhere and as the opportunity offers 
this is being collected and carefully 
examined. For the present it would appear 
to be sufficient to state that our length of 
tenure of the area in question gives H.M. 
Government the strongest claims" (quoted in 
Ramsey, 1978, p.6). 
This opinion was approved in London and construction of the 
emergency landing ground began on 3 September 1934 (see map 
6. 2e). 
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in early 1934, Sir Alan Cobham went to Gibraltar to make a 
survey and report on the feasibility of an air route between 
Gibraltar and Tangier for civil usage. The scheme was rejected 
for j.t would interfer with the military t~aining ground and the 
recreational area on the North Front. By 10 March 1936, the 
'emergency landing ground' was ready for usage. 
The first evidence for a full size airfield came from the 
Secretary of State for the Qolonies, W. Ormsby~Gore MP. who 
wrote to Governor General Harrington on 1 October 1936, and 
asked for his opinion about a proposed air base at Gibraltar, 
partly on an area reclaimed from the sea. However the Governor 
had already had discussions with Sir Samuel Hoare, First Lord of 
the Admiralty, and agreement had been reached that an air base 
was essential. On 26 November 1936, Mr. Ormsby-Gore wrote 
again stating that the Government had decided that while a base 
was essential for Imperial Defence, they did not wish to 
alienate Spain and create international complications by 
reclaiming land at that particular time. Several other schemes 
were discussed (Ramsey, 1978, p.7). The Air Ministry opted to 
revive the reclamation plan, suggesting that 1,000 yards by 800 
yards (914m by 731 m) be created on the western side of the 
isthmus. 
The Governor unofficially found out that the Franco 
Government was aware of the plans and was ready to fortify the 
neighbourhood if works began. Upon receiving the information 
the Foreign Office's reply to the Governor was: 
as far as Mr. Eden is aware 
it was never contemplated that General 
Franco's administration should be consulted 
on this subject. Unless, therefore, the 
fortificaLions of the neighbourhood of 
Gibraltar represents a serious threat to the 
neighbourhoo~ of the Colony, a matter on 
which Mr. Eden is not competent to advise, 
he does not consider it necessary to make 
any notification to the Salamanca 
authorities" (Ramsey, 197G, p.7). 
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The matter was let lie for some time, then in November 
1938, Harrington w~s replaced as_ Governor by General S.i.T F.dmJ .. md 
Ironside, and the issue was brought up once more. It was agreed 
that the Spanish Nationalist Government should be informed of 
the proposed developments, on the 1 . __ J.nes that the emergency 
landing ground was to be improved, for more extensive use and 
that the Fleet Air Arm units from visiting aircraft carriers 
would be using it for training. 
An artinJ.e in the Francoist newspaper Arriba, (Aug. 
concluded: 
"A few days ago, in one of our editorials, 
we expressed the hope that for the sake of 
good relations between Spain and Britain the 
old dispute about Gibraltar would now be 
settled. Today we have to confess that the 
attitude expressed by England in 
establishing this military airfield eighty 
metres from our lines is not the best way to 
arrive at an understanding or to confirm an 
expressed desire for friendship, 
particularly if these military defence works 
are going to be built on land over which we 
have today, as always. unquestionable rlght 
of sovereignty" (Ramsey, 1978, p.8). 
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Shortly afterwards the Governor informed the War Office 
that Spain was building defences on its portion of the neutral 
iround and had i.ncreas8d tho guard at the frontier. He also 
s·ca'Led that unless bilate:ral discussions took place on the 
1ssue: 
the seT:i.es of p:i.:o.-p:ctcks to \vh:lch 
Gibraltar is subjected will increase and 
that friendly relat.i.ons w.i.th Spa>Ln wilJ be 
difficult, if not j.mposs.i.ble to acJ:U.eve" 
(Ramsey, 19'78, p. 8). 
In September 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) arrived at 
Gibraltar from Malta ana formed No. 200 Group with its Head 
Quarters (HQ) in the Bristol Hotel; and began to operate flying 
boats from the harbour. For the RAF and Royal Navy (RN), the 
matter of an efficient operational airbase was by now urgent. 
Captain F.E.P. Barrington, Commander of the AOC Mediterranean 
Command stated to the military authorities that: 
"It is now clear that no sanction has been 
~; ven. -fo-r: t-.he constrnct:ton of anything more 
than an emergency landing ground without 
hanger or workshop accommodation, and the 
Spanish authorities have been told that the 
present construction is solely for that 
purpose. Further it is unlikely that the 
Foreign Office will consent to an alteration 
of policy. It is apparent that even when 
this landing strip is completed it cannot be 
used for any other purpose than as an 
emergency landing ground and that until such 
time as the political situation vis a' vis 
Spain changes completely the suggestion to 
operate land aircraft from Gibraltar is 
impracticable" (Ramsey, 1978, p.9). 
On 4 December 1939, Governor Liddell received a copy of a 
secret dispatch to the British Ambassador in Madrid. It was 
accompanied by a letter from Mr. Malcolm Mac Donald to General 
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Liddell, in ehich the Colonial Secreta~y stated that an 
aide-memoirs had been given to the Spanish Ambassad.o:~: t:n London 
on 25 April 19~9; and that tho main purpose of the eorks at 
Gibraltar would be to improve an emcrgAncy landing ground. The 
J.etter Gtated that: 
"It is not proposed to seek the assent of 
the Spanish Government for the use of the 
la.ndl:o.g ground for the purposes in vie\1 and, 
although it is not the intent of His 
Majesty's Government to employ the landing 
ground for operational purposes, it is not 
considered desirable to furnish the Spanish 
Govermnent -Hi th any as-surance o:o. this point" 
(Ramsey, 1978, p.9). 
During 1939-40, the different branches of the British 
administration vacillated on the issue of reclamation of 
maritime space for a runway, but work on the land runway 
continued. 
The idea of the seaward extension of the runway faded into 
background until March 1941, when the Governor, and the 
British Ambassador to Madrid, received a letter on behalf of 
Winston Churchill. It was pointed out in the letter that the 
presence of the German forces in Sicily posed a major threat to 
British communications with the Middle East and that Gibraltar 
could serve as an intermediate halt in liasions. Churchill 
referred to the fact that the Spanish Government had been 
informed that the landing ground was only to be used in an 
"emergency". He proceeded to define the term as: 
"In one sense the war itself is an emergency 
in a narrower sense an emergency is 
created by the fact that aeroplanes cannot 
fly direct to the Middle East. In a third 
sense landings of these aircraft will not be 
:.eegula)7 
p. 10). 
but i:o.tormltten" (Ramsey, 1978, 
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Churchill stated that he agreed to tho usage of the landi.ng 
ground on condition that no violation of Spanish territorial 
rights would in practice be involved, that landings would be 
i:o.termi tten, and ar:r.i.vs.ls singly and unostentatiously. The 
letter concluded that it was not considered necessary or 
desirable to consult the Spanish authorities or to inform them 
of what was proposed. 
The airfield and runway was aligned almost due east-west, 
roughly in the middle of the original neutral ground, with the 
airfield to the south of the British Fence and Spanish Line. By 
6 April transit aircraft had arrived and tests were being 
carried out. A special committee was constituted and decided 
after consultation with London to increase the width of the 
runway and create an extension westwards. The extension formed 
a " V " tovmrds the south west with the existing strip and was 
actually the foundation of the present runway. In his 
communications with the War Office, the Governor was assured 
that the matter had been approved at a high level (Ramsey, 1978, 
p. 11). 
The reclamation scheme went ahead with the runway extension 
seawards coming to 521 m (570 yds). An RAF station was erected 
at North Front. The USA supported the scheme. The US was keen 
on the project as Gibraltar could prove useful to the US Air 
Ferry Service from West Africa to the UK for the arrival of the 
first US bombers to assist in the assault on Germany. The 
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Governor was assured that Britain would supply the labour and 
plant and that some plant would be supplied by the USA. 
The main road between La Linea and Gibraltar could not be 
diverted and had to cross the runway. Besides the evident 
danger of accidents, some 7,000 Spanish nationals crossed daily 
to work in the C~own Colony. This added to the security risk 
because of enemy agents entering with the work force (Ramsey, 
1978' pp. 36-44). 
In No-vember , r"\.A ., l. :::r:l: .L ' AOC-in-G Coastal Command, Air Chief, 
Marshal Sir Philip de la Ferte expressed the view that due to 
the geostrategic importance of the project, a seaward extension 
of half a mile, providing a runway of 1,646 m (1,800 yds) would 
be desirable. Higher authorities suggested that 1,417 m (1,550 
yds) would be adequate for the moment. Work began on the 
seaward extension in December 1941. Blasting took place at the 
"Scree", on the north east face of the Rock. Further material 
was blasted from the Rock and extracted from the vast tunnel 
network. The daily load was about 7,500 tons. As the work 
progressed, the international political implications deemed so 
important in former years faded. 
By January 1942, the runway had been extended to 900 rn (985 
yds). By April it was 1,052 m (1,150 yds) long and able to 
handle heavy aircraft en route for Egypt and India. By November 
1942, the 1,417 rn (1,550 yds) extension for Operation Torch was 
completed. By January 1943, the extension was 1,646 m (1,800 
yds). In July it was ready for use to its full length. By 
1943, nothing remained of the race course, or Victoria Gardens 
351 
on the once :o.eut:ca1 g.;rm:mq. After \'lorld Wa4:r:' n:, a, fuJ:>the:r:' J.83 m 
(200 yds) was added to the western extension of the J:>unway. In 
J. 983, the G1b:cal to, r Year Book ga,vo tho length of the J:>u.n-vnw a,s 
).,829 m (2,000 yds). Churchill called the airfield, 
"Gi.:b:cB.lta.r' s greatest contribution to the 'i.var" (Ramsey, 1978, 
p.~O: Levie, 1983, p.l84). After 1945, military usage of the 
air base continued and gradually civilian flights became 
important accounting for over 50% of traffic by 1969 (BIS COI, 
Gibraltar Airport: The Facts, 1968, p.10). 
The airfield does ~ ~not;- constitute further encroachment :by 
Britain on Spanish territory, Levie (1983, p.79) states: 
"but the putting to a new use of Spanish 
territory already improperly occupied, a use 
which has had a considerable impact on all 
of the surrounding Spanish territory". 
Spain feels embittered that the initial actions for the 
construction of the airfield were undertaken when Spain was weak 
because of the ravages of the Civil War (Red Book, 1965, 
pp 0 373-375). Indeed the action was reminiscent of the strategy 
between 1704-13. 
On 17 April 1967, Spain published an Order declaring that 
an area of territory in the Gibraltar area was prohibited to 
aircraft (see map 6.3). Britain raised the matter in the 
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
under Article 54(n) of the Chicago Convention. The Council 
considered the issue (10-13 May 1967). Spain invoked Article 
9(a) of the Convention as the basis for declaring a Prohibited 
Area. which it was argued was "of reasonable extent and location 
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so r1s :r.wt to .::..rYce:cfea.r unnecesso,:rily \v:L th a,ir navigation". 
Spain argued tha·t Article 1 of the Convention upheld its 
Brea when considered necessary for security reasons. 
restrictions on the exercise of 
sovereign rights accepted by treaty by the 
state cannot be an infringement of sovereign 
:rj_ghts" (O'Connell, 1982, p.335). 
'J'he UK 
The Council failed to reach a conclusion and bilateral talks 
broke down when Spain set the precondition that Britain accept 
that the land upon which the air facilities are situtated was 
Spanish sovereign territory. Because of these restrictions 
civil and military air services into Gibraltar had to use the 
open channel of the Strait for access. Aircraft approaching the 
airport from east or west have to change coursP. near the 
in order to avoid the Prohibited Area. These approaches cannot 
be taken in adverse weather conditions. Precision-approach 
radar for approaches from the east end are available, but this 
presupposes free flight into the Bay from the Strait. According 
to O'Connell (1982, p.336): 
"The Spanish reticence with respect to the 
Straits has thus been a precondition of the 
continued operation of the Gibraltar airport 
at all. But in order not to exacerbate the 
situation, Royal Navy and Air Force planes 
are instructed not to fly within four miles 
of the Spanish coast. Although their 
maritime reconnaissance squadrons engage in 
surveillance over the Strait, they are 
instructed not to drop sonar buoys in the 
claimed territorial waters". 
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With the opening of the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar 
(1985), substantive discussions concerning the airport did not 
ensue. However several plans were suggested by London and 
Madrid. London offered usage of Gibraltar airport to Spain for 
civil and military aircraft, but the idea of joint control is 
more in line with the Spanish perspective. One plan that 
possibly has the backing of both governments is for the 
construction of an airport terminal on the Spanish side of the 
- frontrer -rinR:ed to- Gibral-tar airport, which could be used for 
internal flights (Sunday Times, 5 June 1985, p.25). 
Due to lack of constructive dialogue on the isthmus/airport 
issue (1985-87), Spain blocked the entry into force of the EC 
Single European Act on 1 July 1987. The dispute centred on the 
inclusion of Gibraltar airport in the air fare liberalization 
agreement (Guardian, 1 July 1987, p.1). The Spanish Transport 
Minister vetoed the package. He said that the agreement would 
have given airlines free access to the airport, in common with 
other regional facilities in Europe, thus implicitly conceding 
sovereignty to Britain, and prejudicing the outcome of future 
sovereignty negotiations (Independent. 26 June 1987, p.1). A 
Spanish diplomat to the EC, Jesus Ezquerra. insisted that the 
agreement had to exclude Gibraltar airport ''which stands on 
disputed land". He objected to it being treated as a British 
regional airport (Sunday Times (Focus), 5 July 1987, p.25). 
Another Spanish diplomat stated that: 
"Spain cannot be a signatory to 
international agreement that appears to 
Britain sovereignty over the isthmus. 
agreement over the isthmus which is 
any 
give 
Any 
not 
dec.i.ded in bilateral tallts \Wuld do that" 
( Supda.y J.').,mes, 5 July 1987, p. 25). 
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B~itain wishes the airport to be included in all international 
ag:reements. Accord.i..ng to The Times (5 July 1987, p.25), '"1'b.e 
British negotiators were not prepared to budge an inch". 
Hm.vever talks on the dilemma were held two weeks later in London 
bet-vJeen Gibraltar's Chief Minister, Joshua Hassan and Britain's 
Foreign Secretary, Geoffr_ey Howe, det-ails we.ee not released. 
(Times, 14 July 1987, p.8). In Novermber 1987, the British 
governemnt offered Spain "co-operation in the use of the 
airport" as opposed to "joint control". In an effort to block 
discussions on the project, some 15,000 Gibraltarians held a 
demonstration in the Colony (Financial Times, 27 Nov.l987, p.3). 
In response Britain warned the Gibraltar~ans that it may "invoke 
the Governor's resArve powers, and impose direct rule", if they 
continue to obstruct an Anglo-Spanish deal on the airport 
(Financial Times, 2 Dec.1987, p.2). Britain's offer to Madrid 
includes the building by Spain of a second terminal to handle 
passengers to and from Spain who would be exempt from 
Gibraltar's passport and customs controls. Britain is also 
prepared to have a Spanish air traffic controller at the 
airport, in the interest of improved liaison between the 
Gibraltar and Seville control towers (Financial Times, 2 
Dec.l987, p.2). 
6.7 POLITICAL STATUS. 
6.7.1 Sovereignty. 
Gibraltar is unique in the history of British colonialism 
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in that over 51% of the l.and is owned by the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD), while the MOD and Property Services Agency employs about 
34% of the workforce of 12,000. A further third is employed by 
the Gibraltar Government and the remainder in the private 
sector. By 1981, some 65% of the gross national product (GNP) 
was generated by HMG expenditure (HC. Rept. 1981, p.xli). In 
consequence the Governor, who is an active list officer and 
Commander in Chief of the garrison, is appointed by the monarch. 
The locally elected Government does not have absolute internal 
powers. In principle the Governor is in charge of defence, 
external affairs, internal security and economic stability. 
Spanish arguments advanced in the Red Book (1965,1968) and 
other official publications state that Gibraltar was not given 
to Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) as a 
military base or colony. If this is the case then what exactly 
did the cession entail. Britain claims that Gibraltar was 
ceded, and as British sovereign territory, it may be used for 
whatever purpose the British Government deems appropriate. 
Spain has repeatedly put the Gibraltar issue before the UN on 
the principle of decolonization, yet disowns the Gibraltarians. 
In international fora Spain has accused Britain of undermining 
the security of the state because of the military base. There 
are evident inherent contradictions in the Spanish argument. 
The text of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) reveals that: (i) 
the word "garrison" 
(ii) provision is 
traditions of the 
is used, this implies military base; and 
made for the respect of the religious 
"Roman Catholic inhabitants", obviously 
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:referring to the Gibraltarian/Spanish inhabitants under 
Protestant rule. 'With so many references to "fort", "castle", 
"garrison", and "religion"; this suggests a military base and 
colony. Depending on the intensity of the dispute, sometimes 
Britain takes the premise that Gibraltar was gained by right of 
conquest (but it must be remembered that Gibraltar was not a 
terra nullis (sovereignless territory) before 1704), and 
subsequently British "rights" we.r_e_ consoli.d.at.ed in the Treaty of 
Utrecht ( 1713). 
Gibraltar's status between 1704-13 was that of a territory 
occupied by aJ.lied forces in the name of a claimant to the 
Spanish throne. British strategy during this period left them 
in a dominant position. Gibraltar's status from 1713 until 1830 
would seem to have been that of a territory taken by right of 
uonquesL, but leglLimi~ed in the form uf a ue~sion (Article X, 
Treaty of Utrecht 1713). Regardless of other contingent factors 
involved in shaping the Treaty, Spain's loss of an integral part 
of its territory to Britain was made under duress. By 1713 the 
British presence was a fait accompli. Spain has continuously 
sought retrocession. The majority of world states, especially 
former colonies including Morocco sympatheize with the Spanish 
case. Yet Spain did not lodge an official protest when 
Gibraltar was designated a Crown Colony (1830). This status 
remained without change until 1950 when due to pressure from the 
Gibraltarians, Leglislative and Executive Councils were created. 
The power lobby representing the Gibraltarians was the 
Association For the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR). At this 
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point Spain feared that Britain would follow a devolutionist 
policy, possibly leading to some form of independent state, 
perhaps of the puppet genre. 
Visits of the British Royal family to Gibraltar, including 
that of Elizabeth II (1954) and the Prince and Princess of Wales 
(1981) were felt as insults by Spain and it was only in 1986 
that official visits to Britain by the Spanish Royal family 
recommenced, the first since 1905. To register displeasure at 
the 1954 visit, Spain stopped the issuance of new w<;~rk pa_sses __ to 
Spaniards wishing to work in Gibraltar. This was a prelude to 
Gibraltar's longest recorded siege (1969-85). In 1961, 
Anglo-Spanish discussions got underway in Madrid with Britain 
asking for a return to the pre-1954 regime. However the winds 
of change were hitting Gibraltar. Spain pointed out that the 
issue entailed much more than smuggling; namely the unilateral 
modifications introduced by Britain into the Gibraltar 
administration and political reforms "without consulting the 
Spanish Government" (Red Book, 1965, p.70). 
6.7.2 The Colony. 
Britain's commitments to the Crown Colony are: (i) if 
Britain should ever decide to relinquish sovereignty, then Spain 
has first option of sovereign control; (ii) Gibraltar will not 
be ceded to Spain against the wishes of the majority of 
Gibraltarians; and (iii) as a dependent territory to carry out 
plans for economic and social development. Professor Allen in 
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his memorandum to the Special Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House of Commons (HC. Rept. 1980-81, p.xliv), summed up the 
realities of the situation when he stated: 
"The rights of the Gibraltarians, our 
political philosophers may reflect, are not 
the only rights to be considered; Spain has 
rights and so does the UK. In the last 
resort we have to face the dilemma that the 
Gibraltarians demand to remain indefinitely 
in exactly their present statuR, especially 
at very considerable cost to the UK 
taxpayers, may be unjustifiable, if not 
impossible to grant. The heart of the 
matt-e-r - i-s -the · indes-sv-luble--- tie --i-n -c·:ne 
minoritie's mind between citizenship and 
territory; it is in the end for the majority 
of UK citizens, as represented by the 
British Government and Parliament of the 
day, to decide what is and shall remain 
British territory". 
Since the 19th century, sovereignty has come to apply as a 
legal presumption only to territories formally constituted. 
accepted, and recognized by other states in the international 
system of states (Crawford, 1979, p.l26). As Gibraltar is not a 
state and its inhabitants do not constitute a nation or distinct 
ethnic group, but possess a common/unique culture with many 
ethnic and cultural affiliations with Britain and Spain, the 
principle of self-determination cannot be deemed as sacrosanct. 
It is interesting that Knight (1985, pp.248-272) in his analysis 
of post-colonial determination on a global scale does not 
discuss Gibraltar, or similar situations where a sovereign 
state wishes to decolonize territory rather than people. 
According to Mikesell's (1986, pp.l-5) framework for the study 
of minority group aspirations, the diagnostic terms are 
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"recognition" of unique tdentity, perception of "access" and 
"partj_cj_pation" in la:t'ger national group, degree and/or 
aspiration for "separation", "autonomy" and/ or .i.:ndepe:a.dence. 
The Gibraltarians seek recognition as a unique entity, with 
access and participation in a state (UK) almost 1,000 mls away. 
While wishing to retain sovereign 1tnks with Britain, the 
Gibraltarians have been veering towards autonomy since the 
1960s, but history and geopolitical imperatives preclude 
-
independence. 
6.8 THE GIBRALTARIANS. 
Since 1704 Gibraltar's raison d'etre has been that of a 
military base, with civilian politics only allowed to develop in 
so far as they suited military needs. While Britain now 
contends that the wishes of the civilian population must be 
respected, Gibraltar has always been firstly a military base and 
only secondly a colony in so far as a civilian population was 
needed to help maintain the base. However by referendum (1968) 
the overwhelming majority of Gibraltarians have voted to remain 
under British rule. Spain cannot advance a demographic argument 
claiming sovereignty over the people of Gibraltar. With the 
allied Anglo-Dutch occupation of Gibraltar (1704) the population 
had the choice of leaving, or remaining and swearing allegiance 
to the Archduke Charles, claimant to the Spanish throne. 
4,000 left with the defeated army, and some 70 remained. 
Today the Gibraltarians are of heterogeneous 
About 
origin: 
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British, Cypriot, French, Genoese, Ir~.sh, Indian, Italian, 
Maghreb~ .. Maltese, Minorcan, Neapolitan, ·,-,07'-'-,J ge·•1 S""' !. , • l; \ . L~t. \----;1 ' Spa,:oj_sh, 
dmvis:O. end. so forth. The 1961 consus had a "rn:.tsce:IJ.f.l,:o.eou.s" item 
\·lhich cla.tmed that the :r:esident DE:ltish subjects .i.n G:i.:o:raJ.ta:r 
not born there nor in Britain or Spain had been born in 55 otbe~ 
states, while the resident alien population came from some 25 
states. 
In 1981, the population was 29,500 civilians; 19,500 
Gibraltarians, €3, -500 Britis-h and 3, 500 aliens of --wholn 2, o50 were 
Moroccans. There were an additional 1,850 British servicemen 
not counting their families. Between 1949-1981 some 1,166 
Gibraltarians married Spanish nationals (mostly Spanish women) 
(HC. Rept. 1981, p.vii). The fact that so many Gibraltarian 
males have married Spanish women over the centuries has helped 
reinforce the Spanish language, catholicism and other facets of 
Spanish culture. 
Since 1713, epidemics and war have caused great population 
fluctuations. The last major upheaval was in 1940 with the 
evacuation of civilians from the Colony, whereby all save 4,000 
males were left with the forces. After World War II the 
population returned to its former numbers. 
In the past, Spain's pejorative statements in relation to 
the Gibraltarians and their ethnic origins has done little to 
endear the people of the Colony into accepting closer ties with 
Spain. In the 1960s, the Spanish press referred to the 
Gibraltarians as "neither English or Spanish" (Red Book, 1965, 
p.433); and "English, second rate English; Spanish, imitation 
SpaD:tsh, and other l'orms of .imJnJ.ee d.(-)SCe:trt" (H.ed 
pp. 424-425). '1'he te:r:'m "pseu.d.o-G.iJ:):r:'flJta:rian" was 
'l'his ·L;ype of p:copaganda is mo:re l'em.i.JJ:i.sce:o.t of 
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:sook., 1965, 
11lso used. 
the fa"scist 
:co,cj_al d.oc·c:e:Lo.es than ·cho present ·i~~-m.o:r o:~ Bpn.n:l.sh. 0:i :pJ.OJ:itcWY. 
U:o.lih:e ·the situation in Ceuta and. ~1.el:U :l..e,, Hb.el'e mo,JJ.y 
Muslims ultimately seek the protection of the ~oroccan 
government, the Gibraltarians do not wish any formal political 
links with the Spanish authorities. Spain cannot support a 
demographic argument in laying claim to the Colony, in the light 
of historical factors. By 1741, of the male population on the 
Rock, 45 were English, 96 Spanish, and 169 Genoese. As early as 
1712, 28 shops on the main street were run by Jews paying rent 
and a Christian levy to the Governor. The 1753 census lists the 
number of civilians as 1,816, of whom 434 were globally 
categorized as British (the majority were Scots and Irish), with 
597 Genoese, 575 Jews, 185 Spanish and 25 Portuguese. By 1779. 
about a third of the population were Sephardic Jews (Stewart, 
1967, p.ll6). In the civil census of the 18th century 
categorized under British, Roman Catholic and Jewish, the 
respective statistics are 467, 1,460, and 783 in 1776; 519, 
1,819 and 863 in 1777; and 512, 2,098 and 776 in 1787. The 
total population in 1815 was 10,136, of which 6,754 were 
comprised of the security forces and their families (Stewart, 
1967, p.l60). The ethnic composition of the civilian population 
in 1814 was 886 Genoese, 650 Portuguese, 527 Spanish, 489 
Jewish, 403 British, 138 Minorcan and 104 Italian (Stewart, 
1967, p.l60). 
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According to the terms of Article X of the Treaty pf 
Utrecht, residonco in Gih:r.aJta:r. i C' . ·"-' forbidden to Jewi.sh and 
Besides the hjstoTical he~itage of TeJ.igious 
bigotry Spain wished to hinder the development of a strong 
Maghrebi population nominally under British tutelage. Spain 
feared an alliance of its two traditional enemies in Gibraltar 
which would threaten communications with Ceuta and the Plazas. 
Brj.tain never upheld this clause of the Treaty for economic and 
st.re.teg--ic reasons. Traders of -diffex·ent ethnic origins helped 
to defray some of the base's expenses and to establish Gibraltar 
on the major trading and victualling routes. Also good 
relations with Morocco was an imperative for survival, 
especially in procuring water and supplies of fresh food. 
During the most recent "siege" (1969-85), Moroccan immigrant 
workers replaced the Spanish "day workers". For obvious reasons 
Spain does not list this particular clause of the Treaty in its 
body of grievances concerning Britain's non-adherence to aspects 
of the Treaty of Utrecht. Nonetheless, Gibraltarians of 
non-Christian origin cannot overlook the implications of such an 
historic perspective. 
While Spain has stated that if Gibraltar were retroceded, 
the Gibraltarians would be protected and their interests 
respected, Spanish attitudes are ambiguous (Pueblo, 30 April 
1959, Franco interview; Red Book, 1968, p.391; Red Book, 1965, 
p.289, p.422; Levie, 1983, pp.95-96). Franco referred to the 
"true" Gibraltarians as the inhabitants of San Roque (Pueblo, 30 
April 1959; Red Book, 1965, p.289, p.422). Because of such 
statements in the past, the Gibraltarians are not oonvi.nced of 
Spa.n.tBh goodvri.:LJ. G.i_bral tar ian pol:i_·tj_c~_El,!J.S :1jJ<:e S:L r ,Joshua 
Hassan ~ave reiterated time and again, tho uniqueness of the 
Gj_b:reJ:cn,:r:i.cm.s a,:o.d ·t;hei:r nisto:cy of :religious and racj_al 
tolerance. This mutual tolerance provides a striking contrast 
to the situation in the Plazas. in the 1970s, tho 
Gibraltarians also witnessed Spain's mismanagement of the 
decoJ_onj.?.atj on of the 'vestsrn Sahara, in \Jhich the Saharawis 
were effectively denied the right to self-determination because 
Madrid secretly agreed with Morocco and Mauritania to divide the 
territory between the latter two states (see chapter 8) (Franck, 
1976, pp.694-721). 
Although Spain has moderated its official statements and 
tried to win Gibraltarian support, in the light of the 
uverwhelmlng pro-British vote in the 196'7 referendum, the 
population remains sceptical. The reasons for this attitude are 
manifold. The Gibraltar's multi ethnic, racial and religious 
matrix and polyglot origins has produced a bilingual culture 
which is unique. To be sure, Spanish is the language of home 
and religion, and English the tongue of the bureaucracy, 
commerce, education and social mobility; but the colonial 
complex of the Gibraltarian is more akin to a regional or class 
consciousness rather than that of the despised native. 
Inmigration to the Rook has been for economic reasons, or a 
quest for religious tolerance or social mobility; the Sephardic 
Jewish, Italian and Irish component of the population offers 
examples. The Roman Catholic and Spanish language culture of 
t~e majority was disassociated from the Spanish reJ.igious 
~~.e~a:rohy and educational system. Under tho stewa~dsh~p of the 
coJ.oni.al ~uthorit~es, the bishops and clergy of Gibraltar came 
from non-Spanish stock such as the Irish. Vrom the 19th cont11ry 
uutil recently, the primary and secondary educational system for 
children of all religions has been the terrain of Irish nuns and 
brothers under the auspices of the British administration. It 
is somewhat ironic that Spanish is taught as a foreign language 
by non-native speakers using curricula similar to those used in 
Britain, while the vast majority of pupils speak Spanish as 
their first language. Similarly hj_story and geography curricula 
devote little or no place to Spain, being based on British 
curricula. 
Because of the negative attitudes expressed by Spain to the 
Gibraltarians the locals fear becoming statAl.ess pawns in 
international affairs, like the Ugandan Asians of the 1970s. 
Despite a certain disdain for the visiting British 
administrators and MOD personnel whose cultural and ethnic 
prejudices sometimes come to the fore, the Gibraltarians have 
yet to be convinced that they would fare better under Spanish 
administration. They are not convinced of the viability of the 
Spanish economy nor democracy. Even the most apoliticized 
Gibraltarian is familiar with Francoism. Unfortunately frontier 
personnel on the Spanish side of the divide do little to dispel 
fears. Harrassment in restricting and eventually cutting off 
communications between Spain and Gibraltar (1965-85) reinforced 
the siege mentality, engendering the concommitant folklore and 
c:md. nos has ·taken place. 
!'JOD--J:>ela ted. spending aud spi~off e~ploy~e~t. and 
gm1orous \'lhj.te:O.a.J.l oor;.t~cibutio:ns :has a:f:'Tm:deu I.; he waj ori cy a 
high standard of li vlng (especially J 935-198Us) .i:o. cornpaF.:Lson to 
their Spanish noj.ghbou.:r.s. Bet\veen 1970-78, Gibraltar :reoeJved a 
ffi4 million ODA grant for housing and schools, and other ODA 
grants totalling ~15.8 million, some mB50 per Gibraltarian 
capita (BIS COI, Faotsheet. 1979) . However the economic 
situation has been in a state of flux since the m.id-1980s. 
In 1967, in the face of protests from the UN General 
Assembly and Spain, Britain conducted a referendum in Gib:r.al.tar 
in which 95.8% of the eligible voters exercised their franchise. 
Of the 12,237 votes cast, 12,138 choose: 
voluntarily to retain their link 
with Great Britain, with democratic local 
institutions and with Britain retaining its' 
present responsibilities". 
Only 44 opted "to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance 
with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government" (HC. Rept. 
1981. p.xi; Levie, 1983, p.ll2). Thus for the first time in 
the history of British-Gibraltarian relations, the civilian 
population was consulted about its future. Like many myths 
about Gibraltar, democracy is one of them. It did not exist on 
the Rook until after World War II, and then only within 
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cj.J:>cumsc:d.bed l:i.mi ts dictated by ·che coloniaJ admi:o.:i.stratj_on. 
Democracy as it e~ists today is a recent phenomenon. 
The real issue of Gib~altar's goostrategio functiou ~Dd the 
Bri tis~a--Spanish dispute has been bee:o. some~iO.a"t ovorshoil.owed by 
two geographical phenomena; (i) ·Lhe principle of the ter~itorial 
integrity of the Spanish state, and (ii) the right of the 
Gibraltarians to some form of self-determination. 'l'b.e 
Gibraltarians are not a homogenous ethnic group nor nation~ no~ 
a colonized people in the true sense of the word; but rather 
Gibraltarian British citizens. To speak of national or 
self-determination is not really possible. A fe'I:J minor 
politicians have called for independence, but the majority along 
with the governments of Britain and Spain do not wish this to 
occur. The geopolitical implications of a micro-state in this 
location are not in the interests of the riparian states, NATO 
nor the EC. Besides it is not a viable proposition for the 
Gibraltarians. In accordance with the Treat~ of Utrecht (1713), 
Britain has never offered sovereignty to a third state. 
in case it shall hereafter seem 
meet to grant, sell, or by any 
means to alienate therefrom the 
said town of Gibraltar, preference 
shall always be given to the Crown 
of Spain before any others" (The Treaty of 
Utrecht, 1713; Red Book, 1965, p. 155-157). 
It was during World War II that Gibraltarian political 
organization came about. Up to then any type of social unrest 
or trade union activity had been ruthlessly suppressed (Stewart, 
1967, p.80). In 1942, Joshua Hassan set up the Association for 
the Advancement of Civil Rights (AACR). After 1945, local 
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political agitation entered Gibraltar's restricted stage. The 
AAGR got limited powers in tho new Le~lislatj.ve and Executive 
Councils in l950. Spain saw this as the first step in tho 
transfer of sovereignty to the local popula~~on. In 1954, Spain 
imposed border restrictions on crossing, and suspended the 
issuance of new work permits for Spanish workers. Greater 
self-government was given to the Gibraltarians in 1956 and 1964. 
With the closing of the La Linea border in 1969. over 3,000 
Moroccans were recruited as non-perminant residents for manual 
labour. Their spouses and families did not have a right of 
residence. Like the unfair treatment of Spanish workers before 
1969, the Moroccans face the same problems. This lends weight 
to Spanish criticism of colonialism. 
The sociology of Gibraltarian society is based on wealth 
(no matter how accumulated) and a hiArarchy of interests. A8 in 
many colonies and disputed territories, home governments are 
technically responsible. In practice abuses arise within the 
society itself rendering change from the outside problematic. A 
similar situation exists in the Plazas. The Gibraltarians like 
the Ceutis and Melillinese have to face change. Doubtless this 
will not be smooth. As Francis Bacon says: 
"He who cannot compromise is a 
will not compromise is a bigot, 
not compromise is a slave" 
Religious Divide). 
fool, He who 
He who dare 
(Beyond the 
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6. 9 ~!?HE ECONOMIC_A OF SOVEREIGNTY. 
6. 8. l Th~ )l:r.·i tish Co:gj;ribution. 
A close Jook at the Gibraltar economy reveals the price of 
B~i.tish sovereignty. Between 1869-85, ove~ 67% of Gibralta~·s 
impo~ts came from the UK and HMG expenditure amounted to about 
67% of the national income with the MOD alone paying over 60% of 
the salaries in the Colony. Public sector employment included 
1,800 British servicemen, 300 expat;rtate civili13.ns, (over 500 
family dependents) and over 3,000 Gibraltartan and Moroccan 
civilians. The naval base and dockyards employ equal numbers of 
the active population, 23% and 22% respectively, with only 14% 
in the wholesale and retail trades and 5% in tourism (Lancaster 
& Taulbee, 1985, p.258). In 1981, it was suggested closing the 
RN Dockyard as of 1983. The economic policies of Prime Minister 
Thatcher are erad11ally reducing British Government irrve~tment in 
the industry. The phasing out of refit and ship repair 
facilities could mean the loss of over 1,000 jobs. The British 
Government converted the dockyards (not the naval base) to 
private operations and management (1984); carrying grants of E28 
million by way of subsidy in the first two years, and a 
commercial contract with the RN for three years. 
In 1968 Gibraltar tried to establish itself as a potential 
off shore financial centre with tax relief schemes and 
exemptions. Over 50% of banking business emanates from outside 
the Rook (Financial Times, 25 Feb.1983, Gibraltar: Special 
Report, pp.33-36). Because of the opening of the La Linea 
frontier (1985), the Gibraltarians expect greater banking 
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interaction with the cosmopolite community of the Costa del Sol 
('J'ele~h. 12 April :l987, p.:"S5). 
Because of its limited a~ea, and lack of agricultural land, 
water and natural resources, everything has to be iwportcd into 
Gibraltar. Spa~.n being aware of this put restrictions on 
Gibraltar's land communications (1713) and mounted several 
sieges and blockades over the ages. However 
Gibraltarian will-power proved stronger than 
- geostratege1rt. 
British and 
the Spanish 
Theoretically, to import, Gibraltar has to export. Yet its 
manufacturing facilities are negligible, lagging behind those of 
Ceuta and Melilla. In 1979, out of a workforce of 11,593; 2,858 
were employed in shipbuilding, only 204 were engaged in other 
manufacturing (Levie, 1983, p.97). Despite the tourist 
potential, in 1979 only 578 persons were employed in 
restaurants, hotels and tourist related trades. This was 
largely due to the closed frontier (1969-1985). The 
Gibraltarians and their administration are hoping to cash in on 
the Costa del Sol tourist bonanza. According to Le Monde (1 
Nov.l986), Gibraltar has become the most fashionable area for 
tourists in south-western Spain. 
Concerning land ownership, 
first (51%); and is followed 
the Ministry of Defence ranks 
by the Gibraltar Government 
possessing nearly as much, and the remaining 3% is under private 
freehold. While the Crown pays rates or property tax to the 
Gibraltar government, the rates are based on usage which is 
claimed to be very low. On this basis, the Gibraltarians have 
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been arguing for decades that more land should be made available 
to locoJ people. 
6.9.2 EntJ:>epot: fl.~-
Many of Gibraltar's dubious trading activities have soured 
British-Spanish relations, and doubtlessly will cause problems 
in the EC context. Britain recognized the ideal location of 
Gibraltar as an entrepot, storage and distribution centre at an 
early date. It was hoped that it would develop into the Hong 
Kong of the Mediterranean, this dream is not altogether dead in 
British and Gibraltarian circles, especially since 1985. 
Historically Spain has been aware of the commercial potential of 
ports in the Strait area. It is not a coincidence that the word 
tarif is derived from the Spanish town of Tarifa on the Strait. 
Despite the stipulations of the Treaty (1713) pertaining to 
communication with the Campo and restrictions on trading, the 
Colony has been a centre for smuggling contraband, similar to 
the Plazas in Morocco. Crown officials and Gibraltarian 
administrators did little or nothing to limit the illicit trade 
throughout the centuries. It is common knowledge in Gibraltar 
which bureaucrats and leading families have ammassed their 
wealth through illicit trading. There is no social moral 
censure on such business activities in Gibraltar. However some 
'outsiders' 
Robert W. 
they tried 
in former times like the Governor of Gibraltar, Sir 
Gardner were silenced or recalled to London, when 
to break the contraband trade. In typical colonial 
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manner. loual e~trepreneurs with the backing of friendly 
politicians and MPs became involve&. Jn the Gardjner oase, 
n:c:ttish me~cc:hants and. politicans \·?oro :LcugeJy respons.i.ble fo:c 
hjs recall in the last century. Again this is reminiscent of 
the sj.tuation in the Pla~a. Mowever without the aid of Spanish 
guards and officials the contraband trade would not be so 
lucrative. British-Gibraltarian entrepreneurship and disdain 
for Spain's economic problems have only been matched by Madrid's 
incapacity to controJ. its own functiOllC:f,ries and actively prevent 
smuggling, as is the case with Rabat and its officials in the 
area of the Plazas. 
According to Stewart (1967, p.123): 
"The freeing of the Port of Gibraltar had 
been forced upon Queen Ann's government by 
the King of Morocco. The Order in Council 
of 1715 was issued to emphasi?.e a previous 
order and to prevent abuses by the Governor 
of Gibraltar". 
Gibraltar ceased to be a free port in 1827 when charges 
were levied on hulks and pontoons (used by smugglers) in the Bay 
by an Order in Council. In 1848, wharfage tolls were introduced 
and tonnage fees in 1858. In 1858 the Privy Council ordered 
duties on wines and spirits. But tradition dies hard, and the 
original grant was never rescinded. 
In 1965 on the eve of Franco's blockade, the Malaga 
newspaper, Sur claimed that 300 smuggling ships cleared the 
Gibraltar port in 1959 (Stewart, 1967, p.268). During a BBC 
television interview in 1965, Fraga Iribarne, the Spanish 
Minister of Information claimed that nearly 1,000 smuggling 
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boats were operating near Gibraltar; of which 40 had been 
ca,ptu:red by C' • vpal:O., and 20 by }'ranee, Italy and Algeria. 
Ir:tba:-:'ne sta:ced tha;t Gibraltar had "re-ms:po:rted more than a 
thousand tons of cigarettes to Spain durj.ng 1963, and half a 
million motors''. Smugglers also operate between Gi.braltar and 
Tangier. The question of Pesetas derived from the contraband 
trade and i.llicit money changing (a common practice at ports on 
the Strait), along with the dual British and Spanish currency 
system on the Rock, is tiot advantageous to the Spanish economy. 
According to the Gibraltar Chronicle (19 July 1961): 
"Gibraltar has become the operations centre 
for smuggling organizations. Gibraltar is 
not a free port, but it is the next best 
thing. Imported goods are put in bond, for 
which a modest fee is charged. They can be 
removed and shipped out whenever the owner 
wishes. As long as they are not smuggled 
back into Gibraltar, the customs authorities 
do not worry too much where they go". 
The Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce was confident enough to 
put on record in its 1960 report that the government had made 
storage facilities available to facilitate the smuggling trade 
(Stewart, 1967, p.269). The biennial government reports on 
Gibraltar giving import and re-export figures, groups dubious 
commodities with innocent ones, "so that the former cannot be 
subjected to separate assessment" (Stewart, 1967, p.270-272, see 
pp.122-141, 265-281). Statistics for Gibraltar like the Plazas 
suggest that the entire populations are chain smokers and 
alcoholics, having luxury products in triplicate. 
According to Martinez (1971, pp.l7-19), smuggling provides 
the real base of the economic life of the Colony, causing a loss 
of $25 million to the Spanish exchequer between 1961-70. Xn 
1971, Gj.br~Jtar was annually importing $5.5 million wo~th of US 
tobacco (pop.25,000), while Spain was only impor·~ing $4.5 
million (pop. 33 million). In 1969, over 8,000 
automobile mmers avoj.ded. Spanish tazes by registering their 
oars in Gibraltar with its 12.5 miles of street and road. 
Such economic activities have greatly soured relations with 
Madrid, because of loss in revenue, flagrant violation of tbA 
Treaty of Utrecht, collusion of the Gibraltarian administration, 
and arrogance with which complaints have been received 
throughout the centuries. Smuggling involves both land and sea 
routes. The trade via the isthmus in the 18th century was 
minimal and further reduced by construction of the Spanish Line 
(1730-31). With the destruction of the Line (1810), the 
smugglers path was once more open ann the trade reachod massive 
proportions with the influx of Spanish day workers from the 
early 19th century until 1969. Maritime smuggling in the area 
has always existed on a grand professional scale. Of course the 
problem has been exacerbated by disputes over maritime 
jurisdiction. Spanish protests went unheded, while Madrid's 
innumerable actions in the Bay to curtail the activity were 
challenged by the British government as taking place within 
British territorial waters (Red Book. 1965, pp.217-256). Overt 
disputes of this nature have lessened since the 1970s, possibly 
as part of Spain's strategy of advancing a peaceful settlement 
to the sovereignty dispute, and also in the international forum, 
Spain is well aware that Morocco has similar grievances in 
relatj.on to the PJazas. 
'J:'he 's:mu.gg:u.ng issue' i.s not as sj_:mple P.,s some sources 
suggest, because of the often covert nature of the activity. On 
the evening of 6 ApriJ. :L985, by chance, the author in tho 
company of a friend employed by the local tax administration, 
duTing a 20 :minutG period observed a cat and mouse game between 
two small Spanish fishing boats and a RN patrol vessel less than 
1 nm to the south ~vest of the Rock. Ostensibly 1 t s_eemed a case 
of attempting to fish within Gibraltarian territorial waters, 
yet the fishermen were trying to land in a secluded beach area. 
The Gibraltarian in the author's company believed that the 
'fishermen' were attempting to pick up illicit merchandise. 
The geography of the region lends itself ·to illicit 
trading. In February 1987, six Britons were held in a drugs 
raid off the Costa del Sol. The haul. of half a ton of uannabis 
and 70 pounds of 'hashish' oil had its origins in Morocco and 
was transferred several times to different vessels in the 
vicinity of the Strait before the attempted landing on the 
Spanish mainland (Guardian, 6 Feb.l987). 
Gibraltar has always gained a substantial part of its 
wealth from illicit trading. To reduce contentions, Britain 
must make greater efforts to bring Gibraltar's economic 
activities in line with EC norms. Spain must cooperate, and 
also re-assess unorthodox trading activities in Ceuta and 
Melilla which have an impact on the entire Strait region. 
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6.10 GiBRALTAR AND THE UN. 
Once the UN became involved in the soveTeignty dispute tho 
issue could no longer be seen as a purely bilateral issue. ~he 
British-Spanish impasse had to be breached; a novel experience 
for two ex-colonial powers. The issue was put before the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1957 (see appendix V). Polarization 
of British and Spanish supporters took place, with Spain gaining 
the aid of many newly independent states, _including the Latj~ 
American and Arab countries. Spain's decolonization policies in 
North Africa had a significant impact. King Hassan of Morocco 
supports Spanish calls for the return of Gibraltar, in the 
belief that retrocession automatically implies the return of the 
Plazas to Rabat. Though the superpowers have not become 
directly involved, on different occasions they voted on 
resolutions favourable to Spain. 
The dispute illustrates that each case of decolonization is 
unique and global policies cannot be applied. Yet there are 
striking similarities with the case of the Plazas. Madrid sees 
Gibraltar as a colonial anachronism, and Rabat agrees including 
the Plazas in this category. Spain refuses to admit that there 
are similarities. Two states lay sovereign claim to Gibraltar 
and the Plazas on the principle of the 'territorial integrity' 
of the state. The principle of self-determination for the 
respective populations does not fully apply. A straight 
withdrawal of the colonial administrations from the territories 
does not offer a ready solution. Ostensibly the Gibraltar 
dispute is a bilateral issue, but in an era of increasing 
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supra-national organization, there are UN, EC and NATO 
dimensions. Any sovereignty changes in the ~egion will clearly 
affect Moroccan-Spanish relations, and consequently those of 
Spain and B~itain. Whatever form decolonization takes in 
Gibraltar, it will set a precedent for the Plazas, despite 
Spanish protests to the contrary. Spain reiterates the a.~gnment 
that Morocco was not a kingdom at the time Madrid acquired the 
Plazas, unlike the situation in _Gjhral tar in 17--D-1. 
In accordance with Article 37(e) of the UN Charter, Britain 
submitted the name of Gibraltar as an "administered territory" 
(1946), and started submitting reports. In 1957 Spain began 
lodging "jurisdictional reservations" with respect to Britain's 
right to do this, on the grounds that it considered Gibraltar an 
integral part of Spain. This is doubly interesting as Spain had 
never submitted such reports on lts North African Plazas. In 
1963 the Gibraltar issue was considered for the first time by 
the UN Special Committee. Britain refused to participate in 
bilateral negotiations and requested Spain not to intervene in 
the sessions. This British attitude to Gibraltar was no longer 
possible due to the changing international situation. During 
the hearings in September 1963, Britain supplied much of the 
requested information and pointed out that the Gibraltarians, 
through their freely elected leaders chose to retain a close 
association with Britain, and Britain would consider any 
proposals for change brought forward by them or their elected 
leaders. 
Britain's stance is interesting because: (i) it was the 
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first time that any government had paid such deference to the 
political aspirations of the Gibraltarians; (ii) i.t dj.rectly 
invoJ.ved the Gibraltarians for the fLrst ·c ~.:me :i.n the 
international arena, giving them indirectly the full status of 
Britj.sh citizens; (iii) because of the composition of the 
population and its ties with Britain, the latter was certain 
which way the Gibraltarians would veer in a referendum; (iv) by 
implication Francoist Spain was portrayed as an annexationist 
state, repressing its own ]llinqri ti_es, a.:nd it-s subjects in the 
Morocco colonies, thus detracting from the sincerity of its 
support for decolonization; and (v) the classical colonial 
policy of paternalism in 'protecting' the native population took 
on a new moral mantle catering for the democratic wishes of 
artifically created majorities in disputed territories. 
Spain's presentation of its revindications was not as 
thorou~h as that nf Britain, despite v~lid arguments such as the 
perennial question of smuggling. In short, Spain's case heavily 
relied on the UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), Paragraph 6, which 
abhors: 
"any attempt aimed at the partial or total 
disruption of the territorial 
integrity of a country" . 
The Gibraltarians were represented by Sir Joshua Hassan, 
Chief Minister of Gibraltar's Councils, and the independent 
politician Peter Isola. Both stated that the Gibraltarians 
wanted "free association with an independent state" in 
conformity with Principle VI(b) of the UNGA Resolution 1541 
(XV). naming Britain as the state. At this session the Latin 
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Amertcan and Arab states (including Tunisia) supported the 
"terr1tori tal integrity" principle, while Austr·alia and Demnark. 
supported the "self-determination" s·cance (Levie, 1980, p.lO~~). 
Bilateral relations deteriorated, and the Gibralta:.c 
( Consti tu.tio:o.) Order (10 April 1964) was the ultimate 
provocation for Spain. This devolution of internal powers was 
seen as a forward step on the road to self-government. 
At the 1964 meeting of the Special Committee, the Spanish 
delegation incl'lJ,ded the Mayor and Deputy Mayor- of- San Roque (The 
Campo), thus emphasizing the point that Gibraltar is not an 
island. The Gibraltarians presented a pamphlet entitled The 
Future of Gibraltar, published by the Leglislative Council, 
stating that: 
the people of Gibraltar wish to 
be politically associated with Britain and 
not Spain". 
The Special Committee (1964) adopted a consensus affirming the 
applicability of the "Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" (UNGA Res. 1514 
(XV)); noting that there was: 
In 
"a disagreement between the UK and Spain 
over the status and situation of the 
territory . (both countries were 
invited) to begin talks without delay 
in order to reach a negotiated 
settlement giving due account of 
the opinions expressed by the members of the 
Committee and bearing in mind the interests 
of the people of the territory" (19 UN GAOR, 
Annexes, Annex 8 (part 1), p.314, UN Doc. 
A/5800/Rev.1 (1964); Red Book, 1965, III; 
Levie,1983, p.105). 
accordance, Spain invited Britain to engage in 
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negotiation (Nov.l964). For whatever reason, Spain exacerbated 
5_ll feelings by delaying crossings a;c J,a I..i_:o.ea,, imposing 
ernba~goes on Spanish exports to Gibraltar, non-renewal of 
vohj_cle licenses, and closing the frontier gs;tes ea:('l.i.er than 
usual. ~he sixteenth siege was commencing. These actions 
triggered British nationalism and intransigence. Franco brought 
to the fore an almost outdated imperial reflex. Mutual 
recriminations became the order of the day, In th_is environment-
Spain's Foreign Minister, Castilla, suggested opening 
negotiations mentioning that despite Britain's unilateral 
measures concerning the administration of Gibraltar, Spain had 
"hitherto abstained from adopting the appropriate counter 
measures" and that failing a negotiated settlement, Spain "would 
find itself obliged in defence of its interests to revise its 
policy in relation to G.i.hraltar" (P.ed Bool~. 1965, p.521; BIS 1-'0, 
1965, Cmnd. 2632, p.14). 
Jingoism became the order of the day. The Spanish strategy 
would seem to have been one of attrition. It failed in relation 
to Britain, but in the longterm focussed world attention on the 
dispute. Spain highlighted the fact that it had no legal 
obligation under the terms of the Treaty (1713) to support the 
status quo of open communications, the airport situation nor 
British control of the southern part of the isthmus. 
On the diplomatic front Britain refused to negotiate, by 
stating: 
"that while Her Majesty's Government cannot 
regard the question of sovereignty as a 
matter for negotiation, they would normally 
have been willing to consider proposals by 
the Spanish Government for discussions of 
ways in which good relations can be 
maintained and any cause of friction 
eliminated. They cannot, however entertain 
any proposals for such conversations so long 
as the present abnormal situation on the 
frontier continues" (Red Book, J.965, p.563; 
Levie, J.983, pp.106-107). -
Further terse notes did not defuse the situation. 
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The only 
addition to the argument was the Spanish statement that: 
"all partial consideration-of 
derived from the existence 
military base in Spain" (Red 
p.525; Cmnd. 2632, p.7). 
t~he problems 
of a British 
Book, 1965, 
In February 1965, Spain reminded Britain that: 
" (Spain would) . provide facilities 
so that no serious alterations 
(disturbances) in civilian life and in the 
economy of Gibraltar may occur before the 
opening of the negotiations and during the 
course of their development" (Red Book, 
1965, pp.544 546; Cmnd. 2632, pp.l8-l8; 20 
UN Gaor, 1 Annex, p.408, UN Doc. 
A/6000/Rev.1; Levie, 1983, p.107). 
Britain restored the internal Gibraltar constitutional 
situation that had existed prior to the setting up of the 
Leglislative and Executive Councils, that is the pre-1950 
status. 
On 5 November 1965, Spain communicated to the UN Secretary 
General that the border restrictions were the "exercise of 
Spain's sovereignty in it's own territory" and that in 
accordance with the UNGA Special Committee "consensus", Spain 
wished to negotiate the issue and did "not set any prior 
condition" (Un Doc. A/6094, 5 Nov.1965). Because of the 
British stance on the frontier restrictions, Spain by 
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implication was telling the international community that Britain 
was imposing prior conditions on negotiations and retarding a 
settlement. In this situation Spain continued to invite 
Britain to negotiate and Britain continued to refuse. Quite 
clearly Spain did not want bilateral discussions, but rather 
wished that the DN Special Committee would go further in 
intervening in the issue. 
Bilateral discussions eventuall~took pla9e in 1966. At 
the London meeting in May, Spain's Foreign Minister reiterated 
that the Gibraltarians were an artificially constituted 
population and that the economy was based on smuggling. He also 
spoke about the naval base. Prior to this meeting Spain had 
notified Britain and other NATO states that: 
"(it did) . not regard Gibraltar as a 
NATO base, and accordingly will not grant 
any faciljty for using it by the member 
staters of NATO that may depend on Spain" 
(Red Book, 1968, p.340-342). 
The ostensible reason given by Spain for this action was the 
demand made by the USSR and it's satellites that the Gibraltar 
base be dismantled. This concern of Francoist Spain for the 
Soviet Block was most unusual. Thus at the London Meeting (May 
1966), Spain's formal proposal for an agreement was: (i) the 
cancellation of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713); (ii) 
a proposal to separately negotiate the British military base 
"whose structure, legal situation, and co-ordination with the 
defence organization of Spain or the Free World'' would form a 
separate entity; and (iii) the creation of a legal regime which 
would govern the inhabitants (Red Book, 1968, pp.348-384, 
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pp.404-413; BIS FO, 1966, Cmnd. 3131, 6-36). 
Britain counter-argued that: the cession of Gibraltar was 
in absolute sovereignty; it exercised sovereignty over the 
ground bet'~':7een the Gibraltar fro:nt~.er .~ence and foot of the 
Rock; usage made of Gibraltar by it's allies was non-prejudicial 
to Spain; and the local economy was based on trade, tourism and 
military-related spending. Britain proposed that La Linea be 
mainta.ined like a:r;1y otl;ler internatjonal frontier, and that it 
would demolish the Fence, but would not renounce claims to the 
isthmus. Britain proposed that: a resident Spanish Commissioner 
be appointed to Gibraltar; notification be given to Madrid prior 
to any constitutional changes; and reaffirmed Spain's right of 
first refusal in the event of relinquishing sovereignty. 
Britain also proposed modifications of Gibraltar's political 
lnsti tutions, giving it more of a mn.:ni o.i.pa.l than a national 
image. Britain suggested the abolition of the free-port status 
and taking other actions against smugglers. London offered the 
Spanish MOD usage of Gibraltar's air and sea ports. The latter 
proposal was designed to detract from Spanish fears for national 
security, but grossly underestimated Spanish sensitivities on 
the colonial nature of the dispute. 
In an effort to consolidate its sovereignty over the once 
neutral ground betwen the Rock and the Fence, Britain suggested 
that the matter be referred to an international tribunal as 
Spain had never sought this recourse. Spain responded that it 
had done so in 1852, when it had advocated that the matter be 
set before "Europe", and also in the UNGA forum. Britain 
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replied thB,t ".t:u:rope" was not an international tribunal and the 
UNGA was a political, not a judicial body. Britain proposed 
that the matter be referred to the ICJ. On 13 December 1966, 
Spain rejected the proposal, stating that the issue was one of 
decolonization, suited to the UN arena (Red Book, 1968, 
pp.425-558; BIS FO, 1966. Cmnd. 3131, pp.50-l28). In 
inter-governamental communications dealing with the isthmus, a 
large part of the correspondence dealt with Spanish al.legations 
that British military planes were violating Spanish air-space in 
the Gib-raltar area. I-t must be ·remember·ed that Spairr -does no·t 
recognize British sovereignty on the land or sea area on which 
Gibraltar airport is situated. Spain was quite sure of the 
support of a majority, if the isthmus issue was put before the 
UNGA. However, in refusing to refer the matter to the ICJ, 
Spain was perceived as refusing to lay its case before one of 
the world's most prestigeous tribunals, and showing lack of 
compromise. Even if the ICJ had given a decision in favour of 
Britain, Spain still had the support of a UNGA majority. If the 
ICJ had found in favour of Spain this would have rendered 
British control of the Colony less tenable and given Spain a 
better stance in future negotiations. However the UN Special 
Committee continued to call upon both disputants to engage in 
constructive negotiations. 
On 13 December 1966, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2189 
(XX1), "Implementation of the Declaration Granting Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples", inviting: 
"the Special 
attention to 
Committee to pay particular 
the small territories and to 
recommend to the General Assembly the most 
appropriate methods and also the steps to be 
taken to enable the popuJ.ation of those 
territories to exercise fu.lJ.y the right of 
self-determination and .i..ndependence" 
(Djonovich, 1973, II, p.121). 
This resolution was not in the interest of Spanish case. 
Throught the Special Committee's handling of the Gibraltar 
issue, led by the Latin American and Arab states, they had 
ignored the question of the Gibr~ltarians by only tackling the 
issue of 'territorial integrity'. On 20 December 1966, the UNGA 
Resolution 2231 (XXI), "Question of Gibraltar" admonished both 
parties to negotiate, and they as well as the Special Committee 
to take into account the interests of the inhabitants. Britain 
proposed that new talks be held with Spain on 18 April 1967. 
While agreeing to the proposal, Spain complicated the issue 
further by establishing a Prohibiter Area of airspace over 
Spanish territory in the Gibraltar area causing difficulty for 
traffic using Gibraltar airport (see above). While this act was 
legal according to the Chicago Convention and the rules of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), this Spanish 
strategy raised Britain's wrath. The talks planned for April 
1967 were not held. However talks took place in June 1967, 
dealing with the airspace problem, but were suspended when Spain 
insisted on the precondition that Britain recognize that the 
airfield was built on Spanish sovereign territory. Originally 
the British raised the issue with the ICAO several times, but 
since 1969 has let the matter drop (O'Connell, 1982, 
pp. 335-336). Britain suspected that if it lost the case, this 
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woul.d cause London international. embarrassment. By this stage a 
body of opinion in Britain was ~eassessing its tenuous claim to 
the once "neutral ground". 
A few days after Spaj_n l:o:crod.uced it's ai::cspace 
restrictions, Britain announced the holding of a referendum in 
which the Gibraltarians were to decide whether to maintain their 
links with Britain or be joined to Q . upaln. Madrid strongly 
objected and the UN Special Committee adopted a resolution 
opposing Britain's actions on the grounds that it would 
contradict the provisions of Resolution 2231 (XXI) of the UNGA. 
Britain stated that it's actions were in keeping with UNGA 
Resolution 2189 (XXI) concerning the interests of the 
Gibraltarians (see appendix V). At the General Assembly, 
Britain's Foreign Secretary asked the Special Committee if its 
functions included "handing a people against their will to 
another government" (Cmnd. 3735, p.18). In the referendum, the 
overwhelming majority of the Gibraltarians voted to maintain 
their links with Britain, which the latter reported to the UN 
Secretary General. However a Resolution was passed indicating 
that the Referendum was in contradiction of Resolution 2231 
(XXI) (20 December 1966) and of the Special Committee (UNGA 
Res.2353 (XXII). 19 December 1967; Djonovich, 1973, p.293). 
Britain gained a limited advantage on the diplomatic front, but 
in the longterm reduced the ultimate power of Westminster, by 
giving the Gibraltarians a mandate on sovereignty. It also set 
a precedent for Spain in the Plazas. A Moroccan official in 
discussion with the author (April 1984) expressed the view that: 
"inte:cested power groups can create a 
'democratic' majority on any issue by 
constructing a Berlin Wall around any area 
and expelling those \-Jho d.i.sf.l,gree over c. 
period of time" . 
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This comment was made in relation to Ceuta, Melilla and 
Gibraltar. He also stated that "as long E.l,S al'chj.ves and 
graveyards exist, states will press to recoup lost territory". 
Intransigence on the Gibraltar and Plaza issues is embedded 
in a post-colonial paralysis based on historic inertia. 
Anachronistic soveFeignty disputes- hav-e c:r·eated potential 
flashpoints. Client populations in these areas are pawns in 
changing geopolitical patterns. Their fears for the future and 
schizophrenic cultures have eliminated room for compromise from 
local politics. 
Gibraltarian police and British troops had to be called in 
to quell violence in the Crown Colony in April 1968, which was 
sparked off by a local group known as 'The Doves'. They 
published a letter in the Gibraltar Chronicle (1 April 1968), 
stating that: 
"More and more of us in Gibraltar are 
convinced that the only solution lies in a 
negotiated settlement both with Britain and 
with Spain" . 
Members of the Leglislative Council replied that they had never 
objected to such a course of action provided that there was no 
question of a transfer of sovereignty. The Integration With 
Britain Party (IWBP) stressed that negotiations would mean 
surrender of sovereignty to Madrid. Upon request The Doves 
supplied the Leglislative Council with specific proposals 
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emphasizing that they were acceptahJ.e to the Spanish Foreign 
Minister. The 12 proposals published :i.n the {";ibral ta:r_ Ch:r__onicle 
(4 April 1968) were the most attractive package offered to 
Britain and the Gibraltarians since l7l3. F.ssent J.a.lly 
everything was to be British, with the Gibraltarians having the 
rights and duties of British citizens, but the Spanish flag 
would fly alongside the Union Jack, and a Gibraltarian flag 
would fly as a symbol of its recognition that it was the 
creation of a new Anglo-Spanish treaty. The IWBP rejected this 
solution, as d1Ci the Legislative Council, but only after 
violence perpetrated against The Doves. In shouting "no 
surrender" in the short-term, the Gibraltarians opted for 
longterm problems. 
While the UN were adopting resolutions, the British 
Government promulgated the Gibraltar Constitution Order (23 May 
1969). In the preamble it was stipulated that: 
Gibraltar will remain part of Her 
Majesty's dominions unless and until an Act 
of Parliament otherwise provides, and 
furthermore that Her Majesty's Government 
will never enter into arrangements under 
which the people of Gibraltar would pass 
under the sovereignty of another state 
against their freely and democratically 
expressed wishes" . 
This preamble was put in at the insistance of the IWBP (Times, 5 
Jan. 1970, "A Special Report" ) . Henceforth the Gibraltarians 
gained a veto over this aspect of British foreign policy. 
For Spain this was a most provocative act, at a time when 
it felt that the issue was nearing a peaceful settlement largely 
because of UN support. In retaliation, on 9 June 1969, Spain 
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closed. the ):.,a :r,inea. cJ:>ossing and J.6 days Ja~"l;ep the Algeciras 
ferry service was discontinued. On 1 Octoher 1969, 
telecommunications senrices vYere cut. 
commenced, leaving Gj.brs.l tar completely dependent o:o. Norocco for 
.i.ts immediate needs. 
The UNGA continued to support the Spanish position and 
passed the strongest worded resolution to date (UNGA Res. 2429 
(XXIII) 18 Doc.1968). It "J>egretted" Britain's non-compliance 
vJith the provisions of its Resolution 2353 (XXII), "deplored the 
co-lonial situation-" in the light of the UN Charter and 
Resolution 1514 (XV); and requested Britain "to terminate the 
colonial situation . no later than 1 October 1969", 
calling upon Britain to "begin without delay negotiations with 
the Government of Spain" (Djonovich, 1973, 12, p.l77; Levie, 
1983, p.115). Britain did not comply with the suggestions of 
the resolution. 
In the early 1970s both Britain and Spain had changes of 
government, and in 1975 Franco died. This helped facilitate a 
fresh approach. The UN continued to issue reports on Gibraltar. 
In October 1977, the Spanish Prime Minister, Suarez, visited 
London. It was reported that during his visit, he stated that 
the Gibraltarians would be welcome to join the new democratic 
Spain gaining regional autonomy like other ethnic groups, and it 
was up to the inhabitants to decide. 
According to the Spanish Constitution of 1978 (Tille VIII, 
Chapter III, for "Autonomous communities"), Article 143 
specifies that bordering provinces "may accede to 
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self-govm:nment" and 
communities". Article 
constitute themselves "autonomous 
144 provides that the Cortes may, for 
reasons of national interest, autbori~e an autonomous community 
for a single province or for a territory not j_ntegrated into a 
province. Article 148 specifies the matters in whi.ch such a 
community may assume competence. Clearly the Spaniards had 
Gibraltar in mind when it was being drafted. 
Bilateral meetings were held at Strasbourg (1977), Paris 
(1978) and Lisbon (1980). The Spanish Government stated that it 
was willing to open the La Linea frontier provided that Britain 
enter into formal negotiations on the future of Gibraltar. 
Agreement was reached on 10 April 1980, whereby negotiations 
would commence at a time to be decided and direct communications 
between Spain and Gibraltar would be reopened. Spain was so 
confident that the issue had been settled, it announced plans to 
seek membership of NATO and the EEC. 
6.11 THE LISBON AGREEMENT 1980. 
The Lisbon Agreement (April 1980) 
re-establishment of direct communications 
provided 
in the 
for the 
Gibraltar 
region and an ending of Spanish restrictions. It committed both 
parties to future substantive discussions. Spain interpreted 
this as meaning that Britain was ready to resolve the dispute in 
accordance with the UN resolutions which had been passed. 
Following the Lisbon Agreement, Spain made some concessions, for 
instance permitting the shipment of butane gas from Spain to 
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Gibraltar Por·L, and Madrid also agreed to work with Gibraltar on 
plans for a satellite communications station. Britain made 
rec.i..procal gestures such 
teJ.evision programmes in Spanish in the Crown Colony. 
thaw d.i..d not last. 
Bnt the 
Spain took exception to a number of British actions, for 
instance the visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to 
Gibraltar (1981); the granting of full citizenship to all 
Gibraltarians (1982); and the us~~e of Gibraltar as a. mil.itary 
depot, refuelling base and workyard during the Falkland/Malvinas 
War (1982). Gibraltar's importance in the British campaign was 
recognized by Argentina who sent an underwater sabotage team to 
Spain with instructions to disrupt British naval supply lines. 
However the Spanish authorities arrested and deported the group 
(Washington Post, 9 Oct. 1983). Despite these actions, Spanish 
supported Argenttnr=~.' s sovereignty claim in the mass media alHl 
diplomatic sphere. Spain abstained on the UN Security Council 
motion requesting Argentine withdrawal from the islands. "The 
British regarded the use of Gibraltar as consistent with the 
sovereign prerogatives enjoyed since 1704" (Lancaster & Taulbee, 
1985, p.255). Spain watched to see if a Falklands settlement 
might provide a precedent for Gibraltar, or if the British 
experience there might dissuade it from future conflict over 
colonial possessions (Economist, 12 April 1982). Suggestions 
for a Falklands/Malvinas style-invasion appeared in the Spanish 
press, possibly instigated by the Spanish military who had 
planned a coup d'etat to coincide with the 1982 general 
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election. The milita~y believed that 'Gi.b~altar' would be a 
national rallying cry in the seizuJ:'e of power. But the coug 
d'eta,t dtd. .Qot materialize (Lc:mcaster & •:eanJ.hee, J.985, :p.256). 
As late as Octobe:r 1986, when Bri ta.in a.nnou.nced j_ts :L:o.ce:at:i.o:o. o:f 
es·tablishing a 150 nm fishories protection zone around the 
Falkland/Malvinas IsJ.ands, several states including Spain 
objected. The Spanish Premier stated that Spanish vessels would 
ignore the restrictions but in fact they indirectly recognized 
them in 1987 by seeking fishing licences (Guardian, 30 Oct.l986, 
12 Nov. 1986). 
Heading the list of the foreign policy agenda of the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE) in 1982, came Spanish 
membership of the EC, increased security for Ceuta, Melilla and 
the Canary Islands, and the retrocession of Gibraltar. With the 
election of PSOE leader Felipe Gonzales, he reaffirmed that he 
was Spanish first and socialist second. Significantly thA 
Gibraltar. Ceuta and Melilla disputes formed an important part 
of his policy. Upon coming to power Gonzales stated that any 
negotiated settlement of the Gibraltar problem would respect the 
populations legitimate interests. For any democratic party in 
Spain and especially the Socialists, a favourable settlement of 
the Gibraltar dispute is an imperative in order to undermine the 
Falangists. With the partial opening of the frontier to 
pedestrians possessing Spanish or British passports, 
Gibraltarians were annually spending ~6-7 million in Spain, 
while the Spanish spent virtually nothing in the Crown Colony 
due to Spanish customs restrictions (El Pais, 31 July 1983). 
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economic chastisement Ha.s j.n retaliation for the 
discriminatory economic laws in Gibraltar against Spa:o.:i.sh 
nationals. such as the prohibition ag~ins·~ their buying prope~ty 
and unequal pay for equaJ. work. 
On 27 November 1984, Britain and Spai~ issued a joint 
communiquA which has come to be known as Brussels 
Agreement/Statement. The Spanish Foreign Minister. Fernando 
Mo:r<:\:n., stated that it ~:.vas "tho biggest dj_plomatic success for 
Spain on the Rook since 1713", as Britain was prepared to 
-
discuss sovereignty CI'imes, 28 Nov. 1984). However, the 
British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe insisted that "the 
British Government fully maintain(ed) its commitment to 
honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar" (Times, 28 
Nov. 1984). As has been shown on many occasions, the 
Gibraltarians wish to block bilteral discussions between Madrid 
and London concerning sovereignty. In the historic tradition of 
all parties concerned, they became engaged in "doublespeak". 
Moran said: 
"The end of the Gibraltar problem means the 
integration of Gibraltar into Spain and 
filling in Spanish sovereignty, with 
maximium respect for the rights of 
Gibral tarians" (Times, 28 Nov. 1984). 
Basically Howe and Moran agreed that their Governments would 
apply not later than 15 February 1985, what had supposedly been 
agreed upon with the Lisbon Declaration (10 April 1980). 
The Lisbon Statement (1980) was an exercise in 
international relations in the long tradition of the respective 
propagandas, being eventually denigrated by both parties. In 
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B:r:ltain, ':Cb.e Times, Gua:rdj_an c:md ~Lele__g_;r_aph (ll-15 April 1984), 
:ra,the:r than exa.mi :o . .ing the su:bsta,nt:i.ve :lssues, conth.1.uud ·co 
st:ress the Frohlem of frontie:r :r:>est:r:l.ctoi.o:o.s from a moralizin~ 
viewpoj.nt, and suggested that B:ritain eouJd. veto Spanish entry 
to the EC if ~1ad:rid did not change its G:i .. h:rCJJ.ta,r strategy. 'X'he 
Spanish media emphasized the sovereignty issue and UNGA 
resolutions in Spain's favour, igno:ring other aspects of the 
problem. 
Tho- Lisbon Statement (1980) "involved simultaneously: 
(i) The equality and reciprocity of rights 
for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians 
in Spain, esentially similar to those of EC 
citizens in any member state. This would 
ensure that each side would "be favouraby 
disposed to each others citizens when 
granting work permits". 
(ii) The establishment of the free movement 
of persons, vehicles and goods between 
Gibraltar and the "neighbouring territory". 
(iii) The establishment of negotiations 
aimed at promoting co-o~eration on economic, 
cultural, touristic, aviation, military and 
environmental matters. Both sides accepted 
that "the issue of sovereignty will be 
discussed in the process" (see Lisbon 
Statement in The Times,28 Nov.1984; see HC. 
Rept, 1981, pp.xvi-xx). 
The British Government stated that it would: 
fully maintain its commitment to 
honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar 
as set out in the preamble of the 1969 
Constitution" . 
The Brussels Communique (1984) commited Spain to undertake "the 
early actions necessary to allow safe and effective air 
communications" in relation to airspace at the eastern entrance 
to the Strait. It was agreed that working groups would meet 
periodicaJ.ly to further Tesolve issues concerning Gibraltar. A 
spokesperson foT the Spanish Foreign Ministry stated that: 
th18 really opens a process of 
decolonizing the Rock Gibraltar 
becomes just one more piece of Andalusia, of 
Spain" ('J'_imes, 28 Nov. 1984). 
Spanish state radio and television stated that: 
"it was the first time since 1713, 
that the British Government has ever agreed 
to tackle sovereignty" (Times, 29- Nov. 
1984). 
Madrid said that the talks concerned: 
both the theme of the sovereignty 
referred to in the Treaty of Utrecht as well 
as sovereignty of the isthmus, which was 
never ceded to Britain" (Times, 29 
Nov. 1984). 
"That's bloody nonsense, in my best Spanish" , was Sir Joshufl. 
Hassan's reply to such Spanish euphoric statements; he stated 
that the Gibraltarians "have always placed "their faith in the 
British Government and people and will continue to do 
so" (Times, 28 Nov.1984). 
In Spain's drive to efface the Franco legacy, establish 
western style democracy, placate its minorities, and become 
integrated into the EC and NATO, opening the La Linea frontier 
became an imperative. The frontier gates were opened on 2 Feb. 
1985. Though the mass media in Britain hailed this as a moral 
and diplomatic victory, and an acceptance of the pre-1969 status 
quo in the Colony, the issue is by no means settled. Despite 
London's efforts in the international community to highlight 
Spain's unfriendly actions in closing the frontier (1969-85), it 
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Teceived little support. Clearl.y a majority of UNGA, EC and 
NATO members supported the Spanish case. 
On the local scale, La Linea and tho Campo do Gibralta~ 
~egion suffered groat economic hardship because of the closure, 
uh.:tle the Gibralta:cians \'JGTG stimulated into g:cea:ce:r 
self-sufficiency, reinforcing a separate sense of identity on 
both sides of the fronteir. Most of the points covered by the 
Lisbon Agreement (1980) and Brussels Communique (1984) ~:Jere 
d.i_plomatic pre-emp:tive-s. Despite suggestions that Britain would 
veto Spanish entry into the EC and the thorny issue of Spanish 
relations with NATO, these supranational organizations ensured 
that the Gibraltar issue would not block the centripetal forces 
integrating Spain into these power blocks. 
According to The Guardian (28 Nov. 1984): 
the joint communique (Brussels 27 
November 1984) remains open to 
interpretation, and could be interpreted by 
Britain as an excuse for indefinite delay 
(in tackling the issue)". 
It would seem that British strategy was aimed at lessening the 
immediate contentions but was not seriously directed at tackling 
the sovereignty impasse. It was hoped that Gibraltar would 
retain the Union Jack indefinitely, with the Gibraltarians and 
Spanish becoming so economically integrated that Spanish 
grievances would lessen. Also the economic burden of 
maintaining the Colony would be less onorous on London. This 
involved a very delicate strategy of trying to maintain 
sovereignty over the Colony, playing the democratic card vis a 
vis the Gibraltarians, and defusing contentions with Madrid. In 
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terms of th8 economics of sovereignty, this means encouraging 
the Gibraltarians to be responsible for their economic futuro, 
and somewhat ironically expecting Spain to contribute to the 
economy of the Colony by means of t~ado, tourism and joi.nt 
projoots, including joint usage of Gibraltar airport. 
Undoubtedly many Gibraltarians will buy property in the Campo 
region and even reside there as was the case prior to 1969, 
while Spaniards vlill be able to buy p.roperty and woTk ih 
Gibraltar. Unlike the pre-1969 situation they may legally 
reside there and workers will not have to leave every night. 
The opposition in Gibraltar saw the Brussels Communique as 
unacceptable. Joe Bossano, leader of the Gibraltarian Socialist 
Party said; "We have been presented with a fait accompli" 
(Guardian, 28 Nov.l984), reflecting the fear of many 
Gibraltarians that Brit~in may be preparing for withdrawal. 
On the eve of the opening of the La Linea frontier, Raphael 
Palomino, an Andalusian socialist MP, stated that: 
"We (the Spanish) understand that towards 
the end of the 20th century one cannot go 
against the wishes of a people, the 
people of Gibraltar have a right to be 
themselves" (Times,28 Jan.1985). 
This was in sharp contrast to the statements of the Franco era. 
Palomino was appointed as president of a new political body, the 
Community of Towns of the Campo de Gibraltar, whose function was 
to establish new mutually beneficial relationships with the 
Gibraltarians. With the opening of the La Linea frontier 
(1985), the Gibraltarians became acutely aware that they had to 
become economically self-sufficient, if they were to resist 
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gradJlal integration into the Spanish state. Ironically tourism, 
particularly from the Costa del Sol was to be a main factor in 
achieving this. In 1985, the author observed on average 40 
tourist coaches per day entering Gibraltar (Apr~.l 1985). 
However the economic boom anticipated has not come about. Once 
more the Gibraltarians started buying perishable products and 
wine in Spain while the Spanish came to buy British grocery 
products for novelty sake. Spanish officials strictly uphold 
customs regulations. With Spanish acsession to the EC 
- - - -
(Jan.l986), the La Linea crossing became subject to the same 
rules as other EC borders. 
Substantive discussions between Madrid and London did not 
get underway (1985-87). On the diplomatic front, Gibraltar's 
ruling party, the AACR tried to have the Crown Colony turned 
into a freely associated state with Britain in order to increase 
local government powers. This project will play an important 
role in the 1988 elections. This would give the local 
government power in internal and external affairs, and 
consequently give the Gibraltarians a stronger hand in resisting 
closer links with Spain (Guardian, 30 Oct.1986). Despite lack 
of progress on the essential problem of sovereignty since 
February 1985, the Gibraltarians remain suspicious of 
Anglo-Spanish intentions. In December 1986, the provocative 
British tradition of trooping the colours at the frontier was 
discontinued (Times,15 Jan.1987). In January 1987, Spain's 
Foreign Minister stated that "the shadow of the Rock is 
projected over all our (Anglo-Spanish) relations" and Gibraltar 
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remains a "threat" to Spanish-British cooperation on all levels, 
including the BC and NATO (Times, 15 Jan.l987). The following 
day "long delays" vJere experienced at La Linea (1'iroes 16 
Jan.l987). 
In March 1986, a Spanish cruiser ente~ed the disputed 
territorial waters in tho Bay, the minor incident was ignored by 
both governments, but the Spanish and British press felt that 
the crew of the vessel had tried to "torpedo" the official visit 
of the Spanish monarch to Britain (Le Monde, 24 April 1986). In 
his address to the House of Commons on 23 April 1986, King Juan 
Carlos urged greater Anglo-Spanish cooperation, implicitly 
asking Britain to speed up the resolution of the sovereignty 
dispute (Telegraph, 24 April 1986). Like the Gibraltarians, 
many Ceutis and Melillinese have been antagonistic towards the 
Lisbon Agreement and Brussels Communique. 
At the time of the Brussels Communique (27 Nov.1984), 
Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe insisted that 
there was "no possible link, precedent or conection with the 
Falkland Islands"; and that historically, legally and 
geographically the case involving the islands was quite 
different to that of Gibraltar (Times, 28 Nov.1984). Yet these 
cases of disputed sovereignty will continue to affect each 
other. With decolonization moving to its ante-penultimate 
moments on the world stage, Gibraltar like the Falkland-Malvinas 
Islands has focussed international attention on 
of colonialism. During an official visit 
these vestiges 
of President Li 
Xiannian of China to Spain, in 1984, King Juan Carlos said: 
"Chj_naJ's restoration of tts territo:-c:la.l 
integrj_ty has been a process which Spain has 
followed and will go on following with 
interest and feelings of solidarity because 
of the anaJ.ogies and pa:-callel.s fo:-c both 
countries of the consequences of past 
colonialism (in relation to Hong Rong and 
G.i.bral tar)" (Times, J.4 Nov. J. 984). 
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The central issue is not one of granting sovereign 
independence but the transfer of sovereignty from one state to 
another. Besides Gi.braltar and the Falkland-Malvinas Islands 
(Franck & Hoffman, 1976, pp.331-386), other examples include 
-
Panama's - claim -to tne- Canal - zone,- Cuba' s to Guantanamo, 
Ireland's to the six counties of Northern Ireland, Morocco's to 
Ceuta and Melilla, and most likely in the future, a Cypriot 
claim to the British bases in Cyprus (Guardian, 12, 13 Nov.1986, 
pp.16, 14 'Cyprus Report'). The claimant's quest for territorial 
integrity is based on a national ideal, and desire to obliterate 
traumatic historical experiences such as colonialism. Most 
significantly, all the above examples are located close to 
geostrategic waterways (see map 1.5). 
6.12 NATO. 
For NATO to gain full advantage of the Gibraltar base, 
Spanish cooperation and usage of the Campo is an imperative. 
Britain maintains a naval dockyard, logistic facilities for 
naval vessels, a maritime HQ, RAP airfield and HQ, and an army 
garrison in Gibraltar. Dockyard facilities are capable of 
refitting Leander class frigates and mine countermeasure 
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vessels, as well as carrying out emergency repairs to naval 
vessels. 
Within the territorial waters claimed by Britain in the Bay 
there is anchorage for about ~0 ships which can be used for 
convoy facilities. As of 1981, the airfield runway was long 
enough to be used by all RAF aircraft except fully loaded 
Vulcans, VC lOs and Victors. Facilities are satisfactory for 
727s and 737s. Devices on the Rock can detect shipping in the 
Strait over a radius of 60-70 miles in good weather and ident_ify 
ships as they enter the narrows. MOD-NATO radar facilities are 
relatively successful in monitoring submerged passage of the 
Strait. Brigadier Dennis (MOD) in his statements to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1980-81) pointed out 
that the Colony could be provided with defences which "are not 
all sited in Gibraltar in peace time" and that Gibraltar was not 
invulnerable to attack from the north; thus reiteratine ~he age 
old desire of Britain to secure Spain as an ally (HC. Rept. 
1981, p.37). Gibraltar's 'staging function' and facilities form 
a significant part of Britain's contribution to NATO. 
According to Rear Admiral Gueritz: 
"Surveillance of the area is important to 
the Alliance as the straits constitute a 
choke-point not only for traffic serving the 
Allied countries on the Mediterranean 
littoral but also for through traffic which 
has significance for other Allied countries 
in Western Europe and North America" (HC. 
Rept. 1981, p.xlii). 
He states that surveillance could be carried out by shore-based 
electronic means or by air, surface or sub-surface units 
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provided by NATO forces of any member state; the inference here 
being Spain. Modern missile systems could be mounted on 
Gibraltar to deny or protect shipping in the Strait. 
The geostrategic and economic value of the dockya~d is more 
advantageous to NATO as a whole rather than Britain. The naval 
dockyards provide an example of. the deficit economics of 
sovereignty. 
Despite Spanish vacillations and inter-party problems since 
joining NATO (1982), Spain is becoming progressively integrated 
-
int6 the~lliance. In October 1981, the PSOE party congress 
took the stance that NATO membership would not protect Spanish 
territorial integrity, in that member states would not guarantee 
Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar (Eusebio, 1983, p.106). Once 
in power the PSOE leader, Filipe Gonzalez linked Spain's 
continued membership of the Alliance with the Gibraltar issue. 
He insisted on the fact that f.ull integration would be difficult 
while a member state holds a colony in Spain (El Pais, 8 
Sep.1983). The Spanish navy studiously avoided military 
exercises with the British within the NATO cadre (El Pais, 8 
Sep.1983). Despite the advantages of Gibraltar's port 
facilities and its willingness to host nuclear-powered vessels, 
the US Sixth fleet avoids making full use of the British base 
because of Spanish sensitivities. According to several reports 
Britain has all the necessary equipment to station nuclear 
warheads on the Rock, and there are both small nuclear missiles 
and anti-nuclear depth charges. "Of course Britain does not 
recognize or deny to any government the presence of nuclear 
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weapons and therefore has not informed Madrid if such 
weapons exist on the Rock" (de la Serna, 1984, p. 164). During 
NATO erxercises in 1981, US Polaris submarines visited 
Gibraltar. 
NATO membership has doubtless made Britain more amenable to 
discussions with Spain. Ultimately under NATO auspices, Spain 
will get access to the base because of exercises or joint 
military control, or a Spanish base commander being appointed, 
o_r_ Flacin~- COM-BGIB-ME-D -unde-r a- Spanisli admiral at Algeciras, 
Cadiz or Cartagena (see chapter 7). The possibility of a lease 
agreement between Britain and Spain under NATO auspices is 
feasible, but it is unlikely that NATO would favour such direct 
involvement. To date NATO has avoided offending Moroccan 
sensitivities over Ceuta and Melilla, unlike the Canary Islands, 
by not including them as NATO bases in strategic planning. The 
fact that Spain is now a member of the Alliance in many ways 
weakens Madrid's argument that the Gibraltar NATO base poses a 
direct threat to Spain in the event that Gibraltar would become 
a legitimate target in time of war in a conflict to which 
Britain was a party and Spain not. Nonetheless the activities 
of Argentine saboteurs in trying to attack the British base from 
mainland Spain (1982) is indicative of how Spain could become 
embroiled in a conflict. 
6.13 THE EC. 
6.13.1 Gibraltar and the EC. 
Within the EC, British-Spanish contentions obstruct 
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integration and weaken Community mechanisms. For instance Spain 
vetoed the coming j_nto force of the Single European Act because 
of the inclusion of Gibraltar airport as a British regional 
facility, in the air fare liberalization agreement in July 1987 
(Times, 5 July 1987, p.25). The dispute is retarding 
development in the Strait region, and has a negative impact on 
British-Spanish trade. Whatever the longterm economic benefits 
to Gibraltar, EC membership has not lessened the intensity of 
the sovereignty dispute, but has acted as a forum to highlight 
contentious viewpoints. 
The EC has tried to avoid overt involvement in the dispute, 
but provides a forum for discussions. Nonetheless if Spain 
regains sovereignty over Gibraltar, the transition period for 
the full integration of Gibraltar would be 7 years. With UK 
admission to the RC (Jan.l973), Gibraltar fell under Article 
227(4), of the Treaty of Rome, relating to European Territories 
for whose external relations a member state has assumed 
responsibility. Unlike the Channel Islands, Gibraltar is a 
member of the EC and its citizens members of the Community under 
the auspices of Britain. However the Gibraltarians chose not to 
participate in the Common Agricultural Policy and VAT systems, 
and to remain outside the EC Customs Union at the time of 
British entry into the Community (1973) (Lancaster & Taulbee, 
1985, p.260). The Gibraltarian decision not to fully 
participate in EC programmes could lead to problems if Gibraltar 
is retroceded to Spain, as the Gibraltarians would have no 
choice but to participate in the schemes to which Madrid is a 
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party. Legally the Spanish Territories in North Afri.ca form an 
integral part of the Spanish state and are therefore part of the 
EC. The Plazas are tho first territories of the EC to share 
common borders with an African state. Spain never formally 
linked its entry to the EC with the Gibraltar question, unlike 
Britain (1981-86) (Economist, 26 June 1982, 20 Aug.1983; Times, 
16 April 1983; El Pais, 22 July 1983). 
6.13.2 The Campo de Gibraltar. 
The Campo is one of the most underdeveloped regions in the 
EC. The Comarca Campo de Gibraltar is part of the province of 
Cadiz (1,514 sq km/590 sq ml). It comprises 7 "municipos" 
(boroughs): Algeciras, Los Barrios, Tarifa, San Roque, La Linea 
de la Conception. Castellar de la Frontera and T' ulmena J.e la 
Frontera. The latter four towns owe their origin, former 
prosperity and present poverty to the Crown Colony and the 
changing state of Anglo-Spanish relations. In the late 1960s, 
income per capita in the region was around 31% of the Spanish 
national average, largely because of the location of some of the 
largest Latifundia in Europe there and its precarious 
relationship with the Crown Colony. In an effort to change the 
economic situation, over 2 million Pesetas were poured into 
education. infrastructural projects and development plans in 
1966-67. Over 8.25 million Pesetas were invested between 
1968-71. Some 7.5 million Pesetas were invested between 1972-75 
(del Campo & Davis, 1980, p.4). By 1973, there were 26 
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i:a.dustrial plants operating in the Campo, including an oil 
refinery, and Algeciras became an industrial centre. But 
investment did not keep abreast of unemployment. La Linea 
benefitted little in real terms and the the C:rown Colony 
continued to have a much higher standard of living, despite the 
blockade. Spain failed to lure the Gibraltarians with its 
economic policies. 
When the La Linea frontier was closed (8 June 1969), there 
_ _we_re_ 4 ,_778 -Spaniards work.fng- in Gibraltar, of which 2, 000 were 
pensioned off. Others obtained work in industrial plants in the 
Campo, but many had to emigrate. Some 85% of these workers had 
lived in La Linea (del Campo & Davis, 1980, p.6). La Linea (7 
sq ml) always functioned as a suburb of the Crown Colony. 
Though constituting only 1.2% of the Campo area, in 1960 over 
32% of the Campo's population resided there, and in 1974 ove~ 
27%. Because of the blockade (1969-85), many entrepreneurs lost 
business and property in Gibraltar (despite the official ban) 
and did not receive compensation from Madrid; unlike Spanish 
nationals being repatriated from the newly independent Maghrebi 
states. By the same token over 1,000 Gibraltarian citizens and 
residents had to leave their property in Spain. In human terms 
1,500-3,000 families were split by the blockade. 
The blockade put economic pressure on the British 
commitment to Gibraltar, for example some E40 million came from 
HMG spending in 1979 (del Campo & Davis, 180, p.8). Despite the 
hardships of the siege, the Gibraltarians saw the advantage of 
their cushioned economy in sharp contrast to the relative 
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failure of the Campamento (San Roque-La Linea) and Cortijo Real 
(Algeciras) industrial zones. La Linea experienced a drop in 
population between 1969-85, from 100,000 to 60,000 (Lancaster & 
Taulbee, 1985, p.254). Over 30% of La Lj_nea's population were 
unemployed in 1984 and were waiting for an economic miracle to 
occur with the opening of the frontier (Le Monde, 16-17 
Dec.1984). Also the Llanitos were waiting for the Government to 
revoke a law pa_ssed in 19~2, enCO!fip~ssing the_ town in a _mili ta.ry 
zone, with a prohibition on foreigners buying property there. 
Fragmented sovereignty in the Strait region has hindered 
economic integration, complimentarity and development. However 
it could be argued that considering that both shores of the 
Strait are economically underdeveloped, Gibraltar and the Plazas 
have helped sustain the populations in the Campo and Moroccan 
hinterlands. 
6.14 BRITISH-SPANISH RELATIONS. 
According to Ram6n Tamames G6mes, Deputy Mayor of Madrid: 
"Hispano-British relations will never be 
completely normal whilst the UK presence 
remains on Spanish territory as it is 
installed at present" (HC. Rept. 1981, 
p.128). 
British foreign policy objectives in relation to Spain in the 
1980s are primarily economic and military. Spain wishes to 
establish closer relations within the EC and NATO. Concerning 
trade, the Gibraltar issue has retarded progress. Between 
1965-79, British exports to Spain only represented 5% of the 
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overall export figures. During the same period Spanish exports 
to the UK rose by 123%. (HC. Rept. J.98l, p.xl:tv). Du:r.i.:n~ 
this period, French exports to Spain were as high as 36% of the 
total export figure, whiJ.e that of West Germany reached 29%. In 
1986, in the EC/NATO context, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West 
Germany ":reminded" Spain's Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzales that 
the reduction which Spain was seeking in the US military 
presence there could seriously a~fec~ t?e sec~rity of all NA!O 
countries. At the same time, Kohl emphasized the "big 
oportunities" for Spain and Germany to work together within the 
EC. 
In trade terms 
trading links with 
(Jan.1986), becoming 
West Germany rapidly established greater 
Spain since its acsession to the EC 
Spain's number one supplier and second 
customer after France. German expo~ts to Spain (Jan-Sop.l986) 
went up by 31% to 505,900 million Pesetas (over ~2.6 million) 
compared with France's 374,000 million Pesetas (up 13%) and 
Britain's 265,400 million Pesetas (7.7%). Germany and France 
are the most likely contenders in winning Spanish defence 
contracts and other high investment projects (Times, 20 
Nov.1986). Britain is making efforts to increase its share of 
the Spanish market. 
In international fora such as the EC and NATO, it is 
embarrassing for Britain to be accused of retarding integration 
and endangering the democratic experience in Spain. History 
shows that Madrid will react if substantive progress on the 
sovereignty issue is delayed. At the UN, the majority of states 
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and all EC members support Article 6, Resolution 1514 (XV) on 
the terrj.torial integrity of the state. ~he NATO viewpoint is 
somewhat ambivalent. Spain has let it be known that comparable 
facilities to those at Gibraltar could be made available at 
Cartagena, Cadiz, or other ports. According to The ~imes (28 
Nov.1984) the ''NATO factor clinched the Rock pact (Brussels 
Communiqu~)'', because of Spain's progressive integration into 
the Alliance. Despite suggestion~ from some _British sources 
that the NATO flag could replace that of Britain in Gibraltar, 
this would pose problems. Spain is presently unwilling to agree 
to such a disguised abandonment of its sovereignty claim; and 
under Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain does not have 
the right to abdicate sovereignty to such a supranational group, 
besides NATO does not enjoy the prerogatives of a sovereign 
state within tho intern~tional community. Also the Commuuist 
Block and non-Aligned states would strongly object to such a 
move. 
6.15 THE FUTURE. 
The dispute could be resolved by bilateral agreements 
supported within the EC and NATO context. This can only work if 
both parties refrain from trying to gain tactical advantages, 
attempting to consolidate their claims indirectly in 
international treaties. Concerning Gibraltar airport, one 
Spanish diplomat stated that any international agreement ''over 
the isthmus which is not decided in bilateral talks" would 
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appear to concede sovereignty to Britain (Times, 5 July 1987, 
p.25). His thesis is substantiated by history. 
If the thesis is accepted that sovereignty resides in the 
people, then in the future, a majority of EC citi%ens in 
Gibralta~ may vote for sovereign J.inks with Spain. 
A certain detente in Anglo-Spanish relations has come about 
since 1985, because of the integrating forces of the EC and 
NATO. Between 1985-87, British-Spanish discussions have been 
~ 
portrayed by~ Britain as agreements on closer bilateral 
cooperation, but this is essentially within the framework of 
multistate organizations. Spain insists that such bilateral 
cooperation entails future retrocession of the Colony. Britain 
reiterates its commitment to the Gibraltarians. But economic 
and geopolitical imperatives may yet force a compromise. 
Hopefully Spain will not be forced into taking actions 
similar to those practised between 1965-85, because of inaction 
on Britain's part. Steps to bring Gibraltar's trading 
activities in line with EC norms would help. Suggestions about 
the construction of an air terminal on the Spanish side of the 
Fence linked by corridor to Gibraltar airport should be 
seriously studied. A combination of the British, Spanish and EC 
flags could be flown in the airport area. Spanish should be 
given equal status with English in the administration, 
educational system and mass media, especially as a majority of 
Gibraltarians speak Spanish. 
The history of territorial acquisition in Gibraltar may 
offer a model for decolonization in stages. Within the 
territory, there 
allegedly ceded 
airfield. Also 
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are several spatial levels. Namely, the area 
in 1713, and the once neutra:J,. gxpund and 
within the Colony, there are the MOD-Crown 
lands, and the area inhabited/owned by civilians. 
British "sovereignty o-v-e:r the fortress of Gibralta:r cannot 
be doubted. It is founded upon Article X of the Treat~ of 
Utrecht (1713)", but "there is some doubt, about the UK's 
sovereignty over neutral ground including the airfield" (HC. 
Rept. 1981, p.lv). If Britain and Spain were to put the issue 
of the neutral ground before the ICJ, it is probable that a 
decision would be given in Spain's favour. This would give both 
parties room for constructive cooperation on matters of mutual 
interest, namely the airport, base and Gibraltarians. 
The MOD area could provide some leeway in the present 
impasse. MOD-related space could be administered by 
NATO-British forces as at present, but in the future joint 
British-Spanish forces could be used, or some combination 
thereof, and their respective flags. Historically Gibraltar has 
been a British base, but since 1942, this has been somewhat 
blurred by Allied and NATO usage. Gibraltar is now 
theoretically a multinational base. Spanish-NATO usage offers 
possibilities for a gradual transfer of sovereignty. 
Another option is for Britain to retrocede sovereignty over 
the military zone to Spain with a treaty clause stipulating that 
Spain re-lease it to Britain under NATO auspices with a 
specified time clause built in, like the precedent set by Hong 
Kong. Another precedent which could be of use is The Agreement 
4lJ 
in Implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
;Q_e_t_~en Sp__p .. tn and the United States of America, (01 Ja:n.l976), 
catering for US bases in Spain, with provisions for the guest 
and host states (27 US.T. 3005-3235, TIAS 8360 & 836l). 
Concerning the civilian zone there are the options of 
maintaining the status quo until and if a majority wish their 
status to be changed. Some form of condominium could be 
implemented, __ e_s_pecial_ly within the EC context, and/or a 
-
negotiated status within the Spanish state. 
It could be argued that such a spatial "Balkanization" of 
sovereignty is not feasible and would be against the wishes of 
the majority, yet historically there is a clear demarcation 
betwen the civilian and military zones, the latter being out of 
bounds to civilians. 
For historical and ethnic reasons Gibraltar cannot be seen 
as an exclave of Spain like Andorra. Yet with an open frontier, 
the Gibraltarians and Campogibraltarians will inevitably 
integrate. In this context a form of condominium may develop de 
facto before being established de jure with Britain being the 
residual partner in the relationship. 
Because of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and assurances 
since the 1970s, Britain will not transfer sovereignty to a 
state other than Spain. The EC and NATO do not have the 
prerogative of sovereign states, but help influence events in 
Gibraltar. While wishing to abide by it's Treaty commitments, 
and obligations to NATO and the EC, Britain partially 
transferred sovereign prerogative to the Gibraltarians in the 
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1969 Constitution, thus protecting its own inte~ests and those 
of the Gibraltarians, and at the same time gaining j.nternational 
recognltion for the rights of an artificially created 
population. In the longterm, a majority of Spanish nationals 
resident in GibraJ.tar may democratically vote for retrocession, 
as theoretically since 1969 sovereignty 
inhabitants of Gibraltar. 
resides in the 
While the Spanish constitution refers to the territorial 
integrity of the state, it also states that sovereignty re~ide~ 
rn the people and that within the territorial whole there are 
various nationalities. According to Article 44(b) of the 
Constitution, the Cortes may enact any law in the national 
interest which would "authorize or grant, as the case may be, a 
status of autonomy for territories not forming part of the 
provincial 
listed as 
organization". While Gibraltar 
part of the Cadiz province, it 
and the Campo are 
is possihle to 
establish Gibraltar as the capital of a new autonomous province, 
separate from Cadiz; or it could be an autonomous community 
within the autonomous region of Andalucia, similar to Val 
d'Aran, which already has autonomy within the autonomy of 
Catalonia. These types of views have been expressed in the 
Cortes. To be involved in such negotiations would be beneficial 
to the Gibraltarians in the longterm. They could determine the 
degree of autonomy which would suit them in future sovereign 
links. Many observers feel that the continuation of British 
sovereignty will be short-lived. Gibraltarian cooperation with 
the Spanish state is largely contingent on economic issues. 
1.:13 
Being in a position of relative strength and having 
community solidarity, the Gibraltarians could negotiate an 
autonomous ~elationship with Madrid. It was s·~ated in a 
memorandum to tho House of Commons_ ~ Affa:t:rs Comm:i.tte~ 
that the autonomy possible unde:c the Sp.a.lliSh Consti tutj_o:n. was 
greater than that enjoyed by Northern Ireland, Sicily or 
Sardinia. A status similar to that of Jersey, Guernsey or the 
Isle of Man is attainable (HC. Rept. 1981, p.21). From their 
__ pQ~ition of strength, the Gibraltarians could discuss autonomy 
within a longterm perspective of several generations, and retain-
their British nationality, thereby ensuring that Spain under EC 
treaty rules would respect their rights as EC citizens within 
another member state. 
In the event of Britain retroceding the Colony, any type of 
violent reaction from dissenters would be short lived. It is 
unlikely that separatist groups or their acolades like Eta 
within Spain would establish strong links with dissident 
Gibraltarians. 
Taking into account the geostrategic importance of 
Gibraltar and Britain's historic role as Sentinel, as well as 
legitimate arguments concerning territorial integrity and the 
rights of the Gibraltarians, an expedient settlement of the 
dispute is an imperative. The importance of the Colony in 
guaranteeing security of passage of the Strait is not an 
Anglocentric fallacy but a geopolitical reality proven by 
history. Gibraltar holds the key to control of the Strait, and 
influences events on the southern shore. 
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PART THREE 
Geography and politics are interlinked in such a manner 
that events in the Gibraltar area may have serious repercussions 
not only in the immediate hinterland but also on the regional 
and global order. The Strait is an artery and geostrategic zone 
for the regional states and superpowers. 
The Strait region is a focal area betwen Iberia and the 
Maghreb, and between the EC, NATO, and the Arab world. Between 
the 7th and 18th centuries, the main threat to security of 
passage of the Strait came from the southern shore, and now once 
again political instability in Morocco and the power of militant 
Islam could risk causing destabalization in the area. 
Peace and stability must be ensured by Spain and Morocco, 
and regional organizations such as the EC and NATO. The 
Moroccan people must be aided by the international community to 
achieve a level of economic and political development that will 
encourage stability on the southern shore, and thus counteract 
forces like militant fundamentalism which wish to exploit 
problems in the region. 
CHAl?'l'E:R SEVEN 
"'ro ec:wh and every action, there is equal 
and opposite action" . 
Isaac Newton 
(1642-1727). 
"Like land and air environments, the 
maritime environment is a potential theatre 
for military operations, and the warship is 
central to these operations". 
Maineville (1983, p.31). 
7.1 GEOPOLITICS. 
7.1.1 Introduction. 
4.15 
The geography of the Strait of Gibraltar encourages the 
emergence of a hierarchy of politico-military power in the area 
reducing "risk factors" and guaranteeing security of passage to 
the international community. Ideally the western Mediterranean 
region should be a zone of stability and prosperity, with Spain 
and Morocco guaranteeing security of passage. Indeed in the 
1970s there were efforts made by several Mediterranean states to 
have it officially declared a "Zone of Peace" by the UN. 
However this is unrealistic because of the geostrategic location 
and vital role of the Strait in global organization. Its 
security is problematic because of territorial disputes, 
inter-state and superpower rivalry, and the North-South divide. 
The riparian states must work in collaboration with each other 
and supranational organizations such as the UN, EC and NATO to 
enhance economic development and reinforce security. 
"Geopolitics" is the study of the interaction between 
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physical 
political 
and human geographical phenomena which 
environment, international relations 
shape the 
and gJ.obal 
strategies. The scale of geopolitical perception and 
organ5.zation may range from the micro level of Tangior to global 
proportions. Since the 19th century, geographers have been 
developing geopolitical models and theo~ies in an attempt to 
understand the predominant political patterns and fo~ces which 
shape global organization, and also to plan for the future 
(Taylor, 1985). The Strait's geographic features dictate that 
the riparian states and superpowers are likely to interact in 
this strategic theatre. While Spain would like to maintain an 
independent line internationally, centripetal forces dictate 
closer relations with Western institutions such as the EC and 
NATO. Because of Iberia's location Spain is geopolitically 
vital to NATO and US interests. Sometimes there are 
divergencies between Spanish, NATO and US objectives. A 
plethora of geopolitical phenomena also interact in relation to 
Morocco (see chapter 8). The British base at Gibraltar 
continues to be the key to the Strait, vital to British, 
Spanish, NATO and US interests. 
One of the tenets of psychology is that all human 
intelligence is based on the ability to master patterns, the 
comprehension 
organization. 
and interweaving of which is the key to rational 
In the geographer's attempt to rationalize the 
inter-relationships between physical and human phenomena, and 
politics, certain models have been observed and developed into 
theories such as the classic Heartland/Rimland dichotomy. Some 
4.J7 
theories have taken on a deterministic mantle, and their abuse 
by the NAZI school of ~_p_JLoli tik gave a stigma to political 
geography until the early 1970s (Muther, 1947, pp.l-40, TayJ.or, 
1985, pp.~0-41). Nonetheless, geopoJ.i.t~caJ. research, often 
state-sponsored, had a long history prior to the 1930s and 
ever-increasing importance after 1945, albeit under different 
guises. Because of ever-improving global communications there 
has been an upsurge in geopolitical research in the past decade 
(Blake (d), 1984, pp.456-462; O'Tuathail, 1986, pp. 1-42)' 
-
although the line between diagnostic and prognostic work is not 
always evident. 
The attraction of geopolitical research is that it 
apparently affords groups, states and inter-state organizations 
enhanced possibilities of ensuring their economic, political and 
military security. The main disadvantage is that geopolitical 
theory is open to abuse and its findings may be used to 
subjugate peoples, territories or states. State-sponsored, and 
indeed dissident group terrorism must also be seen in this 
context. The Cold War psychosis, and media-hyped "Muslim 
threat" and superpower "back-yard" perceptions now have an 
impact on state policy making. It is interesting to note that 
the third-world states, under the leadership of the Tunisian, 
Mohammed Masmudi, tried to establish a non-aligned newsagency to 
combat the global hegemony of seven international press agencies 
within UNESCO in the 1970s. Thanks to such monopolistic press 
agencies, the Tunisian and Moroccan press often contain more 
information about Western trivia, than they do about national 
and intra-Maghrebi affairs. 
The spatial spectrum between global, regional and local 
geopolitical perspectives is vast, complex, misunderstood and 
hence often politically contentious. This became particularly 
apparent to the author while carrying out fieldwork in North 
Africa (1978-84) and North America (1985-86). On one US 
university campus where the author conducted surveys (1986), 
when questioned about the Maghreb, the majority of interviewees 
_e_ithe._r attributed stereotypical ideas of sub-Saharan Africa or 
-
Lebanese mayhem perceptions to it. In one geography group, only 
5% of the students could locate Iran on a non-titled map of the 
world, while 7% could more or less locate Israel. The vast 
majority indicated Iran and Libya with long pencil marks 
stretching from the Ural Mountains to the Mediterranean Sea and 
Indian Ocean. One student included Libya in Middle-America. 
Similar relative location tests were undertaken by the author on 
Algerian and Tunisian university campuses (1978-83) and revealed 
a far greater knowledge of the relative location of global 
geopolitical core states, cities, flash-points, and areas of 
superpower rivalry. However the vast majority of Maghrebi 
interviewees could offer little or no information about their 
respective states south of the Atlas Mountains. 
Geopolitical systems work on a multiplicity of 
inter-related spatial scales, as is evidenced in the Gibraltar 
region. Obviously no single model is capable of encompassing 
the entire geopolitical mosaic. As with atomic theory, the 
"principle of relativity" must be appreciated, because of an 
1:19 
infinite number of "contingent elements", each of 1':7hich 
interacts to constitute the whole. Globaljst-reductionist 
theories often do not ca"ter for tho "contingent coroponen·ts" 
which may lead to misunderstanding and instability, for instance 
the question of decolonization on both shores of tho Strait in 
relation to the social-political climate in Morocco and 
importance of the Strait to the internatlonal community. 
In order to reduce the potential for conflict in the 
\ve-s~ern Medi-terr-anean gre9-,:ter diplomatic efforts have to be 
made. Internal political stability in the riparian states musi 
be achieved by putting the interests of local populations before 
those of ruling regimes, especially in the Maghreb; the EC and 
USA have a major role to play in this context. Avoidance of 
conflict must be a major priority, for example resolving the 
question of disputed sovereignty in the Strait area. Likewise 
Western and superpower involvemAnt in the Moroccan-Saharawi War 
must not escalate. There must be international cooperation in 
limiting hostile acts in the region on land and sea, ranging 
from Moroccan-Spanish fishing disputes to Libyan expansionism in 
the form of annexation (eg northern Chad, and potentially 
southern Tunisia and south east Algeria, and waters disputed 
between Libya and Malta). Also throughout the region, Libyan 
expansionism is indirectly furthered via surrogate groups, often 
with fundamentalist, regionalist or nationalistic aspiriations. 
Regional and international cooperation must be strengthened to 
guarantee security of passage of the Gibraltar artery, 
especially within the LOS (1982) context (see chapter 3). Other 
prescrip·tive geopolitics include tho need for concerted efforts 
to maintain a reasonable ecological balance in the region. 
Environmental problems such as ovorfishing, oil Dollution and 
nuclear related ~ccidents are becoming a majo~ cause of 
coJJ.tent:ton, of·(;e:o. sympt o:ma:t; i c of 
contElntions, and hence may provide the motor foe 
destabilization. Territorial and maritime disputes in the 
region, and contingent issues must not be allowed to become the 
"Sarajavo" factor \vi th rapid escalation effects. The western 
basin must not become a mirror-image of the eastern 
Mediterranean. Objective geopolitical analysis should help 
identify and elucidate problems, and by negotiation offer 
solutions to help pre-empt armed conflict. 
7.1.2 Definitions. 
Walters (1974, p.20) states that: 
"geopolitical features can be defined as the 
geographical facts regarded in terms of 
their political relevance in a global 
context. They include such factors as 
geographical position, resources, movement 
and transportation, and technological 
changes . A global view presupposes a 
set of geopolitical ideas. Foreign policy 
in turn is shaped by the global view. 
DipJ.omacy and strategy in turn, should be 
dependent on foreign policy". 
Kjellen (1899) was probably the first to use the term 
"geopolitics" as meaning "the science of the state as a realm in 
space" (Muir, 1975, p.l92). Pounds (1972, p.438) sees the 
discipline as the "geographical conscience of the state" 
,-'1n·; 
.-:W ·'· 
e:n.taiLL:o.g the "geographically oriented R tudy of politics" . Hui:c 
( J. 975, p. 193) sa.ys that geopoliU.cs inc1 udes "studies of dynamic 
JlO l.:U:;:i.c<:<L processes" a;c leve:ts "b:coade~c than tba;i; of :i.:o.d:i.v:i.dual 
sta/ces B.:o.d vrithi:o. glo}Jal perspect:i.ves" . Acuording to Cohen 
(1973, p.29) and Gray (197'?, p.5) geopolitics is ·che ~elation of 
international political power to the geographical setting. 
Spracher ( 1983, p. l4) ten.s us that geopolitics is "thR study of 
the influence of such phys:i.cal factors as geography, economies 
a11d demography on the poli tj_cs, and especially the foreign 
policy of a state" . Conant and Gold (1977, p.6) state that 
"geopolitics stresses the importance of locational 
factors in influencing the relations among nations". Boyce 
(1982, p.108) feels that the geographical features of each 
nation or group of nations "are reflected in the political 
character and policies of the area" . 
"Nowhere are all these (geopolitical) 
factors as inextricibly entwined as they are 
in the circumstance of Gibraltar, producing 
a complex yet fascinating relationship among 
several involved parties" (Spracher, 1983, 
p. 14). 
Thus the geopolitics of the Strait region includes its 
physical geography and linkage to the global oceans (chapters 
1-2); its economic role as an international artery (chapter 2); 
and political organization (chapters 3-6) at the regional and 
global levels (chapters 7-8). 
7.1.3 Geo~olitical Models. 
Over the past decade geopolitical research has encompassed 
a~eas that were traditionalJ.y the p~escrvo of 
geography, hence reinforcing its epistomology. Thus geopol.itics 
b.a,s :bee:o. do fined a:o.o. :Lntm:preteC:_ :L:r1 ma:o.y ':ra,ys ( soo Blalw, J. 984, 
pp456-4o2; :UrysdaJ.e & Blake; J 985, ~:·cw:Loc, J. 985; C816rior, 
., Ql':> J ) 
. . •70 - • 'l'his pc:u:ticuJa,:~ study of the G.i . .lJ:coJca:.: cegio:r.1 is B..l"") • 
a;ttempt at analyzing the interactio:o. of goo ( ter:ri·co:cial, 
marit:Lmo, locational and physical) phenomena with political 
forces (human, cultural, state and inter-state). It is an 
BJtte.mpt to examine the component pa:cts of the geopolitical 
organization of the region, and their intricate relationship. 
"Geostrategy" implies spatial organization for the implementation 
of political-military policies (C~l~rier, 1961). Most global 
geopolitical models have embraced the 
region (see map 7.1). 
Strait-Mediterranean 
Geopolitical thought in the 20th century has largely been 
shaped by Alfred T. Mahan (1900), Halford J. Mackinder (1904, 
1918, 1942), Nicholas Skykman (1944) and Saul B. Cohen (1964, 
1973, 1976, 1982). Mackinder has had the most pervasive effect 
on geopolitical thought in this century. He stressed the 
importance of landpower as opposed to seapower. His basic 
thesis was that the inner area of Eurasia is the pivot region of 
global politics, because of its spatial extent, abundant 
resources, in-depth defence capacity and consequent protection 
from the reach of maritime powers. Mackinder's pivotal area was 
surrounded by a marginal crescent, which included Islamic 
territories such as those of south-west Asia. Thus if the pivot 
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land-locked state should ever gain control of the marginal 
lands, getting access to the seas, "the empire of the world 
would then be in sight" (Mackinder, 1904, 1919, 1942). Though 
modified by him several times, Mackinder's basic model remained 
unchanged (see map 7.la). 
The American naval historian Alfred 
that naval superiority (seapower) was 
T. Mahan, 
paramount. 
believed 
Hence the 
landpower competes with the seapower in the surrounding marginal 
_cres_c_ent, __ to which the latter has direct access. The 
Mediterranean would be a key region in this struggle, and the 
seapower needs unimpeded passage of Gibraltar. According to 
Walters (1974), Western geostrategical thinking is still 
powerfully influenced by Mackinder's model, despite the vast 
changes in geopolitical relationships and technology which have 
occurred since Mackinder's time. US policy since 1945 has thus 
been based on a strategy of containment of the Soviet Union by a 
system of alliances and bases in the marginal crescent, for 
instance Israel, Egypt and Pakistan. The independent states 
which now form part of the crescent were mostly British or 
French territories until the 1950s. US policy is designed to 
prevent the heartland power, the USSR, from gaining access to 
the oceans. Historically the Russian/Soviet empire has thrust 
towards the marginal crescent seeking access to blue waters (see 
map 7.1b). During the Napeolonic and NAZI land invasions, 
Russia eventually vanquished the enemy because of the 
possibility of retreat, rejuvenation, and counter-attack offered 
by the heartland. 
DD.:.:'i.:og 'i'lo:rJ.d \'far II, SpyJ'>.ma:n ( ).94.t::) S.(lvtsocl the USA ·co 
c..dopt :poJ.i c.i..es that \vould guarc..:o.tee us inte~cests in the 
":r:i.J.,1lc..:o.c'l.s" (mB,:cgi:o.al crescent) . A:nothcF 1\me:c:i.ca:•.l, n. \"f. J\J.e:i.nig 
( J9o6), }JostuJo.ted. ·chat so.:ne :rii:nla,:o.d. sts:css vJe:r>e o:rie:o.ted 
tovm:rds tho heo,:rt l.a,:o.d e.nd others ·tmva:cd.s tho oceans. 'rhe 
allegiance of the :r.i.mla:o.d. states could. voer .i.nvra:rds tm·Ya.rds tb.o 
landpower or outwards to ·Lhe seapower, and could change with 
time. Egypt's history since 1956 would corroborate ~einig's 
thesis. Spykman and Meinig also highlighted the significance of 
air-power in relation to Mackinder's model(see map 7.la). 
Heartland/:rimland views and landpower/seapowor idoas are 
still prevalent in contemporary geopolitical thinking, although 
the landpower (USSR) is now a major maritime force, and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles can reach any part of the 
globe from land or sea bases (see maps 7.la,b,c). Mackinder's 
original theory was based on the assumption that the heartland 
power was endemically expansionist, while the seapower was not. 
It is interesting to note in the historical context, that at the 
time of the elaboration of Mackinder's model, the great maritime 
powers, Britain, France and to a lesser degree the USA were 
competing for control of lands stretching from Morocco to the 
Philippines, while the US was displacing European hegemony in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The heartland-rirnland 
perceptions of the superpowers has ensured that the rimlands 
remain an area of strife. 
Cohen (1973) proposed the concept of geopolitical regions 
as vital subsystems of global spanning geopolitical realms. The 
geopolitj.cal region is derived directly from geographic regions 
and provides a framework for common political and economic 
actions. Contiguity of location and complementarity of 
resources are partly distinguishing marks. Cohen (1973, 1982) 
suggested a global view of world geostratogic regions withjn a 
framework of stable zones and shatterbelts. A shatterbelt is 
"a large strategically located. region . 
occupied by a number of conflicting 
states caught between the 
conflicting interests of the Great Powers" 
(Cohen, 1973, p.253; see Prescott, 1968; 
Drysdale &..._Blake-,- 1985,- pp. 27--28). _ 
While Cohen includes the Middle East (Mashreq) within the 
shatterbelt, he places North Africa (Maghreb) in a region 
described as "Maritime Europe and the Maghreb" (Cohen, 1982, 
p.232). Thus this nomenclature would indicates that while 
Maritime Europe and North Africa have geopolitical features in 
common, they do not constitute a cohesive geopolitical region. 
Geostrategic regions tend to be strategic in scope and nodal in 
structure, while geopolitical regions are tactical in scope and 
more uniform in structure. The Gibraltar region belongs to the 
geostrategic category. According to Cohen (1982, p.224) 
hierarchical integration is imperative for global/regional 
integration. 
The author in discussion with Cohen (April, 1986) failed to 
agree as to why the Maghreb should be "so neatly" classified 
with Maritime Europe in his geopolitical framework. While it is 
true that the Maghreb is more distant from the heartland than 
the Mashreq, and that superpower competition is less intense 
~he~e than in other a~eas, Coheu seems to underestimate its 
unique geopolitical significance, and rappo~t with the Middle 
J:<:ast shaL"Le:cbeJ.t zone. i:_iievertheless the Magb.:reb must .be vieHed 
\v·i tb. 0.a,r.i.ti:me Eu:co-pe vrl'Lhi:o. the geost:categio ~pe:cspectj_ve. Yet 
from a geopolitical viewpoint the Maghreb does not nea·tJ.y fit 
into the vJest European region, a factor \'!'h:Lch .i.s often 
overlooked or ignored. Possibly this is due to France's special 
historical relationship with the region. Extra-Mediterranean 
states still tend to percej_ve the Maghreb as a "French domain"; 
and are partially supported by such activities as 1-'rench 
involvement in Tunisia (1978, 198~) and Chad (1980s) (see 
chapter 8). Also the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Gulf 
region's energy reservoir detract international media attention 
from the west and central Mediterranean except when Libyan news 
becomes headlines. 
Hence concerning Gibraltar and global models, Mackinder 
(1904) placed the west Mediterranean region including the 
northern Maghreb and Strait in his "marginal crescent" in 
relation to the "heartland-pivot zone". In later models ( 1943), 
he placed these areas in the "seapower zone". Spykman (1944) 
included Iberia and France in his "rimland", but unlike previous 
models, the northern Maghreb was not coupled with Iberia, but 
rather categorized in the third zone, "exterior islands and 
continents". As we have seen, Cohen (1973, 1982) placed the 
Strait region including Iberia and North Africa in the "Maritime 
Europe-Maghreb Zone" (see map 7. 1a). 
German geopolitical models, especially those of Karl 
Lc::Ll.Shofe~c ( 1869-1946) v:i.evled. the \·70J.'Jd. C:\S :four vas-e zones 
stretching from north to south, with respective core areas 
situtated in the northern hemisphere (sea map 7.3). These zones 
comprised pan-:R.ussia, the Asiatic ~one of co-prosperity, 
pc:\:'J.-A:meJ:>ica a:o.d. :t:u:cafrica. The latter zone stretched from 
ScRndinavia to South Africa, with Iceland to the west, and to 
the east the Ukraine, Turkey and Arabian peninsula. The core 
comprised the Berlln ~egion encompassing Copenhagen, Ams·terdam 
and Brussels. The "Eurafrica" zone included the Mediterranean 
-
as the middle lake. There are possible similarities between 
Haushofer's model and French geostrategy in the Maghreb during 
the colonial era, when France annexed AlgeJ:>ia (1830), and made 
Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912) into protectorates (see maps 
7.3, 4.1). The slogan at the time was France "from Dunkirk to 
Tamanrasset" . Spain's "Africanista" policy in relation to 
Morocco also bore a certain resemblance, as did those of Italy 
in Libya and the Horn of Africa. Haushofer's "Eurafrica" model 
is interesting in the contemporary context as the Gibraltar 
region still forms a contact area between the developed and 
non-industrialized nations (Brandt, 1980; Kidron & Segal, 1984), 
and the EC and Muslim world (see maps 7.4, 8.2). Also it is a 
contact zone between NATO and the Maghreb. 
At present the western Mediterranean region lies outside 
the "shatterbelt" zone. However one cannot be complacent about 
the tensions which exist there. There is intense interstate 
competition between Spain and Morocco, and Morocco, Algeria and 
Libya, all of which could develop into armed conflict (see 
chap·ceJ: 8) . TerJ:itorial and maritima disputes exist between 
Spain and Britain, Spain and Morocco, Morocco and Algeria, and 
Libya aad Chad, Tunisia, Algeria, £gypt and Malta (see chapteJ:s 
d-6). ~h8 ~estern Saharan Var ~as repcrcu8sions not only on 
Morocco, hu:c also J\lgeTia and Mau:C'itania, and there is rislc of 
future supeJ:power involvement. Separatist groups are active in 
Spain, and among Berber communities in the Maghreb. Militant 
Islamic fundamentalism is evidently gaining inroads in Morocco 
and Tunisia. Along with social-political unrest in the Maghreb, 
the Muslim masses are sympathetic towards Arab Mashreqi problems 
and aspirations. 
7.2 THE SUPERPOWERS. 
7.2.1 The Superpowers in the Mediterranean. 
According to Drysdale and Blake (1985, p.34): 
"Great Power interference over the years 
done little to solve the problems 
national and regional integration and 
sometimes created new problems". 
Both superpowers claim that their presence in the 
has 
of 
has 
Mediterranean 
is aimed at: (i) the deterrence of nuclear and conventional war; 
(ii) maintaining a balance of power; (iii) ensuring good 
political relations with allies in the region; (iv) "showing the 
flag" exercises; ( v) establishing base facilities; (vi) 
influencing the behaviour of Mediterranean states such as Libya; 
and (vii) safeguarding arteries like Gibraltar (see map 7.2). 
The geopolitical theories as discussed above however might 
suggest that the heartland and maritime uowers are struggling 
for control of the rimlands, and exploiting regional problems to 
fu.rthe:Y:' thei:r o~:m. st~catBgios. By virtue of tho fact that the 
USSR is ~ Black Sea state, it could be argued that despite the 
oonst:rc.,ints :i.mposed o:o. Sov:l.et access to the »!.ed.i.teT"T'a:n..ea,:o. 8eo,, 
that it has a geographical right to be active in the region. 
Nonetheless, many Mediterranean states like Greece and Turkey 
fear that Moscow is pursuing its historic quest of gaining 
territorial control of access to the Mediterranean. Certain 
reg.i.Onal states ana. the USA fear Soviet e:xpanslonism in tho 
region. Many Muslims feel that both superpowers are aggressors, 
causing unnecessary regional tensions and wish a plague on both 
their houses. Some Muslim fundamentalist groups dream of the 
creation of an Islamic superpower stretching from Gibraltar to 
the Philippines (see map 8.2a). 
7.2.2 The USA. 
The eastern seaboard of the USA is over 3,000 miles (4,800 
km) from the Atlantic coast of the Maghreb, yet Gibraltar is 
only half way between the USA and the Arabian/Persian Gulf (see 
map 1. 1c). Steaming from the US at about 15 knots, a ship can 
reach Tangier in 8 or 9 days. It may take 6 days to traverse 
the Mediterranean to the Suez Canal, then some 4 to reach Aden; 
and another 4 days to reach the Strait of Hormuz. Thus a voyage 
from New York to Hormuz can take up to three weeks. Civil 
aircraft flying time from New York to the Maghreb is 8-10 hours. 
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Nilitary ~i.rc~aft would be slower anrt may require stopovor 
f'acilities (D~ysd.B.le & :::.na.ke, 1985, p.32). During the many 
6ebatos leading up to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1982), tho US made it perfectly clear that it considered 
protection of its right of passage through Gibralta~ as 
essential for international commerce, the maintenance of its 
naval presence in the Mediterranean, and US security commitments 
to NATO a.nd a,l]Jed. st..at.es (see ehaptcr 3-). In -us perc-eptions 
the Middle East and Mediterranean are areas vital to the 
national interests. This perception has gradually developed 
over the last 150 years. 
Hence according to Gueritz (1980, p.24): 
"It is interesting to reflect that 
international action, and the first US 
involvement overseas, centered upon the 
interference with trade of the Barbary 
sLaLe:s in the early 18th century". 
In the 18th century, the USA had little commercial interest in 
the Mediterranean. Presidents Washington and Adams opted to 
purchase treaties of protection with the Corsairs of Algiers, 
Tunis and Tripoli. In 1880, the Dey of Algiers (Ottoman prince) 
seized the USS George Washington for his own use, and attacks on 
other vessels continued. President Jefferson sent in us 
warships to protect American interests. In the Mediterranean 
region, the air and sea craft hijackings of the 1970s and 80s, 
such as the Achille Lauro vessel (1985), as well as the spate of 
kidnappings and terrorist acts aimed at US interests there are 
reminiscent of the Corsair epoch. 
It was only in the early 20th century that a balanced trade 
e:,;-:cha,n~e be·i.;Heen ·cho USA c:md t/lO sou.th-~:leo l.. ;~erU ·i;erTa.:oaan 
European states emerged. Later US imports of raw materi.als from 
tho non-industrj.alized southern and eastern Mediterranean states 
developed. According to ~ruvor (1980, pp.39-40) by the 1970s, 
US t:rC?,do 'i:7ith the M.edite:rranea:tl states avoragod some 10% o:f a.ll 
foreign trade, and over 10% of the tonnage and value of total us 
oceanborne commerce could be identified as transiting Gibraltar. 
"As the flag follm-7s trade" , the US Sixth Fleet's usage of the 
Strait is seen to be imperative. 
According to Coheh (198"2, pp.a&7-238)- vital US int.erEL8ts 
are tied to its ability to secure links with the 
"trade-dependent maritime world". Some 25% of US GNP is 
involved in either imports or exports, and it uses about 25% of 
the earth's annual production of natural resources to maintain 
5% of its population (Cohen, 1982, p.238). 
Between 1965 and 1975, oil tanker tonnage globally 
increased by 240%, and in 1976, it was estimated th<:l."i> ::;orne 
50,000 commercial ocean-going vessels transited the Strait in an 
east-west direction annually (Truver, 1980, p.39). Truver 
(1980, pp.49-52), estimated that trade carried through the 
Strait as a percentage of global trade was in the order of 24% 
for phosphates, 5.7% for bauxite/alumina, 4% coal, 10% grain, 
and 6.2% iron ore. According to Truver (1980, p.50), in the 
mid-1970s, the percentage of US foreign trade carried under the 
US flag was only 4.8%, hence almost 95% was carried in vessels 
bearing the flag of other nations. Thus security of the Strait 
and freedom of passage for all nations is essential for the US 
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economy. Significantly, some 69 of the 71 strategin materials 
ixwluding o:U., had to be lm:po:.cted. Yot &lmost 95% of ·chese 69 
materials, by tonnage in the mid~1970s uoro being imported jnto 
·che USA by foreign flag shipping (US Cong. Bouse Cmmte. J.975, 
p.5l; Truvcr, 1980, p.50). With intensification in the 
Arab-Israeli War and the energy crjses (1970s), tho USA's 
dependence on usage of the Gibraltar artery became obvious to 
~everyone. 
"The Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the US Department 
of Commerce" identifies 5 key US trade routes of the US that 
pass through Gibraltar, four of which have been classified as 
essential to the US economy. According to Truver (1980) US 
foreign trade passes the Strait in 1,500 ships of all flags 
annually. 
•rruver (1980, p.57) states that US oceanborne trade with 
the Mediterranean region in the mid-1970s was in the order of 
18,000 thousand metric tons (mt) for agricultural products, 
4,000 thousand rot for minerals, metals and chemicals; 22,000 
thousand mt for oil, coal and gas; and almost 4,000 thousand rnt 
for manufactured goods. US agricultural exports via the Strait 
at that period were exceptional because of massive Soviet grain 
purchases (1973-74). Significantly oil and refined products 
accounted for 85% of the total tonnage of US imports from the 
Mediterranean states. Thus approximately 25% of the total of US 
trade with the Mediterranean states and some 33.3% of the 
region's total oil exports transited the Strait in the 
mid-1970s. US imports of oil and associated products transiting 
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the Strait comprised over 12% of total US crudu and product 
imports trausported by vesseJ. (Truver, 1980, p.66). According 
to }(Ov7d.e:o. C 1983, }? . <1:8) some 50% of the seF.J,bor:o.e commerce of the 
VBA's ~~ropean allies travels via the Strait and Mediterranean 
:r:ou.tes; 
"\vj_thout the 
tankers and 
daily basis 
industry of 
to a halt". 
oil transported by the 300 oi.l 
75 super tankers underway on a 
in the Mediterranean, the 
our European allies would grind 
7.2.3 Western Security. 
The aims espoused by the USA in the Mediterranean theatre 
may be summarised as: (i) to curb Soviet expansion, (ii) to 
provide support for Israel, and (iii) to secure oil supplies. 
This policy would have been impossible to implement without 
unimpeded passage at Gibr~ltar. 
With the impregnable Gibraltar base in its possession, and 
the neutralization of France at Waterloo (1815), Britain 
remained unrivalled in the Mediterranean arena until 1939. The 
US naval and military presence in the Mediterranean dates 
largely from World War II, because of the Allied liberation of 
the Maghreb and Italy. With the onset of the Cold War in 1946, 
the battleship USS Missouri carried out the diplomatic mission 
of bearing home from Washington DC the body of the deceased 
Turkish Ambassador to Istanbul, escorted by other naval vessels. 
The US naval mission also visited Piraeus, Naples, Algiers, 
Tangier and Gibraltar. The fleet "showed the flag" in support 
of the rightwing faction in the looming G~eek civil wa~. At 
thj.s time, the USSR renewed its claims to Kars and Ardahan in 
'rl:<r:'Jwy a:o.CI. vm"s seek.ing a. revj_sio:n or tb.e Montrm.1:K Con·vel'l.tion 
(J.936) iu rolation to the transit rsgime of the Turkish Straits, 
and asked for naval bases there. The USSR gained oJ.oser 
:rela,t:i_o:o.s w:i.tb. Alba.:nia and established a naval ba,se a:t Valna 
(1958-61). The Sovj.ets also sought a trusteeship over Libya 
( 1946-48). 
Gradually the US sought to establish 
fu:t'mtf.I' European colonial hegemony (see 
military presence in the Mediterranean 
itself in areas of 
map 1.5). The US 
and its diplomatic 
interests in the region coincided with the transformation of the 
USA into a global military power with "a permanent 
internationalist policy" (Zoppo, 1984, p.313). US economic and 
military aid to Greece (1947) and later Turkey signalled the 
implementation of the "Truman Doctrine" (esentially containment 
of communism and permanent US involvement in Europe) (see map 
1.5). Britain had given the US notice that it would not be 
continuing aid to Turkey and Greece. In 1946, under US threat, 
the USSR withdrew from northern Iran and thus the geostrategic 
Gulf region. In the 1950s, the USA signed bilateral military 
accords with Spain, Morocco, Italy, Portugal, Iran and Libya. 
The containment of communist expansion remained the main US 
objective in the region until the Iranian Revolution (1979) 
unleashed the militant Islamic threat. Regional political 
regimes such as that of Morocco have often exploited the US fear 
of the "red threat", hence gaining aid for their repressive 
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polt.c:ies. On 2 January 1984 in a televi.sed address to the 
nation, Ring Hassan of Morocco claimed that communists were 
imYolved :i.:o. ·L;b.e H:reaC!, Bovolts.. Also boca use of 1\J.geJ:>:i.a:o. su.ppo:rt 
for the Polisa:rio Liberation Front in the Western Sahara, Hassan 
has continuously implied that the Saharawi arc receiving Soviet 
aid (see chapter 8). 
As o:r c":fa:auary 1946, elements of the D~ 'Twelfth Fleet began 
operating as a Mediterranean Squadron. That year the aircraft 
carrier Franklin~- Roosevelt visited Lisbon, Gibraltar, Malta 
and Naples. Initially the naval squadron was referred to as "US 
Naval Forces Northwest African Waters", but was renamed "US 
Naval Forces Mediterranean''. By 1949, there was a rotation 
system in operation for US carriers, the US navy was represented 
in the region at all times. Six months after the establishment 
of NATO, the US Sixth Fleet was created (Feb.l950), and has been 
in operation in the region ever since. The nmnher of vessels 
assigned to the Sixth Fleet averages 40 to 50 ships, with 
approximately 50% being auxiliary and support vessels (Truver, 
1980, p.75). The Fleet can be strengthened during crisis 
situations by vessels from the Atlantic fleets. During the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, the normal US two carrier task force was 
increased by the addition of a third force. According to the US 
Administration the role of the Sixth Fleet includes: 
(i) Deterring agression against Western 
Europe by maintaining strike forces capable 
of utilizing conventional and nuclear 
weapons and to be prepared to conduct such 
offensive operations as either a national or 
a NATO force should deterrence fail. 
(ii) To promote peace and stability by its 
readiness and availability for deployment at 
trouble spots. 
(iii) To create good-will for the US and 
enhance .its prestige \vi th the cou.:o.t:r:i.es 
bordering the Mediterranean; and 
(iv) To protect US citizens, shippj.ng, and 
tnto:rosts in the Mediterranean, ( :l'he. S.txth 
:PJ,e_et_, Public Affa .. irs Officer, Staff 
Commander Sixth Fleet, (undated publication 
(ca.l958)), Ships History ·· Division, 
Washington DC) . 
Under current planning guidelines for a sustained conflict, 
approximately 90% of US military material would be transported 
to the ar~a of operations bj sea, iith only the roost critical 
items and personnel going in by air (Spracher, 1984, p.14). 
This viewpoint is corroborated by US usage of the Gibraltar-Suez 
route in 1987 during the Tanker War crisis in the 
Arabian/Persian Gulf. 
The US played the role of guarantor of freedom from Soviet 
penetration and as mediator in local conflicts until the 
mid-1970s. International confidence in the US was undermined 
however with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), the Iran 
hostage crisis (1979-81), failure to check the Lebanese mayhem 
from 1982 on, inability to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
lack of a strong counter-response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (1980), and the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute. US 
sanctions and military actions against Libya (1986) received 
little practical support from the international community, save 
Britain. The US stance on the Iran-Iraq war since 1980 has 
given the Muslim world an image of impotence, as has US 
unpreparedness in becoming embroiled in the Tanker War (1987) in 
the Arabian/Persian Gulf. US calls for "concerted" allied 
act:lo:o. :i.:o. cleaTing the Gulf of m:i.D.es and gua:ranteeing freedom of 
passage of HoTmuz met with a negative :response (1987), and 
friendly regional states such as Saudi A:rahia u:i.sh to distenco 
themselves :f:':r:'om US ac~cions. The "Iran-gate" scanda,le ( 1986-87) 
has causod conservative ~uslim regimes much concern, and above 
all the US image has been dealt a severe blow by the inability 
of the USA to counteract the actions of Muslim fundamentalist 
:revolutionaries. The disturbances caused by militant 
fundamentalists at Mecca !=luring the JiQJ_j in 1987 was a clear 
warning to America's Muslim allies. 
us involvement in Lebanon and Libya (1980s) did not 
seriously run the risk of overt confrontation with the USSR. us 
resolve in the Mediterranean region has not been seriously 
tested since the Yom Kippur War (1973). The question of 
securing oil routes to the West and allies such as Japan has 
becomR a global preoccupation (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, p.35). 
US and Soviet policies in relation to the Arabian/Persian Gulf 
Tanker War (1987) are broadly similar, and hence there is little 
risk of superpower confrontation; US resolve may yet be 
seriously tested by Iran. 
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter declared that the US was 
willing to use all means necessary to defend US interests in the 
Gulf region. This would inevitably mean usage of the Gibraltar 
Strait. The Reagan Administration upheld this policy and 
greatly upgraded and expanded the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 
now known as Central Command. To move the 400,000 men of the 
RDF implies usage of the Strait, and access points en route 
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eastwards such as Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and Oman 
(Drysdale & BJa~e. 1985, pp.34-36). 
'l'he RDF /Ce:o:l;:rBJ Command j_n con,junction \·Jith the US Sixth 
Fleet presents a formidable force which may be jointly deployed 
in the Mediterranean. Because of an (i.nadvertent?) Iraqi 
attack on the USS Stark in the Arab:La,n/ PersJan Gulf resulting j_n 
the death of 37 sailors in May 1987, President Reagan pledged to 
strengthen US military commitment in the region, particularly in 
enforcing the-right of passage fo-r the international community. 
Hence to maintain the balance of power, help secure strategic 
imports, and implement its Mediterranean, Middle-East, Israeli 
and Arabian/Persian Gulf policies, Gibraltar Strait remains 
vital in terms of access, distance, time and cost (see map 
l.lc). This necessitates friendly relations between the USA, 
Spain 
the two 
allied 
and Morocco. As long as there remain contentions between 
latter states concerning territorial disputes, the 
British/NATO Gibraltar base remains invaluable to the US 
in any emergency situation. 
7.2.4 The USSR. 
Like the USA, the Soviets have geostrategic and 
geopolitical interests in the region (Weinland, 1984. 
pp.267-291). Soviet concern is enhanced by the geostrategic 
location of the Mediterranean in relation to the USSR (see map 
7.lb). Because some of its bluewater ports are situtated in the 
Black Sea region, the Gibraltar artery forms an important link 
in Soviet naval deployments, and to a lesser extent trade. 
The Soviet Union has the world's greatest number o.f 
intornat~.onal borders with neighbouring states, many of whom are 
hostile (eg China) or strong supporters of the USA (eg Norway, 
Turkey, Japan and formerly Iran). For instance the USSR has 
over 14,000 miles (2,200 km) of common borders with Turkey and 
Iran. There are some 750 miles (1,200 km) of Caspian Sea 
coastline under Iranian control. Prior to 1979, the USA had a 
free- hand -in intell-igence gath6ring from Iranian bases. --:No¥7 the 
USSR faces the threat of Iran exporting its Islamic Revolution 
to its Muslim populations (see map 8.2a). The USA has 
electronic monitoring equipment in Turkey, and US missiles were 
stationed there until the 1960s. The USSR fears arms buildups 
in US client states (see map 7.2c). Short range missiles, and 
medium range bombers and fighter aircraft are within striking 
range of boviet cities from eastern Mediterranean locations. 
The nearest Soviet territory is less than 200 miles (320 km) 
from Teheran, 300 miles (480 km) from Syria, 500 miles (800 km) 
from the Mediterranean and 600 miles (960 km) from the Gulf 
(Drysdale & Blake, 1985, pp.30-32). Naturally the creation of 
the RDF/Central Command generated much concern in Moscow. The 
Soviets do not have direct territorial access to the region, nor 
allies of the stature of Turkey, Italy, Israel and Britain with 
the valuable sovereign Gibraltar and Cyprus bases. 
The Soviets wish to gain allies and base facilities 
throughout the region. Interestingly the USSR and USA were the 
first two states to recognize the independence of Israel in 
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1948. 'J'he usm:t targeted geostrateg1c sta~tos fo:r a:td, :L:ncludt:ng 
Egypt (1955-72), which offered naval base facilities at 
Alexand:rta and Port Said (see map 7.2b). Tho Friendship T:reaty 
\'11th Egypt e:o.d.od i:o. 1976; \·Jh:U.e \·Jithin a couple of years Egypt 
was ro-onte:rt:ng the US fold, particularly with tho signing of 
the .C_~:(OJ.> Pavj_d. AG.__cord_s. (1978). 
Other Soviet allies such 
Friendship Treaties in 1980 and 
as Syria and Iraq also signed 
1972 respectively; yet both 
states are mutually antagonistic, striving for regional 
hegemony. While -Syria tr-ies to follow--- a:u. independent line, 
ideologically somewhat akin to Qadhafiism, Iraq is more 
dependent on Moscow, from which it procures over 70% of its 
armaments. This has further alienated rapprochement between the 
USSR and the Iranian Islamic Republic, because of the Gulf War. 
Moscow enjoys good relations with PDR Yemen, thus gaining access 
to the strategic Aden and Socotra Island bases. 
Usage of the Strait for the USSR is essential to its 
Mediterranean, Atlantic, African and Maghrebi policies (see maps 
7.2a,b). The decolonization issues in the area, Western Sahara 
War, Algerian-Moroccan rivalry, and Libyan adventurism are 
naturally of interest to the Soviets (see chapter 8). Along 
with "flying the flag", Soviet fishing fleets have interests in 
the waters off West Africa, particularly the Saharan Bank, where 
research vessels operate. Since 1956, the USSR has sought good 
relations with Morocco, and has aided development projects 
there. However there is little possibility of a communist 
threat from Morocco, but a fundamentalist regime or one inspired 
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by egaltta~ian ideals could be forced into a position of 
requesting Soviet military aid. 
The USSR enjoys good relations with tho respective states, 
hut none of them could be termed as satellites nor close allies 
(~a~tmann, 1984, pp.l74-,75). While Libya is anti-American, it 
is not unconditionally pro-Soviet. Nonetheless, on more than 
one occasion since 1981, Colonel Qadhafi has stated that US 
policies could force Libya closer to Moscow. However 
considering the Libyan military fiascos in encounters with US 
forces (1981, 1986) and Western backed Chadian forces (1987), 
the Soviets are maintaining a careful distance with the Libyan 
regime. Algeria's independent stance, and strong support for 
the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World causes mean that the 
USSR often takes a position similar to that of Algeria on 
international issues rather than vice versa. This fact is often 
mis~nterpreted by the USA. Morocco and Tunisia try to maintain 
cordial rather than close relations with the USSR (see chapter 
8). 
Concerning access and port facilities in the Maghreb, 
Soviet vessels occasionally visit Moroccan ports but do not 
enjoy special privileges. Large numbers of Soviet commercial 
and fishing vessels visit Spanish ports including Ceuta, and the 
coastal waters off Morocco's Atlantic coast. Algeria offers 
light maintenance facilities for submarines at Annaba. Rumours 
about Soviet naval 
Algeria, (a major 
substantiated (see 
facilities at 
French base 
map 7.2b). 
Mers el Kebir in western 
until 1962) have not been 
Tunisia offers the Soviets 
cl:cydock:Lng fac:i.l:dies for auxiliary vessels oJ).d sr(broa,:ri:o.es at 
Hammamet. In October 1984, a submerged Soviet nucJ.ear submarine 
~:ms .:LnvoJ.ved. i:o. oJ coJ.lj sio:o. VJi th EJ, Soviet cargo vessel .i.:n the 
Strait of Gihralta:c, and was brought to Bammamot for repa:Lrs 
('I'imeJ?, 17 Oct. l984, p. l). Tunisia offers the Sovic·ts naval 
repair facilities at the strategic Bi~e:rte base. This is for 
purely economic reasons, as Western naval powers declined offers 
of exclusive usage. The Soviets used Libyan airfields for 
military aircraft on two occasions in 1981, but as of 1987, 
there is still no pattern of regular usage of Libyan facilities. 
Overall, the Soviets do not have major port facilities in 
the region and so have to anchor outside the territorial waters 
of the littoral states. Anchorage areas used include the waters 
off Sollum near the Egyptian-Libyan border, areas off Hammamet 
in Tunisia, Banco le Sec off Tabarka near the Algerian-Tunisian 
border. and Banco Tofino between Spain and Morocco. Of these, 
Hammamet and Sollum are the principal maintenance anchorages, 
while the others are used mostly for operational rendez-vous. 
The Soviet role in the Mediterranean is of a 
politico-military character. As the USSR is not dependent on 
Gulf oil, its principal aim in the region is to prevent 
encirclement, and to undertake the training and deployment of 
its fleet. Essentially the Mediterranean is an arena where the 
superpowers rival each other, struggling for predominance, but 
the threat to peace is arguably conventional rather than 
nuclear. The geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean to 
the Soviets was witnessed with their naval deployments during 
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the Arab-Israeli war (1973), and also during the airlift of 
suppli.es and personnel to Angola (1975) and Bthiopia (1977). 
J?rinc:i.pally, surveillance and escort functions are cc:uTj_ed ou.t 
by the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet (SOVMEDRON). 
As recently as 1963, there were virtually no Soviet vessels 
in the Mediterranean; in the early 1980s there were 
approximately 50, of which 25 were permanently deployed surface 
combatants (Memual, 1981, p.l3). The Soviets have illustrated 
- - -a.n-r-mp~re s s ivreua;petui-ty- tu-J:'B ird orce-~the- ~-Medi-terranean- squadron- -
in wartime as was witnessed during the 1973 Middle East War, 
when the number of vessels reached almost 100 (Snyder, 1981, 
p.41). The only viable exit for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet is 
through Gibraltar, because of the vulnerability of the Suez 
Canal. The Black Sea Fleet has the mission of guarding Soviet 
naval and industrial complexes in the Ukraine, as well as 
supporting Soviet activities in the Mediterranean. It consists 
of small anti-submarine warfare vessels and gunships capable of 
supporting local ground force actions. The Soviets routinely 
move Mediterranean deployed units from the Northern Fleet at 
Murmansk rather from the closer Black Sea Fleet because of the 
constraints imposed on passage of the Turkish Straits (Mumford, 
1981, p.41). The Soviets keep 10 to 12 attack submarines in the 
Mediterranean at any given time, which mostly have their base 
with the Northern Fleet (Spracher, 1983, p.21). 
In accordance with the geostrategic doctrines of Admiral 
Gorshkov, the SOVMEDRON was developed to impressive proportions 
since the mid-1970s. Admiral Di Giovanni of the Italian Navy 
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and NATO Commander (1982, p.53) states that if one overflies the 
M:ed:L'LeT:canca:n from G:i.:bTo.ltaT to the J~hd.dls East one sees attack 
gTov.ps of tho SOVMBDRON st:retchi:o.g f:l:'o:m t:O.e anchorages off 
AJ.bo:rci,:a to Hammamet, Tobruk, SoJ.J.n:m, KitheTa,, C:r:ete, SypTus CJ,nd. 
Tartus; and a permanent Soviet buoy moored off Pantelleria, and. 
many auxiliary vessels dispersed throughout the region. 
Since the mid-1960s the SOVMEDRON has intermingled with 
elements of the US Sixth Fleet in what some have aptly called a 
cat and mouse game. Soviet naval exercises are held mostly in 
the eastern Mediterranean basin, though the SOVMEDRON does 
periodically join in global exercises as in 1970 and 1975. Loss 
of naval facilities in Egypt (1972), like those at Valona 
(Albania 1960), has shown how volatile superpower relations can 
be with Mediterranean states. The surface vessels of the 
SOVMEDRON Tot~te from the Black Sea HQ at Sevastopol. Naval-air 
support comes from the Black Sea Fleet, with its bases in the 
Crimea for the eastern Mediterranean, and also Syria. Thus 
Soviet naval interests can be interdicted at the Gibraltar and 
Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal, all of which lie largely 
within the control of pro-Western states. 
7.3 NATO AND IBERIA. 
7.3.1 ~ain and the NATO Alliance. 
According to Heiberg (1983, p.64) Spain's participation in 
the Western Alliance is vital: 
"Because Spain will facilitate the European 
dialogue with North Africa and the Arab 
\'7m·1d, the Span:i.sh presence j_n NATO ~'?ill 
eventually assist in B.dd:ressj_ng the most 
J.ikely aroa of confrontation between the 
Atlcw.t.ic Alliance and the Wa.:rsB>'i:i PB,ct" . 
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Gueritz (1980, p.2l) sees Spain as the key factor in the control 
of the western Mediterranean basin and of the depJ.oyment routes 
of Soviet naval forces. The major weakness of Sovi.et maritime 
power is the division of the navy between four separate naval 
centres, and the salien-t problem of' access. -The Iberian 
peninsula forms a land barrier to oceanic communications, 
confining international sea and air traffic to the Gibraltar 
artery. The Spanish coastlines in the Strait area confer upon 
it the power to monitor the movements of potentially hostile 
forces and to impose inhibitions upon their deployments. Hence 
good relations between Spain and the USA are essential for 
Western security. Within two months of Franco's death (1975), 
the USA and Spain signed a treaty which upgraded and extended a 
series of earlier bilateral military agreements. A resolution 
of the us Senate (21 June 1976) expressed its anticipation of 
"Spain's full cooperation within NATO" . Certain treaty 
provisions were designed so as to bring Spain's defence policies 
into line with those of NATO. 
In 1982 Spain joined the 15 nation strong North Atlantic 
Treaty Orgaization (NATO). Because of Spain's geographical 
attributes, its membership was a major coup for NATO strategies, 
especially those associated with the defence of the Alliance's 
southern flank, principally in the Strait area and Maghreb (see 
map 7. 5). 
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According to ~ees (1976, p.3): 
"Jt should be noted, 
and air facilities in 
cJ.early outflank the 
Command" . 
expanded Soviet naval 
North Afrlca could 
entire NATO Southern 
Liko ~urkey, Spain lies astride vital geostratogio straits, at 
the extremity of NATO's stated boundaries, and also in the orbit 
of the Arab geopolitical realm (see map 8.2a). Gibraltar Strait 
is the only access point for NATO contingencies from northern 
Euro_pe FJ..nd America to the Nedi-te1-ranean. Gibraltar offers major 
NATO base facilities. In the event of revolution in Morocco, or 
inter-Maghrebi contentions escalating, Iberia's role in securing 
Western interests would be vital. In the event of Soviet 
penetration of the Maghreb, Iberia would play a vital role in 
deterrence, or defensive or counter-staging roles. Because of 
Spain's refusal to cooperate with US strategies during the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, this restricted the US-Israeli supply route to 
the Strait's international corridor, thus illustrating the 
vulnerability of the Strait artery. The Maghrebi states, 
particularly Morocco, Algeria and Libya perceive themselves to 
be major actors in Arab geopolitics, especially in relation to 
the Israeli problem. Instability in the Maghreb could endanger 
NATO, US and Israeli interests in relation to passage of the 
Strait. 
Despite the ambiguous nature of the Spanish-US 
relationship, and bilateral military agreements and membership 
of NATO, sometimes their actions and aims do not coincide. For 
instance, in 1986, Spanish fighter planes came within minutes of 
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oonf~ollting US F-III bombers which strayed into Spanish airspace 
on their way to st~ike Libya. The mj_litary authorities stated 
that ~hey feared the intruders might be Mo~occa~. The Spanish 
plane~ weru called back only after urgent communications with 
the Spanish MOD which confi~med that the Prime Minister had been 
informed of the raid by President Reagan shortly before the 
attack was launched from bases in Britain. Mr Gonzales 
categorically denied the US permission to use Spanish airspace. 
Along w~ th viplatin_g Spanish and Mo.T'occan ..airspace, P-IIIs 't'Yere 
refuelled in flight by US KC-10 tankers which had taken off from 
the US Zaragoza base in Spain, and transfered to bases in 
Britain four days before the attack. Spain made its displeasure 
known by pointing out that usage of the Zaragoza base had 
violated tho spirit of the base agreements (Guardian, 15 April 
1987, p.l). 
Essential foreign policy diff8renues between NATO states 
and the USA sometimes become blurred in international 
perception. By association, the Israeli bombing of PLO HQ in 
Tunisia (1985) was perceived by some Arab states to have US 
support, and consequently that of NATO. Thus NATO countries 
like Spain fear becoming embroiled in conflicts in the Arab 
world. The participation of European leader states like France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Britain, and smaller states like 
Denmark and Ireland in UN multi-national peacekeeking operations 
in the Middle East has enhanced Western cooperation. To the 
Soviets and Muslim world, this is seen as a re-assertion of 
Western hegemonistic aspirations. Thus the activities of such 
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organisations as Hezbollah and Islamic J.thad. a:r:e not only 
diroctod against the USA but its Woste~n allies also, as is 
evidenced .tn Lebanon (1982-87) and tho Arabian/Persian Gulf 
(J.987). 
Spanish rnembe~ship of NATO offers the Alliance further 
resources and the primary asset of territo:r:y, approximately 
771,000 sq km, with a coastline length of over 2,038 nm, and a 
sea area (within EEZ limits) of some 1,219,400 sq km (Couper, 
1983, p:227). This includes nearly a thousand miles of 
Mediterranean coastline, and strategic islands like the 
Balearics (see map 1.4). Additionally Spain's Atlantic coast 
offers improved control over the Bay of Biscay and routes to the 
English Channel and trans-Atlantic shipping lanes (Penas, 1979; 
Heiberg, 1983, p.9). 
As in other NATO states, the Spanish population (38 
million, 1987) is divided on the issue of hosting intermediate 
range nuclear weapons. The Spanish population compared with 
that of the European NATO total now accounts for over 10%, and 
it's GDP over 7% (Heiberg, 1983, p.9). The US decision to 
enhance radiation-blast weapons (neutron bombs) caused 
dissension among European members of the Alliance, being 
perceived as a unilateral US strategy where usage of the bomb 
would be wholly in the European environment. The main dialogue 
within NATO hinges on whether to give preference to nuclear 
strategies, or conventional warfare and flexibile response. 
Spain's location astride the Strait is invaluable in any 
assessment of conventional warfare in the region. Because of US 
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and UK commitments in other pa:rt s of "i:;he world., as wa.s v1ttnessed 
by the inclusion of UX NATO committed forces from Gibraltar to 
the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982); the Spanish contribution 
helps to strengthen NATO in the Strait region as a whole. 
According to the "US Department of Defense Annual Report" to 
Congress (1982), major objectives included in the J.ong-Term 
Defense Program (LTDP) were Spain's future role for stockage of 
fuel and ammunition, a-nd mining a-nd m-ine-counter measures in the 
Strait region (Heiberg, 1983, p.5). It is envisaged that US 
bilateral and NATO commitments with Spain will reinforce Western 
security. 
For the Alliance, the Southern flank of Europe has proved 
to be the most problematical in it's geostrategical 
organization. Turkey's common frontier with the USSR and 
guardianship of the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits have 
rendered its security crucial to the Alliance. Although Turkey 
is one of the weaker members of NATO, it maintains over half a 
million men under arms, and in the early 1980s it's defence 
expenditure ranked among the highest in the Alliance in 
percentage of GNP (Heiberg, 1983, p.5). Because of Turkey's 
economic and political problems it is difficult to estimate how 
long it can continute to devote so much of the national economic 
effort to defence. Also because of the Turkish-Greek Aegean 
maritime dispute, and Greece's volatile relationship with the 
USA and NATO, Spain is arguably poised to become a leader state 
on NATO's Southern flank. While Italy is of major importance to 
the Alliance and the defence of the Sicilian-Tunisian Straits, 
Spain offers greater geographical advantages to the Alliance. 
Sp~in's geostratogic location between North America, Europe and 
Af~ica. and ~elatively safe distance from the Middle East, 
offers NATO a major strategic platform. 
The USA and NATO as yet cannot take Spain for granted 
within its geopolitical view. With the transition of Spanish 
politics from Francoism to democracy, there remains contentions; 
the 1981 abortive military coup was a salient reminder. 
7.3.2 NATO and us Objectives. 
(a) NA'l'O. 
NATO aims in relation to Iberia are: 
(i) to counter any Soviet threat; 
(ii) to strengthen the present boundaries of the Alliance; 
(iii) to reduce contentions among NATO member states; 
(iv) to benefit from the political linkages of Spain with 
other states. eg "imtermediary" roles; 
(v) to bolster democracy in Spain; and 
(vi) to reinforce linkages between NATO and US policies, 
this is particularly true in relation to the question of US 
bases in Spain. (Heiberg, 1983, pp.2-10). 
NATO's primary aim is to strengthen the defence of Western 
states against the perceived Soviet threat. Iberia offers the 
possibility of defence in depth which is essential to the US 
doctrine of forward defence, especially in the light of French 
withdrawal (1965) from the integrated military structure. To 
date only West Germany, Italy and the DR have agreed to host 
i:o:termed.iate-:ra.ngo miss.iJ.es. :Ct :"i..s :::w:Ped t:O.at SpoJ.:o. -vri.ll. :t'ollm1 
suit. 
Tho Spanish maritime dimensiou ouhances the NATO defence 
system, in te:t:'mS of an increase in number of vessels, aLr and 
sea port facilities, and geostrategic capacity in the Gibraltar, 
Balearic and Canary sealanes. Spain's ai:t:' facilities, in 
collaboration with the British Gibraltar base will strengthen 
the Southern flank and Strait region. Spain also offers staging 
facilities for forces en route for the eastern and south-eastern 
Mediterranean destinations. 
From a geographic perspective NATO boundaries are somewhat 
ambiguous. Participation in the discussions leading up to the 
Helsinki Accords (1975) included official Maghrebi "observers" 
(UD Dept. of State Bulletin, LXXIII, 1 Sep.1975, p.339; 
Heiberg, 1983, p.71). The original NATO Charter encompassed 
"the French Departement of Algeria," but Algerian independence 
(1962) rendered this clause irrelevant. The Canaries, 
Balearics, Alboran and Chafarinas Islands fall within the NATO 
area as defined by the Charter. The inclusion of Ceuta and 
Melilla (and possibly Velez de la Gomera and Alhucemas) would 
require a unanimous amendment of the Charter, which is unlikely 
to occur. 
NATO aims include reducing conflict among member states. 
In 1982, a survey conducted in Spain by the Spanish daily El 
Pais revealed that 29% of those interviewed were in favour of 
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rnj_J_j_tary <:wtion in the no,tj.onal Ci?.l.mpa:i.gn to regc-,Lo. tb.e Crmm. 
Colony of G:Lbralta:r, whi.l.e o,bou.t 29% sti?.tDd that they \-Jere not 
Ru.r.e, thus cons·cituting a flos,tJng vote uhich could be won ove:c 
to a military solution (Cable, 1982, p.l523). If not soJ.ving 
the British-Spanish territorial dispute, NATO's auspices may 
help remove the possibility of open conflict. 
Apart from Spain's rapport with the USA and Britain, its 
relations ~vi th othe~ Mediterran-ean Ni\'l'O states has-- to be ·ta.keiJ. 
into consideration. In the early 1980s command of the Iberian 
Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) was transferred from an American 
Vice Admiral to a Portuguese Commander. Lisbon has 
categorically rejected the proposed idea of alternating command 
of IBERLANT with Spain. Thus there is rivalry between the 
Iberian states for prestige in the Alliance. Although France is 
not integrated into NA~O's military structure, its sphere of 
influence in the western Mediterranean and Bay of Biscay has 
been catered for in French-NATO operational arrangements in a 
crisis situation, in which Spanish naval forces will be 
integrated into this plan. Both Greece and Turkey fear that 
NATO's acceptance of a Spanish role in French maritime areas 
could set a precedent for joint operations in the eastern 
Mediterranean which could undermine their respective claims to 
areas in the Aegean Sea (Financial Times, 24 Feb.1982, p.2). 
Other NATO goals are doubtless to strengthen Western 
democratic institutions in Spain, yet precedent would suggest 
that NATO will support a broad spectrum of regimes as has been 
witnessed in Greece and Turkey. Heiberg (1983, p.26) states 
believes that Madrid's expertise will be beneficial to the 
LUliance. 
(b) 'OS Obj oct_L'Lc_s_. 
While US objectives are similar to those of NATO, there are 
specific US national goals in relation to Spain. Bilateral 
relations and those in the NATO context are perceived as being 
potentially beneficial for us -G-Gr:d;.i:ngenoies outsi.d.@ ·the NATO 
area, particularly in the Mashreq and Maghreb. The US 
acknowledges that the Spanish stance on Israel (1948-86), the 
Falklands/Malvinas crisis (1982), Nicaragua from 1979, and the 
US-Libya conflict (1986) reflected a very independent viewpoint; 
but doubtless believes that NATO membership will bring Spain 
more in line with the US position. For example, while Madrid 
was not offic1ally involved in the US bombing raid on Libya 
(1986), US aircraft made emergency landings at US bases in Spain 
on the return journey. The US also enjoys close relations with 
Morocco and has base facilities there. Washington hopes that 
with Spain under the NATO mantle, a non-military solution may be 
found to the Moroccan-Spanish territorial dispute (see chapter 
5). 
The Reagan Administration recognizes that the Spanish 
geopolitical viewpoint is Eurocentric, akin to that of Italy and 
Greece, and that relations with the present political regime are 
very different to those which existed during the Franco era. 
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The USA does not enjoy the so called "special relatj_onship" with 
Spain that it does with Britain, hence Spai.n has to be very 
carefully integrated into NATO. 
The USA maintains four military bases in Spatn staffed by 
over 10,500 US personnel. Those most relevant to the Strait 
region are Rota (near Cadiz) and Moran (near Seville) (see map 
7.2b). In March 1987, over 67% of the Spanish electorate voted 
in favour or--full in"tegratHrn Hrt-o-NATO, :Out also-expressed tn-e-
wish for the removal of the US bases which Prime Minister 
Gonzales and his supporters see as a heritage of the Franco 
regime. On 10 November 1987, the Spanish government asked the 
USA to evacuate the bases by May 1989. 
7.3.3 Spanish Viewpoint. 
Spanish objectives in joining NATO are: 
(i) to enhance its international image; 
(ii) to assert its national independence in relation to the 
USA, and in particular the removal of US bases; 
(iii) to play a significant role in international 
geopolitics by acting in concert with its NATO allies and 
as an intermediary in North-South relations and the Arab 
world; 
(iv) to consolidate its territorial claims to the Plazas 
and the Crown Colony of Gibraltar; and 
(v) to further its age old strategy for dominance in the 
Strait area. 
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Spanish membership of NATO generated much public debate, 
media coverage, and conflj_cting opinions within political 
parties and the armed forces. Po:U.tioa.lly Spain '\'Jishes to 
change its international image. Because of its imperial golden 
age, rapid decline in the 19th century and international 
isolation during the Franco era, Spain wishes to redefine its 
role in the European power concert via membership of NATO and 
the EC. Concerning membership of these supranational 
-~-o-rganizations. irr 1981, the- Spani-sh--Mi-nist-er-of Defence state-d 
that: 
"Spanish foreign policy will witness 
something very positive because Spain will 
play its role as a European power 
In Europe lies its strength as a state, as a 
society and as a nation " (Ad-Dustur 
(London), 24 Aug.1981, pp.32-33; Heiberg, 
1983, p.32). 
There is a strong current of opinion in Spain that views 
membership of the 16 state NATO organization as a means of 
avoiding becoming a US satellite. It is felt that collaboration 
with European NATO states will serve its interests best and 
relieve somewhat the perceived negative effects of the US 
presence. In 1981, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Party 
(PSOE) stated: 
"America helped Europe to free itself from 
fascism, and it not only did not help Spain 
but condemned it to dictatorship for many 
more years . We have little for which 
to thank the US, the last country with which 
we were at war" (Ya (Madrid), Nov.l981, 
pp.6-7; Heiberg, 1983, pp.6-7). 
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Paradoxically, there is a body of opinion in Spain which feels 
that NA'rO membership offers Madrid an "opportunity" for ridding 
itself of US bases. Nonetheless, bilateral agreements with the 
USA contain a right to disapprove of US operations in relation 
to use of Spanish territory. Spain implemented this veto during 
the Middle East War (1973), the Iranian crisis (1979), and 
possibly the raid on Libya (1986). 
In 1981, Spain's Foreign Minister Perez-Lorca stated that: 
"If we join the Atlantic Alliance, clearly 
the bases will be placed at the service of a 
specific objective, which is stated in the 
treaty. The us will, therefore, cease to 
have facilities in Spain for a worldwide 
policy . Unless it is for the defense 
of Europe and North America. as a member of 
NATO it will have to ask permission in every 
individual case" (ABC (Madrid), 5 Sep.1981; 
Heiberg, 1983, p.33). 
This holds significant potential for Spanish foreign 
policy. It must be noted that Spain was the first European 
state to receive the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and only 
established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1986. Madrid 
has also had "meetings" with Polisario leaders (see chapter 8). 
In line with its foreign policy, Spain condemned the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (1980), attended the Non-Aligned 
Conference at Havana (1979), and enjoys good relations with 
Latin and South American states including Cuba and Nicaragua. 
Because of its historic and cultural links with the Maghreb, and 
the Arab and Spanish-speaking worlds, Spain wishes to maintain 
its independence in diplomatic affairs, but also stresses that 
it has a major role to play as an intermediary. In 1982, the 
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Spanish ~oreign Minister on an official visit to Tunisia stated 
that Spain considers .i.tself an ally who Hill "defend the 
interests" of Tunisia and the entire 
membership of such organizations as NATO and 
(Tunis), 23 Dec.1981, p.6). 
:region 
the 
through its 
EC (L'Action. 
Spanish geostrategy via NATO includes strengthening claims 
to the Gibraltar base, and reassertion of sovereignty over the 
Plazas. Prior to 1982, it seemed that a resolution of the 
G-ibraltar- issue 'i:TaG a -prBr~quisit-e --'Go Bpan:ish membersnip of-
NATO. Madrid made the case that it's membership would enhance 
the Alliance's interests in the Strait, if the Gibraltar base 
was under Spanish control. Significantly Spanish entry into the 
Alliance (1982) coincided with progress on the Rock problem, 
eventually leading to a full opening of the frontier (1985). 
Concerning the Plazas, Madrid sees NATO membership as a 
guarantee of security. Doubtless NATO states appreciate Ceuta 
and Melillas' geostrategic attributes. During discussions on 
entry to NATO the Spanish government stated that the defence of 
the state included the extra-peninsular territories. Spain also 
indicated that the NATO framework might provide for defence of 
the Plazas if they were attacked by sea, but if they were 
threatened from land, the allies would consult. NATO forces in 
Ceuta would complement those on the northern shore. Spain has 
the prerogative of offering their usage to other NATO members. 
Spanish forces there could be earmarked for NATO duties, and the 
Plazas offer excellent sites to extend the early warning system. 
For reasons of national defence and international prestige, 
Spain wishes to 
particularly the 
this would help 
assume command 
St:T.:ait region. 
consolidate its 
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over specific NATO areas, 
Evidently Madrid feels that 
claims to the d.isputed 
te:rritor.tes. Spanish opposi ton to the "trans.i. t paoSSB-ge regj.me" 
as codified in the LOS (1982), stands in sharp contrast to the 
US and UK stance (see chapter 3). Spain is still pursuing its 
historic quest for military/naval hegemony in the Strait area 
(see chapters 4-5). In 1981, the Minister of Defence stated 
that the command authority which Spain sought within NATO 
specifically included the Strait (El Pais (Madrid), 4 Aug.1981, 
p. 10). 
While Spain wishes to recapture some of it's former glory 
by playing an active role with the NATO powers, it's attitude to 
the "nuclear club" is ambiguous. The PSOE has repeatedly stated 
it's opposition to the deployment of nuclear weapons. One of 
Spain's reasons for opposing the "transit passage regime" of the 
Strait (LOS, 1982) was the perceived danger of nuclear-related 
vessels (see chapter 3). Also a major argument in Madrid's 
claim to the Gibraltar Colony was the alleged presence of 
nuclear-related weapons at the base (see chapter 6). Yet Spain 
possesses 3 nuclear power stations, and 19 more are under 
construction. Spain has the technology and capacity to produce 
nuclear bombs, and it is known that the army 
procuring medium-range tactical defensive 
However the population remains opposed to 
nuclear weapons. 
is interested in 
nuclear weapons. 
the deployment of 
In January 1966, a US B-52 aircraft crashed over Spain with 
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4. hydrogen bombs on board. It took over 10 weeks to recover the 
weapons, with one bomb being retrieved from the Mediterranean 
Sea. The Palomares and Villarijos communities are still 
suffeJ:>:t.ng the effects ¥71th the hi ghost incidence of 
cancer-related disesaes and mortality in Spain. Many Spaniards 
feel that the inquiry carried out by the Franco administration 
and USA was less than adequate. Although, after the accident 
Franco banned all US nuclear bombers and weapons from landing 
-
on, flying over or being deployed from Spanish terri tory (US 
bases), the Spaniards are resentful of the fact that the US was 
responsible for the accident. The 1976 bilateral treaty 
stipulated that the US nuclear submarine squadron at the Rota 
base be withdrawn by 1979. 
For the above stated reasons Spanish governments of 
whatever political persuasion do not have a mandate from the 
population to deploy nuclear weapons. Such a contentious issue 
within Spain could further polarize different factions and 
weaken the democratic process. Overall the Spanish position in 
NATO is primarily aimed at achieving national territorial and 
maritime goals in the Strait area, as well as entailing 
political and economic objectives. 
7.4 DEFENCE OF THE STRAIT. 
7.4.1 Geostrategic Theatre. 
According to Lieutenant Commander Jorge Calvar of the 
Spanish Navy (1980, p.3): 
"The Strait is a corridor for 
the world: for Spain it 
feature of its geography". 
the rest of 
is a, permanent 
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While Morocco and France have access to both the Atlantic Ocean 
and Mediterranean Sea, Spain has the most advantageous 
geostrategic location. Such possessions as the Balearic, 
Alboran, Canary and Chafarinas Islands hold potential for 
projective action in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and North 
Africa._ The _Bale_ar_iQS and Canaries o£fer for-~·ra£'d pGsiti-ons and -
have geographical advantages for greater military development 
(see chapter 1, map 1.4). The Balearics are at the fork of the 
main sea routes leading to the Gulf of Lions and Bay of Genoa. 
They are the flank of the Gibraltar-Sicilian maritime route. 
They possess the hydrographic conditions necessary for naval and 
air bases, and offer the possibility of surveillance, defensive 
and offensive actions. The Canaries offer similar advantages. 
The geostrategic triangles Alboran-Rosas-Sicily, and 
Azores-Cadiz-Canaries are of the utmost importance in relation 
to protection of the Strait. Possession of the Canaries and 
Plazas offer Spain strategic advantages in the event of a crisis 
in the Maghreb. Presently this depends on cooperation with the 
British in Gibraltar. These strategic factors are rendered more 
important by the fact that the other Iberian NATO state, 
Portugal, does not have a Mediterranean coast and is distant 
from the Maghreb. 
Calvar (1980, p.3) describes the Strait as "the epicentre" 
of the North-South/East-West axes. The Strait is too narrow to 
provide space for manoeuvre during major naval operations. By 
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the same token, passage is vulnerable in time of crisis. The 
theatre of operations pertaining to the Strait is that contained 
within the Cape Saint Vincent meridian to the west and that of 
Cape La Nao to the east, essentially the area between Capes 
Saint Vincent and Cantin (Morocco) to the west and Capes La Nao 
and Tenes (Algeria) to the east, a 500 mile sleeve (Calvar, 
1980, p.3) (see maps 1.4, 7.5). 
According to Calvar (1980, p.5), the establishment of 
JJH~.RJ,ANT- wi-th- HQ -at Lis:B-efl is -a-n acknow-J:.eugernent- ny NArro tha:t 
strategic control of the Atlantic begins in the western 
Mediterranean and vice versa. Usage of the Gibraltar base and 
access to the Strait are cardinal criteria in IBERLANT planning. 
IBERLANT depends on usage of bases in the 
Portugal-Spain-Morocco-Atlantic Islands complex, with British 
and Spanish cooperation in the Gibraltar base. At present the 
NATO superior to ~OMGIBMED in the Atlantic is regionally 
COMIBERLANT (HQ Lisbon) who reports to SACLANT (HQ Norfolk, 
Virginia). The western Mediterranean area, MEDOC (Mediterrane 
Occidental) will in time of peace and tension be controlled from 
COMGIBMED'S viewpoint, from Naples Commander Navies South 
(COMNAVSOUTH). But in wartime, the French would control routes 
to Toulon. 
because of 
Greece and 
COMGIBMED 
problems 
Turkey. 
is of particular importance to NATO, 
on the Southern Flank, especially with 
IBERLANT is currently responsible for 
western approaches to the Strait. 
According to Calvar (1980, p.16), the object of naval 
operations in the Strait may be defined as: 
"Strategic dominance, tactical superiority 
and logistic sufficiency in any contingency 
in the Strait" . 
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He states that control of the Strait depends on surveillance. 
At a tactical level ·threats are possible from air, submarino or 
surface. Because of geographical configuration, the landpower 
holds dominance over surface and air attack. However terrorist 
type assaults are a possibility. Security in time of tension 
would_ _d_e_pend Qn coordinated Sp_anisl).-:-NATO _action,_ th:u..s 
reinforcing the importance of the Gibraltar/NATO base. This 
would necessitate patrols by surface vessels and coastal 
aircraft with air to surface roles (A/S); A/S surveillance by 
submarines and helicopters, and land-base A/S installations like 
those in operation at the Gibraltar base, such as radar and 
passive sonar detection. In a crisis, the greatest threat would 
como from submarines. ~dmiral Saturno Suanzes de la Hidalga 
(1982, pp.S0-83) stresses that Spain can improve submarine 
capability detection by closely cooperating in the "laying of 
fixed detection installations on the sea bed in the Strait or 
its approaches''. Spanish possession of Albor~n. Ceuta, and 
Melilla also offer advantages for the control of submerged 
passage. However since World War II, Western and NATO interests 
in the security of the Strait have been guaranteed from the 
Gibraltar base, this is of major significance as Spain has not 
been involved in an international war since the 19th century 
(see chapter 6) . 
The US Rota base in Spain, at the western entrance to the 
Strait, complements Gibraltar 1 s. US activity at the Rota naval 
1:7J 
and air base as of 1953 was aimed at "flying the flag" in the 
proximity of the Strait. Within NATO, an essentjaJ. aim of 
SACJANT is the monitoring of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic, 
in which the GIUK GAP has its counterpart in the Gibraltar-Rota 
link (see maps l.la,b). Rota's dual TOle as a US and NATO base, 
afforded the US a certain independence. Spanish diplomatic 
history would suggest that it will not cooperate with the 
British administration in the Colony on NATO matters, as long as 
the _present _sta:tus qu.o is ma-i-ntained.- -While su-ppo:rting- a--
peaceful resolution of the sovereignty dispute, the USA has not 
lent much support to the Spanish case (see chapter 6). 
According to Cable (1984, p.61), 
"although Spain requested the 
1968, to stop the Sixth 
Gibraltar, US warships 
occasionally visit the Rock. 
Navy team inspected Gibraltar 
US as early as 
Fleet using 
continue to 
In 1981, a US 
dockyard". 
The geographical advantages offered by the southern shore 
in relation to security of the Strait are problematic because of 
historical and socio-economic factors (see chapters 4-5). The 
latter point is self-evident in the light of recent history, and 
the superpowers' experiences in Albania, Egypt, Libya, Malta and 
PDR Yemen (Aden). The major maritime powers do not possess 
absolute secure "territories" or a "sovereign claim" in the 
region, save the special case of Britain with the Gibraltar 
Crown Colony and sovereign Cyprus bases. 
Overall the Spanish see the Strait and the southern shore 
as its "back-yard'. Often this tends to ignore the fact that it 
is also seen by Morocco as its "front-garden". Hence the 
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Spanish, Moroccan and Western strategic aims have to be 
accommodated. Spain wishes to be the lynchpin in NATO's 
security arrangements of the Strait, thereby enhancing its 
natj.onal security and fulfilling i.ts historic quest. Hence the 
Gibraltar base remains crucial in the regional balance of power. 
7.4.2 The Gibraltar Base. 
P.J:though -c1.roumsta,nces--n.ave greatly changea- since Mabiin 
(1894) wrote about the importance of the Gibraltar base to the 
British Empire and global geopolitics, Gibraltar's pivotal role 
has hardly diminished. The Strait remains one of the world's 
most strategic commercial routes (see chapter 2), and is vital 
to all naval powers. Contemporary geostrategic planning still 
emphasizes conventional as opposed to nuclear strategies. Hence 
the Gibraltar base has retained many of its traditional roles 
(see chapter 6). The fact that the superpowers demanded a 
liberal legal transit regime for the Strait (LOS, 1982), and 
were categorical in their refusal to accept any obligation of 
giving prior "notification" or requesting "authorization" for 
the transit of military-related vessels illustrates the 
importance which they attach to use of the Starit (see chapter 
3). Also the fact that neither Britain nor Spain will renounce 
claims to Gibraltar is highly significant. 
Whatever viewpoints exist concerning sovereignty over the 
Crown Colony of Gibraltar, its history and status have been 
shaped by geostrategic forces (see chapter 6). For Western 
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security it is a pivotal base. In discussions with NATO 
representatives, and officials in Spain and Morocco (1985), the 
author heard the opinion expressed that better alternative 
geographical locations exist in the area for a commanding base. 
One NATO representative stated that the prime geostrategic 
locations are in the Ceuta-Ksar el Seghir area. Be that as it 
may, nobody has created a base equal in stature to that of 
Gibraltar with its massive infrastructural facilities. 
S1nce --1945 GYbraltar ·-s value --n_as 15een ennanced- by --many 
factors. France, a major Western leader state, lost its power 
in the Strait theatre with the independence of Morocco (1956) 
and Algeria (1962). Britain is no longer a major world power, 
but remains a close ally of the USA. It's West of Suez Policy 
(1971) may have set a precedent for it's Gibraltar Policy; if 
not overtly by retroceeding the Gibraltar base, then in terms of 
military and associated economic commitments. The US-British 
"special relationship", may yet foster a greater US contribution 
to maintaining the Gibraltar base. The US-British arrangements 
concerning Diego Garcia may offer a precedent (Madeley, 1984). 
The US Sixth Fleet has taken over Britain's traditional role in 
the Mediterranean (Crowe, 1983, pp.l8-25; Williams, 1983, 
pp.30-38), but is dependent on host nations for bases, and is 
cognisant of the value of the allied Gibraltar base. 
According to Beaver (1981, p.400): 
"the role of Gibraltar is quite clearly 
defined in times of peace, tension and war". 
In time of peace, Gibraltar acts as: (i) a guarantor of passage 
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of the Strait; (ii) a moderating force in the regional balance 
of power (see chapters 4-6); (iii) an intelligence gathering 
centre; and (iv) a crucial link in NATO strategic organization. 
In time of tension, it helps in guaranteeing security of passage 
of the Strait, eg 1973 Arab-Israel~ War. Gibraltar has the 
infrastructure to adapt to new technology and weapons systems. 
The Gibraltar base military infrastructure is the best in the 
Mediterranean, with f!).cili_ties f_or _na:val __ t-raining- and-
manoeuvres, storage facilities, and the largest drydocks in the 
western basin. The RN Hospital and large communications centre 
in the Rock can deal with every type of crisis. It affords 
Britain the possibility of greatly contributing to US and NATO 
policies, as well as its own diminishing interests in the 
region. While it is true that the Spanish and British bases in 
the region are dependent on usage of the hinterland~; precedent 
shows that the Gibraltar base was able to function without 
Spanish cooperation in the past. Spanish membership of NATO has 
afforded Britain and NATO the potential for greater interaction 
between Gibraltar and its natural hinterland (Rowden, 1983, 
pp. 47-49). 
In time of tension, the Supreme Allied Commanders Atlantic 
(SACLANT) and Europe (SACEUR) have given Flag Officer Gibraltar 
the operational task of controlling the Strait and of 
maintaining a NATO presence. One of NATO's technical plans 
"Fortress Gate" is periodically tested there. (Beaver, 1981, 
p.401). At the Gibraltar base, the RAF has a dual national and 
NATO role. With the RN, they form the joint NATO Maritime 
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Their NATO area cove~s some 100 nm on both sides of 
the Strait as well as the Strait itself. The maritime HQ lies 
within the Rock and is partly funded by NATO. All ships and 
submarines transiting the Strait are monitored by the forces at 
Gibraltar and the information is passed onto NATO HQs in Naples 
and Lisbon. 
The airbase is particularly important for NA~O exercises 
and acts as a staging area. There are parking spaces for 
approximately 50 aircraft. with two large hangers and repair 
-
- wurlrsnops-. -Fuel -st-orage res-e-rvoirs in the Rock have a capacity 
of over 200 million gallons, and is piped under the runway to 
refuelling points. According to Colonel Dodd (1986 pp.l48-150), 
during exercises in 1985 up to 30 aircraft at a time operated 
from Gibraltar, flying more than 300 sorties. However Spanish 
air-space restrictions remain a problem (see chapter 6). There 
is only a positive approach radar for aircraft landing from east 
to west. The resultant problems restrict some NATO states from 
making full use of the base. However Spain permits civil 
aircraft which cannot land at Gibraltar because of difficulties, 
to land at Rota and other Spanish airfields. Tangier and Faro 
(Portugal) accept diverted civil and military aircraft. Spanish 
air and naval forces only carry out exercises with British 
vessels not emanating from the Crown Colony. 
At present RAF Gibraltar can control maritime patrol and 
aircraft operating up to a 1,000 nm from the Rock. However the 
airfield is exposed. The RAF Station Commander has 
approximately 450 RAF and WRAF personnel as well as 130 local 
1..:'?'6 
civilians. This strength can be increased to 2,500 when 
necessary (Dodd, 1986, p. 150). Since the FaJ.kl.a,:ads/M;1,1Vi.uas r.-ra-r 
( 1982), the RAF have :based 3 cJa_guar ai:rc:ra,:ft B,t Gib:ral ta:r. 
Otherwise patrols are carried out by visiting airc-raft from the 
RAF and NATO airforces. In 1985-86, tho base p-rovided 
facilities for Nimrods~ Buccaneers, Hercules, Harriers and 
Jaguars of the RAF, US Orions, Auroras from Canada and twin 
engined Atlantiques from West Germany, the Netherlands and 
France on training and maritime patrol dut1es. The RN 
frequently operate King helicopters with dipping anti-sonars, 
and naval Lynx are used (Dodd, 1986, p.149). In 1986, an EXOCET 
land-based anti-ship missile system was delivered to the RN at 
Gibraltar, to meet a NATO commitment. The system consists of 
two twin EXOCET missile launchers mounted on trailers, a control 
cabin, stores and accommodation cabin, and two mobile 
generators. It is fully transportable using Hercules aircraft 
and is capable of world wide operation. It is easily 
transportable by sea or road, and can be rapidly deployed to 
other coastal or off-shore island locations (Dodd, 1986, 
pp.148-150). Regardless of the sovereignty changes which may 
occur in the Strait area in the future, and changes which may 
come in NATO command structures, Gibraltar's vital role in the 
NATO defence system is unlikely to alter. 
7.5 CONCLUSION. 
All geopolitical models recognize the importance of the 
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Strait area in global affairs. Historically and at present the 
Strait is an important artery in geostra.tegic plFJ.nnin~. 'J'h.i.s 
fact is recognized by all and especially the superpowers, whose 
world viewpoints have seemingly been greatly influenced by the 
"Heartland-Rimland" model. Besides superpower rivalry, the 
Strait is vital to Western economic interests. Spain has a 
major role to play in the region, particularly in the NATO 
context. However US, NATO and Spanish geopolitical objectives 
do not -ahmys coinc.,iEie. Control of the Str-a-it '-s--goostratc-gic--
theatre remains crucial to the balance of power, and the 
Gibraltar base remains a major key. Gibraltar will continue to 
be a coveted possession. 
"The Maghreb (is) different. r·~ is in ·che 
Arab world and in Africa, but not of them. 
Nor is it Euro-pean". 
- W. Parker (1984, p.l8). 
"Certainly the l.faghrebins feel part of the 
Arab world because of religion, and the 
cultural heritage; but Tripoli, Tunis, 
Algiers and Rabat are closer to Rome. 
Mars-eilles, Pa-r-is and Ma-drid t-..'1-an - they are-
to Cairo and Mecca. The flow of people, 
goods and often ideas is more intense with 
Europe than with the Mashreq". 
Le Mende 
(29-30 Jan.l984). 
"Civilization will go on being governed by 
the laws of accumulation, it's enrichment 
implies dialogue between cultures". 
8.1 THE MAGHREB. 
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, 
Algerian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (1985). 
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Among the Arab states, there is relative cultural 
homogeneity, despite local idiosyncracies. This is evidenced by 
the number of attempted state unions since the 1940s, eg 
Egypt-Syria, Libya-Morocco. The failure of these unions is due 
to centrifugal factors and contested state leadership, rather 
than major cultural divisions among the Arabs. Despite the 
strong influence of Berber and French cultures on North Africa, 
the Maghreb forms an integral part of the Arab world. Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia have an area of almost 3.2 million sq km, or 
TABLt::5.1 
"iKE MAGHREB: n~RRITORIAL, ~!IAR!l!ME, POPULIIIION 1\ND GOP DA'fA 
Algeria. L i byt1. 
Land area 919,600 
(sq rnl/sq km) 
RANK 
2,301,761 
Length o1 
Coast I ine 
(rim) 
RANK 
Sea area 
rJ it hi n EEZ 
I i mit s 
('000 sq km) 
RANK 
%cultivated 
arable land. 
RANK 
Population (1986) 
(millions). 
RANK 
Absolute pop. 
dens i t y ( km) . 
RANK 
:7. pop urban. 
RANK 
GNP/Copi to 
(US $). 
f\ANK 
( 1 ) 
596 
(3) 
137.2 
(3) 
3 
(3) 
21 .4 
(2) 
9 
(3) 
52 
( 1 ) 
2,350 
(2) 
~-1o rocco_ 
G79,361 
1. "/59. 533 
(2) 
910 
( 1 ) 
338.1 
( 1 ) 
(4) 
3.7 
(4) 
2 
(4) 
52 
( 1 ) 
8. !:·H) 
( 1 ) 
"iunisia. 
254,071 
659,976 
(3) 
895 
(2) 
278.1 
(2) 
18 
(2) 
23.5 
( 1 ) 
31 
(2) 
41 
(2) 
870 
(4) 
------- -------
63,362 
164. 107 
(4) 
555 
(4) 
85.7 
(4) 
32 
( 1 ) 
7 
(3) 
42 
( 1 ) 
52 
( 1 ) 
1. 390 
(3) 
':ources: ATLAS~CO (1986); Couper, (1983), pp.2.26-227; Cr>sdcie & Blcke, (1985), 
pp.15-16; WJRLD POPULATION DATA SHEET, W~shington, DC.: F0puio\ion Re!erence 
Eureou, ~S:4; (ste bibliogro;J~y). 
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over 3.25 million sq km if one includes the Western Sahara. If 
Libya and Mauritania are taken to be Maghrebi states, then the 
region has an area of almost 6 million sq km (see map 8.1). The 
~!o:aoshreq on the other hand is abou"L 3. '7 million sq km. V/:bj_le the 
Maghrebi population (58-60 million 1987) is relatively small in 
comparison to that of the Mashreq (222.3 million 1987), the 
Maghrebis wish to be closely allied with the Mashreqis. It is 
estimated _that_ by_ 2000 AD, the- Maghrsbis wi-11-mnnber ov-er 100 
million (see table 8.1). 
Distances in the Maghreb are considerable, travelling by 
the main roads, Tangier is some 286 krn (177 ml) from Rabat and 
95 km (59 ml) from Ceuta. However Tangier-Ceuta by the 
non-surfaced coastal road is only 50 km (32 rnl). The distance 
from Tangier to Algiers via the main coastal road is 
approximately 1,229 km (727 ml) and Tangier-Tunis is some 2,121 
km (1,250 ml). Tripoli is 754 km (457 ml) from Tunis. Hence 
Tripoli is approximately 3,875 km (1,707 ml) from Tangier 
(Michelin, No.153, 1983). Commercial flights between each of 
the neighbouring Maghrebi capitals takes about 2 hours or 6-7 
hours between Rabat and Tripoli. 
Algiers is some 410 nm from Gibraltar (approximately 28 hrs 
sailing, travelling at about 15 knots); 400 nm from Marseilles 
(26 hrs); 279 nm from Barcelona (19 hrs); 582 nm from Malta (38 
hrs); 1,256 nm from Venice (3 days, 11 hours); 1,071 nm from 
Piraeus (3 days, 23 hrs) and 1,495 nm from Port Said (4 days, 3 
hrs). Algiers-Leningrad is some 2,589 nm (approx. 7 days, 6 
hrs); while Algiers-New York is 3,620 nm (10 days, 2 hrs). 
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Tangier is 539 nm from Barcelona (36 hrs), 1,505 nm from Piraeus 
(4 days, 4 hours) and 1,688 from Venice (4 days, 16 hrs). The 
distance between Tunis and Venice is some 937 nm (2 days, 14 
hrs) (see map l.lc), (Couper, 1984, pp.230-231). 
Algeria and Morocco are leader states in the Maghreb in 
terms of area, population and international status. They also 
play significant political roles in the Arab world and on 
Gibraltar's southern flank. Each has individual policies and 
objectives" _which hav_e an_ jJnpae-t on- -regional and- gl-obal 
politics. Proximity to the EC and NATO dictates interactional; 
and linkage to the Arab World brings the Maghreb within the 
o:rb:i.t of such centripetal forces as the Arab League, OAPEC, the 
Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), and of course the 
Arab-Israeli dispute. The configuration of the Strait of 
Gibraltar offers the salient geographical expression of the 
interaction between several geopolitical systems and holds great 
potential in the ongoing Euro-Arab Dialogue (see maps 8.2). 
8.1.1 Multipolarism. 
According to Cohen (1982, pp.228-229), the global order is 
progressing towards one of "hierarchical integration". The key 
actors on the international stage are the emerging regional or 
second-order powers. Thus globalism and regionalism must be 
accommodated at these two levels of the hierarchy. 
The Helsinki Agreement (1975), detente and realpolitik are 
symptomatic of the superpowers' recognition that bipolarism (USA 
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Vs USSH.) is not Horkable, as it \vas beLLeved to be between 1945 
and the ear·ly 1970s. The geopolitical and geosi;J"ategic 
characteristics of third states form the salient component in 
the international orde£. Since 1945 both Moscow and Washington 
have shown an incredj.ble capacity to deviate from their 
respective universalistic ideological stances (Servier, 1982), 
in order to accommodate the political regimes of third states. 
In so doing, it is debatable whether the superpowers have 
contributed much to the eliming.tio_n of -~va,:r, - terl'orism, famine 
and resource competition in the world community. 
Islamic fundamentalists believe that the superpowers have 
been the main cause of political catastrophies. For instance, 
superpower relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, 
Israel and Morocco, are believed to be the main cause of 
tension, war and terrorism in the Muslim world. Superpower 
competition in the Red Sea region (l970s-80s) (Abunafeesa, 
1985), and especially in Ethiopia and Sudan would seem to have 
obstructed international attention and aid being focussed on 
famine relief in the region until 1984. Many Maghrebis feel 
that superpower interests in the natural resources of the 
Sahara, Libya and the Aouzou strip have largely dictated US and 
Soviet policies in the region, adding an extra dimension to 
Maghrebi rivalries. 
The much-publicized 
governments particularly 
"human rights" 
in relation 
stances of Western 
to minorities and 
dissidents in communist states sound hollow to many Maghrebis, 
because of the repressive nature of the Moroccan and Tunisian 
~:8'?' 
regimes which see themselves as allied to the West. While the 
Algerian and Libyan regimes officially espouse variations of 
democracy and socialism, they are one party states where 
individual freedom only remains an ideal. Maghrebi perceptions 
in relation to the superpov-1e:cs are influenced :Oy the plight of 
Palestinian. and Afghani refugees. Despite the 1977 us 
announcement on restraint of arms transfers thr·oughout the 
world, some 18 states were exempted for the stated purpose of 
maintaining regional balances. Algeria took exception to the 
fact that Morocco was on the list of exemptions. 
In the 1980s, because of "back-yard" policies, (eg us 
activities in Nicaragua and Grenada, and Soviet involvement in 
Afghanistan), the superpowers have become more dependent on 
surrogates outside their immediate spheres. This is 
particularly evident in the Mediterranean region. There, 
surrogates are used as unequal partners to implement regional 
policies. However linkages between the superpowers and regional 
states are not clear cut, as Spain, Morocco, Algeria and Libya 
have definite national, regional and extra-regional goals which 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the superpowers. 
Hence compromise has to be reached. This imperative is 
particularly evident in the Western Sahara and Spanish Plazas 
disputes. 
Concerning global geopolitical organization, Cohen (1982, 
p.230) is quite right in his opinion that hierarchical 
integration depends on interlinkages, both horizontal (global) 
and vertical (regional). In his model, the first-order powers 
consist of the USA, USSR, EC, Japan and China. The second-order 
is formed by regional powers, whose influence extends throughout 
tho immediate geopolitical region, and extra-regionally, eg 
Spain, Algeria and Morocco. Third (eg Tunisia) and fourth order 
powers are regionally circumscribed, but still play a 
significant role. Thus, no political-territorial entity in the 
western Mediterranean may be excluded from the power dialectic. 
Geopolitical classifications are nothing new (see maps 7.1, 
7-.2-; table-8.1}, (M-a-han, 18§0; De Bj_"""i.J, 1967; Cole, -Igso). 
However, what is new is the recognition of the complexity of 
interaction between states of various geopolitical capacities, 
and in particular multipolarism. Geopolitical classifications 
include such criteria as location, area, population, natural 
resources, economy, self-perception and so on. However these 
are relative to time, technology and perception. For instance 
in the past decade, Maghrebi viewpoints have been significant in 
relation to the development of the Law of the Sea (1982), oil 
and gas supplies to the West, and Afro-Asian attitudes to Israel 
(see chapters 3, 7). 
To assess second-order powers, Cohen (1982, pp.230-237) 
ranked some 27 states on an ordinal scale using 12 geopolitical 
criteria, each criterion being assigned a 1-4 scale. All the 
states in the Gibraltar region ranked in the lower third of the 
second-order powers. As this study was carried out in the early 
1980s, before Spain joined the first-order EC power (1986), 
Spain was treated as an individual state. According to Cohen's 
findings, Spain ranked as the first second-order power in the 
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western Medi.terranean region, with 26 points. Doth Algeria and 
Morocco ranked closely behind Spain v7i th 21: po~.:o.ts each. S:tnce 
1982, the the Western Saharan War has greatly undermined the 
economic and political structures of Morocco. Because of 
pragmatic political and resource exploitation policies, Algeria 
will soon emerge as the first second-order power in the region. 
In Cohen's (1982) classification, Israel (with 35 points) and 
Yug_osl(w.i a _ ( 33 - poin-ts)- ranked in -tho -top third· o£- trhe -
second-order powers. While Turkey (31 points) and Egypt (29 
points) ranked in the middle third. 
Using the same 27 states, and added criteria, such as 
geostrategic location, Cline (1980) found that Spain ranked 
seventh, Algeria twelfth, and Morocco nineteenth in his global 
rating of second-order powers. Thus in the Mediterranean 
context thi~ means that Egypt ranked first, Israel second, 
Algeria third, Yugoslavia fourth, and Morocco fifth. Hence, the 
classification of second-order powers of both Cohen (1982) and 
Cline (1980) indictate the importance of Algeria and Morocco in 
the regional geopolitics of Mediterranean. 
In order to maintain security in the Gibraltar area, it is 
arguable that the West must foster a more constructive 
relationship with Algeria, and reassess its preconceptions that 
Algiers' independent stance in international affairs is 
anti-Western. In the same vein, Morocco's potential for 
internal and regional conflict is fraught with danger. Lord 
Acton's famous dictum that "absolute power corrupts absolutely" 
is particularly relevant to the regime of Hassan II of Morocco. 
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In an attempt to change the dicta·torial image of his regime, 
King Hassan attempted to introduce a mythical mul.ti-party systom 
in the 1970s, although many pa~ties and political leaders 
remained outlawed. Essentially the feudaJ. orde~ of Moroccan 
society took on the outward mantle of a constitutional monarchy, 
but the King continued to rule as well as reign, and parliament 
leglislates what the King dictates. Having the dual role of 
Emir (Leader of the Faithful) and King, the Moroccan 
Constitution states that _the Ktn~ is -above any £o:rm of CiVIl 
authority because of his divine role. The vast majority of 
Moroccans remain "marginalized" in political and economic terms. 
Indeed, Western support for the Moroccan regime is reminiscent 
of US policies followed in Iran until 1979 (see below). It is 
arguable that mounting instability in Morocco poses the greatest 
threat to security in the Strait region. In the past 20 years 
second-order powers such as Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Israel 
have largely shaped regional geopolitics and consequently have 
had a major impact on global politics; Algeria and Morocco are 
poised to play similar roles in the future. 
Third-order states like Tunisia (and potentially Libya) 
also have a significant input in regional affairs. Currently 
Tunisia plays the role of "intermediary" in regional and Arab 
affairs. Libya's behaviour since 1969, may be viewed as that of 
agent nr~vocateur, both regionally and globally. In relation to 
Morocco, Tunisia has a moderating influence, while Libya acts as 
a destabilizing force. Mauritania's marginal role is restricted 
to diplomacy, but its geostrategic location near the Western 
4.9J. 
Sahara, Algeria, Canary Islands and Atlantic Ocean is of 
importance to Algeria and Morocco. Algeria succeeded in 
persuading Mauritania to renounce its claims to the Western 
Sahara (1979), and offically Tecognize SADH (198~) (see below). 
Algeria wishes to gain territorial access to the Atlantic coast 
via friendly weaker states. 
8.2 INTER-MAGHREBI RELATIONS. 
8.2.1 The Greater Maghreb Union. 
The economic disparities within and between Maghrebi 
states, along with the phenomenal population explosion, 
inter-state rivalry and the seemingly interminable Western 
Saharan War are all factors which render the region volatile 
(see maps 8.3). In 1983, the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, Algerian 
NLF and Tunisian Neo nestour celebrated in Tang.i.er· the ~bth 
anniversary of the historic pan-Maghrebi summit which had stated 
the absolute necessity of establishing the Greater Maghreb Union 
(see maps 8.3). Yet from 1962 on, the different "stateisms" and 
nationalisms became apparent causing bilateral problems, in the 
form of border disputes and shifting alliances. 
Despite the many common attributes, each state found itself 
confronted by contradictory forces; anti-colonialism yet the 
denigration of their minority cultures; much rhetoric about 
democracy yet authoritarianism; the struggle for development; 
and cultural revolutions aimed at embellishing their Arab and 
Islamic heritages. The state construction ideal followed the 
0 
MAP 8.3 ~HE MAGHREB: 
40--------_ GROSS NAT!ONAL PRODUCT 
20 
10 0 
G.N P. par C<Jpita in S U.S. (1982) 
c=J•1000 
c:=J 1000-1999 
~2000-1!999 
~=~=~=~=3 5000-10,000 
~>10,000 
EGYPT 
690 
•'4 3 
Country • 
fur cap;ta G.N.P. 
Populatron estimate to mid-1982 
c?ct cc:;u!n G.N.?. d~ 1.mcvci!cll!:l. ~~ri:::l c:r;r.:t:::d! 
10 
10 
0 
20 
20 
1: 
1: 
,.._~·. 
j 
) 
. ., 
,.. 
'"· ( 
\"· 
/·. 
--~ 
1 
·-... 
\ 
SUDAN 
"440 
. :20 2 
JO 
/ 
,.. ' 
'·, _.,.
7: 
t,O 
3:1-1 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
J 
I 
_I 
,., . " 
'""' 
40 j_~i~ 
I 
I 
1-1 
'I Z;CI 
.-1-1---- .l;; 
0 oC8 10COm iss I ~ -----== . I t=. r • o c~~ 1otOh~ ' 
-··--------
Source: G. Blake, J. Dewdney & J. Mitthell. The Cambr1~ge Atlas of the Kidd:3 
East & North Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927. 
-~ 
-.!) 
., 
path of nation-state building (Zartmann, 1984, pp.l49-177), 
which led to entrenched nationalism despite the common heritage, 
and support which Tunisia and Morocco had given Algeria in it's 
liberation war (1954-62). Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and 
Libya have displayed expansionist tendencies in the Eegion, and 
particularly, in the western Sahara. Yet there have been 
abortive unions (eg Libya-Tunisia, Libya-Morocco), as well as 
shifting alliances. 
-
- Mor-occo -is overburd.enea by vihat appears to be an unwinnable 
war against the West Saharans, and is facing the most serious 
crisis in the region. Morocco's appalling social and economic 
conditions risk turning it into "the powder keg" of the region 
(Le Mende, 1 Jan.1984, p.1). Some similarities exist between 
the situations in Iran (prior to 1979) and Morocco in 1987. 
These similarities are: 
(i) Monarchical dictatorial regimes based on 
a feudal hierarchy of powerful families and 
clans who control the resources and wealth 
of the nation; Western support for both 
regimes in the belief that "stability" must 
be maintained at all costs. 
(ii) Well educated intellegentsias caught 
between Western and Soviet ideologies, Third 
World viewpoints, militant Islam, and 
traditional Islamic culture. The vast 
majority of the citizens adhere to 
traditional Islamic norms. Controversial 
national government policies ranging from 
economics to tourism and family planning are 
perceived as being dictated, inspired or 
funded by Western institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
(iii) The abject poverty of the vast 
majority stands out in sharp contrast to the 
great wealth of a small minority, eg the 
infamous bidonvilles of Teheran and 
Casablanca. The Western lifestyles of the 
rich are perceived as symbolizing Western 
decadence (see chapter 4). 
( iv) Both 1Vlorocco and Iran are "old 
sovereign" states which display intense 
nationalism and aspirations for regional 
hegemony. Often the West supports these 
sentiments in the belief that these states 
'dill advance Western aims re~ionally and 
internationally. However this can prove to 
be a double edged sword; Iran "the 
policeman" of the Gulf region prior to 1979 
is now using its military strength to spread 
fundamentalist revolution throughout the 
region. 
(v) The actions of the Shah were often taken 
in the belief that they would have 
unconditional Western support; this is true 
of Hassan II today, particularly in his 
relationship with the Eeagan Administratton. 
(vi) --'I'he - rrania-n (pre-1979) and Moroccan 
regimes play the "Western card" j_n 
international affairs, gaining the support 
of Western governments. In relation to 
national internal policies there is little 
overt Western condemnation of the ruthless 
suppression of dissidents or unfair 
distribution of national wealth. In 
relations with neighbouring states (eg 
Algeria and Iraq), Morocco and Iran believe 
that they have the support of Washington. 
(vii) There exists a dialectic in national 
governmental policies between loyalty to the 
Arab-Muslim world and support or the West, 
eg policies in relation to Israel. Zartmann 
(1985, pp.97-1l1) indirectly looks for 
answers to this problem in "Explaining the 
Nearly Inexplicable: The Absence of Islam in 
Moroccan Foreign Policy". 
(viii) Well trained and equipped military 
forces largely created by the West. The 
Iranian armed forces have been deployed 
against Iraq since 1980, and the Moroccan 
armed forces have been used against Algeria 
(1962-63) and the Saharawi people since 
1975. In both case these wars have arguably 
come about because of disputed boundaries, 
contested sovereignty and hegemonistic 
aspirations. 
(ix) In Iran there were popular revolts 
prior to 1979, and in Morocco there have 
been at least three populist uprisings in 
the past decade. Since 1970, there have 
been three attempted military coups d'etat 
in Morocco aimed at the overthrow of the 
monarchy. 
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Despite Algerian dislike of the Sherifian regime, especially 
since the War of the Sands (1962) over disputed borde~s. Algie~s 
fears that social and Berber disconten·t in Morocco could 
overspj_ll. L2 1983- 8~,, revolts stcLrted. j.:rJ Ma:c:rakesh in southern 
Morocco and rapidly spread to the Rif region, and significantly 
into two Berber areas. Algiers has not forgotten its Kabyle 
Spring of discontent (1981), nor the air-drop of arms at Cape 
Sigli (Kabylia, 1978) from an undisclosed source. 
Libyan tied-aid and unionist poliei~s __ ha:ve rB~arded 
integration. While Mauritania accepted Libyan aid (1960s-70s), 
it declined to join in union. Eventually Tripoli gave material 
support to the Polisario in an effort to establish a United 
States of the Sahara, at the expense of Morocco and Algeria; 
then to the Saharawi and Algerians/ surprise Libya joined a 
union with Morocco (1984-86). It is estimated that over 3,000 
Tunisians have passed throu~h training camps ~n Libya, 
ostensibly to "liberate" Palestine, but arguably in preparation 
for the overthrow of Tunisia/s pro-Western regime (Parker, 1984, 
p.60): yet Libya actually joined Tunisia in a short-lived union 
in 1974. Tripoli expelled some 90,000 Tunisian immigrant 
workers in 1984-86, because of disputes with Tunis; the vast 
majority of the guest workers were from the impoverished 
southern regions, thus further exacerbating problems within 
Tunisia (Le Monde, 15 Nov.1984; p.6; ibid, 24 Aug. 1985, p.3; 
Liberation, 15 Nov. 1985, p.20). At different times Tripoli 
has also encouraged the Touaregs of southern Algeria to revolt 
or move into Libya. 
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Morocco and Mauritania joined in a defensjve alliance in 
1976, when thAy annexed the former Spanish Sahara (Hodges, 1984, 
p.4). With par~ition of the Spanish/Western Sahara, and 
ever-closer relations between Morocco and Mauritania, diplomatic 
relations with Algeria were severed. Algeria offically 
recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (1976) 
and actively supported the Polisario liberation fighters. 
Tunisia remained a constant ally of Mauritania and Morocco, 
Wi-S-hing- t-o eounter- the- gTowirrg predominance of Algeria in the 
1970s. Much to the surprise of the Arab world, Bourguiba 
suggested that Mauritania join the short-lived Tunisian-Libyan 
Union in 1974. Mauritania remained non-commital to the offer. 
In 1973, Mauritania was welcomed into all the Maghrebi 
cooperation organizations. In 1976-77, Mauritania enlisted 
French and Moroccan intervention in its struggle against the 
Polisario. After 1979, Tunisia drew closer to Algiers, fearing 
a Libyan invasion. 
(1979). diplomatic 
After a military coup d'etat 
relations were broken off 
in Mauritania 
with Morocco. 
Mauritania renounced all claims to the southern half of the 
Western 
Algeria. 
Sahara, and re-established cordial relations with 
The failure of Maghrebi governments to resolve the Western 
Sahara dispute epitomizes their failure to create the Greater 
Maghreb. Since 1975, a bitter and intractable war has been 
fought for control of the former Spanish colony of the Western 
Sahara (area 266,062 sq km/102,700 sq ml). It risks leading to 
destabilization in Morocco, as happened in Mauritania in 1979 
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when the military seized power because of: (i) tho collapse of 
tho Mauritanian economy; (ii) failure to secure control of the 
annexed territory; (J.Jl) attacks by Saharawi guerrillas on 
strategic areas within Mauritanian; (iv) populaT discontent 
among Mauritanians concerning social and economic issues, and 
the goverrunent's unfulfilled promises about a speedy end to the 
war; (v) the fact that the military were better equipped then, 
than at any other time in the history of the state, and was also 
receiving military aid from Morocco; and (vi) international 
disapproval of Mauritania's policies in the Western Sahara, 
particularly from Algeria and the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) (see map 8.2b). 
8.2.2 SADR and the Union. 
By 1987, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) had 
been formally recognized by 67 countries, half of which are 
members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (see maps 
8.2b), and the remainder South American, Asian and Oceanic 
states (Irish Times, 3 Jan.1987, p.5). Morocco does not 
recognize SADR and lays claim to its territory (see maps 8.4). 
(Assidon, 1978; LFDLP, 1978). 
The Western Saharan War is fundamentally a dispute over 
sovereignty between the indigenous Western Saharans/Saharawis 
and Morocco, and hinges on the principle of self-determination 
(see appendix V, chapters 5-6). Because of Algerian support for 
SADR, this has added to the rift between Rabat and Algiers, thus 
= /.'ou·ntd by 
.== A--'~-.rflClC' 
-=== In!~ ~,:J( IO'ICI 
---- fo.Jnd,.,rJ!'S 
F(lrn-·r ~ f rpn:h 
P'>cs: Alnca 
j\/' 
I ,c /{ 
&r~ 
0( 
rr-t' 
"\\.. Lorfll)'2l~ 
?" 
,.,~ 
~""' 
4.~ 
&., 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
------
( 0 f"rt WuF<lLU! 
11 m: ------- J 
c 
't'"' 
2~, 
' 
' 
(. 
\: 
~ 
J\'1. (:'; T£.1\..f;.. A.\ FA_,. 
~~~~~~ 
= ,_ 
\~ 
, 0 ,_ 
F_:tt:'~~- 0.;_ .._,. 
_, 0 
; "-clom~-
-' 0ach2l1" 
I 
; -; (o.. . uett~rZl 
" 0 
-I, T;Juo! =I 
C:urcra :::::I 
_, 
-I 
-
A 1 G E R A 
' 
' 
' 
' 
·-"-
' 
' .... 
' 
' ' 
' \ 
\ 
T2l01o4d&I'\11H 
0 
' 
'= 
' 
MA\lVR¥TANJA 
g~{1'~-:!:~oa!l1ll1ta-· 
\MAL r 
I 
:il!l'UlJh.ch~~ 
/ 5t..lo~lf. __ _ 
o Toajit.ay) 
-==4 
-=... 
--" 5 ENE G A JL__., 2:: ·- -~ 
.,;;•(" ' 
' 
' 
' 
SUU!IC£: THE GE()(,MPHER. U.S. DEPA..'ITh!Eli;T OF STATE 
MAP 8. 4a THE ~':iES1"[RN SAHARA: GREA iER ti.OROCCO. 
j.)Saf· MO::<.o::::::c f,~"·g 0~ 
rv.o9ador6 Mc_·rra!tesh .... -"'· ;-8..-eCr.ar j' c,,HJ"~ 0 • : o :-~..enadld 
"? 0 ·~-,-· 0udl/c.:1J"t·..-·"" 
Agiic1:;:-··· Td.f' c .... / 
T1Jn1t \o .... . : p' 
o o·}::,;-.-.,;._ ......... "". 
J o.·-1>· 
. 
0 Gou1tm1;;e 
A:..GE:-1~A 
·---···-· ,, 
D GO()> 
0 ~T?!!..~~-j oT1ndout 
c.. : ., 
oSmr:ra . 
'. o ~ara D1e:J 121 
.... 
~...,..~';>-
000 
8)u Cra0a;-·-·-·-·-·· 
' ~ : o 81r Mo9hrt-•il · · ___ ..._., , 
'\ ,o0"~' 
~ '~''r ; . .......... <t· : '· ~ ~ ~"<- ,. I 7RQP:C '. Of CANCER .:S} v,"< / Q Zouerate '·, 'J· ' l ' - ' dhrbo~; ~ I ·.., 
~ AORAR V:ALI 
!VJAURITAi\IIA 
TAGANT 
T1mi:ucroo 
· ·- , BRA:<NA , ~ I seneY"' '· : N',g2' 
' / ', ('·._ .• .,.-.. -·-·-·-·-·-• .r \ 
i1Daka3,_ SEN~GAL '\•{ t /~~-~·=Is~ 
MAP 8 .4b THE ~ESTERN SAHARA: ~ORTH-~EST A~R~CA 
Source: Hodges, ~ony. THE ~ESlERN SAHARANS. 
"The i\l.inority Ri-';hts G~oup". Rej:::or~ i\lc.<-8. l..onc1nn, 1SR<: 
Bir Gandous 
0 
S0urce: Hodgeo, Tony. 
<:::>~ 
Guelta 
Zem:r.our 
0 [u~~TI~OOC~ 
~WOOl~ww 
~\) 
\) 
'(;;;) 
~ 0 Aot.:ssert 
Zouzra12 
Yichla 
0 
Agaenitc 
Zug 
0 
:I ~~1~:~~~~=~ 
o· :::::.:::.:. 
0 Sir N:oghrei1 
~ ~ (Lj ~ ~ ~L~ 1 ~ 
~ Ea1:ti1wor:,s: (l:mi~s c1 :V1orc~=:~·:cl~:Jkj 
2:.-eas, :-n:r.: ~ £3~) 
Jlhl?>f:~iltG :o:-mvo: i.:sl: 
R:illlwe>y 
c :<ilomet:l!s JCC 
l 
MAP 8. 4c n-:;:: t;JC:SH:R~ 5!\H.C.::lA. 
THE WESTERN SAI-!ARAI\S. "The U.inority R:ghts Group". Report No.40. :..o11C.:o71, .. ,..,, / I ~d-.·. 
:· 
": 
0 
.. ~t-
•·•m•f}~E~t-u· ,.,_ooo ~~~···· - ·  
--~--
-:~-
10 
Defence spending per capita in $U.S. (1982) 
1:«-:'1•3500 ~100:499 
~1500-3500 
mll500-1499 
Service personnel 
~~,;;;;;//1 t/~::::in 50-99 
CJ•so 
144.000 Total rcguler serv1ce personnel 
Atrforce ~ Army 
~Navy 
Proport1on of total service personnel in 
army. navy, atrforce 
10 
~ Number of armoured fighting veh>cles (tan~s. armoured 
''lr personnel carriers. armoured cars (exc. self-propelled artillery))·-
~ Number of combat vessels (fast anack craft. fngates. 
submarines. landing craft) 
<(f<J Number of combat aircraft (inc. ;;rmed helicopters) 
Major armements suppliers (shown in order ol importance) 
u.s. U.S.A 
w .E. Western Europe 
s u. U.S.S.R. and Eastern Sloe 
I. !ndigznous ilrmi:mcnts imtur;try !d~v~!opmon1 and production) 
0 Oih~r 
1\:o ro;-,c~r cupplyino c:m3 dir~ly 
20 
2C 
10 
20 
,-~ 
/ j 
) 
._, 
\ 
(_ 
\' 
I 
'· 
' . ., 
'· . . ) ·,_ 
-- 3a_ ( / .... ~ 
.-·..r·-· 
1. 
-...... 
.... 
AC 
38 I 
20 
OJ I 
,- ' ~- ' ,-.,".. 20 •• - .. (0 
(7P" J )._ •. , <' 60 
. - ~. --· --~--.. 
· ----
1
.,... : :. ~~~~;~~ ", \ 40 I 
(')'_ ·-~--~~~,~~~ 
\1 ·-. - -,,~ ,~~-~~ \~~~'II' I ' "7' ~ ,._, • "II! J 
< !·.' :', '• -'~~' \ ' ~~~ 
' ~ -·~ ,':.~~-~~~~~~ 
20 
0 
•. ..., ~--/' /,_ !'. ·.';- .)~~~~J\___ ''~'"-~.-· ,, ;-:4-'\ ,. ~-_, 
porcontag .. oftngn•a , ',,, •. "\' ·~· '>~>' ~"''"" ""''" '''"-"' 1-:' ;of "(\•~•!"" 
0 50( 1000 miles 
c:.45 c"· r .... $;. :- , ·w ~ ~ ~~ ~0 19 ;: ... • J',/ ."(Y../' . 
40- t.5 ::- ,, 0 .. '' . J •, • .:.. ' 
~~~~~~~~~ 
0 5C( 100:Hm 
~ 20-:l9 ~~~~: ~tl tJ!iy,l "'II~ 
t::-t:-2'" Cr;:.:tr~.~~~:::.l 
Source: G. Ilake, J. 
East & North Africa. 
Dewdnt'y &' J. Mitcht'll. Tlle Caml:ridge Atlas of tete Midclle 
Cambridge: Cambridge ''niven;i·'.' Press, 1937. 
(, 
~-> 
50~. 
offering scope for intervention by Libya and other Arab states, 
and superpower intervention (see maps 8.4, U.b). 
Becc:w.se of severe drought ( 1868--73), the outbreak of i:lEU 
(1975), deveJ.opment of Saharawi nationalism, discovery of rich 
deposits of phosphates (Bou Craa, Saquiet region), proximity of 
massive iron ore deposits (Gara Djebilet, Algeria), and the 
possibility of discovering hydrocarbons, the Western Sahara 
became the focus of Maghrebi attention in the 1970s. 
--Competition for productive offshore fisheries has also focussed 
international attention on the region. Spain, Horocco, 
Mauritania and Algeria have thus vied for control of the Western 
Sahara (Thompson & Adloff, 1980). 
The offshore fishing area is one of the richest in the 
world, and is estimated to be able to support an annual catch of 
over 2 million tons. Presently about 0.25 million tons are 
caught by fleets from the Canaries; yet in 1974, only about 1% 
of the catch was landed at local ports. Spanish, Soviet and 
Japanese fleets were activo in the area until the outbreak of 
the war. The Polisario claims a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 
nm EEZ for SADR, and consequently foreign vessels operating in 
the area are seen as legitimate targets. On several occasions, 
Spanish fishermen have been fired upon or taken captive (Hodges, 
1984, p. 6). 
Concerning oil, encouraged by the French experience in the 
Algerian Sahara (1960-61), 43 onshore blocks covering over 37% 
of the territory were awarded to 11 consortia, belonging to 20 
oil companies. By 1964, 27 discoveries had been made, but were 
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not deemed to be economically viable. Then expJ.o~ation shifted 
to the offshore areas. To date no oil has been f011nd. However 
politicaJ. instability has discouraged greater oxplo~ation. The 
Moroccan government awarded new offshore blocks to BP and 
~hillips Petroleum in 1978, but because of tho war tho companies 
were forced to pull out in 1980. Thereafter prospecting shifted 
to Tarfaya in southern Morocco (1981 Shell) and Moroccan 
offshore areas (Mobil 1982) (Hodges. 1984, p.6). 
Since the 1950s, the international community ha~ ~xpresse~ 
interest in the region's iron resources. Deposits were found at 
Agracha, a few miles from the massive Mauritanian iron mines at 
Zouerate; in the east Saguia el Hamra, near the Gara Djebilet 
deposits in south west Algeria; and in the centre of the 
territory. Because of the war the mines have not come into 
operation. There has been speculation about Algeria's desire to 
establish a road/rail route from its mines to the Atl.~ntic coast 
via the Western Sahara. Likewise there was speculation in the 
1970s, that the neighbouring states could cooperate in smelting 
and integrated industrial projects in the border areas (Hodges, 
1984, p.6). 
In the 1940s, phosphates were discovered, but a systematic 
survey was not carried out until 1962. It was estimated that 
the territory's total deposits were over 10 billion tons and 
proven reserves were 1.7 billion tons of high-grade phosphates 
(75%-80% bone phosphate of lime) at Bou-Craa. Spain's Institute 
Nacional de Industria (INI) founded a special company, Fosfatos 
de Bu Craa (1969) to exploit the deposits. By 1972, export had 
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begun. By 1975, some 25 billion Pesetas had been invested, 
making for a production capacity of 3.7 mi1.lion ton8 of ore per 
annum, whj.le yearly output had risen to 2.6 million tons. The 
target set for 1980 was to have been 10 million tons/year, 
rendering the terrj.tory the second world producer after Morocco. 
The Moroccan annexation clearly had control of the phosphate 
deposits as a priority. However the industry came to a 
standstill in 1975. The Saharawis and friendly states like 
Al~eria -belie\f'e that revenue !rom mining could -provide tho 
economic basis for an independent state; however this is open to 
debate because of the abundance of ore in the world (Hodges, 
1984, p. 6). 
Since 1956 Morocco had demanded the decolonization of the 
Spanish Sahara, and had refused to recognize Mauritanian 
independence (1959) (see maps 5.1, 8.4)). Hassan initiated a 
policy of detente with Algiers and Nouakchott in 1969; in 
January, a 20-year treaty was signed at Ifrane committing 
Algiers and Rabat to: 
"submit all the questions 
between them to bilateral 
(Journal Official de la RADP 8 
pp. 82-84). 
in abeyance 
commissions" 
( 11) 1969, 
In 1970, both states convened a summit in Tlemcen, setting up a 
commission to resolve their border dispute. In June 1972, 
Morocco recognized Algeria's western border. Then Algiers 
helped to smooth the way for detente between Morocco and 
Mauritania. Eventually Hassan invited President Daddah of 
Mauritania to an Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat (1969), and 
signed a F~jendship Treaty with Mauritania the following year, 
hence formally :r:el:i.n.quj_shing his cla.:im to the staLe. Between 
19'70-'?'3, the three statG leaders uonvened two t~~pa~tite 
·. (1',. dh"b 1970 Ag ct·.,.. .. 1973) ·· "b.i ,h mee·c~Lngs _ _,oua _ .. l ou. .. , . a l_ . , ac '(.:7 ... __ u .... they jointly 
endorsed the UN calls for seJ_f-dete:r:mination for the people of 
the Spanish Sahara (UN Doc. A/10023/Rev.l, pp.l26-7). In 1976, 
Morocco and Mauritania renegaded on their agreement (with 
Spanish collusion); and annexed the territories. With the 
declar-ation of inde-pendence o:f SADR (19?'6), everyone was aware-
that the insurgents could not win an outright victory. Survival 
of the state depended on the international community, and 
Algeria took up SADR's cause. 
Polisario numbers in 1982, were thought to be 7,000 armed 
fighters, and in 1984, 3,500 (Parker, 1984, p.116). Yet they 
have managed to keep 10-15,000 Moroccan regular troops held 
down. Because of the tenacity of the Polisario in harrassing 
the Mauritanian army in the south Western Sahara and within the 
state, Mauritania signed a defence pact with Morocco in 1977. 
This led to the installation of over 9,000 Moroccan troops in 
Mauritania and the territory which it had annexed (Rio de Oro). 
Because of the French-Mauritanian military agreements 
(1976,1977), France got involved in Operation Lamantin, which 
entailed the bombing of Saharawi guerrilla bases (Dec. 1977) and 
other air strikes in 1978. French nationals were kidnapped by 
the Polisario in 1977, but were later released, after 
negotiations. Polisario raids on strategic sites in Mauritania, 
such as the Zouerate-Nouadhibo railroad continued. The 
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escalating scale and cost of the war, along with severe drought 
brought ~bout a military coup in July l978. At Algiers on 5 
August 1979, a now Mauritanian regime signed a peace agreement 
renouncing claims to the Tiris el-Gharbia. Morocco immedia·tely 
annexed the region. Mauritani.a formally recognized SADR in 
1984, thus alienating Rabat. 
Since 1976 the Moroccans have been engaged in a defensive 
war, trying to consolidate their hold on strategic areas, with 
- - --
small settlements constantly changing hands. In the late 1970s, 
the Polisario began striking targets in Morocco. Being a 
traditional ally of Morocco, the US response has been somewhat 
ambiguous. The Ford and Carter Administrations supported the 
principle of self-determination for the Western Saharans, while 
the Reagan Administration has backed the Moroccan position. The 
Carter Administration agreed that US military aid could only be 
used in the defence of the Moroccan state, which did not include 
the disputed territories. In 1979, the Carter Administration 
agreed to sell $232.5 million worth of military hardware 
(including 20-F-5Es, 24 Hughes 500 MD helicopters and 60V-10s) 
to Morocco, and to "relax" the US position on their use in the 
Sahara (Parker, 1984, p.127). On Hassan's own admission there 
were 80,000 Moroccan troops in the territories in 1983 (Le 
Mende, 26 Jan.1983), and 100,000 in 1984. The Royal Armed 
Forces (FAR) trebled in size reaching 200,000 men by 1983 (Le 
Mende, 28 Jan.1983). This has increased the potential for a 
military coup in Morocco considering the level of discontent 
among the military and general public. Many soldiers and 
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officers come from ~umble Eural backgrounds, and may not always 
be so willing to suppress popular revolts as they have been in 
the past. 
In the 1980s, Moroccan geostrategy has entailed the 
construction of a series of defensive walls in an effort to 
encompass the main urban centres and strategic mines (see map 
8.4). By 1986, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) still only 
controlled about 25% of the territory. The defensive walls are 
Eeminiscent of France's Maginot Line; or the French Mauricet 
-Line along- 'the -A1gerian-TuniBian fror1tier- ( 1958-621- (Ilurne, 
1977; Alleg, 1981; Courriere, 1968). In the case of the 
Mauricet Line, the vast desert area could not be effectively 
guarded against guerrilla penetration, and Tunisia was friendly 
to the Algerian cause. Hassan's wall building strategy has led 
to the borders of northern Mauritania, thus increasing tensions 
and threatening Mauritania's neutrality (Financial Times, 30 
April 1987). The Walls are getting closer to Algeria's Tindouf 
region; thus forcing the Polisario to circumvent the walls in 
very sensitive areas. Arguably Algeria will not permit Morocco 
the right of hot pursuit, and Mauritania is unlikely to agree to 
cooperate as it recognizes SADR, does not want to be drawn back 
into the war, and enjoys close relations with Algeria. 
The Polisario war of attrition is undermining the economic 
bases of the Moroccan state. It is the main reason for the 
training and organization of a huge Moroccan army. The bloody 
struggle is tying Hassan's hands as he has promised the masses, 
nationalist Istiqlal party and the FAR outright victory. On the 
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diplomatic front, the war has caused the ostracization of Hassan 
in the international community, and is responsible for the 
animosity of neighbouring states. Morocco's defence-related 
expenditure in 1980 was estimated to be 40% of thG national 
budget (Hodges, 1984, p.l4). 
The SADR conflict illustrates better than any other issue 
that Maghrebi unity is a long-term ideal, rather than a 
short-term reality. Nonetheless, in war-ravaged Europe (1946), 
who would have forecast a united 12 nation EC by 1986? The 
author carried out interviews in the Maghreb between 1978-1985. 
The informal interviews were conducted with academics, 
journalists, politicians (particularly Algerian NLF people) and 
university students. The "written" interviews were conducted 
among the author's students at the universities of Annaba and 
Constantine (Algeria), and Tunis (O'Reilly, 1983). Among the 
many themes treated was that of Maghrebi unity. Almost 100% 
spoke with enthusiasm about a "future united Maghreb union" 
based on a common history, culture and Islam, and future 
economic integration. They also spoke of the many 
inter-governmental meetings which had taken place between the 
Maghrebi regimes, some 286 between 1958 and 1982 (see table 
8.2). However analyzing Maghrebi inter-governmental relations, 
many used the adage "my enemy's enemy is my friend" (or more 
literally "my neighbour's enemy is my friend"). This viewpoint 
admirably illustrates the respective national perceptions of the 
Maghrebis balance of power strategy (Middle East Journal, 
Vol.40, No.2, 1986). Also despite many government calls for 
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closer economic integration, l. nte~ Magh ~<->b·i .!..-.. ~~.Lv - trade is rninima~l 
(see table 8.3, see below). As Algeria and ~orocco are tho most 
powerful Maghrebi states, there can be no solution to tho 
Saharawi war without the consent of Algeria. ~hough an ally of 
Morocco, the USA cannot afford to isolate Algeria by giving too 
much overt support to Rabat on the Saharawi issue. 
An historic meeting took place between Hassan and Algeria's 
President Chadli Benjedid on 26 February 1983, at Akid Lotfi .. 
the first since the creation of SADR (1976) and the breaking off 
of diplomatic relations between the two states. Communications 
by road, rail and air were re-established, but the King 
misjudjed the situation in believing that Algiers had changed 
its policy on SADR. Chadli encouraged "d..tscussions" between 
Hassan and the Western Saharans. Fundamentally, Chadli was 
trying to break the deadlock by offering Moronon an honourable 
way out of the imbroglio, within the United Maghreb context, and 
assuring Rabat that Algeria was not hostile to Morocco. In the 
same year Libya established cordial relations with Morocco, 
after years of hostility. 
However Algeria continued to support the Polisario, as 
outright victory for Morocco could threaten Algeria's leadership 
role in the region, and the NLF are acutely aware of Morocco's 
irredentist "Greater Morocco" dreams which included the Algerian 
Tindouf region until the late 1970s (see maps 8.4). Algeria's 
international image, especially in Africa would suffer if it 
abandoned the Saharawi cause. In so far as the Polisario have 
declared their ideology, it is clearly more in line with that of 
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Algeria than Morocco. 
On 19 March 1983, Algeria signed a ~r~at~ pf Concorde and 
:e:.raLerni"t.y VJ:i:i;h Tunisia, -.:ib.ich inclutlod BJssuJ:>a,nces of milj_taJry 
assistance; c:md. ~-nvi ted neighbouring states ·i;o j o:i.:o. them. 
Mauri·tania joined the treaty in 1984, thus isolating Morocco. 
This was Morocco's main reason for joining its former archenemy, 
Libya, in an ill-prepared union in 1984. Both states also 
wished to gain reciprocal alliances or at least reciprocal 
neutrality in relation to the wars in the Western Sahara and 
Chad. Libya reacted to- Mauritania's a~d-hesion to the 
Algerian-Tunisian treaty by 
Ostensibly Tunisia supported 
proposing its own candiditure. 
Libya's request, but Algeria had 
reservations. Arguably Algeria was asking Libya to reassess the 
ideal of Maghrebi unity, as Algeria had by now signed boundary 
accords with all its neighbours save Libya. Algeria is aware of 
Qadhafi's lack of respect for boundary accords signed by former 
colonial powers. For instance Libyan claims to the Chad's 
Auozou zone could foreshadow Libyan claims to Algerian frontier 
areas, as the boundary accords were signed by France and the 
former King of Libya, but never ratified. 
Algeria has made it clear that it will not tolerate Libyan 
interference in Tunisia's internal affairs, by the 1983 Treaty 
with Tunisia, and the communiques of solidarity with the 
Tunisian Government during the 1984 riots. It has been alleged 
that Libya was involved in raids on Gafsa and Kasserine 
(Tunisia, 1979, 1981), and the 1984 commando assault on the 
Algerian-Italian gas-pipeline in Tunisia. From mid-1985 to 
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1986, tensions heightened between Trpoli and Tunis, with the 
expulsion of diplomats, forced removal of 30,000 Tunisian guest 
uorkers from t,j_bya, and. the deployment o? Ja:cge numbe:rs of 
so~.d .. i.e:cs on both sides of the Libyan-ri'u:l.isia:u. .bo:r:<l.e:r:· (:r.~ Jf.~ond.e, 
15 Nov.1984, p.6; ibid 24 Aug.l985, p.3; ~iboration, 5 Nov.l985, 
p.20), (see map 8.5). In 1987, Colonel Qadhafi offered generous 
financial aid to Tunisia's new president, Ben Ali, on the 
condition that he would break links uith the West, and implement 
a foreign policy similar to that of Libya. 
On 28 January 1986, at In-Amena (southern Algeria), the 
Algerian President met Colonel Qadhafi. Libya once more 
expressed its deep desire for a Maghrebi Union. Essentially, 
Qadhafi wished to defuse the situation, because of hostile 
threats from Egypt to the east, his unsuccesful campaign in Chad 
to the south, and the force of Algeria to the west. Because of 
the Libyan-Moroccan Union (1984) anrl Libyan aggression towards 
Tunisia (1984-85), Algeria had maintained "distanced" relations 
with Libya. Qadhafi assured Chadli that he would remove troops 
from the Tunisian frontier and compensate the expelled Tunisian 
workers. Libya sought Algerian support in its heightening 
crisis with the USA (Le Monde, 28 Jan.1986). The day after the 
In-Amena meeting, Radio called for a "strategic 
alliance" between 
Tripoli 
Libya 
war" of the USA against the 
and Algeria to counter "the colonial 
Arab world. The Algerian media 
between "two brother peoples" (Le merely reported solidarity 
Monde, 30 Jan. 1986). 
The Libyan dilemma in relation to SADR is that while 
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Qadhafi supports all types of J.i.be:cat1o:o. :movomcmts and 
identifies with the philosophies expressed by the ~olisario, tho 
creation of a sixth Maghrebi state is diametrically opposed to 
his ideology of Arab unity. Hence Qadhafi's Saharawi policy is 
volatile. Tripoli only offically recognized SADR in 1980, while 
Qad.hafi had been supplying aid intermittently via :tb.Sl. ~TiCJ.J1 
corridor since the mid-1970s. With rapprochement between 
Tripoli and Rabat ±n 19G3 and union (1904-86), Libyan suppu-rt to 
the Polisario came to a halt. It is likely that Tripoli has 
resumed covert aid to the Polisario since the dissolution of the 
union with Morocco in 1986. 
The SADR dilemma illustrates the fact that while the 
Maghrebi states have many geographical phenomena in common, and 
idealize the concept of Maghrebi and Arab unity, each is in the 
process of state and nation-state building, with the consequent 
chauvinism and territoriality. SADR could yet prove to be the 
Sarajevo factor for conflict in the Maghreb, leading to outright 
war in the region. 
8.3 THE MAGHREB: EXTERNAL RELATIONS. 
8.3.1 North-South Linkages. 
Acording to Geopolitique (No.lO, 1985, p.l), 
(the west Mediterranean) . 
now seems to be fundamentally divided 
between a European north in the process of 
becoming integrated and a Maghreb looking 
for its unity both in a glorious past and a 
problematic future" . 
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TABLE 8.5 
SHAHt:.: 0~ 'i'Ht l'!.AGHkt:l:l IN rt·k lC's It'!.POHIS 
1975 1985 
Morocco 0.50% 0.357o 
Algeria 1.60% 1.70% 
Tunisia 0.?.5% 0.32% 
2.35% 2.37?o 
----- -------
Source: Various EUROSTM. 
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Because of ~eographical fac·~ors, t~o ~a~hruhi states have a 
myriad of Tela;t:i.onships wj_th Spa:i . .o., }'rrl.nce EUJ.o. rteJy (see maps 
/i 'l I, ·1 ::• 2 8 2) 
'"':·: . ~ ' 0 . ~ () . -.J ~ • • 
S:pa:o1sh n~~ arcb:L~eC'G"'~0 ~S ·~e·~~~~~'nl~ ("I''"Onc" o,.u.u. , ···- L '·"-'· '-' -'·• -'- !.t.c.L .~.; .. c,r _,_,. .. .r. - !.. 1., 
as is the impact of Spanish culture ~n no~~hern Morocco. 
a,reas of Iv1arseilles, a.nd the :t:larbes a.rrandiseJ.nG:r.rL of Paris are 
culturally Maghrebi enclaves. Significantly Europeans are often 
referred to as Uhoumis (Romans) by the peoples of the Atlas. 
There is minimal trade between the Maghrebi states (see 
-
table 8.3), and despite the official rhetoric, there is little 
commeJ>ce with sub-Saharan Africa and the Third World. Yet it 
was Algeria \vhich launched the call for the "New International 
Economic Order" at the UN, and the "North-South Dialogue". 
Maghrebi policies show little economic precedent for South-South 
intercourse (see maps 8.6, 8.7). On average 65%-75% of North 
African trade is with the West (EC, US, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and Australia), while trade with sub-Saharan Africa and 
the non-oil producing Arab states accounts for about 2%. France 
remains the Maghreb's greatest supplier of goods and the USA its 
greatest customer (for trading statistics for the respective 
Maghrebi states, see appendices VI-IX). There is no joint North 
American-EC economic dialogue or strategy in the region. 
8.3.2. The French Connection. 
During the Algerian Liberation War (1954-62), with the 
historic words "Je vous ai compris" (I understand you) 
( r:o:nsta.:o.tine, J 960), Charles de Gaulle, oste:o.s.Lbly trj_ed. to 
~eassure the intransigent European settlers that their interests 
v70ll.ld. :bo :protected; but i:o. fact he was signalJ_ing hJs :t:o.tent:Lo:o. 
to grant independence, and adapting to tho post-colonial order. 
With1.n a couple 
Algeria, however 
strong. 
of years the majority of colonists had loft 
French influence in the Maghreb :remained 
French interests in the Maghreb are strategic in economic, 
political and military terms. In the 19th cen_:tury scramble for 
Africa, Britain and France emerged as the major powers. France 
annexed Algeria (1830-1870), established a protectorateship over 
Tunisia (1881) and secured its interests in Morcco with the 
Entente Cordiale (1904) and establishment of a protectorate 
there (1912). 
Although the colonial love-hate relationship is evident, 
France's imperial mis~i~~ c~yilatrice (HornA, 1977; Alleg, 1981; 
Courriere. 1968) has reaped the reward of winning the minds of 
the Maghrebis, establishing Paris and Marseilles as major 
culture beacons for them. In the mid-1980s, there were nearly 3 
million Muslims in France, mostly of Maghrebi origin. In 1982 
Moroccan nationals accounted for some 450,000 people, Algerians 
numbered over 830,000 (1.5 million, if one includes French 
nationals who have a claim to Algerian nationality), 250,000 
Tunisians, and 57,000 Mauritanians (Herodote, no.35, 1984, 
pp.l31-149). Emigrant remittances to Morocco amounted to over 
$1 billion, $450 million to Algeria and $342 million to Tunisia 
in 1981 (Parker, 1984, pp.l32-133). In the other direction, 
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the:ee is still a signifj_cant money f.low f':r:om the Piedi:i NoiLS. 
( fo:r.>me:C' European settlers) a.n0. coopeJ:>EJ.:n:i.;_s_ ( O.svA.l.o~~men. L ~:vor:ke;~s), 
often abannelJ.od through non-officia: Foutes. 
Islam is now tho second religion of France. Tho Paris 
mosque j_s ·che o:ne of most prestige outsido l)fl.~ ~J~ JslQ._m (Islamic 
Kingdom), with capacity for 3,000 people. This intense culture 
flow between France and the Maghreb is epitomized by the large 
number of French cooperants found in every sphere of Maghrebi 
lifA, except in Libya. - In 1984, 'chere ·were some 8, 000 working 
in Morocco, 2,300 in Algeria and 840 in Tunisia. Over a quarter 
of a million Moroccan students attend French schools in Morocco, 
with smaller numbers of Maghrebis at similar establishments in 
Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania (Parker. 1984, p.l30). Despite 
NLF rhetoric about the imperative of Algerianizing education, 
most of the leading members have their children attending French 
eduoaLional establlshments. 
Although there has been a great decrease in the number of 
French nationals in the Maghreb since 1962, French citizens 
still form the largest foreign group in each of the respective 
states save Libya. There are some 45,000 French citizens in 
Morocco and 15,000 in Tunisia (Parker, 1984, p.132). In the 
early 1960s there were almost 3 million French nationals in 
Algeria, but the NLF dictum of "Le bateau ou le cercueil" (the 
boat or the coffin) ensured the departure of the overwhelming 
majority (1960-63) (Horne. 1977). In 1984, there were over 
45,000 French citizens in Algeria; and French military advisers 
numbered some 250 in Morocco and 40 in Tunisia (Parker, 1984, 
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p.lo2). 
With AJ.gerian-French d~tonto since thA death of PTosident 
Houmodie!l.:n.e ( 197 8) , the :t:''J:'O:t1Ch hcwo Jon. -::.Jed. ·i.; o accept th.eir 
:nostalgia fo:r t:he lost de)?a:.rteme:QJ4.. l''I'cDJ.ce hoJd.s fl,D. a,mbj_guou.s 
J'espect for the Algerians who shattered their empi.~e. J'ende:rod 
France the pariah of the interna·tional community during the War 
(1954-62), toppled two governments and led France to the brink 
of civil war (Horne, 1977). With independence, Algeria has 
_mA .. Lo.taj_neci a doggedly -anti -imper-ialii:rl.i- a:uu: ant·i-F:rench stance. 
Yet Algeria has emerged as a leader state. As Presidents 
Giscard d'Estang and Mitterand have stated; "on est les faux 
cousj_ns'' (wo are half-cousins) linked by history, geography and 
familial ties for 
Algerian market 
strengthened the 
better or worse. Of course, the lucrative 
and valuable 
bonds. France 
imports uf Moroccan phosphates. 
hydrocarbon resources has 
is also largely dependent on 
France still views the geostrategic location of the Maghreb 
as vital to its self-defence and by association that of the 
West. This includes usage of air and sea ports, thus countering 
Soviet access to the region. France closely monitors Soviet 
usage of Algerian facilities and Libyan activity in the region, 
as is witnessed by its vital deterrence role in Chad. The 
Maghreb provides France with a valuable corridor to sub-Saharan 
Africa. Moroccan involvement in Zaire and Angola (in support of 
Mobutu and Savimbi in the 1970s) was largely under French 
auspices, with US approval. France has continuously frustrated 
Libyan adventurism in Chad and Tunisia. Prudently, France did 
:o.o c join :t:o. tb.e US crusad.e ( 1970s- BOs) a~ains·c L:Loya. f'l'aJ.lce 
hc.s t:C'ieo. i~o mai11tai:o. II u:o.e pol i.tiqu.e ~~C('l~j_l:i.:~1:e6 II .-L:o. :"e'l a.t:i.m:. ·t;o 
~o~occo and Algeria, and i;he Vasto£D s~ha~cn War. \'/l.d.te 
P:resj_d.e:o.t Glsca,l'd d.' :t.:stang 's }?OJi.c:l.Gs \18:re mm:o t~U.-cecl. :i.:o. favm:Lc 
of Mo~occo. those of President Mittera:o.d havo veered slightly in 
favour of Algeria. 
F:eance's 1982 historic agreements with Algeria concerning 
hydrocarbons, was revolutionary in N9rth-South relatlons. and 
was seen as such by the Third World, lending credibility to the 
North-South Dialo~e and the recommendations of the B~andt 
Report (1980). The US looked with displeasure on the 
advantageous terms offered by France's socialist government, as 
this would influence Algeria's bargaining strategy with 
Washington. Like France's politigue esilibre in relation to the 
ArFJ.b-Ts~aP.l; c'l; srmt.e, its 1982 economic agreomontc with Algeria 
helped ensure its energy supplies and reduce the threat of 
embargo. 
Algeria produces about 45 million tons of oil and 15 
billion cubic metres of gas annually (Atlaseco, 1984, p.50). 
Government planning in the exploitation of gas was carefully 
directed at building the necessary infrastructure; by 1983 there 
was an LNG extraction and processing capacity of 30 billion 
cubic metres as compared with 15 billion cubic metres in 1982. 
It is estimated that there are 1,100 million tons of oil in 
Algeria, thus making it the sixteenth largest world reserve. 
However Algeria's real wealth lies in its gas deposits; reserves 
are estimated to be 3,700 billion cubic metres, the world's 
ti22 
fourth largest reserve, afte~ the USSR, Iran ~nd lJSA. 
Until tho early 1980s, Algeri.a f~ced ·~wcl rnajo~ p~obJems 
vii t:o_ ·c:b.e exportation of gets; :i.t hc-1,d. ·(;o be :" .. i qu.:U:'.i.ed a.t lmv 
tempe~atures for transportation, save wha·~ is exported to Italy 
via pipeline; and Algeria is looking for prices equivalent to 
that of thermal oil. Following Mj_tterand's visit to Algeria in 
1982, France agreed to Algerian demands. Under the 
Franco-Algerian Agreement (4 April 1982), Algeria sells its gas 
at 20% more than the world price, and there is a clause 
pertaining to backpayments for gas imported by France in the 
past. It has been agreed that France will receive 9.1 billion 
cubic metres of gas yearly by 1990. French purchases of gas in 
1981, represented over 50% of Algerian export revenues. 
1 Concerning Morocco, maintaining his "politique 
equilibre", Mitterand while on an official visit there in 1983, 
called for a conference of west Mediterranean states to be held 
in Paris, underlining Rabat's importance to the region and 
special relationship with France (Le Mende, 1 Feb.1983). 
Some 16 African states are within the French Franc Zone, 
and French remains an official language or is widely spoken in 
about 30 African states. French is an official language in all 
Maghrebi states except Libya. Outside the Maghreb, five 
Muslim-Arab states have French speaking communities and several 
have daily newspapers in French. In 1981, the Franc Zone in 
Africa absorbed over 33.3% of French exports to Africa and 
received over 49% of French foreign aid (see map 8.8), CiLeune 
Afrique, No.1195, 30 Nov.l983). While the Maghrebi states are 
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outside the F~anc Zone, their economies a~e greatJ.y influenced 
by j_ts trade :r1etuorks. Between l98 J.-82, Noroccc, Alger~ i_CJ, a:n.d 
Tunisia ranked among ·tho states whic~ received most fo~eig:n. aj.d 
" F ( -- A f' . ·~w ·1 'i 9 ~ ) :ccom ~:.ranee cJeune ... :r.l.q:u_e_, ""~o. __ o . Morocco also received 
$200-$300 million, and Tunisia some $100 million in US aid in 
1981 (Parker, 1984, p.l32). After the 'Bread ~evolts' (198~-e4) 
in Morocco and Tunisia, French aid was substantially increased. 
From an historical perspective, it is arguable that France's 
'Maghrebi-Africa' policy is now integrated into 
viewpoint concerning the region (see maps 8.2, 8.8). 
8.3.3 The Spanish Connection. 
it's EC 
Since time immemorial there has been intercourse between 
Iberia and the Maghreb, epitomised by the Moorish occupation of 
Spain (711-1492), and the Spanish Protectorateship (1912-56). 
Since the 15th century Spain has controlled territories 
stretching from Tangier to Tunis; only five Plazas remain. In 
1982, there were some 20,000 Spanish troops stationed in the 
Plazas (Heiberg, 1983, p.20). Significantly the Spanish flag 
bears the royal seal framed by the Pillars of Hercules, the two 
promontories on either side of the eastern entrance to the 
Strait. In the future Spain will literally provide a fixed-link 
(bridge or tunnel) between the EC/NATO and the Maghreb. 
According toLe Monde (25 Jan.l986, p.4), the relationship 
between Morocco and Spain, "one successively colonized by the 
other, can only be passionate and ambiguous". "Tens of 
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thousands of Muslj_ms" in the Plazas are teehnh.!aJ.ly stateless 
persons, "having neither Spanish nor Moroccan nationality". The 
number of Spanish residents in MoEocco is infinitely smaller 
than the number of Moroccan immigrant workers in Spain; "50,000 
according to official figures, or 90,000 aoording to unofficial 
sources''. In northern Morocco, Spain maintains primary and 
secondary schools, attended by several thousand Moroccans. A 
large number of Spanish nuns and priests also work there, "but 
do not engage in proselytiz~n_?5" . 
Despite close geographical interaction, Spain's trade with 
Algeria and Libya is greater than that with Morocco. Of the 
estimated 20,000 Spaniards (1984) living in the Maghreb, about 
14,000 live in Morocco. According toLe Monde (25 Jan.1986), 
Spain ranks as Morocco's second client and fourth supplier of 
goods. Spain is a partner in the Bou Craa (Western Sahara) 
phosphate industry. and acti.vely involved in the fishing sector 
off the Moroccan and Saharan coasts. Some 16,000 Spanish and 
Canary fishermen in over 1,000 boats fish in these waters, and 
earnings averaged over $500 million in 1981 (Parker, 1984, 
p.137). The 1983 bilateral fishing accord was the first to 
recognize Moroccan economic interests. Morocco's attempts at 
economic independence negatively effect Spanish fishing 
communities; thus both governments face political pressure from 
their respective peoples on fishing accords. Until Spanish 
entry into the EC (1986), Spain had not respected the 1979 
bilateral territorial transit accords, thus prohibiting the 
passage of Moroccan citrus products via Iberia into the EC, but 
o2ti 
this is now permitted. Moreover joint military manoevures now 
regula.rly ta.k.e place, espec:i.a,lJy in the naval s:phere, FJ~nd S:raJn 
has supplied Morocco with corvettes. 
Spain became embroiled in Moroccan Algerian contentions 
over the Western Sahara in the mid-l970s. With Spanish 
"knowledge" of the planned Moroccan-Mauritanian partition (1976) 
of the former Spanish Sahara and subsequent events, Algiers took 
exception_ to Madrid_' s polic_ies~ Part.ly in r.eBp.onse, -the NLF 
allowed MPAIAC - (The Movement for the Self-Determination and 
Independence of the Canary Archipelago) to broadcast on 
Algerian radio. MPAIAC carried out bombings in 1977-78, and was 
allegedly partially responsible for the collision of two 
airliners in the Canaries, resulting in the death of hundreds of 
tourists (Parker, 1984, p.138). D~tente between Algiers and 
~·ia.drid carne about in 1979, whe:r1 Prime Niuiste.c Sua..L't:Jz; in his 
capacity as leader of the Central Democratic Union (UDC) visited 
Algeria and met the Secretary General of the Peoples 
Organization for the Liberation of the Saguiet el Hambra and Rio 
de Oro (Polisario). At the UN in 1986, Spain was notably the 
only Western state to support Algerian motions for direct 
negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. In November 
1986, Spain expelled Polisario represenatives from Madrid after 
a Polisario attacks on Spanish sailors off the Saharan coast. 
Spain imports LNG from Algeria and is interested in sponsoring a 
gas-pipeline from Algeria to Spain. In 1982, Spain was 
Algeria's seventh supplier of merchandise and is interested in 
winning greater markets in military equipment. Spain also has 
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significant trading relations with Libya, and is t~y~ng to 
become more active in Tunisia. In ~eJ.ation to tho EC markets, 
Spain ·; tbn M r.l'hr ' ' g ·· ···· U·O · .• .. ····a·,~ __ s -'"' ... o,b. . en s rea ces ~... m_pe Ll u .. fo~ citrus and olive 
oil exports. 
Spanish policy has been aimed at mainta~.n~~g good relations 
with all the Maghrebi and Arab states, and its former stance on 
the Arab-Israeli dispute was warmly ~ppreciated by them (see 
chapter 7). However tho Moroccan Istiqlal Party vigorously 
attaol~ed Madrid's · decision - to es-L-ciblish cl"i_plomatic rela,tions 
with Israel in 1986. Spain's non-collaboration in the US raid 
on Libya (1986), was noted by the Arab world. 
8.3.4 The Italian Connection. 
The Italian rapport with the Maghreb is less intense than 
that of France or Spain, but nonetheless significant. Straits 
of less than 90 wide divide Italy from Tunisia. The 
Algerian-Italian gas pipeline is the geographical manifestation 
of their political interaction. 
In 1982, Algeria and Italy signed agreements concerning the 
supply of natural gas. It is planned that 12.5 billion cubic 
metres of gas will be supplied annually to Italy over a 25 year 
period (Le Temps (Tunis), 20 Sep.1982, p.9; Jeune Afrique 
(Paris) No.1166, 11 May 1983, p.30). The construction of the 
Algero-Italian pipeline via Tunisia was a major step in 
Maghrebi-European relations, and foreshadows the proposed 
pipeline between between Algeria and Spain via Morocco. Over 
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2,500 km of pipes were laid (1978-1981), crossing the Algerian 
desert (from Hassi R'Mel), the Yunisian mountains, the 
Tunisian-Sioilain straits and peninsular Italy as far north as 
Minerbio. More than $3 billion were invested in the project, of 
which the ItaJ.ians put $2 billion. The pipeline went into 
operation in 1983. It is estimated that annual revenue from the 
project will amount to $2 billion (the equivalent of 50% of the 
revenues from oil in 1982). There was a commando attack on the 
pipeline 1n tne Tunisian sector in January 1984, the assailants 
were believed to have crossed from Libya. France, Italy and 
Belgium will buy over 27 billion cubic metres of gas annually 
from Algeria over the next quarter of a century. 
In the late 19th century, Italy vied with France and 
Britain for control of Tunisia. Italy established substantial 
commercial links with Tunis, and a significant number of 
Italians from the Mezzogiorno established themselves in the 
area. Many intermarried with French and Maltese immigrants. 
Italy's geopolitical quest for control of Tunisia was blocked 
once and for all when Britain signed the Entente Cordials (1904) 
with France. In the mid-1970s, Italian communities were among 
the last to be repatriated from Tunisia. 
Italy's dream of recreating the Roman Empire was 
circumscribed by the French presence in Tunisia and Chad, and 
Britain's in Egypt and Sudan. Italian adventurism in Libya 
(1911-46) was the shortest colonial experience of any of the 
Maghrebi states (see map 4.1). This accounts for the rather 
ephemeral cultural stamp left by Europe on Libya. In 1984, 
thoro were some 20,000 Italian nationals in L~bya, most of whom 
Hero under co:n.t:rc:wt ( Parkor, J. 984, p. 109). '.l'b.o Jta.lia:o. S8tt.1.8:r 
po:r:mlat.:"~o:o. crea,ted :by colonialism vms oxpoJleu. by Co:Lon.el 
Qadhafi in tho 1970s. However because of ~t~l.y's Ru~opean 
stance in international affairs, and refusal to be identified 
with US interests in the Maghreb, there is much good will 
towards Italy in the Arab world. Considering tho geographic 
proximity of Italy to the Maghreb, like Spain, Italy has an 
important economic, social and political role to play in 
EC-Maghrebi affairs. The estimated population of the Maghreb 
will be over 100 million people by 2000 AD. For Italy and the 
EC in general, the Maghreb thus holds enormous commercial 
potential. The demographic revolution means that the Maghrebi 
economies and social environments will need at least to produce 
twice as much food. build fon:r t.i mes as many house::; and 
accomplish a five fold increase in education and public health 
services, to maintain an acceptable standard of living (Garaud, 
198b, p.2). Technologically, this is possible with EC 
cooperation, while politically this development is indespensable 
for stability on the EC's southern flank. 
8.4 THE EC. 
8.4.1 In Search of an EC Maghrebi Policy. 
According to Nesterenko (1985, p.33), 
"The EC's relations with the Maghreb fall 
within the larger framework of its relations 
with the states around the Mediterranean 
rim". 
Lack of a coherent EC policy in relation to the M~ghreb j_s lJke 
closing the door of one's home in an effort to ignorG tho fact 
·that dynamite is being stored in the nai~h~our's house. 
Ceog:caphic :p~t:>OKi.mj_·cy and j_nte:t:>ac·G:Lo:o. dJ_ctatc tha:f. there r:n:u::;t :to 
a constructive rapport between the ~uropcan and 
Communities (see map 8.2c). 
In the wake of World ~ar II, the roweEs once more 
recognized that poverty was a major cause of conflict. The 
Marshall Pla).l was a salient recognition of tho fact. Petty 
nationalism and statcism had. to give way to a more 
j_nternationalist approach based on laissez _f_ai:re principles. 
This was capitalism's answer to Soviet expansion and the 
Comintern. The inception of the EEC was based largely on the 
financial aid of the US Marshall Plan, and. .inter-state 
complementarity. 
for political 
All recognized that economics were the motor 
unification in Europe. Historic geopolitical 
precedents were offered by Prussia's role in German unification, 
that of Piedmont in Italy, southern England in the UK context 
and the Ile de France in France. The Treaty of Rome (1958) laid 
the grounds for economic and political integration in Europe. 
The adhesion of the Iberian states to the EC (1986), not only 
meant the integration of the south-western states into Europe of 
the 12, but ever-closer geographical interaction with the 
Maghreb, sharing common maritime and territorial boundaries 
exemplified especially in Ceuta and Melilla. The Maghreb now 
constitutes the EC rimlands (see map 8.2c). 
In the 1970s and 80s, the EC has stressed that: 
" (the) :Mediterranean is o..n a:cea o·f 
considerable importance to the Community, . 
and (the EC) is i:o. El, Fni.qne nositj_on, 
r,:.1d has :cesponsibj_litios ; t ctl>n:oot shi:ck" 
(negelsberg~r & Vessels, 188~. p.2~9). 
Thus tho EC has a responsibility to ensure sound futu~e economic 
and political development in the Maghreb. :No:.:··L;h Af:cica' s 
proximity offers the EC an opportunity or putting its espoused 
policies of concerted action in international affairs into 
operatj_on, thus , t ~ . g aemons ravln the "European identity" .in 
international fora (Regelsberger & Wessels, 1984, p.239). In 
the diplomatic sphere, the EC must play a greater role in 
resolving problems in the west Mediterranean region, for 
instance the Moroccan-Spanish disputes (Bourrinet & Torrelli, 
1980, pp.38-67, 76-109). EC viewpoints on the Maghreb are 
divergent. In the European Parliament, the Christain Democrats 
have stressed the importance of a policy to curtail Soviet 
expansion, Gaullists wish to exclude the superpowers from the 
Mediterranean arena, and the Socialists want the EC to be a 
forum for d~tente. By 1987, no group had produced a coherent 
Maghrebi agenda. 
The geopolitical forces of the EC dictate that a coherent 
Maghrebi policy be adopted. With the Association Agreements 
concluded with Greece (1961) and Turkey (1963), the EC 
elaborated its first formal links with third states. It is 
arguable that geostrategic reasons took precedence over 
economics. While Greece was incorporated into the EC (1984), 
the Turkish case is more problematic. Turkey's location renders 
it part of Europe and Asia; it's human, political and economic 
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geography dicta;te C;JJ mo:re cautious a.pp:roach on ·che pa,:rt of 
B:rtvssels COD.CCr:rJ.:i_:ng close:r :r21Fl,t i. OJJ.S • :Oe s ~:J :i ·i~ o }'j·'"' >v ad.v.i.se ·t;o 
~('ll.:.:':k.oy :o.o·;,; to for.mc1,lly r-;,pp1y ?o:c a.d.mtss:i.o:o. to ·i~:ho Cu:rnnm:o.i·::;y, 
~urkey did so in Aprtl 1987. ~utu:re devalopmcnts betweun tho ~C 
and Turkey may set a p~ecedent for Morcoco. 
Cooperation Agreements were signed with Morocco, and 
Tunisia (1969), and later Association Agreements (1976), during 
an era of unprecedented economic development in Europe. These 
accords were -nut oriented. towards eventual EC rnem.be:rship, but. 
rather served French interests in adapting to the post-colonial 
economic order (see above, map 8.8). In the 1970s the EC 
developed a 'Global Mediterranean Policy' guaranteeing free 
access for industrial products, and facilitating the entry of 
agricultural exports from the Maghreb. Included were aid and 
cooperation packages. By the 1980s, a complex network of 
accords had been established with all Mediterranean states 
except Libya and Albania. It was envisaged that the EC ideals 
of democracy and free trade would efface former hostile colonial 
relationships, leading to cooperation. However, it was also 
foreseen that the Maghreb would have a population of over 100 
million consumers by 2000 AD. According to Regelsberger and 
Wessels (1984, p.239). 
"A global Mediterranean policy was conceived 
to be, along with the Lome Agreement, a 
central part of its (EC's) role as a 
civilian power as opposed to a Superpower 
military concern dimension". 
In North Africa, EC-Maghrebi cooperation is imperative for 
regional security. Maghrebi leaders have reiterated time and 
again that the :RC :rhetoric of vlest Med:L·ce:r:':canea:o :t':rate:nd ty mnst 
be bolsto:r:ed :hy mo:r:e equ.i ti:blo t:cad:t:og pa:i~·i~u:oJ.::>. 
'.L'b.c oil. cr>:i.ses of the J.97Cs lo:o:c a :o.0\'1 d:Lno:o.sto:J. ·co ::-;:c 
interest in the ~egion, particularly lD Alge~ia and ~i:bya. 
Signi.ficantly associat~.on ~greements ~lth the Maghrcbi states 
v1e:ce only sigm::d in 1976. The :u.t·cle progress made in 
EC-Maghrebi relations ( 1976-86) beca~me stra,.i_ned when Spain and 
Portugal joined the Community (see tables 8.4, 8.5). Future 
~berian policies will have a major influence on Maghrebi views 
of the EC. 
Spanish integration into the EC will have longterm social, 
economlc and political consequences for the North Africans. The 
degree of self-sufficiency attained by the EC because of Spanish 
membership, and EC preference and rights systems, undermines the 
Maghreb's economic commitment to the EC, except in relation to 
hydrocarbon and phosphate supplies. With Iberian integration, 
it is estimated that the Community is self-sufficient in all 
Mediterranean agricultural products; citrus fruits (90%), small 
fruits (110%), tomatoes (100%), olive oil (109%), canned fish 
(120%) and wine (110%) (Nesterenko, 1985, p.34). Hence this 
means a restructuring of Maghrebi trading patterns. Because of 
preference for Iberian produce, pressures will be brought to 
bear in Brussels to strengthen trade barriers against Maghrebi 
produce. Because of the EC's first-power status, its surplus of 
Mediterranean products has the advantage of EC market mechanisms 
to penetrate the international market, unlike the more fragile 
Maghrebi market mechanisms (Bourrinet & Torrelli, 1980, 
Jl:P. 5'7 --J.OU). 
The Maghreb's intermediaLe technology sootor (textiJ.es, 
footw~~e and leather goods) now faces greator competition from 
high quality, low priced Xbarian p~o~uc·~s. Korocco aTid Tunisia 
have most to lose in ·bhi.s area. The gradual erosion of the 1976 
Agreemen·L s \.Yould corroborate this inte:cp:cetation, as the EC 
Commission aokowledged in 1984 (BC. Hept. COMM. No.l07. 
Parag.l9. J. 1 May 1984) . AJ.ready in 1978, the Commission 
accepted that there was a II serious j_mbalanoe II in its economic 
relations with the Maghreb (Nesterenko, 1985, p.36). On 28 
March 1985, the Euro Council made a statement of intention, in 
the Community's name, in relation to the Mediterranean which was 
essentially political rather than economic. Its breadth was of 
a global Mediterranean nature, though it had been understood 
that it would deal specifically with the Maghreb and economics. 
Significantly only Morocco is referred to in thP. 1 ;:u:;t paragraph. 
Concerning the economic rapport, the EC is the Maghreb's 
largest supplier of manufactured goods. Maghrebi trade with the 
EC had a defecit of $1,700 million in 1980, while its share of 
EC imports averaged less than 2.5% The Maghreb's export share 
of manufactured goods to the EC (mostly textiles) is about 1% 
(Nesterenko, 1985, p.36). Though small, it is significant to 
the local economies. Algerian and Libyan hydrocarbon exports to 
the Community have remained steady, as with Moroccan phosphate 
exports (see table 8.4, 8.5, appendices VI-IX). 
To ensure future development and regional security in the 
Maghreb, more realistic policies have to be adopted. EC 
suggostions us to development in the Magh~eb entaiJ. redeployment 
of lands and resources, and divs~s~fic~tion of 
Hedeployme:o.t i:o. Ho:rocco a:o.c1 T'ruJ. i.s:i.o, .i.s :·.w;:; v18.blo, :::>ucauso l~l:w 
physical and technological cnviro:o.~ents t~e~e are unlikely to 
yj e:l.d. :p:r;oducts t::1a,c the :t:C is not alreoJd.y seJf-su.ffJoj_e:o.t Lu, m: 
will shortly be. Mo:r:occan economic strateg:i.es of tP.J,rget.i.ng key 
sectors towards EC market demands in tho 1970s, bear w~tness to 
this. Ironically redeployment necessitates hard currency, which 
theoret-ical-ly should - come from trade \·lith tlHS" BC. W.ith 
reference to diversification, Morocco is already vigorously 
pursuing export policies to the Eastern Block, America, 
Middle -East and Africa. The main problem here is the perishable 
nature of produce and prohibitive transport costs. When the 
1965-1970 average is compared to the 1980-82 average, the EC's 
share of Morocco's sum total of exports dropped from 72% to 53% 
fur citrus fruits, by over ~0% for early fruit and vegetables, 
from 72% to 20% for wine, and from 56% to 46% for canned fish 
(Nesterenko, 1985, p.43). 
8.4.2 Viewpoints from the Southern Shore. 
In 1985, prominent political figures in the Maghreb were 
interviewed by Geopolitique (No. 10) and asked their views on the 
EC. The contrasting answers indicate the national positions. 
Though Libya has substantial trading links with the EC, it 
refuses to have formal links. Mauritania's rapport with the EC 
is limited, and mostly via France and the Lome Convention. 
Algeria's J:i'orei~n .·"-'.hmo6. ':a,leb 
history of Eu~opo with that of the Magh~eb, ~DG emph~sized that 
'hn 1~de·po~d0llC8 s~·~u~g·ln~ 'cho~e (lOoPQs ~OS) L ····"'- -- ·-· ~ .. ....., ..... c; .. L .1 0 '-i u -- .1.. • • v - '-" the 
name of a united Maghreb. Ibrahimi recognj.zed the great 
a,chj.ev·ements of the )~C, but stated that its rC~,is_on d.' etTe is c, 
quest for economic hegemony. He asked what uas tho EC's 
attitude to the question-of' wine surpluses in the 1970s, from 
which Algeria once derived over 70% of its export earnings. He 
stated that the sudden shrinkage of the EC market (1976), forced 
Algeria to seek alternative markets and hasten its costly policy 
of reconverting the vineyards. Currently wine forms a 
negligible part of the Algerian export market. Thus he restated 
Algeria's scepticism about Western relations with the developing 
countries, and re-echoed Boumedienne's famous statement that 
wine was the poisoned gift of French colonialism. In the same 
vein of thought, he asked what the EC offers in exchange for 
Algeria's role in furnishing the Community with hydrocarbons, 
and security of supply? "Simply, a bad balance of payments". 
With reference to EC-Maghrebi Agreements, Ibrahimi says: 
"While they have flourished commercially, 
with mounting deficits, the volume of 
financial cooperation stagnated since 1975, 
even though our imports have grown tenfold 
in the intervening period" . 
Ibrahimi concluded by stating that economic realism 
dictates that the EC will "look after itself", and the lesson to 
be learned by the Maghrebi states is that they must follow the 
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EC' s exa.mple, by coo:poratin.g and. econom:i.cu,l:l.y :i./\tAg:I:'B,"Ctng 'Lo 
l\l~e c:i.<:l,' s ua.u"L ious rolatioD.sl:.i;c u:i_'G~.l t b.c :Be :i.r:> ho,sed o:o. a, 
the :L960s. P~oside~t Boumedienne's (1965-l978) 6ra~m of making 
Algerj_a tho indust~ia.l core of a united :lv.Iaghreb, tho 'P:v:-u.ssia of 
. h g· 
·c_ .. e ~o J_on, is still alive. Hecau8e of i·cs natural rosources, 
Algeria is less willing to accept economic dependence on the 
dictates of the E·c market. 
(b) 'I'unj_sia .. 
When interviel'.¥ed. by f,eo_JLolitique (1985, NO.lO, pp.6-13), 
the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed M'zali, stated that: 
"Geopolitically (there is) . 
dramatic absence of any 
association based on solj.darity 
North and South" . 
He also said that: 
the . 
form of 
between 
"It is not the broadening of the Community 
which concerns us, for that is an internal 
matter for Europe. Rather what does concern 
us is the steady decline in our trade with 
the EC". 
M'zali spoke of the characteristics of Tunisian culture and 
society, and its evolution towards the ideal of democracy and 
economic development based on Tunisian precepts. He asked the 
EC to respect the political uniqueness of the Maghreb, and by 
closer economic cooperation help secure stability. 
Islam, M'zali said that: 
"The defence of Islam was seen as a struggle 
to preserve the personality of Tunisia and 
safeguard the cultural identity of the 
Concerning 
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'l'untsia:o.s" . 
'rhus M' ?.:BJi J?O:i.:o.tod out ·~he goopcliticc:J. :•:-ea.Jj -G~i.es of 
Tunisia; goographic~Jly close to the developed ~orld, but of the 
South; lslamic anct modern aspiring to democracy, but t~reatened 
by poverty and fundamentalism if not suppo~ted by tho EC. 
(c) Morocco. 
The Moroccan viewpoint has similarities with those of 
Algeria and Tunisia, but is not exactly the same. It wishes to 
portray an independent stance, like Algeria, but does not have 
the advantages of hydrocarbon resources nor internal political 
stability to do so. Like Tunisia, it seeks EC economic and 
political support for the present regime; but unlike Tunisia, 
the Moroccan democratic process is more fictional than real. 
Hassan recognizes that Morocco's relations with the EC are of 
geostrategic and geopolitical importance, becfl,11Se of proximity 
to Gibraltar. 
In 1985, Moroccan exports accounted for less than 6% of EC 
imports of Mediterranean farm produce (Nesterenko, 1985, p.40). 
Morocco regrets that the 1976 agreements were limited to the 
agricultural sphere, and wants future accords to include 
fishing, industry and social concerns. In 1985, there were over 
750,000 Moroccan nationals living in the EC, and remittances 
equalled almost half Morocco's trade defecit (Nesterenko, 1985, 
p.40). The number of Moroccan immigrants living in the EC had 
risen to 1 million by 1987 (Sunday Times Magazine, 15 Nov.1987, 
pp.74-83). Morocco wishes EC aid to be increased, or at least 
maintained at the level agreed upon in 1976. 
Morocco believes it can make a significant contribution to 
the EC in the economic and political spheres (see maps 8.2). BC 
a.g.d.culturs 
fertilizers. 
.is 
In 
hea·vily 
J982 , the 
ctepe:o.de:.xl; 
EC im:ported 
o:o. ·i.,he i:u1po:r:·t a..t :Lon of 
50% of :i_ts :req:·c:.i :cements 
from Morocco, 20% from the USA, 12% from Senegal and Togo, 12% 
from Israel and Tunisia, and 6% from the USSR (Nesterenko, 1985, 
p. 41). Morocco has the largest known phosphate reserves in the 
world. Moroccan waters are rich in fish stocks, the EC Common 
}'i-sheries -Policy ca.m.wt - ITIBet t.he Communi t;y demand-. Spain's 
fishing fleet, represents 70% of the EC's total tonnage, and it 
is estimated that over 1,000 Spanish vessels were o:perating in 
Moroccan waters in the mid-1980s. Surveys suggest that the 
amount of fish which may be taken in Morocco's Atlantic waters 
without damaging future stocks to be 5 million tons, or 8% of 
the world catch (Nesterenko, 1985, p.41). 
Morocco wishes to play an active liaison role between the 
EC/West and Arabs. In an interview in 1985, Ahmed Reda Guedira, 
Advisor to the King, stated the Moroccan viewpoint on the EC 
(Geopolitique, No. 10. pp.26-31). He said that being an 
underdeveloped state at the time of independence (1956), Morocco 
was affected by the ideological hostilities of the superpowers. 
"Being imbued with the spirit of Bandung. Marxism-Leninism held 
a certain attraction in contrast to what the colonial West had 
to offer". However, in 1964, Morocco instigated negotiations 
with the EC, leading to agreements (1969, 1976). Guedira stated 
that the limited trading agreements put no obligation on the EC 
to aid Moroccan development. Because the agreements "are 
539 
:ma:a.ifestly of :u_ttle interest to both. sides", their "state e;md 
:o.atu.re cannot be i mp:cmred." . Hence in 1984, King 
Hv.ssa.:o., po!'so:nc;.:!.l y :;.D.formod :'l:eu.sseJ s n.:t~.d. ·c!w :::::c chai:.rma:o. 
:r>:-eesidcnt ~j.tter~nd, of Morocco's ~ntension to sock full 
membership o? the ~c. and shortly afterwards :posed. its 
candidature. Hassan's dossier highlighted three areas: (i) 
trade; (ii) geographical location and the proposed trans-Strait 
fixed-link; and (iii) political, the desire to be allied to 
democratic Europe. 
In relation to Morocco's request to join the EC, Gu~d.ira 
stated that: 
"Hassan II has taken his deois1o:o., and it is 
indeed his own, for no one else in his 
ministerial team would have been so bold". 
Hassan stated that Morocco's candidature should be considered at 
the highest political level in the EC, rather than by the heavy 
bureaucracy, because of the political "implications and 
consequences at every level". Significantly when Hassan signed 
a Treaty of Union with Libya the same year, Guedira said that 
this did not affect in any way Morocco's sovereign decision to 
join the EC. He insisted that Morocco wished to play its role 
in the "marriage" of the Arab and European worlds, of Western 
technology and Arab wealth. To show his resolve in the affair 
Hassan created two new government posts, a minister for 
communications with the EC, and one to consolidate relations 
with the Gulf States. One Community diplomat told the author 
(1985) in private that Hassan's request for EC membership 
initially "caused shook", then "embarrased silence" and 
J40 
ev·entuaJJy "mirth" . Shortly after a state visit to Britain in 
1987, rrassan onoo again asked Brussels to accopt Morocco's 
oanditature for HC membership. 
Morocco is aware of the EC's d.i.lemma, a:r.l 
j.mpove~ishod state on ~ts southern flank, yet a oou~t~y of g~e~L 
geostrategic importance. Hassan is cognisant that the USA 
informally supported Greek and Spanish membership of the EC, and 
backs Turkey's candidature. If the EC does not adopt coherent 
-
strategies in relation to Morocco, then Western aid 
(particularly from the USA) offers the only panacea for 
Morocco's problems, apart from closer links with anti-Western 
states. Morocco's request to join the EC constitutes one of the 
greatest geopolitical gambles which the region has witnessed 
since the establishment of colonies on both shores of the 
Strait. Any form of political union between Morocco and the EC 
is highly problematic. Formal political links would endanger 
King Hassan's rule because of the nature of his autocratic 
regime in contrast to EC style democracy. One can only imagine 
the problems that would be encountered in Rabat, Casablanca or 
Tangier in organizing the election of Euro-MPs. Thus Hassan's 
application for EC membership may be seen as a warning to the 
West to support him financially and pol1tically, or be prepared 
for a difficult future. Significantly to date, no EC state nor 
the Euro Parliament has offically recognized SADR. The idea of 
union with the EC is also sacriligious for fundamentalists as 
this would offer non-Islamic powers a say in governing a Muslim 
territory and people. 
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associated bodies such as the GFoup of 77. llistory, geography, 
self-perception and aspired roles b.a,ve significantly shaped 
their national viewpoints (see map 8.2b). In 1955, at the 
inaugural meeting of the nonaligned countries at Bandung some 29 
states participB.tect, .i.nclu.d:lng I1agh:rcbi :rop:resenta:i.;ive::;. At the 
Summit of Non-Aligned Countries (1986) in Harare, some 101 
governments were represented, including those of the Maghreb. 
At the 1986 summit, Qadhafi stated that there was no such thing 
as non-alignment and that the Movement was "a farce". Qadhafi's 
viewpoint reflected that of Cuba, which had attempted to push 
the Movement into a Soviet alliance in 1979. At the 1986 
summit, the state~ alms of the Movement were to encourage 
North-South cooperation, facilitate the superpower dialogue, and 
participation in international fora for nuclear disarmament. 
All Maghrebi delegations (save Libya) offically supported these 
motions. 
However global agreement on political principles among the 
developing countries is far removed from the every-day realities 
of the Maghrebis states (see map 8.2a,b,c). Algeria is possibly 
Yet as a 
against 
While 
the only state in the region to be truly non-aligned. 
general rule, the Maghrebis have always hedged 
polarization of their relations with the superpowers. 
Morocco has shown itself to have allied stances with the USA and 
France, in the late 1970s it signed trade agreements for 
phosphates and fish with ·ch8 USSR, \VOrth ove:r $2 r.n.U.Jj on El,Dd 
$300 million rAspoctiveJ.y (Za~tmann, 198~. p.l74). 
es~ablish bases 1n North Africa, SOCUI'O phospha:to and. 
hydrocarbon supp:U8s, and ~ain influence :La the Stl~ai't a:r.m;J,. US 
policy in the :region is globalist, which has alienated Alge:cia 
somewhat and caused a violent backlash on the part of Libya. In 
1987 Qadhafi vowed to install Soviet nuclear missiles along the 
Libyan coast if tho USA attacked again. He stdted th~t: 
"Libya will declare that it is a communist 
country and join the Warsaw Pact, and deploy 
Soviet missiles on the coast of the 
Mediterranean" (NBC News, Qadhafi Interview, 
23 March 1987, reported in The Gua:rdian, 24 
March 1987; & Le Monde, 24 March 1987). 
Despite such statements it is unlikely that any of the Maghrebi 
peoples would permit their regimes to follow such a path due to 
contact with Western Europe and the strength of the Islamic 
ideal. 
8.5.2 Maghrebi-US Relations. 
The USA established consular representation in the Maghreb 
in the 18th century, and Morocco was the first to offically 
recognize the independence of the USA (1776). Because of the 
European scramble to partition Africa in the 19th century, the 
Moroccan Sultan formally requested the US to establish a 
protectorate, in the belief that this would save his kingdom 
(see chapter 4, maps 4.1-4.2). With the Allied liberation of 
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North Africa (1942), the DS established contacts wj.th the 
::~;.a"ghrehi. tndepe:o.de7lue movmne:o:cs. John F. :.ronnedy helped. focus 
internati.onal atten·tion on the Algerian Liberation War 
(1954-62), yet the USA managed to waintain good relations with 
France. ~he US presence at the French air base of Port Layautey 
(Kenitra), north of Rabat, eventually became a communications 
centre of great importance for the US Sixth Fleet. The US 
establishf'ld. a lar~e commt,_n~.ce..tionc not\:Jorl:;. at Tangj_e:c. By 1951, 
the USA had developed three strategic air command bases in 
Morocco, at Sidi Slimane (between Kenitra and Meknes), Nouasseur 
(south of Casablanca), and Ben Guerir (north of Marrakesh). The 
base agreements had been signed by France, which proved 
frustrating for the newly independent Moroccan state (1956). 
Morocco asked that the US air force presence be withdraw in 
1963, the KeDlLrti complex was not evacuated until 1978. 
Nonetheless Morocco is cooperative with the USA on fleet visits, 
overflight and intelligence gathering. From 1975 on there was 
closer cooperation, largely because of the Western Sahara War 
and the Reagan Administration/s quest for base facilities for 
the RDF. Morocco has supplied the USA with valuable 
intelligence concerning Soviet weapons captured in the Sahara. 
As US commercial interests in Morocco are negligible, and 
Morocco has 
always been 
diplomatic 
no known 
based on 
relations 
hydrocarbon resources, the rapport has 
geostrategic principles. However 
were strained because of the 
( 1984-86). In 1987, the US resumed Moroccan-Libyan Union 
sending high level government personnel on official visits to 
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a mode~ate by the USh. Bo ar~angod initial contacts between 
rs~ael and 2gypt (1970s); Jewish communities livo in ~olativo 
security in Morocco; and international Jewish Congresses we£e 
allowed to be held there in the 1980s. Hassan b~s supported 
anti-communist forces in Angola, Zaire and the ATabian/Persian 
Gulf. Hassan's enemies feel that his policies a£e inherently 
pro-Western and pro-Israeli; some believe that 
over-identification with US policies may yet lead to his 
downfall. 
US relations with Algeria to date have been based on 
economic rather than political principles (see maps 2.2-2.4). 
In the mid-1980s the US obtained contracts with Algeria to the 
value of $1 2 billion (Ptirker, 1984, p.l43). The US remains 
suspicious of Algeria because of its nationalization policies in 
the 1970s, and its anti-imperialist stance, including diplomatic 
support for Vietnam, the Palestinians, the New International 
Economic Order, the Mediterranean Zone of Peace movement, and 
avid Third World stances at the UN conferences on the law of the 
sea (see chapter 3). Algeria's diplomatic and military support 
for the Polisario has retarded better relations. Algeria's role 
in resolving the US hostage crisis in Iran (1979-81), was a 
clear indicator of its stature in the international community. 
Yet the USA failed to acknowledge Algeria's actions, and 
insensitively signed an arms deal with Morocco within days of 
the release of the hostages. 
Despite Algerian-US contentions in the 1980s concerning 
pr~cin~ and LNG contracts, jt is recognized that Algerian 
81'-P:Pl:Los of 1J.yd.:rocarbons e:ue sj gnifica.nt to t~J.o US oco:o.omy. 
Comme~cia: agreemen·t between Alger~.a a~d the USA has boon mo~o 
;?:ro:bJc~mt1tic tb.a.:a tha:t \v."i..th Fnmce c>,nd :Ctaly. ·op to tho 
mid-l980s, US importers were prepared to meet the Algerian 
prico, but the US government and consumer groups were not. 
Fears have been expressed. by the US government concerning 
secu.ri ty of su.ppl.y. Oppo:r!ents of Algerian-US LNG agreements 
suggest that the fJ.ov1 could be interrupted for political reasons 
or that prices may be arbitrarily changed at short notice. This 
is indicative of the pervasive view that Algeria is esentially 
unfriendly. 
The Panhandle Eastern Corporation suspended its shipments 
of LNG under contract in 1983, but Distrigas of Boston has 
conti~ued tu impurL 1.9 billion cubic metres annually. The 
outcome of the saga, is still not clear, but the symbiosis 
between Algeria and consumers in the north-eastern USA, some 15% 
of whose domestic fuel requirements were to have come from this 
source according to US projections in the mid-1970s, has not 
developed as anticipated, and it seems unlikely that it will at 
any time soon (Parker, 1984, p.46). The Algerian stance could 
yet prove advantageous to the nation, as it refuses to deplete 
its resources for short-term capital gain. In 1980, 86% of 
export revenue came from oil; in 1984, oil was still providing 
some 60% of the national budget. Algeria is paid for oil in 
dollars, and buys imports from non-dollar areas, thus 
bonofitting from the increased cur~ency value. 
In the earJ.y l980s, there were over 2,000 Soviet and East 
Europuan military advisers in Algeria, as well as 11,1~0 Soviet 
·technicians working in tho oommercjal sphere (Parker, 1984, 
p.l44). However these statistics are minimal in comparison to 
the number of Westerners, Chinese and other forei~ners working 
there, believed to be approximately 1.25 million. While living 
and working in educations.l .i.nstitn:t,j,o:ns j_:iJ. Algeri~ ( 1978-81), 
the author found in general that there was little friendly 
contact between the Soviets and Algerians in the educational 
env.ironment, everyday situations such as II queueing II at stores 
or in the social sphere. The cultural and ideological 
differences are rarely breached, despite the official rhetoric 
of fraternity. While the USA is Algeria's first trading 
partner, until recently Algeria rem~ined the fourth largest 
purchaser of Soviet arms among the less developed countries. 
Since 1979, Algeria has tried to diversify its sources of arms 
supply; with the USA, France and Spain competing for the trade. 
Tunisia enjoys excellent relations with the USA, but like 
Morocco, economic interests are limited. The US interest in 
Tunisia is geopolitical, because of location and President 
Bourguiba's pro-Western stance in international affairs 
(1956-87). The superpowers, France and Maghrebi regimes closely 
monitored events in Tunisia between 1978-87, because of the 
deterioriating health of Bourguiba, the pending leadership 
crisis, populist revolts and Libyan interference in Tunisian 
affairs. A bloodless coup d'etat took place on 7 November 1987, 
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and the Prime i!finister, General Zine al-Abadj.ne Ben Ali, took 
over the role of President of the republ.i.c. Tt .·i_s l.i.koly tb.at 
Ben Al.i \vill continuo ~runisia' s pro- \1 est e:r:0. po:U.cy c~e:i_m{-'Js, 8 
Nov.l987; p.20; ib.id, 9 Nov.l987, pp.B, 17, 24; Obse:rver, 8 
Nov.1987, p.l3; Independent, 9 Nov.l987, pp.l, 12; Gua:rdi~n, 9 
Nov.1987, p.7). There were unconfirmed reports in Tunis that 
Ben Ali may have informed the USA or been aided by the US in 
"retiring" Bourguiba (Guardian, 9 Nov-.1987, p.7). 
Several Western ojJ_ companieD arc actively engaged in 
onshore and of.f.sho:re exploration in Tunisia (see maps 2.2-2.5). 
Oil and natural gas deposits were discovered in 1964 and will 
cover domestic needs into the next century. Oil reserves are 
estimated to be approximately 250 million tons and natural gas 
150 billion cubic metres. Along with hydrocarbon extraction, 
phosphate exploitation represents just less than a quarter of 
the GNP. Oil production l~ about 5.~ million tons annually, and 
natural gas some 250 million cubic metres (Atlaseco, 1984, 1985, 
1986). Tunisia is trying to foster refining and chemical 
plants; the US and EC are competing for the trade. 
Relations between Libya and the USA were dictated by 
geostrategic and economic principles until Colonel Qadhafi came 
to power in 1969. Petroleum reserves are estimated to about 3 
billion tons, while in 1984, it was believed that the production 
of natural gas could reach some 560 billion cubic metres per 
year (see maps 2.2-2.4), (Atlaseco, 1984, 1986). Despite the 
forced US evacuation of its Libyan bases and political 
contentions, as late as 1980, Libya was the third largest 
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supplier of US oil imports. Until 1981, 6 US companies were 
invol.ved in oil extraction and e~portation. US development 
projects in Libya in the early 1980s, were estimated to bo 
valued at $10 billion, and US exports averaged some $900 million 
(Parker, 1984, p.l45). In 1982, the majority of US citi~ens 
left Libya, and the US government embargoed the importation of 
Libyan oil. The US air strike on Libya (1986) was aimed at 
bringing down the Qadhafi regime. It was hoped that Libyan 
dis-sidents would st!:l.ge a coup d/etat, and re-establish good 
relations with Washington. In 1987, Qadhafi stated that US 
"imperialism" could force Libya into seeking membership of the 
Warsaw Pact. The Soviets have declined closer association with 
Libya because of Qadhafi/s capacity to become involved in 
disputes, and the fact that Libyan military engagements with the 
USA (1981, 1986), and in Chad (1987) proved to be fiascos. The 
USA and France maintain cordial relations with Mauritania. This 
is aimed at countering Qadhafiism, and Soviet fishing interests 
in the region. 
In conclusion it may be said that all the Maghrebi regimes 
offically declare their states to be nonaligned (see map 8.5). 
However Morocco and Tunisia foster closer relations with the 
West and especially the US. Since 1979, Algeria has developed 
greater links with the West, and has maintained cordial 
relations with the USSR without deviating from its goal of 
nonalignment. The pro-Soviet attitudes expressed by the Libyan 
regime are only significant in so far as they suit Libyan 
policy, which is dictated by Colonel Qadhafi rather than Moscow. 
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8. 6 ARABISN: S'.I'A'l'E Vs NATTON. 
All the Maghrebi regimes have pursued policies aimed at the 
d.est:('uction of thei:;: indigenous m:i.D.o:c:U~y He:ct>er cultures. 
:c:conically Alge:cia. and. Libya officially suppor·i~ m.i.:norj_ty :r.i..ghts 
groups throughout the world. L\t tho h.tstor:i.c T.a.ngte:r_ Bu:mm.i..j:;_ 
(1958) of Maghrebi political parties, the leaders of the 
Moroccan and Algerian delegations made tho rallying cry: "We are 
Arab, Arab, Arab". This evocative slogan reflects the desire to 
be part of the Arab world, rather than peripheral: and to 
obliterate the Berber component of the culture as well as that 
inherited from European colonialism. Membership of the Arab 
League for the Maghreb.i. states symbolizes the desire to find 
their Arab identity and role in global geopolitics (see maps 
8. 2). 
The Arab League was founded in 1945, and in 1987 consisted 
of 22 states and the PLO (sec map 8.2a). .. Paradoxically", 
association has survived because of its looseness" (Drysdale & 
Blake, 1985, p.246). Its constitution pledges to uphold the 
independence and sovereignty of member states, promote 
cooperation and coordination. Decisions are only binding on 
states that accept them. Hence, few major political issues have 
been unaminously resolved by the League. When contacted by the 
author in Tunis (1984), to know if there was a definite League 
policy, or Arab viewpoint on the implementation of the Law of 
the Sea, the answer was no. However the Tunis bureau was most 
helpful in supplying copies of UN information. 
With the signing of the 'Camp David Accords' (1978), the 
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headquarters (General Secretariat) of the Arab League was 
transfered to Tunis, because of the expulsion of Egypt from the 
association. Now Tunis hosts several branches of the League's 
bureaucracy, including the Arab League ~ducation, Culture and 
Scientific Organi~aLion (ALECSO), the Arab Postal Union, and 
Arab State Broadcasting Union. Branches of the organization are 
based in other Arab cities such as Amman, Baghdad and Rabat. 
Significantly, the Maghrebi states now host the major 
bureaucratic organs of the League. 
An espoused aim of the Arab League is to provide a forum 
for consultation and conflict resolution. For instance in 1967, 
it was decided that petro dollars would be given to Egypt, Syria 
and Jordan to aid in the war effort against Israel. At Rabat 
(1974) the League officially recognized the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. At the Fez 
meeting (1982), the League adopted a joint Arab peace plan that 
implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist. The League has 
helped resolve disputes between Iraq and Kuwait (1961), Oman and 
PDR Yemen (1972-76), Egypt and Libya (1977), and Jordan and PLO 
forces (1970). Significantly, the PLO bureaucracy was moved to 
Tunis in 1983, and was bombed by Israel in 1985. 
The League provides a forum for informal dialogue, eg 
Algeria and Morocco. It played a role in the creation of the 
Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) (1964) and Arab Common 
Market CACM) which Libya and Mauritania joined. The League has 
offically helped foster the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The League and 
EC Bureau in Tunis, frequently sponsor joint educational 
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projects. The League was instrumental in bringing togethe~ the 
oil producing count~ies including Alge~ia, Libya and Tunisia. 
~rhe Maghreb and Arab wo~ld a~e rich in hyd~ocarbon and 
mineral ~esou~ces (see map 2.2-2.4). Almost 70% of the wo~ld's 
p~oven oil resources are located in Arab states. In 1960, the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPRC) was founded 
(DrysdaJ.e & Blake, 1985, pp.90, 246-249, 258). Because of the 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, oil producing Arab states imposed an 
embargo to dissuade Western support for Israel. Other oil 
producing states tried to meet the demand. Imbued with radical 
economic ideas, (eg Algeria and Libya), by the 1970s OPEC 
emerged as a quasi-cartel with control over oil output and 
pricing. Thus the Arab states challenged the Western monopoly 
of the oil industry and market which it had enjoyed for decades 
via seven major companies (Odell, 1983). With the closure of 
the Suez Canal (1967-80), the tanker voyage from the Gulf to the 
EC was lengthened by approximately 7,700 km (4,800 mls) because 
of the necessity to use the Cape of Good Hope route (see map 
1.1c). The Gibraltar artery remained invaluable for energy 
supplies between the Maghrebi oil exporting states and the West. 
The tanker voyage between the Maghreb and Rotterdam only takes 
16 days as opposed to 62, from the Gulf via the Cape route. The 
proximity of Maghrebi supplies to Italian and French refineries 
was crucial in relieving the oil crisis, with the tanker journey 
only taking one day. In 1968 alone, Libyan output increased by 
50%, the West became heavily dependent on Maghrebi supplies. 
With the 1969 cou~ d'etat in Libya, Qadhafi immediately raised 
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the fixed oil prices and ordered tho international companies to 
cut production or face nationalization. r.ibyan cutbacks 
coincided with a tightening of the oil market and he~vy HC 
demand. 
Between 1967 and 1973, because of a shortage of VLCCs, the 
Trans Arabian Oil Pipeline (TAPLINE) being put out of operation, 
and the incapacity of the USA to meet domestic demands, all 
spare production capacity lay in the OPEC states (see map 2.2). 
Libya encouraged other oil producing states to limit production. 
Eventually the seven major oil barons began to deal with OPEC as 
a block. 
In 1968, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) was founded. With the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
OPEC raised prices by 70% because of the tight market, while 
OAPEC cut production and imposed embargoes on the USA and the 
Netherlands because of their support for Israel. The situation 
remained somewhat stable until the Iranian Revolution (1979). 
With the drop in Iranian oil supplies to 5 million b/d, prices 
soared on the open market. OPEC rose prices in stages. Between 
1972-85, there was a 15 fold price increase. In 1978, the USA 
imported 7.8% of its oil supplies from Algeria and 7.8% from 
Libya. By 1983, imports from Algeria had fallen to 4.7% and 
Libyan trade had been embargoed. By the mid-1980s, less than a 
third of US oil imports were emanating from OPEC states. In the 
EC states, save the UK, members are still heavily dependent 
(75%-95%) on oil imports from OPEC (Drysdale & Blake, 1985, 
pp. 333-336). 
Fo~ ·the Maghreb, the consequences of the energy crisis 
(1967-79) have been manyfold. Algeria and Libya gained greater 
stc.:turo i.n the 
g:ren,t.ost o:nel:'gy 
Arab community becomi~g 
cartel. The undreamt of 
p~r~ of the world's 
\veal t h g f'.i:o.ed. by 
A1ge:r.ia and :r_.:i.byo, helped fu:o.d the X'enc:dssa,nce of A:rah:i.srn a:o.d. 
Islam, and strengthen nationalism; for instance Algeria invested 
heavily in an Arabization cawpaign. Algeria and Libya were 
instrumental in setting up the Islamic Conference OX'ganization 
(ICO), an association of over 40 states (see map 8.2a). With 
the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry (1970s) Algeria 
and Libya greatly invested in their "development revolutions", 
by any standards, their citizens enjoy the highest level of 
living in the Maghreb, as is witnessed by universal education, 
free medical care, massive housing campaigns and the fact that 
Bread Revolts (1984-5) did not occur there as in Morocco and 
Tunisia. Algeria emerged as the major second-order power in the 
Maghreb. Oil wealth helped finance the Polisario struggle 
against Morocco, while Morocco received aid from the Gulf 
states. The great transfer of wealth to the Arab oil states, 
and Algeria and Libya's proximity to the EC and Gibraltar 
artery, made their roles pivotal in the global economy. The 
confidence gained by Algeria is reflected in its negotiations 
with France, Italy, Spain and the USA concerning the pricing of 
LNG in the 1980s. Because of its relatively small population 
and vast wealth, Libya vehemently espoused the pan-Arab and 
Unionist ideals. Libyan wealth also sponsored Qadhafi's 
adventures in Chad, Tunisia, Mauritania, Western Sahara, and 
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other st o:t P. s . 
In the 1980s OPEC has lost its monopoly because of tho 
:L:oto:rl~.c:,t:i_o:naJ ocon.omic :('ecessio:o., slom3_m'J:o. i:u. de:um:,ld duo to 
oo:l1S~:l'V£l,t-Lo:n, fl,:n.d the soa:cing of pet:co1ou.n1 p:cod.uot:~OJ.l in 
non--OPEC sts;tes. Also ra.dj_cal OP:::<::c me:mbe:cs, l:Lke :cibyu. a:u.cJ 
Iran, have blatantly broken the organization's quota system. 
For Libya, this has signalled the end of the golden age of oil 
wealth to finance Qadhafiism. In 1986, Libya made barter 
agreements with the USSR, to supply oil (in which the Soviets 
are already self-sufficient) for arms. The agreements have not 
functioned as planned and by 1987 seemed to have fallen through. 
Because of Algeria's large population, the decl:i.ning oil wealth 
may yet pose serious problems for the regime. This factor has 
prompted President Chadli to liberalize the economy somewhat 
placing more importance on the primary sector, as opposed to the 
former grandiose industrial 
principles. Though figures are 
schemes based on T~:ninist 
not available for Algeria's 
contribution to the Polisario war effort, the survival of SADR 
largely depends on Maghrebi oil money. 
8.7 ISLAM ON THE SOUTHERN SHORE. 
8.7.1 A Universalizing System. 
Muslim peoples wish to strengthen their Islamic identity 
and develop their countries. Some believe in following Western, 
socialist or Soviet economic models; this has resulted in 
conflict. Many wish to construct a Muslim development model, 
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be :non-aligned. Fundamentalists \vish to see the 
Isl<:un:tza,tion of rooderni ty, a,nd establishment of a u.n.t versal 
:T:sl::urd.c state (see map 8. 2a). 
JslB,m :l.s tb.e rna i or centripetal fore_~ in the ~-Aa,gh:r:-eb. Islc:un 
is a totGJ,l cul tu.:re system embracj_:o.g every aspect of :i.:o.c'l.i vidual 
and social life, and territorial and political organization; 
there is no distinct-ton between the religious and secular 
spheres. Being an all embrasing culture, Islam continues to 
diffuse throughout the world and to Islamize subcultures_ Wi'th 
European penetration of the Islamic territories from the 18th 
century on, the mutual antagonisms between the Christian and 
Muslim monotheistic universalizing religious systems produced a 
dialectic that is still seeking a peaceful resolution (see map 
4.1). With European decolonization of the Muslim world, Islam 
is looking for a unified territorial expression, which the 
political leaderR of many states (Libya, Algeria, Syrl~. Iran) 
pay a certain deference to. The Muslim countries and in 
particular the Arab states are fostering closer cultual linkages 
(see table 8.2) the geopolitical strength of such unions would 
enable Islam to play its part in the 20th century power concert. 
Judaism, though not a universalizing religion, is also one of 
the three great monotheistic religious systems, from which 
Christianity and Islam take their roots (Sopher,l967). Zionism 
and the creation of the state of Israel (1948) has acted as a 
powerful motor in reinforcing a Muslim sense of identity and 
common viewpoint (Rodinson, 1968). 
Since 1950s, and particularly the Algerian Revolution 
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(1954-62), the Suez Crisis (1956), the Arab-Israeli Wars (1956, 
1957, 1973), oil c:rises (1970s) and Jranj_an Revolution (1979), 
there has been a revivaJ. of international focus upon the Muslim 
world. Many Western and Communist analysts all too often 
express viewpoints that are fundamentally antagonistic to Islam 
because of closely integrated historical and cultural 
prejudices, (eg. Laffin, 1981). According to Rodinson (1980), 
over the centuries, European attitudes to Islam as reflected in 
popular culture, J5.te:rEJ,ture and media have displayed ceratin 
cyclical characteristics. Within these cycles European 
perceptions have revolved around an interest in the exotic 
aspects of Islam, often imposing on the Arabs the myth of the 
"noble savage" from a Eurocentric optic, or else see Islam as a 
fantical tyrannical system based on destruction and jihad. 
Rodinson (1980) states that these viewpoints seem to fluctuate 
with the state or European-Arab relations. With the energy 
crises and Iranian Revolution (1979), Western attitudes towards 
Islam have once more reverted to a belief in the Muslim threat. 
Having experienced Christian/European colonialism, the Islamic 
peoples (umma) now greatly fear the Western and Communist threat 
in the geopolitical and cultural domains. 
Islamic territories (Dar al Islam) 
Superpower usage of 
to further their 
universalistic ideologies. such as the siting of missiles in the 
Middle East, is seen not only as a threat to the respective 
Muslim states, but to the Arab nation. Leaders such as Qadhafi 
see American military usage of Saudi Arabian facilities as 
imperialistic, and sacriligious as Mecca and Medina are 
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epicentres of Islam. 
The history of OPEC/OAPEC is illustrative of the desire of 
the Arab states to be masters of their own destiny. Many MusJ.tm 
countries like Algeria, Libya and the Gulf states encourage 
non-Muslim migrant workers in target development areas. Migrant 
workers of all natj.ona:U.ties, like tourists in the Maghreb, 
often encounter the negative aspects of discrimination because 
of different cultural mores and perspectives. In Algeria for 
example, large scale tourism such as that found in Spain, 
Morocco and Tunisia is not encouraged. Foreign schools in 
Algeria are required to teach the official languages (Arabic and 
French) while Western parents often object to such requirements, 
particularly lessons in Arabic. Similarly in Maghrebi 
educational institutions, many students strongly reject the 
"depersonalization" of their Islamic culture by Western teachers 
and materials. 
Contrary to Marxist and Western beliefs, religion has not 
receded into private life, but has re-emerged as a powerful 
political force in many parts of the world. Religious militancy 
has manifested itself with Orthodox Judaism in Israel, Sikhism 
in India, fundamentalist Protestantism in the USA, Catholic 
liberation theology in Latin America and so on. 
relative location of Islamic territories and 
geopolitical factors, Islamic militancy has 
attention in recent years. 
Because of the 
a plethora of 
received most 
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8.7.2 The Muslim Realm. 
Whatever geopolitical criteria are used. in attempting to 
define the Muslim realm (D<bt: al. Isla,m), :i.t :i_s problematlcal 
because of vastness i:o. area, distribution of Mu.sJ:i.ms ( mnma,), 
expanding religious frontiers and state boundaries (see map 8.1, 
8. 2a). In 1987, it was estimated that the domain of Islam 
embraced one b.i.l .. l.i on adherents, 20% of the world's population 
(Factsheet: Islam 1987). Dar al Islam (Islamic Kingdom or 
Domain of Peace) refers to Muslims living in an avowedly Islamic 
state whose Muslim nature is proclaimed in the constitution or 
law (Sharia) or is implicit when the overwhelming majority of 
citizens are Muslim. There are some 45 countries in this 
category. Dar al Harb (domain of war) exists in lands outside 
Dar al Islam. Dar al Subh may be said to constitute part of Dar 
al Harb and exists where Muslim minorities live in non-Muslim 
states. About 33.3% of the umma (Muslim community) are in this 
category. The largest is the 100 million Muslims in India 
constituting 12% of the total population. Next is the USSR with 
44 million or 15% of the popultaion. China follows with 40 
million or 4% of the population (Factsheet, Islam 1987). 
The tradition of Muslim refugees (muhajirin) fleeing from 
their homelands to escape political and religious persecution is 
nothing new and dates from the 7th century when the Prophet 
Mohammed and his loyal followers fled Mecca for the security of 
Medina (Rodinson, 1968, 1971). In the Maghreb in the 11th 
century, the Kharedjite sect of Islam fled to the secluded areas 
of the M'zab in the Algerian desert, and the to Tunisian island 
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of Djerba to protect themselves (Laroui, 1976). In 19th centu~y 
Algerj.a, thousands of MusJ.ims fled ·to Morocco, ~unisia, Lebanon 
and Syr~a to escape from the invading F~ench armies. In recent 
decades a new social/territorial classification has come i~to 
usage, that of Da...,"t B.l Muha j ir in or areas vJith Muslim rofugees o~ 
incipient refugees. Examples include the migration of 7 million 
Muslims from India to Pakistan (1947--), and the great movement 
of peoples which came about with the creation of the state of 
Bangladesh (1971), especially the Bihari Muslims. The 
Palestinian diaspora (1948-87) now numbers some 5 million people 
(Factsheet: Islam 1987; Hale, 1982, pp.l29-145). There are more 
than 5 million Afghani refugees abroad because of the Soviet 
invasion (1980). Other examples include the plight of Muslim 
refugees from the Philippines to Brunei and the Saharawis to 
Algeria. It is estimated that there are more than 20 million 
refugees in the social/territorial category of Dar al Muhajirin 
(Factsheet: Islam 1987). Naturally many Muslim refugees seek 
refuge in non-Muslim countries like France, Britain and the USA. 
Contemporary Islam is found on all continents. Numerically 
the Arabs constitute only about 25% of the global Islamic 
community. Some 42 of the 170 states represented at the UN are 
members of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), which 
concerns itself with political, economic and religious matters 
(see maps 8.2). The reo is the political manifestation of the 
aspirations of 1 billion people. The Islamic core area 
stretches from Morocco to Iran, more than 5,000 miles (8,000 
km), about one fifth of the way around the globe. The core area 
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oucup:Led by ·che Arabs co:o.stitutos about 5. 3 m:u.:u.on sq ml ( 13. '? 
million sq km), an area second only to the largest state in the 
world, the DSSH. Of t~e 300 million people in tho uo~e a~oa, 
he·tveen 180-200 million are Arabs, with some 10 million Jr~n~ans 
and 45 million Turks (Drysdale & Blake, 198t:i, p.225; H6rodote, 
1984, No.36, pp.3-18). It is estimated that by 2000, the Arab 
population will be numerically greater than that of the 
supe:rpmvers. Yet the above figures for the Muslim community of 
the core area represent less than half of the global Muslim 
umma. Arabic is the world's fifth most widely spoken language 
after Chinese, English, Spanish and Russian. The core area 
contains more than two thirds of proven global oil reserves. 
Peripheral Islamic states such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Chad and Mauritania are greatly influenced by events at the 
Arab-Muslim core. 
Within the Arab core. there i.s a nertain homogeneity, which 
arguably lends itself to political union. Failure of such uni.on 
is due to contested state leadership. While there are several 
ideologies attributed to Islam within the Muslim world, there is 
only one all embracing religion. For non-Muslims there is often 
a confusion between Islam and the ideologies which lay claim to 
it. The centripetal forces which integrate the Maghrebis into 
the Islamic community are manyfold. 
8.7.3 Islam in the Maghreb. 
The vast majority of Maghrebis are Sunni Muslims (97%-99%), 
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who follow the Malakite rite of Quranic law (sea below). Very 
small Khara.dj j_ te groups a.lso l.i. ve there, historically associated 
v1itl1 Shi' j.sm. Less than 1% of the Moroccan and ~unisian 
populations are Jewish. 
Despite local t;1aghrebi characteristics such as maraboutism 
(local saint cults) and fraternities (secret politico-religious 
organizations), Islam has not experienced the great schisms and 
trends towards devolved religious subsystems so characteristic 
of other religions (Dermingham, 1954; De Planhol, 1959; 
Deffontaines, 1948; Sopher, 1967). During the colonial era, 
Christian attempts at proselytizing in the Maghreb met with 
failure. largely because of the political and social integrating 
agents of Islam such as the Quran, sunnah and fiqh (the bases of 
Islamic Law). According to Islam, in the 7th century, the Quran 
(recitation) was recited in Arabic by God to the Prophet 
Mohammed as the final message to humanity in the long 
Judaeo-Christian tradition. By the 9th century, the number of 
"official editions" of the Quran varied between seven and 
fourteen, but with only minimal differences. That recorded by 
Nafi is the one most in use in the Maghreb. Although some of 
the oldest universities in the world were founded at Tunis, 
Constantine and Fez, the educational tradition in the Maghreb 
has been largely oral. Zaouias (rural schools under the control 
of fraternities), masjids (mosque schools with no boarders), 
medersas (initially law schools often having hospitals attached 
to them), and machaads (general places of learning, such as 
maraboutic sites) were responsible for the transmission of Islam 
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in the Maghreb (O'Reilly, 1983; Guillaume, 1979; Kalisky, 1980; 
Sourd.el, 1979). 
Though not funded by the Maghrobi governments, traditional 
Quranic schools are found in most areas. The state schools 
offor a widor range of subjects, nonetheless during holiday 
periods and weekends many children attend the Quranic schools. 
Between 1978-81, the author conducted interviews with Algerians 
who had attended. these schools. Over 78% of those who 
ps.rt.i.clpated stated that they hcvt learned. to chc.nt vast sections 
of the Quran and Arabic grammar, but very little of the three 
Rs. The classical Arabic found in the ~ is the basis of 
standard international Arabic as found in education, the media 
and government. Though there are great linguistic variations in 
Maghrebi Arabic, the standardized written form is a unifying 
force. As translations of the Quran are considered not to be 
valid, non-Arabia sp8tikers (eg Berbers) have to follow their 
religious rites in Arabic. States like Indonesia and Pakistan 
encourage closer educational cooperation with Tunisia because of 
the excellent standards found at the Zitouna Quranic University 
and other educational institutions there. While the majority of 
Maghrebis speak Arabic, the vast majority of the literate 
population read and write in French. 
fundamentalists reproach the local regimes for not 
the pace of Arabization. For the Maghrebis 
Arabists and 
accelerating 
there is an 
indissoluble linkage between Islam, Arabic, and union with the 
rest of Dar al Islam. Wahhada (oneness) is a 
theological/cultural facet of Islam. Quranic Arabic remains a 
major unifier. 
The second major source of Islamic law (sharia) is the 
sunnah based on what the Prophet Mohammed is supposed to have 
said and done. The hadiths (Bosquet, 1979) which are the basis 
of the sunnah consti tu.te a "law of oral t:.:'adi tion \·!b.:Lch 
superj_mposed itself on the 'l.vritten la'\<7" (Hasse, 1930, p.52). 
Sunnah became the "practice and the theory of Muslim orthodoxy" 
(Masse, 1930, pp.52-53). The vast majority of Muslims are 
Su.n:n.ts ~ ;3,S opposed to Shi I a. Shi I as constitute a.bout lO% of the 
umma, numbering about 80 million (Le Point, No.599, 12 March 
1984, pp.21-34). The only Shi'a state is Iran, while Shi 1 a 
populations are found in Saudi Arabia (1 million), Bahrain (60% 
of pop), Kuwait (30% of pop), Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and 
Yemen (Independent, 4 Sep.l987, p.8). Despite the historical 
schism between Sunnis and Shi 1 a, they are united by the Islamic 
uunu~pL of wahhada (oneness), and of shared or contiguous 
territories. As the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei has stated: 
"the Imam is not limited by geographical 
frontiers" (Independent, 4 Aug.l987, p.8). 
Thus Khomeini's philosophies are as relevant to the Moroccans 
and Tunisians as they are to the Iranians. 
It is nonsensical to believe that all Muslims are 
profoundly militant; it is equally fallacious to hold that 
militant Shi'a philosophies are completely divorced from trends 
in Sunni'ism. This is witnessed by Sunni militancy in Tunisia. 
The Western media often suggest that the essential differences 
between Shi'a and Sunni are greater than they actually are. 
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This viewpoint is often supported by Muslim regimes such as that 
of Saudi Arabia or Morocco, but is seen as an affront by other 
regimes and the masses, who believe in the spiritual unity of 
Islam. 
Very small non-Sunnis communities of the Kharedjite sect 
exist in the M'zab (Algeria) and Djerba (Tunisia). In the 
Maghrebi context, the M'zabites and Djerbis lead a more 
:pu:c:i.:ta:uical lifestyle 'Lhan their neighbours, and are 
mostly in trading activities throughout North Africa. 
engaged 
While the 
habitual regionalist biases exist, there is no 
political contention between Kharedjites and 
religious or 
their fellow 
Muslims. Shiism largely owes its origins to an historical 
leadership dispute, whereby the Shi'a faction supported the idea 
of an hereditary caliph or leader of the umma. Being a minority 
the Shi's were persecuted and their history provides many 
examples of martyrdom. A belief in prophetic leaders or mahdis 
is closely associated with Shiism. While never overtly stating 
it, Khomeini and Qadhafi have tried to take on the mantle of the 
mahdi. In the early 1980s, a fundamentalist leader in Algeria 
proclaimed himself the mahdi. 
The Five Pillars of Islam (arkan'u) act as integrating 
agents. They are belief in one God (shahada), prayer (salat), 
fasting (saum), alms-giving (zakat) and pilgrimage (haj/hadj). 
Some schools of Muslim law include jihad or holy war as a sixth 
pillar. Most non-Muslim geographers fail to appreciate the 
geopolitical significance of shahada. 
Shahada is based on faith (din) in monotheism, this oneness 
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(wahhada) incorporates every aspect of spiritual and human 
existence. Thus lav1 and. political orga:oj_:;;;a;tion (.Bha_ria) must be 
based on the I:Jhat is believ·ed to bo God's "~dO:r:-d (@1l:r~.n). The 
relationsh~p between the individual and God is based on innate 
intelligence and spiritual vision (haqiqa). In recognition of 
this Muslims are obliged to profess publicly their belief in God 
and the Prophet (sha~&da), and Islam (acceptance, peace) is 
shared. The oneness (wahhada) of Islamic peoples, cultures and 
territories, is hard to accomplish because of centrifugal 
processes. Muslim fundamentalists wish to establish an Islamic 
state in which there will be the perfect wahhada. The Maghrebi 
regimes have all relied on the Muslim ideal of oneness (wahhada) 
to support their respective political ideologies, eg Algerian 
Islamic socialism, Qadhafiism, and Moroccan aliegence to Emir 
Hassan. Essentially, the aspirations for a Gxeater Maghreb 
union are based on the ideal of Wahhada. Fundamentalists see 
communism and Westernism as a direct threat to wahhada (see map 
8. 2a). 
The second pillar of Islam, prayer (salat) obliges the 
Maghrebis to pray in the direction of the Arabian peninsula, 
Mecca (qibla), five times daily. One fundamentalist interviewed 
by the author pointed out that it is ironical that qibla is now 
in the direction of the US RDF/Central Command. The obligatory 
communal Friday prayer (salat al jomo) held at the mosque is 
supplemented by a sermon (khotba), often of a political nature. 
Imams (prayer leaders) preside at mosque gtherings. 
Traditionally, imams were democratically chosen by the 
566 
community. However all the Maghrebi regimes have progressively 
taken over the function of choosing, educating and funding the 
'l'he same j_s true of' the Magh:rebj_ ul_~mas OI' con:o.cils 
tradi.tionaJ.1y responsible for supervising and mainta5:o.ing 
orthodoxy. Since the 1970s, the Libyan ulema< has been divested 
of power, with Qadhafi's special committees taking over its 
function. After much contention between President Bourguiba and 
the Tunisian ulema (1950s-60s), a modus vivendi was achieved in 
the 1970s. Basically, the Tunisian ulema learned not to 
challenge Bourguiba's decrees. His controversial policies have 
included outlawing polygamy (the only Islamic state to do so), 
suppression of religious courts, and encouragement of workers to 
break the Ramadhan fast. The religious endowments (habus) owned 
or controlled by the ulema were also nationalized. With the 
removal of Bourguiba from power in 1987, it is likely that the 
ulema will try to regain some of its power, and reactionary 
tactics are possible. In 1987, several months before seizing 
power, Ben Ali stated that: 
"Islam in Tunisia, thanks to Bourguiba, is 
no longer an excuse to reject progress. 
Understand me well, for us 
fundamentalism does not mean Islam, but 
obscurantism and poverty of spirit" 
(Independent, 9 Nov.1987, p.12). 
In Algeria, Islamic reformers such as Ben Badis, Al Uabi 
and Al Brahimi played a leading role in shaping nationalism. In 
1931, they brought together 13 groups to form an enlarged ulema, 
and published politico-religious newspapers. They waged war on 
obscurantism and introduced Algeria to the progressive trends 
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that we:re hei ng felt in other parts of da_,l,'_ aJO Isls,m tn the 20th 
century (O'Re.i.lly, 1983, pp.350-372; Kaddache, 1980). After 
1965, Boumedj.enne effectively removed power from tho :ulema by 
creating a Ministry of Religious Affairs and nationalizing the 
habus. The appointment of imams became institutionalized, they 
must hold educational certificates issued at theologicaJ 
colleges run by the state. Boumedienne was responsible for 
mal-ring Algeria tho only tfaghrebi state to :revert to the Muslim 
weekend, observing Friday as the sabbath (thus most of Algeria's 
trade with the international community is reduced to 3-4 days 
per week). Boumedienne maintained that theTe was no 
independence without socialism and no socialism without Islam, 
thus the construction of mosques became a priority in NLF 
planning for reasons of integration and as a symbol of the 
triumph of Islam over imperialism. In 1962, there were barely 
800 mosques, by 1982 there were over 5,000, an increase of 630% 
(Marin, 1982, p.147). Algerian mosques became symbols of the 
Islamic resurgence, the triumph of the NLF, centres for the 
dissemination of government policies, cores for the diffusion of 
Arabic, a bulwark against maraboutism and fraternities, and the 
physical expression of Algeria's desire to be an active agent at 
the core of the Arab world. 
In Morocco, a ministry of religious affairs is in charge of 
Quranic schools, foundations and mosques; Sharia courts no 
longer function. The king, in his office of emir (descendant of 
Mohammed) presides over the ulema. However his personal life 
and morals are seriously questioned by the fundamentalists. 
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Unlike Tunisia and Algeria, Morocco has not nationaJ.ized the 
religious endowments (habus), which are an important source of 
revenue and power for the establishment. 
Since the late 1970s, mosque attendance in tho Maghreb has 
increased enormousJ.y, witnessed by overcrowding. Algeria 
broadcasts the Friday services on the national media. While 
some of the respective state bureaucracies close down on Friday 
afternoons, fundamentalists reproach their governments for the 
inconveniences caused by not making Friday the official sabbath. 
Students and workers are demanding more time and mosque space 
for prayer. Because of the rural exodus, population explosion 
and accommodation crisis, unofficial mosques are being 
established in the bidonvilles of Tangier, Ceuta, Algiers and 
Tunis. These mosques are progressively becoming the domain of 
fundamentalist cadres, drawing followers from the marginalized 
youth, dissidents, and students. 
The third pillar of Islam, fasting (saum) provides another 
centripetal force. Fasting during daylight hours in the month 
of Ramadhan is obligatoy. Tunisia is the only Maghrebi state 
where the saum is not a legal obligation. In the cosmopolitan 
centres of Tunisia and Morocco, especially near tourist 
complexes, food and drink is available. However in the author's 
experience, the overwhelming majority of Tunisians and Moroccans 
observe the fast. Fundamentalists wish the fast to be a legal 
obligation enforced by law. To accommodate traditionalist and 
fundamentalist aspirations, it is significant that Algeria moved 
in this direction in 1981. On Ramadhan eve, the Minister of 
~eligious Affairs stated that: 
"Whoever defies the obligatory character of 
the fast is condemned to death as an 
apostate. His body will no·~ be was~od nor 
covered in a shroud' :oo:r bu:ried .iD. a i4usl.im 
cemete:r:-y" ( Au.t:reme:o.t, No. 08, me.:.ech 18[12, 
pp.82-J53). 
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Although Algeria has the most stable regime in the Maghreb, it 
studiously avoids confrontation with the fundamentalists, unlike 
the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes. 
The fourth pillar, alms-giving is of two kinds, obligatory 
(zakat) and voluntary (sadaqat). According to the sharia, the 
alms-tax should be levied at 10%-20% of the doner's wealth. 
However, the modern tax systems found in the Maghrebi states 
have replaced the traditional zakat. Because of oil wealth, 
Libya and Algeria have been able to alleviate chronic poverty, 
and finance institutions such as hospitals and schools, whereas 
in Morocco and Tunisia, the state tax system which replaced the 
zakat has not succeeded in providing aid for those citizens most 
in need. A basic tenet of fundamentalism is the demand for a 
greater distribution of the wealth of the state. In the 1970s, 
the Arab oil states were the most generous in the world, in 
terms of aid to the developing countries (Kellner, 1975). 
Algeria and Libya's viewpoints concerning third world issues 
have been much influenced by zakat ideals. 
is the fifth pillar of Islam. The obligatory 
pilgrimage (hadjNOTU>) makes Mecca the epic~ntre for Muslim 
political and economic interaction. The hadj acts as an 
informal contact-field between governments and groups. Muslim 
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refugees dispersed throughout the world find the opportunity of 
meeting each other there, eg Afghanis, Palestinians, West 
Saharans and so on. It's geopolitical significance is also 
appreciated by the fundamentalists (see below). 
During the colonial epoch, the French colonial 
administration employed several strategies to prevent the 
Maghrebis going on the hadj, by restricting free movement in 
Algeria, non-issuance of visa,s, :i. .. :r:lsufficient- transport~ and 
unsuitable transport time-tables. With national independence 
Algeria and Libya greatly facilitated their pilgrims. In the 
1960s, Bourguiba made the controversial remark that the hadj 
causes a haemorrage of hard currency. 
In 1950, some 95,000 Muslims went on the hadj. By 1978 
there were over 1.5 million pilgrims from over 70 countries. 
Each year there aro over 100,000 lllOI'e; with oO% travelling by 
air, 47% by motorized transport and 3% by diverse means such as 
sea, foot and camel (Jansen, 1979, pp.32-34; De Planhol, 1959, 
p.74). According to The Guardian (3 Aug.1987, p.5) some 2 
million people attended the Hadj in 1987. The first 
transmission of the hadj on television (1970s) had a great 
impact on the Muslim world. The Maghrebi media provides live 
coverage of the festivities. With the new-found oil wealth of 
the 1970s, facilities for the hadjis at Mecca were modernized 
and sanitized; attendance continued to rise. In 1977, 
attendance from the Maghreb peaked, when over 55,000 Algerians 
participated, in contrast to 22,674 hadjis from Morocco and 
almost 8,000 from Tunisia; while some 20,770 Libyans and over 
1,000 Mauritanians 
pp.l26-128). This 
made 
great 
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the pilgrimage (Guellouz, 1977, 
increase is indicative of the oil 
wealth, interest in Islam and increasing political awareness. 
On average the number of Moroccan pilgrims who went to Mecca 
between 1970-84 was 20,050 annually (Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.50). 
In terms of numbers of pilgrims, out of the 21 Arab states 
represented at the Hadj during the period 1970-84, Algeria 
ranked fifth, Libya seventh, Morocco ninth and Tunisia tenth 
(Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.60). By the 1980s.- over 47% of t-ho hadjis 
came from Arab states, almost 34% from non-Arab Asiatic 
countries, some 18% from non-Arab African states, less than 0.5% 
from Europe, about 0.66% from the Americas and less than 0.5% 
from the remainder of the world (Guellouz, 1977, pp.126-128; 
Autrement, N0.38, 1982; Al-Rakeiba, 1984, p.50). On the last 
day of the pilgrimage, the hadjis and Muslim world join 
simultaneously in the ritual sacrifice of sheep at the Aid el 
Fitr. While Mecca and the hadj is believed to be in the purest 
orthodox tradition, leaders like Qadhafi and Imam Khomeini wish 
to "liberate" the sacred sites from the the present Saudi 
Arabian regime, which they consider to be a vassal of the USA. 
The hadj provides fundamentalist militant groups with an 
informal forum. In 1979 militants held the Great Mosque for 22 
days, some 117 people were killed in battle, and 22 beheaded by 
the Saudi authorities (Guardian, 3 Aug.1987, p.5). During the 
1987 hadj fundamentalist protests led to the death of an 
estimated 402 people and 649 were injured, the majority of whom 
were Iranians (Times, 9 Aug.1987, pp.1,11; ibid, 2 Aug.1987, 
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pp.l,9,25; Independent, 4: Aug.l987, p.l; Guardian, 3 Aug.1987, 
p.l). The p~otests wore o~chestrated by Teheran; significantly 
the codename :fo:r the operation \vas "Wahhada" (unity/oneness). 
8.7.4 Jihad. 
Jihad, sometimes considered to be the sixth pillar of Islam 
has several meanings, .incJuding struggle aga-inst ev-il which is 
believed to exist in oneself and in society, self-defence and 
war against non-Muslims. Despite the great humanistic themes of 
Islamic theology, according to the ~ (2:216) "fighting is 
obligatory". As in the other monotheistic systems, there is a 
strong belief in the exclusive possession of "truth"; an 
eschatological vision of existence which nurtures extremism, and 
conflict with other universalizing ideologies. Thus Islam is 
one of the strongest geopolitical ideological forces in the 
world. 
By the 15th century, Islam was the most widely distributed 
religious system in the world. With the rise of European 
imperialism, Islam strove to keep Dar al Islam intact rather 
than expanding its territories by conquest. Since the 1960s, 
once more Islam has been competing for peoples and territories. 
Essentially between the 17th century and the 1970s, jihad was 
used as a means of self-defence. Historically the Kharedjite 
sect (minority groups in Algeria and Tunisia) tried to make 
jihad a pillar of Islam. Of the four main juridic schools of 
sharia, three saw jihad as an obligation under certain 
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conditions; if kafirs (non-believers) began hostilities and if 
there was a good chance of success. The Malakj.te school of law 
followed in the Maghreb favours ~ii)lad. Those \·7ho cUe in battle 
are considered as martyrs. in the ~ (13:39), cnanging 
policies and inconsistencies relating to non-Muslims is 
justified by the changing will of God. Territories and peoples 
not under Islamic control, constitute Dar al Harb (:C,ands of 
War); the Quran (13:39) asks "do they not see how We invade 
their land and shrink its boJ:>ders". The Quran (3:134-141) 
states that God wishes to "test the faithful and annihilate the 
infidels". Arab-Muslims are reminded in the ~ that they 
"are the noblest nation that has ever been risen up for mankind" 
(3-99-110) and that "unbelievers are (the) sworn enemies" (Sura 
4). According to Dr Ali Issa Othman (former adviser to UNRWA): 
"The spread of Islam was military. There is 
a tendency to apologise for this and we 
should not. It is one of the injunctions of 
the Quran that you must fight for the 
spreading of Islam" (Waddy, 1976, p.10). 
In the Maghreb there is little tolerance shown towards atheists 
and polytheists. With national independence, almost the entire 
Jewish and Christian populations of Algeria and Libya left. In 
conversation with Algerian social scientists, the author was 
reminded that a Te Deum was chanted in Rome when news arrived of 
the invasion of Algiers (1830). On strategic historic sites in 
Morocco, Algiers, Constantine, Annaba, Tunis and Carthage 
elaborate basilicas and cathedrals were constructed by the 
colonists from 1830 on. 
Considering the positive attributes of Muslim civilization, 
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the geostrategic advantages offered by the Arab/Muslim 
territories, and history of European and superpower imperialism 
:from the J.Bth centu.ry on, it j_s not surp:rising that :Cs:tami.c 
militancy is manifesting itself in global matters at present. 
Since the 18th century, :Oar al Islam has w.i tnessed over 60 
bloody encounters with major non-Muslim powers, in the form of 
encroachment, invasion, colonization and war. The most recent 
in the chronicle are the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980), 
the Is:rB,e.Ji invasions of' Lebanon ( 1982), and US engagements with 
Libya (1982, 1986) and Iran (1987) (see Fig. 8.1). There were 
18 imperial attacks on the Muslim world between 1790-1870, 35 
between 1870-1930, and 12 between 1930 and 1987. Over the past 
two centuries, Britain has been involved in at least 23 of these 
military adventures, France in 13, Tsarist Russia in 8, the 
Netherlands in 7, Italy in 6, Israel in 5, Spain in 3, the USSR 
in 2, Greece in one and the USA directly in two (O'Reilly, 1983, 
pp.312-314). 
"This being the historical record of 
militant Islam, it is surprising that 
Islamic antagonism towards Europe is not far 
greater than it is" (Jansen, 1979, p.65). 
In the 20th century, calls for jihad by the Turkish Sultan 
(1914), several Arab leaders in relation to Israel and Ayatollah 
Khomeini (1980s) have not meet with universal approval in Muslim 
states. With the European invasion of the Maghreb, calls for 
jihad were made by Abd' el Qadir (Algeria), Abd' el Krim 
(Morocco) and Omar Mokhtar (Libya). It would seem that a 
universal jihad is the dream of Qadhafi, Khomeini and militant 
~~j J 
J: 
,, 
(") 
LU 
.---Ji 
I 
0n L ,) 
r~ 
Lc) 
ri 
<if 
I 
'L() J 
I 
'L() 
'il2 
'C1 
n () 
~ l I:J l? 
( > 
J 
J 
J 
J 
c_) 
'D 0 ( ~ = 
(.j 
tel 
< 1 0 I ~ q 
h 
~ 
~~ /} u ~ 
f) 
~ 0 ~ 
~ (31 
J:l ~ ~ [1 
~J 
c-; 0 ~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
~ ~ 
@ 
c:c:;: 
" ~ .'J'L-::-= :::J I 
-'• 
l\ 0 '"1_,.-,,J'l.~,.,/ ' J V ~"'-"'u"'' ~'" "'' 
L;, .o::;:J 
r; 
'--• C'v: :::) c 
() 
LJ. L2====J c·;:J o (C J'l: tJ 0 
0 QD. lDc~~~~. 0 
() 
() 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
~f\J'c 0J'<_ 
--
;.-._/ 
c:P' 0 0 
1/~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 
0 0 
I> 0 c ( 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 oo 
~-~ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
:?2[Q) c::J 0 :?2[;;) b:J CJ 
-" ~8) M :?2~ :?2[Al i?l? 
'ilLS 'i)[Q) :?2r? 'i)r;:J 
22[0) 'i)[Ql 
'i) 0'\l 
--- I t 
I) 
I 
' (_) 0 
() 0 
() () 
() (] 
() () 
Or? 
!3D 
[}~ 
C"C> 
~ 
'i)@ 
'i)Q'iJ© 'ilOV© 'il~ 'ilO~© 
Vc:::JU 
:') 
:) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 -v-~ 
0 Po oc 
0 0 00 
n JL 
'i)[Q) :?2LS 22C3 
'iJQ :?2 Oo 'i)(LD 
'i)lVJ )lD 
'ilb. 
I u t I 
"''''J''o< Various, o<poci<JIIy [t-Jf'{ILI)rh[D!A BR!TANtnCA, G.~ ,lonsen. M!LITIItH 
{c;LA•.o t·v,rlc'n Pan (Wc,rlrl 1\l'o>r'i), 1979 
576 
fundamentalists. 
Many young Maghrebis see jihad as the mirror image of the 
Christian crusades and colonialism, and as & buleark against 
superpower imperialism at the present time. In 1979, it was 
stated in The Guardian (26 l<'eb. 1979) that: 
"there is a genuj_ne fear that Muslims may be 
creating a great deal. of trouble for 
themselves and the rest of the world by 
unleashing forces that they may not be able 
to control or direct". 
In a somewhat more alarmist manner The Daily Telegraph (25 March 
1979) warned that: 
once again on the march out of "Islam is 
Arabia 
Islamic 
world". 
Who knows what djinna (the 
resurgence) has let loose upon the 
According to Algerie Actualite (No.807, 2-8 April, 1981): 
"The Algerian vision of international 
relations and thus the action of the state 
in relation to foreign policy is determined 
by concrete action and militancy". 
With the ignominy of defeat at the hands of European 
powers, Islam was the major geopolitical force which sustained 
Maghrebi identity. This was proven by the response of the 
masses to such mujahidin leaders as Abd' el Qadir, Abd' el Krim 
and Omar Mokhtar (1830-1928). All Maghrebi resistance 
movements, including those which eventually liberated the 
states, relied heavily on the geopolitical force of jihad to 
mobilize the masses. With independence, the Maghrebi regimes 
relied on interpretations of Islam to support their respective 
political orientations. These regimes faced the problem of 
national development and 
geopolitical imperatives of 
synthes.i.zing 
the :modern 
Islam 
'i:lOrld. 
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with the 
Magh:rebi 
fundamentalists feel that poJ.jtical independence f~om Burope did 
not mean Islamic independence. The Magh:eebj. coJonj_EJ~l experj_ence 
being bloodier than that experienced j_n other areas of Dar ~.1 
Islam has left the populations more open to the precepts of 
jihad. 
Islamic militancy within Dar al Islam did not dissipate 
with European decolonization. In Muslim countries between 
1948-87, at least 29 heads of state and prime ministers were 
'killed' and over 20 former prime ministers and ex-senior 
ministers. During the same period there were at least 25 
inter-Muslim and civil wars. Between 1968-87, some 28 foreign 
diplomats were assassinated in Muslim countries. The present 
Maghrebi regimes have been responsible for the assassination of 
dissidents at home and abroad. In 1983 alone, 16 TIR diplomats 
and guards were killed at their embassy in Lebanon, and 241 
marines were killed by a bombing raid on their Beirut barracks. 
Fundamentalists wish to ensure that Muslims within Dar al 
Islam live, and have government support, in following the 
Quranic ethic. They wish to spread the frontiers of Islam 
globally. This is in the historic tradition of Dar al Harb 
(lands of war), or lands not yet under Islamic control. Between 
the two extremes of Dar al Islam and Dar al Harb, a territorial 
status exists known as Dar al Subh eg Melilla, Ceuta and on a 
grander scale in India and the USSR. Muslim refugees (20 
million 1987) living in "foreign" states may be said to live in 
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Dar al Muh~~n (Lands of Refuge). Muslims living outside Dar 
al Isla,m are instructed to stJ:>ive to establish Islamic J:>egj_mes 
there. Fundamentalists argue that in Muslim states where the 
.Shcu:i.a is :not part of state law, or where the political :regime 
is corrupt, or closely allied to the superpowers, then the 
status of Dar al Subh exists, and all Muslims are obliged by the 
~~~~ to take up l~hgd, overthrowing the regime. Qhomeini 
invoked the Dar al Subh philosophy in Iran (1979), and later in 
:celat;io:n to Lebanon, I:t>aq, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel/Palestine 
and the Gulf states. Qadhafi indirectly invoked this philosophy 
in relation to Morocco, Tunisia and the Spanish Plazas in 
Morocco. Some fundamentalists include in this category 
immigrant communities in Europe, particularly the Maghrebis in 
France. The spate of bombings in Paris (1986) and Tunisia 
(1987) lend credence to fears that fundamentalism is rapidly 
gaining strength in the Maghreb and immigrant communities. 
As fundamentalists wish to Islamize modernity, they could 
well argue that territorial seas, straits and EEZs adjacent to 
Islamic territories now constitute part of Dar al Islam. The 
great manifestations of this in recent years have been the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal (1956), attempts to bring all 
the waters of the Red Sea under Arab control (1960s-70s), 
Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sirt (1980s), and Iranian 
activities in the Gulf since 1979. Fundamentalist regimes may 
yet try to Islamize the LOS Convention itself (see chapter 3). 
In the contemporary geopolitical context, the term 
fundamentalist embraces integrists, pan-Arabists, Islamists, 
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:revolu.t:i..ona:r.i 8S of various politicoJ. persuasions, terrorists, 
reformists c=w.d the Muslim Brothers. o·uts:i.d.e the lslo,mic realm 
fundamcnta.J_j_ sm is often confused with traditionalism and 
obscurantism. Fundamentalist groups share the same historical 
sources, ideologues, pamphlets and recorded sermons such as 
those of Qutob (H~rodote, 1985, No.36, pp.68-82). There is no 
distinction between Sunni and Shi'a fundamentalist aspirations 
and methods, as \"JaB I;:Ji tnessed by events ln Tunisia in 1987, when 
bombs exploded outside the Presidental Palace at Carthage and at 
Monastir touristic complex (Independent, 4 Aug.1987). 
Significantly the bombings at Monastir coincided with Iranian 
sponsored rioting at Mecca. As with Nasser's use of the Muslim 
Brother organization in his rise to power, Qadhafi uses 
fundamentalist groups and principles to further his philosophy 
which is essentially pan-Ar~bisL. The paradox is that many 
devout Muslims in Libya deplore some of Qadhafi's policies, for 
example in respect of the liberation of women. 
8.7.5 Fundamentalism in the Maghreb. 
In the Maghreb, fundamentalists are commonly referred to as 
Muslim Brothers or Quanghis, though they have few formal links 
with the official Muslim Brother organization which was founded 
by Hassan al Banna in Egypt (1928), and has been instrumental in 
shaping politics in the Mashreqi states. Though the activities 
of these groups are evident in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, 
specific organizational structures are hard to recognize. 
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In Morocco, ~mir Hassan has incorporated the religious 
elites into his political organization. In the rural areas the 
traditionaJ. fraternities and ~uft leaders (mystj_ns) who control 
·c:he folk religious foci, such as ma;r_g);>outj_Q shrines and. zc=wuiEJ,s 
believe in Hassan's baraka (grace and charisma) and are largely 
under his control. Fundamentalist groups are most active in the 
urban centres, bidonvilles and universities. It was estimated 
that there were as many as 15 such groups operating at Mohammed 
V University in Rabat in 1987. The material used by these 
groups is mostly of Libyan, Pakistani, Iranian and Egyptian 
origin. Perhaps the best known of these organizations is the 
League of Islamic Youth (Jama'at al-Shabiba al-Islaroiya). 
Ironically the group was originally supported by the government 
as a counter to socialist organizations, but was decreed illegal 
in 1975 after its assination of a leader of the Socialist Union 
of Popular Forces. However it has continued to function in roost 
urban centres. Its leaders describe themselves as Kharedjites 
and are drawn from the professional classes. Since 1979, the 
great upsurge in membership of judo and sports clubs, interest 
in Muslim literature, wearing of distinctive chadors by young 
women, and nature of graffiti in public places all indicate the 
unrest which exists. To counteract this the government has 
created the Popular Islamic Reform Movement and increased the 
religious component in educational curricula. One biology 
professor at Rabat University informed the author (1985) that he 
had been instructed by the educational authorities "to reiterate 
the fact of divine creation" during his lectures "on the theory 
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of evolution, so as to avoid conflict \vi th fundamentalists II. 
The in·~elligentia, professional caste and army acknowledge the 
strength of traditional islam in Morocco; and that despite 
ap~'?ea,renoes, the king pursues a Weste:rn lifestyle and pol:Lcies. 
Hassan's application to join the EC (1984-7), special 
relationship with the USA and ambiguous role in furthering the 
Israeli-Arab dialogue is seen as prejudicial to Morocco's role 
in Dar al Islam. Hassan's II liberatJ.on. II of the Western Sahara 
(1976) has not provided a history of success and the Spanish 
Plazas remain part of Dars al Harb and Subh. The brutal 
crushing of populist revolts (1981, 1984) gave the 
fundamentalists a natural leadership role. 
In Algeria, Boumedienne's policies (1965-78) conformed in 
many respects to the fundamentalist ideal. His Quranic 
education Zeitouna University (Tunis), and puritanical 
personality provided him with powerful political assets in 
reforming Islam within the modern state. The NLF embarked on a 
massive programme of mosque construction, religious education 
and Arabization. Nonetheless NLF policies did not aim at 
reinstituting the sharia in toto. Salaried women are encouraged 
to abandon the traditional garments. Fundamentalists allege 
that the NLF have overemphasized the economic and leftist 
attributes of state development at the expense of Islam. Since 
1979, Islam once more provides a political formum for discontent 
and anti-Westernism among the youth, just as it did for their 
parents in the past. Due to the secretive nature of Algerian 
society, there is little information concerning fundamentalist 
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activities. Howeve~ groups operating in Algeria seem Lo have 
1 J · k g ; th i l it t ·rg · · ~ t i · r 6._ • ·,o " J ·- -_ess .liL a G w_ -·· m--· ... a,:n o.. anlza _ons -c_lrouh ... !.OU"t ~ ~ ls_._am 
than the Tunisians and Moroccans, save fundamentalist immigrants 
in Libya and France. ~he author found it difficult to get 
interviews with Algerian fundamentalists on university campuses, 
unlike the situation in Tunisia, yet the MusJim Brothers are 
active there. 
At El Oued, i.J\ 1979, tho Brothers a'ttacked a group of 
people, and caused the death of a prostitute. In June 1981, 
students at Annaba University were attacked by fundamentalists, 
resulting in dozens of casualties and an undisclosed number of 
dead. On three occasions 1979-80, the author was informally 
requested by the Algerian university authorities or particular 
students, not to be present on campus at certain times; as if by 
coincidence fundament~list rioting occurred on those days. In 
1981, in Sidi Bel Abbes, an individual proclaiming himself emir 
(prince of the faithful), a title used by leaders of the Muslim 
Brother movement, was arrested in the local mosque after 
delivering inflammatory anti-government speeches. At Laghouat 
in 1981, the ejection of Muslim extremists from a mosque 
resulted in the death of a policeman. Besides the circulation 
of the usual cassettes of predicators such as El Kichk (an 
Egyptian integrist), there have been calls for more mosque space 
in public institutions, the introduction of sharia and a ban on 
alcohol by interested groups. There have been periodic attacks 
in Constantine and Algiers on people thought to have been acting 
or dressed in an immoral way. A massive prayer protest held at 
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Algiers J.n the earJy l980s, prompted the Presj.d.ent to address 
the nation confirming the NL:to' Is commi tmont to Is1BJm, pe<:weful 
development, and. the I'ight of all to praJct.i.co Islam, .i.:o.c:J.u.d.i.n.g 
the Brothers. Chadli stated that: 
"(he) would never accept in any manner, that 
certain people use Islam as a slogan to 
accomplish certain plans and ambitions" 
(Presidential address. broadcast by RTA, 
Spring 1981). 
Jn the author Is experience, disturbances caused by m:Ui tant 
groups in Algeria were quickly and discretely squashed by the 
authorities, unlike the policies pursued in Morocco and Tunisia 
where alleged fundamentalists or sympathizers are imprisoned 
without trial, beaten and intimadated. The NLF has the 
political infrastructure to channel fundamentalist discontent, 
this is proven by the ability of a lobby in parliament which has 
ret~rded the enactment of leglislation over the past ten years, 
in relation to more liberal family laws. The NLF fear that 
fundamentalist cells may be in the control of Libya, or 
exploited by such figures as the deposed president, Ben Bella. 
Between 1956-87, Bourguiba pursued secular policies in 
Tunisia, in many ways similar to those of Ataturk in Turkey. 
Islamic militants in Tunisia have been active since the 1970s 
and were involved in raids on Gafsa and Kasserine, and in the 
populist revolts of 1978 (over 200 dead) and 1984-5. Because of 
the popular discontent which exists in Tunisia, the Islamists 
are among several groups which wish to overthrow the present 
regime, and may yet emerge as leaders of the masses. 
Bourguibals response to the fundamentalist threat since 1978 was 
to clamp dm-m ha:rd 
revolution, Tunisian 
on Islamic militancy. 
Islamists have been 
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Since the Iranian 
involved w.i_ th 
fundamentalist groups and adventures in Libya, Lebanon, Iran and 
Franco. 
In 1984, Iran "hailed" t:b.e approach of tho "Islamic 
Revolution" in the Maghreb and prophecied that its 
doctrines/propaganda would be "fruitful" (Le Monde, 28 Jan.l984, 
p.l). On 27 March 1987, the Tunisian Government stated that it 
had evidence of an Iranian plot to topple the Bourgu:Lba Is regime 
and install a fundamentalist one. Consequently Tunisia ordered 
the closure of the Iranian embassy in Tunis which had been 
turned into "an active centre working to export the Khomeini 
revolution to Tunisia". Tunisia claimed that fundamentalist 
cells throughout the state were under the control of Iranian 
agents, and that units were trained to use ideology and 
psychologi.nal techniques to indoctrinate recruits and prepare 
the ground for mass insurrection (Guardian, 28 March 1987). The 
same week 8 terrorists were arrested in Paris, of whom 6 were 
Tunisian nationals, and members of the militant group Islamic 
Jihad (Times, 27 March 1987; Le Monde, 26 March 1987). The same 
week in Djibouti, a Tunisian national admitted to planting bombs 
which resulted in the death of 11 people. The act had been 
carried out on behalf of a Middle Eastern group called Troops of 
Revolutionaries and Resisters (Guardian, 24 March 1987). Yet 
Western researchers continue to speak of Tunisia and Morocco as 
being the most stable states in the Maghreb. 
There are at least a dozen fundamentalist groups active on 
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Tunisian university 
departments. As a 
government supported 
(1970s). By 1979 
campuses, particularly in the science 
counter to fundamentalist groups, the 
the Association tQ Protect the ~ 
a more autonomous organization had evolved 
association, and was called the Islamic from the 
Revival 
Several 
original 
Movement, 
splinter 
with 
groups 
support from a broad social spectrum. 
developed in the 1980s, the most 
i.mportant-D-f whiGh is the- Islamic Tendency~ Movement_ (MTT) ~, which -
has been refused official regognition as a political party. 
After an incident at an hotel in 1981, over 100 leading MTI 
members were imprisoned with sentences ranging up to 11 years, 
more were arrested in 1983, and 1986-87 (Guardian, 24 April 
1987, p.4). Imprisonment and other police strategies aimed at 
fundamentalists and the MTI have only increased their 
activities, and support among the population. After 
disturbances perpetrated by Islamists against "immoral 
behaviour'' and foreigners in Tunis in April 1987, the repressive 
actions of the government met with little support from the 
masses. Over-reaction by the armed forces lent the Islamists 
the martyr ethos. In July-August 1987, fundamentalists were 
responsible for planting bombs outside the Presidential Palace 
and at touristic complexes. A trial in the summer of 1987 of 90 
Islamic militants, most of them MTI members, ended with death 
sentences for seven and heavy prison terms for most. The low 
number of death sentences was attributed to the persuasive power 
of the then Minister of the Interior, Ben Ali, who convinced 
Bourguiba that it was unwise to make martyrs out of MTI leaders. 
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However in the following weeks, Bourguiba had second thoughts 
and demanded the re-trj.al of the MTI case with the aim of 
gaining a greater number of death penalties. Without being 
"soft" on the fundamentalist issue, the Tunisian government and 
its Western allies do not want an overt confrontation between 
the government authorities and the Islarnists. According to The 
Guardian (9 Nov.l987, p.7), Bourguiba's "decision" to press 
ahead in his efforts to reopen the MTI txial lar-gely "explains" 
why a "coup" took place on 7 November 1987 led by Ben Ali. 
Ironically the comparatively open policies of the Tunisian 
regime, and contact with the outside world, have created 
dialectics within the society which must be resolved now that 
Bourguiba has been removed from the scene. While Ben Ali has 
adopted many of Bourguiba's pro-Western policies, it is believed 
that he wishes Tunisia to take a more active role 
internationally in Arab and Muslim affairs. Arguably the 
fundamentalists may emerge as the group with the strongest 
popular support. 
Algeria's form of Islamic socialism has been austere enough 
to appeal to the deeply felt Muslim sentiments of the masses who 
have not been exposed to what fundamentalists in the surrounding 
states term "Western decadence". Though Algeria has a one party 
state, the NLF is eclectic in that it embraces many shades of 
Muslim opinion. Fundamentalists there do not have access to the 
great numbers of marginalized groups so evident in Morocco. 
While Qadhafi may not be unaminously popular among Libyans, 
Qadhafiism is deeply entrenched in the young generation. 
Despite Western predictions, 
overthrow his regime during 
Qadhafi disappears from the 
the masses did 
the US raid in 
scene, it is 
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not rise to 
1986. Even if 
arguable that 
Qadhafiism, though somewhat more restrained, will survive. 
8.8 CONCLUSION. 
Because of the intensity of international trade, and 
revolutions in telecommunications 
1945, Mcluhan's (1967) "global 
and weapons 
village" 
systems since 
philosophy is 
particularly relevant to the Mediterranean and Strait region. 
There is intense interaction between the Muslim and non-Islamic 
worlds, between the rich North and the poorer South, and between 
first-order (eg EC, USA, USSR), second-order (eg Morocco, 
Algeria) and third-order (eg Tunisia) powers in the area. All 
~lobal geopolitical models ranging from those of Mackinder 
(1904, 1919, 1942) to Cohen (1973, 1976, 1982) have embraced the 
Strait region illustrating its vital importance in international 
affairs. Because of the spatial extent and intensity of 
geopolitical activity in the region there exist a whole range of 
contradictions between development and underdevelopment, 
democracy and autocracy, Eurocentricism and Maghrebi 
regionalism, nationalisms and supra-nationalisms, aligences to 
Arab-Muslim traditionalism, independence and commitment to the 
superpowers. There is a struggle towards hierarchical 
integration which often results in conflict with centrifugal 
forces such as nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. 
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Globalism, regional.i.sm and sub-regionalism have to be 
accommodated at a myriad of levels ranging from the divided 
communities of Ceuta to the national aspirations of Spain and 
Morocco, and tho supra-national forces of the EC and NATO. To 
date there are no Helsinki Accords concerning the Arab/Muslim 
world including the Maghreb. Those Muslim states which veer 
towards either of the superpowers face the overt wrath of 
militant fundamentalism and the latent wrath of the umma or 
global Islamic community. Just as_ Nass~rite_Egypt once provided 
the Arab world with a role model of Arabism and its geopolitical 
potential in the 1950s and 1960s, Iran has been providing the 
Maghreb with a model of how an Islamic state should function and 
spread a universalizing politico-religious system by 
revolutionary means throughout the world. Besides Khomeini's 
stated aims of spreading the word of God, and countering the 
"satanic" hegemonist.:ic aspirations the superpowers, 
fundamentalist revolution is aimed at re-asserting Muslim 
strength by the recreation of its golden age (AD 700-1400) and 
becoming a first-order global power. 
In the interest of peace and security, the states of the 
western Mediterranean region must establish greater mutually 
beneficial inter-linkages, particularly between states on the 
northern and southern shores eg securing the interests of 1 
million Moroccan migrant workers living in the EC (Sunday Times 
Magazine, 15 Nov. 1987, p.74). The fact that Morocco has made 
application to join the EC provides a salient example of the 
historical, human and economic intercourse which already exists 
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between Europe and the Maghreb. A fixed-link (bridge or tunnel) 
spanning the Strait between Spain and Morocco should be 
supported in political and economi.c terms by the internationaJ. 
community, strengthening Euro-Maghrebi bonds. 
The aspirations of the peoples and regimes of the Magh~eb 
to establish a United Maghreb Union has been retarded by the 
different political orientations of the respective regimes. 
Also the differences in national wealth and natural resources 
has fostered mutually antagonistic uationa;lislrts. This 
situation has led to the continued rivalry between the 
second-order regional powers Algeria and Morocco. The failure 
of the Maghrebi governments to resolve the Western Sahara 
dispute epitomizes their failure to create the Greater Maghreb 
Union. While theoretically all the Maghrebi states are 
non-aligned, Morocco and Tunisia veer towards the West, and 
Algeria has extended the hand of friendship towards the West 
since the death of Boumedienne (1978). Libya sees its own 
interests best served by cordial relations with Moscow, however 
like Algeria, its main goals lie in the Arab/Muslim world. 
At present, the threat to peace on the southern shore of 
the Strait comes from underdevelopment, poverty and corruption 
rather than from superpower rivalry. Dissatisfaction among the 
Moroccan majority is widespread. The Western Saharan War is 
undermining the entire economic fabric of the state and 
fostering a strong well-equipped army which draws its manpower 
from the impoverished masses. The Plaza dispute is a constant 
reminder to the nation of the ignominy of defeat at the hands of 
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European/Christian colonialism. 
TsJB.m.i.c fundamentalism does not recognize any tor:rltorial 
Jooundarj_es o:r borders. Events in any pare of Dar al :Ls~L~,m help 
shape the fundamentalist globalist viewpoint. This ranges from 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Western involvemnet in 
Lebanon to such legal instruments as the LOS (1982), the Camp 
David Accords (1978) and bilateral treaties between the USA and 
Arab states such as Morocco and Saudi Arabia. 
In order to avoid destabilization on the southern shore of 
the Strait, the economic, social and political interests of the 
Moroccan masses must be given priority by their closest 
neighbours, the EC and allied institutions. Special 
understandings should be established and clauses inserted in 
accords concerning aid, trade and defence packages between the 
Morocco and the EC, and Morocco and the USA and NATO. The 
accords should be aimed at fostering (i) respect for individual 
rights, (ii) a multi-party system of government, and (iii) a 
fairer distribution of the national wealth. However, Western 
political institutions must appreciate the Islamic character of 
Moroccan society. and its special historical and cultural 
linkages to other Arab and Muslim states. Despite the benefits 
gained by the West from King Hassan's pro-Western stance on 
issues relating to international affairs, it is not in the 
West's long-term interest to over-exploit Hassan's good offices. 
Indeed his attitude is often reminiscent of that of the Shah of 
Iran prior to 1979. It is fallacious to believe that the 
viewpoint of the present regime reflects that of the Moroccan 
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people as a whole; real geopolitical power and security on the 
southern shore of the Strait resides in the Moroccan masses. 
OveEall revolutionary Islam as a force in Morocco is maturing 
and wiJ.l have vast consequences in regional geopolitics in the 
future. 
While it is highly unlikely that there will be a united 
fundamentalist Maghreb in the futu£e, the possibility of 
Islamist regimes gaining control in Morocco and Tunisia is a 
very real one. The ethos of corruption and underdevelopment in 
Morocco is phenomenal in comparison to Algeria, Tunisia or 
Libya. In the author's experience the Casablanca bidonvilles 
are the most deprived areas in the Maghreb, or indeed the 
Mashreq. The Tunis slums of Melassine, Algier's Babel Oued, or 
Annaba's coastal bidonvilles look luxurious in comparison to 
those of Morocco. Morocco's marginalized population may yet 
provide a radical revolutionary guard. They have not forgotten 
the deaths of at least 600 of their fold during the Casablanca 
revolt (1981) and 100 in 1984-85. The present regime cannot 
reily on the army, considering that there were attempted coups 
d'etat in 1971, 1978 and 1983. 
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Gibraltar ranks among the most geostrategic arteries in the 
world in terms o£ internatj.onal trade, energy supply, and naval 
deployment. Hence any threat to security of passage of the 
Strait endangers the regional and global balance of power. 
Fundamentally there are three issues which risk causing 
destabilization: (i) the increasing national jurisdiction which 
both Spain and Morocco are seeking to exert over the waters of 
the Strait; (ii) the contentious question of decolonization of 
the Crown Colony, and the Spanish Plazas in North Africa; and 
(iii) instability on the Islamic southern shore. 
History suggests that the coastal states will continue to 
extend their sovereignty to ever-greater expanses of maritime 
space, and seek to impose greater national jn.risdiction 
territorial seas. Intrinsically linked to the issue of 
sovereignty over the seas is the right of the international 
community to make passage and overflight of straits like 
Gibraltar whose waters are constituted in whole or in part 
throughout its length of territorial seas. Hence the legal 
regime of "transit passage " as codified in the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOS 1982, Part III, Sec.2, Arts.37-44) which 
precludes Gibraltar from the traditional regime of "innocent 
passage" is an attempt at catering for the legitimate 
aspirations of the international community. Despite the 
positive attributes of the "transit passage regime", Spain and 
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Morocco are not in agreement with many aspects of the LOS 
Convention (1982), particularly with regard to the right of 
submerged passage, overflight, passage of naval vessels, and 
vessels with a high pollution potential. Spain and Morocco may 
yet decline to coope:cate with the implementation of the "·cransit 
passage regime'', and seek to impose ever-greater national 
jurisdiction over the waters of the Strait, thus causing 
contentj.on in the region. The whole question of maritime 
jurisdict.i.on .i.n the region is further complicated by the fact 
that boundaries have not yet been agreed upon by Spain and 
Gibraltar (UK), and Spain and Morocco in relation to the Plazas. 
The LOS (1982) may be seen as the first legal instrument to 
fully cater for the "international" status of the Strait of 
Gibraltar, despite the many historical agreements, accords, and 
conventions. In the interests of peace and stability, the 
,., ip('l.T' i an sto,tes and the maritime pm·1ers must ratify the LOS 
Convention (1982), and seek to support the Convention by further 
international agreements. including the commitment that UN 
forces will be deployed in the Strait area in the event that 
international passage of the Strait is endangered due to war or 
other hostile acts. Despite the fact that Spain disputes 
British sovereignty over the Crown Colony, and Morocco contests 
Spanish sovereignty in the Plazas, the riparian states must 
accept the de facto presence of the UK in Gibraltar. and that of 
Spain in the Plazas. These territories have a right to 
territorial waters, and hence "provisional" maritime boundaries 
should be agreed upon, in the interests of peace and security. 
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Declarations could be inserted into the agreements stating that 
the maritime boundaries are "provisional" and :Ln no way detract 
from the sove~eign claims to territories of the signatory 
parties. 
Gibraltar and the Plazas are the historical legacy of 
inter-state strife between Spain and Morocco, and colonialism in 
the region. The micro-fragmentation of territory in the Strait 
area, particularly between the 18th century and 1956, was the 
geographical expression of a hierarchy of geopolitical power in 
the global community. With the decline of European imperialism 
and decolonization since 1945, in the longterm it is doubtful 
that Britain and Spain will be able to maintain their sovereign 
links with the Crown Colony and the Plazas respectively. 
However decolonization in the region is problematic, not least 
because of the hierarchical nature of geopolitical organization 
in the Strait region, and the associated bases of Gibraltar and 
Ceuta guaranteeing Western security, but also the fact that 
sizeable populations living in the disputed territories do not 
wish them to be decolonized. Decolonization in the region is 
not a classic case of liberating peoples but rather territories 
which both Spain and Morocco claim on the grounds of the 
principle of "the territorial integrity of the state". Whatever 
arguments may be put forward by the disputants, the legitimate 
interests of the Gibraltarians, Ceutis and Melillinese must be 
catered for. Because of British and Spanish membership of the 
EC and NATO, these organizations offer scope for greater 
cooperation between the member states and in the future the 
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acrimonious aspects of the sovereignty dispute should become 
less evident, as Britain and the Gibraltarians establish closer 
links with Spain. EventualJ.y a majority of people in tho Crown 
Colony may vote for integration into the Spanish state, while 
the base may be staffed by multinational NATO forces. However 
there is no room for complacancy. By discussing the sovereignty 
issue from a longtcrm perspective and actively cooperating with 
the Spanish authorities, B:rital:o. may help contribute to 
lessening tensions in the region. 
From the Moroccan viewpoint, 1:1.ny uhan·ge in tho sovereign 
status of Gibraltar automatically implies that Spain must return 
the Plazas to Morocco. However Spain maintains that the Plazas 
are an integral part of the Spanish state and thus their 
sovereignty is not an issue open to discussion. This Spanish 
viewpoint is unrealistic, considering (i) Madrid's arguments in 
relation to sovereignty over the Crown Colony; (ii) Moroccan 
strategy since 1956 in regaining sovereignty over the other once 
colonized territories; and (iii) the continuing campaign of the 
Moroccan people for the decolonization of the Plazas. 
In an effort to defuse tensions in the region, Spain could 
return the Minor Plazas to Morocco immediately, as they are 
manifestly of little economic or strategic importance to Madrid, 
despite the certain advantages which the Chafarinas may hold. 
Decolonization of the Major Plazas is more problematic because 
of the opposition of the majority of inhabitants there to any 
change in their sovereign status. However the Muslim population 
of Melilla is becoming increasing militant because of its unfair 
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t~eatment by the Spanish authorities; militancy may spread to 
the Muslim population of Ceuta. By 2000 AD, it 5.s most likely 
that Muslims and those wishing for reunification wj.th Morocco 
wilJ constitute a majority in Melilla. It is probable that 
Ceuta w5.11 be the last Plaza to be decolonized, bocause the vast 
majority of people there are Spanish nationals and are closely 
iiltegrated into the economy and culture of mainland Spain. Also 
the Ceuta base is of importance not only to Spain but also 
Western security. At present, because of the political climate 
in Morocco, a hasty decolonization of Ceuta is not advisable, 
but rather a well-structured negotiated settlement catering for 
the legitimate aspirations of Spain, Morocco and the Ceutis, and 
ensuring Western interests there. Unless Spain makes positive 
efforts in this direction, it is likely that Morocco will take 
more militant action in attempting to regain sovereignty over 
Ceuta. 
Historically security of the Strait has been most 
endangered from the southern shore. All major global 
geopolitical models have included the Gibraltar and northern 
Maghrebi region. At present, stability in the Maghreb is 
threatened by: (i) the powerful force of fundamentalist Islam; 
(ii) inter-state rivalry, particularly between Morocco and 
Algeria, epitomized by the Western Saharan War which is 
emblematic of Morocco's "Greater Morocco" dream and Algeria's 
quest for the leadership role among the Maghrebi states; and 
(iii) the dictatorial nature of King Hassan's regime. In the 
event of revolution in Morocco, a radical military junta or 
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militant fundamentalist oligarchy would emerge as the natural 
leaders. Such a regime would most likely struggle for greater 
geopolitical power in tho Maghreb, particularly vis ~ vis 
Algeria, or struggle for a more militant Greater Maghrobi Union, 
as is the case with Libya. A more radical Moroccan regime would 
be less disposed to accepting the status quo concerning the 
Plazas and the "transit passage" regime for the Strait (J_JOS 
J982). Western interests in the region would be obvious targets 
for fundamentalists following the precedent set by Iran since 
1979. In the interests of poaco and stability, Western 
institutions such as the EC and NATO must assist the Moroccan 
people in their endeavours for greater economic and political 
development. Unconditional Western support for the regime of 
Hassan II is not a feasible strategy in the longterm for 
ensuring stability on the southern shore of the Strait. The 
West must avoid becoming involved in the Western Saharan War 
because of the risk this runs in relation to Algeria and the 
Arab-Muslim world, and of course the potential for superpower 
confrontation in the area. Also the EC has a major role to play 
in ensuring greater economic cooperation with the Maghrebis, 
particularly Morocco. The proposed trans-Strait fixed-link in 
the form of a bridge or tunnel should not be merely viewed as a 
Moroccan-Spanish project, but rather a solid link between the EC 
and the Maghreb; and should have the financial support of the 
Community, especially as of 1986 Ceuta and Melilla are EC 
exclaves. With concerted NATO and US action, Spain, Morocco and 
the Alliance could strive to come to an agreement, whereby the 
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Ceuta base would be protected by the West, ensuring that hostile 
forces will not gain control of it. 
APPENDIX I (o fib). 
(o) HIE MOST IMPORTANT S1"RAHS ON WHICH WORLD SHIPPING CONCENTRATES, STRAIIS OF 
HISTORICAL INTEREST AND THOSE WITH FUTURE POTENTIAL: INTERNATIONAL STRAITS. 
Min imi uw Ocoon I 0ncl No. o1 r i pori on 
Shoits. Didth:nm. 1oclor.fnclor.stctos. 
----------------
ARC'flC (East Siberian Sea, Laptcv Sea, Borcntu Sea, Hcaufort Sen) 
~. Prol iv Longo 69.0 
2. Prol iv Vi I 'kitskogo 30.0 
3. Prol iv Motochkin c 1 .H 
~- Pro. ~arskiye Voroto 29.8 
5. Pro. Dimilriyo Laptcvo 29.8 
IS. Borrol'! Strait 
7. McClure Strait 
B. Robeson Channel 
0. Nares Stouit 
27.0 
43.0 
10.0 
14.0 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
c 
c 
e 
G 
c 
G 
G 
d 
d 
(1) USSH. 
(1) USSR. 
(1) USSR. 
(1) USSR. 
(1) USSR. 
(1) Canada. 
(1) Canada. 
(2) Canada. Greenland. 
(2) Canada. Greenland. 
NORTH AMERICA (North Atlantic Ocean, North Pacific Ocean) 
10. Strait of Canso c 1.0 (ii) c (1) Canada. 
11. Strait of Belle !sleo 9.0 (v) c (1) Canada. 
12. Cabot Strait• 41.5 (v) d (1) Canada. 
13. Davis Strait 164.0 (v) d (2) Canada.Greenland. 
14. Hudson Strait• 28.0 {v) c (1) Canada. 
15. Jacques Cartier Pass 15.0 (iv) c (1) Canada. 
16. Northumberland Strait 7.0 {iv) c (1) Canada. 
1J. Strait of Juan de Fuca• 9.0 (v) c (2) USA. Canada. 
18. Shelikof Strait 20.0 (ii) c (1) Alaska (USA) 
19. Unimak Passo 10.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
20. Amukta Pass 35.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
21. Seguam Pass 13.0 {v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
22. Samalgor (Samolga) 16.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
23. Amchitka Pass 46.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
24. Adak Strait 7.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
25. Tanago Pass 19.0 (v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
26 Agottu Strait 17.0 {v) e (1) Alaska (USA). 
27. Bering Strait• 19.0 (~) o (2) USA. USSR. 
28. Florida Straits (E) 82.0 (v) c (2) USA.Bahamos. 
29. Florida Straits (W)o 42.5 (v) c (2) USA. Cuba. 
30. Yucatan Chonnelo 105.0 (iii) c G (2) Mexico. Cuba. 
31. N-W Providence Ch 26 0 (v) c (1) Bahamas. 
32. N-E Providence Cho 24 ""- (v; e (1) Bahamas. 
33. Crooked Island Posso 26.2 (v) e {1) Bahamas. 
34. Moyoguano Passage (E) 39.0 (v) e (1) Bahamas. 
35. Caicos Passage 35.e (vi e (1) Turks/Coicos (UK: 
36. Turks Island Passage 18 2 (v~ e (1) Turks/Coicos (UK, 
37. Windward ~ossageo 46.25 (v; e (2) Cuba. Hoit;. 
38. Mono Possogeo 26 35 (v) e (2) Dominican Rep. 
39. Anegado Possogeo 
40. Guadeloupe Passage 
41. Dominica Passage 
42. Martinique Passage 
43. St. Lucio Channel 
45.0 
28.0 
16.0 
22.0 
17.0 
(v) 
(") 
(v) 
(v) 
( v) 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
Puerto Rico (US) 
( 1 ) V i r g i n I s (UK) . 
(3) Montserrat (UK) 
Guo de I oupe ( F r) . 
Antigua & Barbudo. 
(2) Guadeloupe (Fr). 
Dominica. 
(2) Martinique (Fr). 
Dominica. 
(2) Martinique (Fr). 
14. S~. Vinccni Passageo 
45. Jamaica C~onnel 
46. Dragon's Mouih 
1}/. ScHpont's MouU1 
18. tlo"l!bn·+'n roguono I~ ass 
49. Golloon's Possaye:o 
50. Old BahaMa Channel 
23.5 
69.0 
400yds 
!J.0 
1 :->. t1 
16.0 
SOUTH AMERICA (South Atlont ic) 
51. Estrecho de Ia Mai rc 16.0 
52. Strait of Magellano% 1.0 
SJ. ~eagle Channel 1.0 
WESI AFRICA (North At I antic) 
54. Canary Jslon~~orocco 56.5 
55. Canary Island Straits c 4.0 
NORTH EUROPE (Barents Sea. Baltic 
56. Denmark Strait 138.0 
57. (Ent) Gulf of Finland 17.0 
58. (Ent) Gulf of Bothnio c 1.0 
59. Alonds Hav 17.0 
60. Kalmar Sund 2.0 
61. Bornholmsgattet 19.0 
62. Oresund o %@ 2.0 
63. Kattegot @ 12.0 
64. Skogerrok @ 61.0 
65. The Great Belt o%@ 4.1 
GG. Pe11i;unU Firlho 
67. Little Minch 
68. North Channel 
69. St. George's Channel• 
70. Strait of Dover• 
2.6 
10.0 
10.75 
35.0 
17.5 
SOUTHERN EUROPE (Medi terroneon) 
71. Strait of Gibraltar•@ 7.6 
72. Freu de Minorca 
73. Strait of Bonifacio• 
74. Corsica-Elba Strait 
75. Conal de Piombino 
(Elba-Italy) 
76. Canol d'Uomo 
(Gig I io-Jtoly) 
77. Strait of Messina• 
78. Strait of Sicilyo 
20.0 
3.5 
26.0 
5.0 
9.6 
1. 68 
55.0 
79. Pantelleria-Tunisio St 40.0 
80. Malta Channel• 44.0 
81. Strait of Otrantoa@ 39.25 
82. Corfu Channel 3.0 
83. Kithero Strait• 16.0 
84. Kithero-Andikithero St 21.75 
85. Andikithero-crete St 
86. Kasos Strait 
87. Korpothos Strait 
88. Dardonel lesa % @ 
17.4 
27.0 
23.0 
750 yds 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
0 
:; t . Lucio. 
(2) Sts Lucio~ Vincent. 
( 3) J Oh10 i c a . Ha i t i . 
Navassa Is (USA). 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
c G (2) lrinidod. Veneluclu. 
c G (2) "ft·iilidod. Vone;,uolu. 
c G (2) Vc,1e?.UO I 0. 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
0 
e 
c 
0 
c 
e 
Sea, North 
( i) d 
( i i i) e G 
( i i i) e G 
( i i i) c G 
( i i i) c G 
(iii) c G 
(v) c G 
(v) c G 
(v) c G 
(v) d G 
( i v) d 
( i v) e 
( v) d 
( v) d 
( v) c 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
a 
e 
d 
e 
c 
c 
Curucuo (Dutch). 
(2) lrinidod [( i"obago. 
Gt·e;•odu. 
(1) Cuba. 
(1) Argentino. 
(2) Argentina.Chi lo. 
(2) Argentino.Chile. 
(2) Spain. Moro~co. 
(1) Spain. 
Sea, Atlantic) 
(2) Greenland. Iceland. 
(2) Finland. USSR. 
(2) Finland. s~eden. 
(1) Saeden. Finland. 
(1) s~eden. 
(1) Saeden. Denmark. 
(2) Denmark. s~eden. 
(2) Denmark. Saeden. 
(2) Noraay. Denmark. 
(1) Denmark. 
(i) Ui\. 
(1) UK. 
(1) UK. 
(2) UK. Ireland. 
(2) UK. France. 
(3) Spain. Morocco. 
(Gibraltar (UK)). 
(1) Spain. 
(2) Corsica (Fr) Sardinia (It). 
(2) France. Italy. 
(1) Italy. 
(1) Italy. 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
(iv) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
c (1) Italy. 
( i i i ) 
c (2) Italy. Tunisia. 
c (2) Italy. Tunisia. 
d ( 2) Ma I t a . S i c i I y ( I t ) . 
b G (2) Albania. Italy. 
c (2) Albania. Greece. 
e (1) Greece. 
e (1) Greece. 
e (1) Greece. 
e (1) Greece. 
e (1) Greece. 
a (1) Turkey. 
6oo 
09. Hosporus Strait• % D 700 yds 
80. Kcrchcnokiy Pro I iv St 1.0 
91. Yurftcy-Cyprus Strait 68.0 
9~. Ojcrba-Tunisia Strait 3.0 
8:-L \<0r:(0nai1-Tunisio St Hl.!'i 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
(iv) 
I::AS"i" At">HCI\ fiND SOUT:I /ISlfl (I nd i Oil Ocean) 
a (1) lurkcy. 
b G (1) USSR. 
c (2) Turkey. Cyprus. 
c (1) "ft•nisi<1. 
c (1) Tunisia. 
80. ~!.o:<wilb i que Cilannc I o 30.0 ( i i) c (2) Mo:<oi•lbiquo. 
95. Mafia Channel 7.0 
96. Zan;. i our Chonne I 1·1. 0 
97. PoMbo Po~Yogo 20.0 
98. Zan%ibar-Pombo Strait 21.5 
99. Bob cl Mandcbv 0 9.4 
100. Strait of Tirana G 3.1 
101. S~rait of Gubal• G 6.6 
102. S~roit of Hormuzo G 20.6 
103. Pat~ Stroit 3.:3 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
(v) 
( i v") 
( i v) 
(v) 
I • . ) 
\ 1 I J 
Madagascar. 
c (1) Tanzania. 
c (1) Tanzania. 
c (1) Tanzania. 
d (1) Tanzania. 
a G (4) Djibouti. N Yemen. 
lthiopia. S Yemen. 
b G (2) lgypt. Saudi Arabia. 
a G ( 1) Egypt. 
b G (2) Iran. Oman. 
c (2) Sri LGnko. Indio. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Indian Ocean, South Chino Sea, Phi I ippine Sea) 
104. GrGat Channel 88.0 (v) c (3) Indonesia. ~oloysia. 
105. Malacca Strait 
106. Singapore Strait 
107. Berhala Strait 
108. Bangko Strait 
109. Karimota Strait• 
110. Jasper Strait• 
111. Sunde Straito 
112 . Ba I i S t r a i t 
113. Lombok Strait• 
114. Alas Strait 
115. Sope Strait 
116. Sopudi Straito 
117. Roti Strait 
118. Omboi Stroito 
119 . Mo k ass a r S t r o i t o 
120 T1mpous Strait 
121. Seroson Passage 
122. Monipo Stroito 
123. Wetor Possogeo 
i24. Sibutu Possogeo 
8.3 
2.4 
18.0 
8.0 
27.2 
5.25 
4.3 
2.0 
11. 3 
5.0 
8.0 
23.8 
6.0 
16.9 
48.9 
10.0 
23.0 
13.4 
12.5 
17.5 
125. Boloboc Passageo 27.0 
126. Basi I ian Strodo 6.4 
127. Surigao Strait• 8.5 
128. Mindoro Stroito 19.4 
129. Son Bernardino Passage• 3.5 
130. Verde Island Passageo 3.75 
131. Bobuyon Channel 14.0 
132. Bol intong Chonnelo 23.75 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
( i v) 
( i v) 
( i i i ) 
( i v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
( v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
( v) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( ; i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
c 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
c 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
Thailand. 
(2) Indonesia. ~loysio. 
(3) Singapore. ~loysia. 
Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
( 1 ) In done s i o. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(i) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(1) Indonesia. 
(2) Indonesia. 
Phi I i pp i nes. 
( 1) Phi I i pp i nes. 
( ~ ) Ph 1 I i pp i nes 
( i ) Phi I i pp i nes. 
(~) Phi I ippines. 
( i ) Phi I i pp i ne s. 
( 1) Phi I i pp i nes. 
( 1) Phi I i pp i nes 
( 1 ) Phi I i pp i nes. 
EAST ASIA (South Chino Sea, 
North Pacific Ocean) 
East Chino Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea o1 Okhotsk, 
133. Luzon Strait(Bashi)o 
134. Hoinon Strait 
135. Lemmo Channel 
136. Pescodores Channel 
40.5 
10.0 
16.0 
17.0 
(v) 
(iv) 
( i v) 
( i i i ) 
e 
c 
c 
d 
(2) Taiwan. Philippines. 
(1) PR Chino. 
( 1) ~'R Chi no. 
(2) PR Chino. Taiwan. 
137. rorio\OSO St.·oi1c· 
138. h~ami S1ruito 
139. Takara Koikyo 
G-'}.3 
31.0 
22.0 
140. Toncgoshimo Kaikyo 10.0 
( i j i ) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
141. Yokushimo Kaikyo c 30.0 ( i v) 
(v) 
( i v) 
( i j i ) 
142. Onu1o1i St (Van DicloHln)'' 15.5 
143. Pohai Strait 19.0 
144. Choju Hochyup Stroito 1i.G 
14~. ~.Korea/Chosen Strait 
Strait divided into 2 
146. Atolontc-·Ina 7.aki St 
147. Craigic-Komino Shima 
148. Aunt-Komino Shima St 
149. Blakeney-Kofllino Shima 
150. Voshon-Mitsu Shima 
n.e (iii) 
channels by ·rsu 
/.6. 0 ( i i i) 
22.8 (iii) 
24.0 ( i i i) 
25.25 ( i i i) 
25.0 ( i i i) 
c c 2) PR c: 1 i i 1 a . ·r o i mm . 
e (1) Jopun. 
e (1) Japan. 
e (1) Japan. 
e ( 1 ) Japan. 
0 (1) Japan. 
b G (I) Chi no. 
c G (2) S Koroa. Japan. 
c (?.) S Koroa. Japan. 
Shiflla Islands (Japan) 
e (1) Japan. 
o (1) Japan. 
0 (1) ,Jopan. 
e en Japan. 
e (~) Japan. 
151. E.Koreo/Chosen Strait 25.0 (iii) c (2) S Korea. Japan. 
Strait divided by archipelo.gic (straits) (Japan) 
152. Futogami Jimo-lki Shima 6.25 (iii) e (1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
(1) Japan. 
153. Futogomi Jimo-Azuchi Shi5.5 (iii) e 
154. Madora Shimo-lki Shima 6.75 (iii) e 
155. Kokoto Shimo-lki Shima 6.75 (iii) e 
156. Yeboshi Jimo-lki Shima 4.25 (iii) e 
157. Yeboshi Jimo-Kyushu St 6.5 (iii) o 
158. Yeboshi Jimo-0ro Shima 10.75 (iii) e 
159. Oro Shimo-Kyushu St 11.0 (iii) e 
160. Oro Shimo-0 Shima 18.25 (iii) e 
161. Soda Kaikyo 
162. Tsugoru Koikyo Stroito 
163. La Perouse (Soya) Sto 
164. Nemuro Kaikyo 
165. Rishiri-suido 
18.0 
9.6 
19.9 
11L((:! 
10.0 
166. P. Pervyy Kuri I 'skiy 7.0 
167. P.Chetvertyy Kurilskiy 31.0 
168. Prol iv Yekoteriny 10.0 
169. Proliv Frizo 20.0 
170. Prol iv Bussol 37.0 
171. Prol iv Kruzenshterno 36.0 
172. Prol iv Nevel'skogo 10.0 
173. Prol iv Totarskiy 28.0 
174. Prol iv Li lke 13.0 
(iv) 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
(v) 
( i i i ) 
( i i i ) 
( i v) 
e G (1) Japan. 
e (1) Japan. 
e (2) USSR. Japan. 
e (L) USSk. Japan. 
e ( 1) Japan. 
c ( 1) USSR. 
e (1) USSR. 
e ( 1) USSR. 
e ( 1) USSR. 
e ( 1) USSR. 
e ( 1) USSR. 
c ( 1) USSR. 
c ( 1) USSR. 
c G (1) USSR. 
OCEANIA (South Pacific Ocean. North Pacific Ocean) 
175. St. George's Ct>anne! 8.0 (ii) e (1) Papua New Guinea. 
176. Bougoinvi lie Strai:~ 
177. Manning Strait 
178. Indispensable 
179. Cook Stroito 
180. Foveoux Strait 
181. Boss Strait 
182. Torres Stroito 
183. Bonks Strait 
184. Apol imo Strait 
185. Vatu-i-Ra Channel 
186. Kaulokohi Channel 
187. Kauoi Channelo 
15.0 
19.0 
11.5 
15.0 
c 80.0 
2.2 
8.0 
4.0 
2.0 
15.0 
63.0 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
(v) 
( i i ) 
( v) 
(iv) 
(v) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
( i i ) 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
c 
c 
c 
e 
e 
e 
e 
Austral ion Trustee. 
(2) P.N.Guineo. Sol. 
(1) Solomon Islands. 
(1) Solomon Islands. 
(1) Ne\'1 Zealand. 
(1) Nel'l Zealand. 
(1) Australia. 
(2) Aust 'I. P.N.Gui. 
(1) Australia. 
(1) Western Samoa. 
( 1) F i j i . 
( 1 ) Ha\'lo i i (USA.) . 
( 1 ) Hal'lo i i (USA) . 
602 
·1 en. l<t< it;; i Choi1tw I ?.?.. (3 ( i i ) c ( 1 ) H<.tV;.'o i i (USA) . 
1Wl. !Jn i I o I o r,:,nnnol H . (1 ( i i ) c ( i ) :-im·JO I I (USA). 
190. A I en11 i hniln Channel ?.S. 0 ( i i ) e ( 1 ) Ho\70 i i (USA). 
(b) OHlER SlRAJTS OF HlSi"Oi-HCAL INn:nES'f AND 'iKOSE WI"iH FUTURE POTENTIAL. 
ARCTIC (East Si[~orion Sea, l.aptev Sea, Barents Sea, Beau1ad Sea) 
1. Pro I iv Eter i kan 2. Pro I iv Sannikovo 
3. Prol iv Ologovcshchonskiy 4. Pro I iv Zoryo 
5. Prol iv Morgana 6. Pro I iv Avstriyskiy 
1. Prol iv Britonskiy Kenol 8. Prol iv Shokolskogo 
9. Pro I iv Krosnoi Armi i 10. Pro I iv Ovtsyono 
11. Yeniseyskiy Zol iv 12. Gydonskuyo Gubo 
13. Obskoya Gubo 14. Tozovskoyo Gubo 
15. Prol iv Molygino 16. James Ross Strait 
17. Prince of ~ales Strait 18. Prince Albert Sound 
19. Dolphin and Union Strait 
21. Victoria Strait 
23. Viscount Melvi I le Sound 
25. Me Cl intock Channel 
27. Lady Ann Strait 
29. Belcher Channel 
NORTH AMERICA 
31. Gaspe Passage 
33. Di~on Entrance 
35. Hebert Pass 
37. Fenimore Pass 
39. Santo Barbaro Channel 
41. Virgin Pa:~agc 
43. Honduras Channel 
20. Dease Strait 
22. Roe Strait 
24. Lancaster Sound 
26. Jones Sound 
28. Byom Martin Channel 
30. Wellington Channel 
32. Hecate 
34. Kennedy Entrance 
36. Yunosko Pass 
38. Eto I in Strait 
40. Mouchoi r Passage 
~2. Vicquc~ Po~~agc 
NORTH EUROPE (Barents Seo, Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean) 
44. Koro Strait 45. Kodet Channel 
46. Ferner Belt. 47. The Hole 
48. North Minch 49. The Selent 
50. Bristol Channel 
EAST AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA (indian Ocean) 
51. Cornaro Is Strait. 52. Cope Guordofui St 
53. East Gulf of Bahrain Strait (Bahroin/Ootar) 
54. West Gulf of Bahrain Strait (Bahrain/Saudi Arabia) 
55. Ten Degree Channel. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Indian Ocean. South Chino Sea, Phi I ippine Sea) 
56. Djoi lolo Passage 57. Api Passage 
58. Koti Passage 
60. Grehund Strait 
62. Dampier Strait 
64. Magueda Passage 
59. Molucca Passage 
61. Boston Passage 
63. Port Timor-Lete Island St. 
65. Polillo Strait 
EAST ASIA (South China Sea, East China Sea, Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, 
North Pacific Ocean) 
66. Shimonoseki Koikyo 
68. Hukson Chedo 
67. Okinawa Islands-Honshu St. 
69. Moemol Suido 
G0:.5 
"/'!!. Stmono';c ~:; d i do II . i~o~:tono::;h i tt10 S<t i (10 
7?.. Okushiri t~n i kyo 7J. No·(suko St r a i t 
73. ·r ora ku SL•: do '14. Sil i lw tOil Sui do 
75. Kunosh i r i Sui do 76. Yc~orofu Ka i kyo 
77. Minotniuruppus Suic!o '/!:l. Diane Strait 
'/D. :<ct o i !\ti i :tyo 110. RoshorJa l~o i kyo 
01. l(oroni I< a i kyo B2. Silusukotan St rod 
03. Harumukoton Kaikyo 84. f'ioti Strait 
OS. Banjo I( a i kyo 06. Uororu Kaikyo 
s-7. Shi rinki Koikyo so. Sevorny Pro I i o 
Oct-:AN!A (South Poci1ic Ocean, North Pacific Ocean) 
89. Jsumrud Strait 
91. Vitior Strait 
93. Dundas Strait 
95. Kalohi Channel 
91. Keoloikohiki Channel 
Kt:Y: 
Maritime connection: 
(i) Inter-oceanic straits. 
(ii) Intra-oceanic straits. 
(iii) Inter-sea straits. 
(iv) Intra-sea straits. 
(v) Inter-sea-oceanic straits. 
90. Goschona Strait 
92. Cloreno Strait 
04. Saipan Channel 
86. Auou Channel 
98. Alolokeiki Channel 
Territorial Connection: 
a Intercontinental straits. 
b Intracontinental straits. 
c Continental-island straits. 
d Inter-insular straits. 
e Archipelagic straits. 
G Gulf. 
o Straits in the region of the most used shipping Iones in the ~orld as 
represented in "World Straits and Shipping Lones" (Mop) 504911(545037)12-18, 
Office of the Geographer, Deportment of State, Washington DC. (Undated Mop, c 
1982). 
%International straits by virtue of historic/long-standing international 
convent ions. 
@Only entrance to semi-enclosed sea, gulf or boy. 
Sources: "World Straits and Shipping Lones" (Mop) 504911(545037)12-18, Office of 
t he G eo g r a ph e r , De p a r t men t c f S t a t e , VV a s h i n g t on DC ; T he T i me s At I as of t he Wo r I d 
(1985); Couper (1983); Kennedy (1958, pp 114-164); Koh (1982, pp.24-26); Smith 
(1973) (see bibliography). 
6ol-, 
GIBRALTAR: TRfiFfiC FLO\~ 
(o) GIBRALTAR: TRAFFIC PASSING f ASWIAtlD 1981. (CLASS. NGROSS) 1,000 GTs. 
3-2~ 2-51( 5-HH< 10-15:< 1 ~-?.51< 25--51):( YOTAL 
GEN. CARGO 1178 2580. 2172. 73. 9:551. 
. 
NGROSS 4566.96 9052.73 1622EL24 7499 06 1 HJ4.64 0.00 0.00 3B:i?.3.45 
AUX.YRAIN 0. 
e.ee 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
0. 
0.ee 
1. 
7.12 
e. 
0.00 
276. 
e. 
e.ee 
0. 
0.0e 
Ia. 
86.67 
723. 
0. 
e.eo 
0. 
e.ee 
4. 
607.34 
1053. 
e:. e. 0. 2. 
0.eo o.oe: 11LOO 2.29 
e. 0. e. 1. 
0.eo 0.00 ELee 1.12 
23. e. 0. 21. 
0.00 0.90 e.00 694.91 
<>82. 23. e. 2557. 
NGROSS 
BARGE 
NGROSS 
BARGE CAR 
NGROSS 
BULK 
NGROSS 
2. 
2.29 
e. 
e.e0 
e. 
e.00 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.oe 2388.23 6918.85 19556.82 15720.31 1546.18 e.e0 48130.26 
BULK/C.C. 
NGROSS 
BULK/OIL 
NGROSS 
c.c. 
0. 
0.ee 
e. 
0.e0 
1e2. 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
o.ee 
93. 
7. 
124.78 
1. 
1. e. e. a. 
36.88 0.e0 0.00 161.66 
94. 1 1 e. e. 205. 
22.35 3543.70 7 327.82 e.oe 10893.68 
85. 91. 32. e. 680. 
NGROSS 
CABLE 
NGROSS 
CARGO/TRA 
NGROSS 
CEMENT 
NGROSS 
IUH3 
e. 
0.ee 
193. 
298.51 
e. 
9.00 
e. 
9.00 
7. 
10.40 
339. 
492.65 
0. 
0.e0 
e. 
0.ee 
84. 
345.43 ne.75 11e4.71 1613.66 2974.97 173e.oe e.eo 87B8.e2 
2. 5. 
6.75 38.77 
3. 21. 
10.98 125.83 
ze. 3. 
61.69 19.84 
CHEM.TANK 191. 35. 
NGROSS 
DEPOT SHI 
NGROSS 
DREDGER 
NGROSS 
DRILL SHI 
NGROSS 
FERRY 
NGROSS 
FISH CARR 
NGROSS 
FISH FACT 
NGROSS 
fiSHING 
4. 
4.33 
0.30 
2. 
2.29 
e. 
e.ee 
4. 
3.57 
5. 
8.44 
(l 
699.69 
e. 
e.ee 
1. 
2.43 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
7. 
29.34 
19 
57.24 
e. 
NGROSS e.O(• e.00 
ICEBREAKE 0 4. 
NGROSS 0.0(• 9.30 
LIVESTOC~ 181 29. 
NGROSS 189.13 92.38 
LNG 6. 0. 
NGROSS 9.52 0.ee 
LNG/LPG 0. e. 
NGROSS e eo e.00 
LPG 114 1e9 
NGROSS 
OR[ 
NGROSS 
ORE/OIL 
NGROSS 
PART C.C 
180.07 
e. 
e.ee 
e 
0.00 
351.25 
32. 
129.46 
2 
7.42 
46. 
25L53 
e. 
e.ea 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
1. 
7.24 
15 
84.84 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
7. 
49 32 
L 
5.e5 
8. 
43.62 
67' 
514.21 
8L 
663.84 
0. 
e ee 
0. 
e.ee 
2. 
24.97 
3. 
34.51 
19. 
256.71 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
o.ee 
e. 
0.00 
11 
141.10 
L 
10.24 
L 
e. e. e. 0. 7. 
e 0e e.ee e.0e e.ee 45.52 
e. e. e. e. 26. 
e.ee e.0e e.ee 0.ee 16e.88 
1. 3. e. e. 37. 
1 5.5e 78.10 e.ea e.e0 ne.63 
47. L 0. 0. 632. 
89e.49 32.76 e.ee 0.ee 2623.84 
e. A. A ~ .to 
e.ee e.ee e.ee e.ee 4.33 
e. e. e. e. 2. 
0.ee e.ee e.ee 0.ee 2. 7 3 
e. 0. e. e. 2. 
o.ee a eo e.e0 e.ee 2.29 
0. e. e. e. L 
e.ee 0.eo e.e0 e eo 7.24 
e. e. e. e. 37. 
o.eo e.ee e.ee e.ee 258.85 
e. e. e. e. 25 
e.ee e.ee e.e0 e.e0 75 92 
e. e. e. e. 
13.e2 e.ee e.0e e.ee e ee 13.02 
e. e e. o. o 4. 
e.ee e.ee e.ee e.aa e oc- 9.3e 
e. e. e. e. e. 21 7. 
e.oe e.eo e.ee e.ee e.e(• 33{L84 
e. 33. 13. 1 1. o 64 
e.oe 723.89 382.78 878.e2 e.ee 1999.27 
e. e. e. 4. e 12. 
o.eo 0 eo e.ee 326.ae e.ee 37e.42 
18 32 32. e. e. 372. 
213.25 614.23 1199.48 e.ee e.ae Je72.5o 
7 7. 30. 39 262 
850.31 610 11 1415.92 225.09 0(10 3894.74 
8. 51, 83. 1 7 162. 
, 2.92 189.46 2045.81 5811.74 20(•4 ~5 Hlil72.29 
13. 0. 
6o:; 
t~GI?OSS 79.6? 1 ~e <)9 
1. 2. 
7 1 () 
29 
285.49 21(.98 e.0o 9.00 o.ee 736.79 
25 e. e. 121. 
NG:10SS 1.95 7.97 210.0G 167.03 1920.49 972.35 0.00 0.00 2379.83 
?IPE LAYE 0. 0. 0. 1. e. 0. (l. 0. 1. 
NGrlOSS 0.00 O.Oe 0.00 13.10 0.00 0.00 e.0e 0.013 13.10 
:>mHOON 0. i. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 
NGROSS 0.60 ~.7G 5.68 G.00 0.00 0.00 0.013 0.00 113.44 
PUS~Er! TU 7. 0. 0. 0. 0. 111. 0. 0. 7. 
tJGrlOSS Hl.3"/ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.ee 0 00 0 013 0.0e 10.37 
REf ?1'13. 193. ?.IJ 1 43. 0. 0. 0. 0. 7 3e. 
NGROSS 271.70 6 70.11 219e. 91 493.55 13.00 0.00 e.00 e.00 3626.26 
RESEARCI~ 15. 11. 2. 1. 1. 0. 0. G. 30. 
t~GROSS 14. "l7 37.66 11 10 13.94 17.11 0.00 0.0e e.e0 94.58 
RO/RO 439. 288. 172. 73. 22. e. 0. e. 994. 
NGROSS 622.16 967.73 1329.59 935.16 382.30 0.00 e.ee 0.ee 4237.04 
RO/RO/C.C 6. e. 1. 16. 33. 0. e. 0. 56. 
NGROSS 9. 56 0.00 6.27 166. 11 691.22 0.e0 e.0e 0.00 895.15 
SALVAGE T 16. 1. e. e. 0. e. 0. 0. 17. 
NGROSS 14.32 2.27 e.ee e.0e 0.e0 e.ee e.e0 13.00 16.6e 
SALVAGES 0. 1. 0. e. e. e. e. e. 1. 
wGI-Ioss 0.00 2.63 e.ee o.ee e.a0 o.ee e.ee e.ee 2.63 
SALVAGE T e. 3. e. e. e. 0. e. 0. 3. 
NGRoss e.ee 1.1 e 0.0e e.ee e.ee e.0e 0.eo 0.ee 1.1 e 
SEMI-SUB e. e. 1. e. e. e. e. 0. 1. 
NGROSS e.ee 0.e0 7.69 9.0e e.00 9.09 0.00 0.0e 7.69 
SUPPLY 7. 2. e. 0. e. 0. e. 0. 9. 
NGRoss 6.56 6.8e e.ee e.ee e.ee e.ee e.ee 0.0e 13.36 
SUPPORT S 3. e. e. e. ll. e. e. 0. 3. 
NGRoss 4.65 e.e0 e.0e e.ee o.ee e.oe e.eo e.ee 4.65 
TANK 214. 152. 1e3. 226. 456. 484. 425. 373. 2433. 
NGROSS 
TRAINING 
NGROSS 
lUG 
NGROSS 
TUG/SUPPL 
NGROSS 
VEHICLE 
NGROSS 
\'liNE TANK 
NGROSS 
T 0 T A L 
NGROSS 
293.37 
0. 
e.ee 
59. 
3e.e3 
15. 
1e.B8 
32. 
38.57 
32. 
47.07 
6136. 
576.05 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
e.00 
e. 
0.00 
17. 
54 63 
6. 
18.69 
3Be6. 
755.95 2901.53 8678.98 18181.5e 29e13.98 48513.51 108914.95 
1. 
5.e3 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0.e0 
23. 
180.85 
e. 
0.eo 
3420. 
e. 
0.ee 
e. 
e.0e 
e. 
0.e0 
2e. 
260.27 
e. 
e.0e 
2e15. 
e. 
e.e0 
e 
0.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
17. 
e. 
0.ae 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e 00 
e. 
e. 
0.ee 
~ 
v. 
0.ae 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0. 1. 
e.ee 5.e3 
6. :)~. 
0.00 3e.e3 
0. 15. 
e.0e 10.88 
0. 109. 
292.15 0.00 e.ee 0.eo 826.47 
e. 0. a. e. 38. 
e.ee e.ee e.eo 0.eo 65.77 
1966. 1339. 691. 390. 19763 
7224.1e r3362 97 25850.67 24336.93 36928.97 47192.50 46859.62 50518.46 :'52273.41 
(b) GIBRALTAR· Tf'AffiC PASSING WESTWARD 1981. (1.eeo Gll. 
GEN CARGO 
NGROSS 
AUX .TRAIN 
NGROSS 
BARGE 
NGROSS 
BARGE CAR 
NGROSS 
BULl< 
NGROSS 
BULK/C. C. 
4232. 2573. 745 
4611.30 9e46.67 17264.24 8542.84 
e.79 
e. 
e.oe 
12. 
0. 
o.eo 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
e. 
9.90 
e. 
e.oo 
299 
0. 
e.e0 
e. 
9.ee 
e. 
e eo 
841. 
51 
877.7 3 
e. 
e.oe 
0. 
e.ee 
7. 
151 67 
1363. 
e. 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0 
e.00 
e. 
e. 9891. 
0.oo 4e342 57 
e.e0 e.eo e.o0 e. 79 
0. e. e. 1. 
e.ee e.00 0.e0 9.9e 
10. 0. e. 29. 
264.e6 0.0e e.00 436.58 
561. 23. e. 3087. 
20.85 
e. 
e.e0 
e. 
e.ee 2611.44 HI379.B3 25141.45 18273.72 1542.29 e.eo 57948.55 
13 e. e. e. 12 1. e. 0. 
606 
~~cr.os; 
ilULI(/OIL 
NGI-IOSS 
C.C. 
NGilOSS 
f (H) 
8 
0.00 
205. 
319.4() 
::ABU:C C 
~JGf10SS 0.00 
:::11:JGO/Tn1\ 0. 
cJGilOSS 0.06 
. 
CE~FNT 11. 
iJGilOSS 15. n 
CHEU.TAII!:, 3c6 
NG~OSS 501.46 
DEPOT SHI 
ti!GROSS 
l.mWGER 
NGROSS 
DRILL SHI 
NGROSS 
FISH CARR 
NGROSS 
FISH FACT 
NGROSS 
HOPPER DR 
NGROSS 
ICEBREAKE 
NGROSS 
LIVESTOCK 
NGFIOSS 
LNG 
NGROSS 
LNG/LPG 
1.16 
e. 
e.eo 
1. 
0.75 
3. 
2.93 
3. 
4.60 
1.87 
0. 
e.ee 
182. 
190.20 
7. 
11 11 
e. 
111. 
174.78 
e. 
e.ee 
e 
e.eo 
(1 
0.00 
78. 
~19.41 
3.CC' 
0. 
0.08 
0. 
e 0e 
83. 
.3G.OO C.JO 
80 1 tG 
44.71 3725.13 7843.62 
114. 95. 32. 
0.C(· 
0. 218. 
0.0e 11613.66 
0. 711 
974.00 ?.210 30 3003 03 1737.60 e.Be 9?.97 a2 
1. :.;, 0. c. 0. 0. 0. 6. 
?..?.:i :HJ.'/'1 o.a0 e.eA o.ec o.ee e.eo c1.02 
2 19. 2. G. 0. C. 8. 23. 
o. 7'J 113.00 25.0e e.ee 0.00 o.ee e.0t1 1 a7 .63 
1£. 5. 2. 0. 2. 0. 0. J9. 
57.15 33.07 2;;.e0 0.00 c\2.47 3.80 e.0<J 181.06 
199. r,:;_ 17. 79. 1. C. 0. G87. 
732.45 321.58 22/.87 H77.aa 32.76 e.a0 0.oe 3293.59 
0. 
0.00 
,_ 
2.46 
0. 
0.ee 
6. 
22.96 
8. 
26.45 
e. 
0.0e 
3. 
6.99 
2i. 
84.81 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
G.66 
1e7. 
~47 .64 
35. 
141.19 
2 
7.42 
0. 
0.00 
0 
0.00 
e. 
e.00 
12. 
67.44 
0. 
0.ee 
0. 
e.00 
0. 
e.00 
8. 
6U"i 
{)_ 
0.00 
8. 
43.62 
63. 
481.74 
92. 
e. 
0.00 
0. 
0.00 
2. 
21.15 
2. 
25.97 
0. 
0.00 
0. 
0. 0. 0. 0. 
0.00 a.e0 o.e0 0.ee 1.16 
e. 0. o. o. 1. 
0.e0 0.0e 0.00 0.ee 2.48 
e. 0. G. e. 3. 
o.oe e.0o t'l.ee e.oe 21.e0 
e. 0. o. e. 23. 
e.eo e.eo o.0e o.ee 119.30 
e. e. 0. e. ,,_ 
e.ee e.ee o.ee 0.00 31.05 
e. 0. 0. e. 1. 
0.oe 0.e0 e .0e o.oo e 00 1.87 
0. 0. e. o. e. 3. 
e.ee e.00 e.0e o.ee e.e0 6.99 
e. e. e. o. e. 211. 
0.00 0.eo o.0o 0.00 o.ao 336.08 
e. 32. 13. 1a. e. 66. 
0.eo 701.62 38~.e7 1088.93 e.ee 2184. n 
e. o e. J e. 1 1. 
;;_,;,; o.tm \l.oo 246.7 3 e.eo 290.35 
26. 34. 31. o. e. 372 
318 83 
101 
653.33 1121.71 
39. 42. 3. 
e.eo 0.90 3098.01 
0. 312 
752.61 1118.22 80e.98 1498.84 225.e9 e.eo 4536.93 
,_ 
5.65 
8. 51. 87. 19. 168 
189 46 2e51.75 6181.26 2205.89 10641 42 
LPG 
NGROSS 
ORE 
NGROSS 
ORE/OIL 
NGROSS 
PART C.C. 4 7 46. 0. 0. 0 131 
NGR:JSS 
PASSENGER 
NGROSS 
73.2~ 15e.49 
1. 
7.99 
29. 
e. 
e.0e 
24. 
281.87 
13. 
214.27 
53. 
e.ee e.ee e.eo 727.86 
e. 4. 15. 25. 1. e 121. 
PIPE LAYE 
NGRuSS 
PONTOON 
NGP.~>S 
PUSHER TU 
REF 
NGROSS 
RESEARCH 
e.eo 
e. 
e.oo 
1. 
1.81 
6 
8 78 
213 
219.26 
12 
NGROSS 11 19 
RO/RO 446. 
NGROSS 634.73 
RO/RO/C.C 6. 
NC.ROSS 9.56 
SALVAGE T 12. 
NGROSS 10.31 
SALVAG[ S 0. 
15.93 
0. 
e.oe 
,_ 
208.57 
e. 
e.eo 
180.48 1e78.9e 979.56 67.14 e.ee 253e.59 
,_ e. e. 0 e. 1. 
13.10 e.eo e.oe e.ee e.ee 13.10 
e o. e. 0. 0. 3. 
4. 76 5.68 o.ec• e.eB e.oe e.ee e.ee 12.25 
e e. o e. e !! e 6. 
e.ef! e e~ o.c1c1 0.00 e.oe 0 eo o.oo 8. 78 
16e. 328. 49 o fl. e. o 776 
655.97 2446 44 560.38 o.oo e.oe o.ee o.oo 3956.06 
4 1. e. e. 0. 18 
12.48 5.54 13.94 o.eo o.eo o.eo e.oo 43.14 
289. 165. 63. 35. o. e e 1009. 
934.54 1456.51 797.84 666.49 o.oo e.oo e.e& 449e. 1 1 
2. 1. 20. 35 2 0. 0 66. 
7.oo 6.27 235.14 730.2::: 6e.19 e.ee e.eo Te48.36 
e. e. o. e e. o. o 1 2 
e.eo e.0e e.oe o.0l' e.oo e.ee 0.ee 10.31 
,_ o. e. o o. e. o 1. 
!'GROSS 
SALVAGE T 
NGROSS 
STORAGE B 
tJGROSS 
SUPPLY 
t~GROSS 
su:-Po~..- s 
t<GROSS 
. 
SUPI'O~·,-
NGROSS 
)'AMK 
tJGROSSG 
e.e0 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0.00 
5. 
<l. 
6.62 
e. 
EUl0 
213. 
295.09 
YUG 47. 
~~GflOSS 26.33 
YUG/ICEBR 1. 
NGROSS 0.3e 
TUG/SUPPL 10. 
NGROSS 7.21 
VCMICLE 33. 
NGROSS 
\'liNE lANK 
NGROSS 
\'1000-CHIP 
NGROSS 
40.32 
38. 
55.14 
e. 
e.ee 
6210. 
:.63 
(.. 
8.64 
e. 
e.ee 
2. 
G.80 
(). 
2.00 
0. 
0.00 
142 
535.62 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
0.e0 
1. 
3.22 
15. 
50.e7 
Q. 
12.81 
e. 
e.ee 
3755. 
2.00 
e 
0.00 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
9.00 
0. 
0.09 
1. 
7.62 
95 
G.Oe: 
e. 
0.00 
e. 
0.00 
0. 
9.01'1 
0. 
0.ee: 
e. 
0.oe 
218. 
0.00 
e. 
0.00 
0. 
e.ee 
0. 
e.ee 
o. 
e.oo 
e. 
e.eo 
411. 
0.e:e 
e. 
0.00 
0. 
e.eo 
0. 
e.ee 
0. 
e.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
417. 
3.03 
e. 
e.0e 
1. 
67.87 
0. 
0.00 
(l 
0.ee 
0. 
0.00 
355. 
0 30 ~.53 
G. to. 
3.ee 8.64 
1. 2. 
105.25 173.12 
0. 
3.0e 
0. 
e.ee 
3. 
e.ee 
192. 
11.64 
' Y, 
1. 
6.62 
7.62 
2043. 
684.61 2808.31 7815.53 15910.31 23782.05 25409.4S 77323.04 
e. 
0.00 
0. 
0.00 
e. 
0.00 
~6. 
128.94 
e. 
e.oe 
e. 
e.ee 
361e. 
0. 
0.00 
e. 
e.a0 
e. 
e.a0 
28. 
0. 
o.ee 
e. 
e.ee 
e. 
0.ee 
11. 
0. 
0.00 
e. 
o.ee 
e. 
0.ee 
1. 
0. 0. 47. 
o.o0 e.oe 26.38 
e. e. 1. 
0.00 0.ee e.3e 
e. e. 11. 
e.ee 0.00 Hl.44 
0. c. 104. 
362.89 182.04 33.18 0.00 e.00 797.43 
e. e. 0. 0. e. 42. 
e.ee e.e0 0.ee 0.ee 0.ee 67.95 
e. 1. 0. e. e. 1. 
0.ee 16.82 e.e0 0.ee 0.0e 16.82 
2240. 23e0. 1350. 637. 212. 2e314. l 0 l A L 
NGROSS 7333.65 13207.55 27498.26 26911.54 43157.34 47426.65 42783.81 27809.60 236118.22 
Source: Lloyds Morithf~ lnfonr.otion Services ltd. Stolistical Surrmory Report (1967). 
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CYCLES OF GI.OflAL POLIYJCS: rRE/\.IJES, AGREEMENTS /\1\!D HIS"iORIC/\L ~:VI~Ni"S 
RELATING TO THE GIBRALTAR REGION. 
t'Jorlci Poncrr; 
or ABpirantr;. 
Count rio;:. "f root i os. 
~Jrotocoln. 
fi~JrGetrl011t 9. 
l!kl j . CV011 t . 
:<oy 
Irwt itut ions 
und/or 
JtiooiO\jiGS. 
Rolevanco to 
Goopo; it i c;1 
o1 Gibrnl'i:nr 
Rogion. 
······------- ------------------
711 IslahL 
1 462 I be r i a . 
1492 I be r i a. 
1494 Portugal. 
Spain. 
(Papacy). 
1509 Spain. 
1644 Portugal 
GB. 
1 663 I be r i c . 
1689 Netherlands. 
(N'Ionds). 
1697 N' lands. 
1698 Netherlands 
GB. 
1700 N'londs. GB. 
tc~ogh reb. 
Iberia. 
Portugal. 
Spain. 
Morocco. 
Spain. 
port ugo I. 
Portugo I. 
Sp. 
Sp. 
Portugal 
England. 
Pcrtugol 
Sp 
H.R. 
Emperor 
N'londs. 
N'londs 
GB. SP. 
France 
(Fr. ) . 
Fr. 
Eng I and 
N'londs. 
Invasion o1 
1 be ria. 
Land/horse 
p0\':10 r. 
Rc I i g ion. 
~Jonopo I y o1 
both coasts. 
-- -----------------------------------
Reconqucs t . 
Conor i es I'L 
Plazas token 
by Spain. 
Discovery 
of Americas. 
Tordcsi lias 
(T). 
Cintro (T). 
Do<:Jry. 
Dissolution 
of Iberian 
Crowns (T). 
All ionce ( T) 
Vienna. 
Peace (T) 
R i j S\'1 i j k. Fr. 
& respective 
I i st ed states. 
2 Loo-T he Hogue 
(T)s. 
Partition. 
Land/sea 
power. 
Notional ism. 
Duopoly. 
Seopower. Less Sp. 
E~ponsionism. concern in 
Medi tcrron-
eon. 
2 Seopo~:Jers. Spanish 
E~ponsionism. control of 
waters. 
Seopower. Velez Plaza 
to Spnin. 
2 seopowers, Tangier 
E~ponsionism. given to GB. 
2 Seopowers. Ceutis opt 
Nationalism, to remain 
Imperial ism. with Spain. 
Seapo~:Je r. Future 
Imperial ism. invasion of 
Gibraltar & 
subsequent 
treaties. 
Compel i ng ibid. 
seopowers. GB. rivals 
Dutch 
supremacy. 
N'londs Vs Fr. ibid. 
e)(ponsionism. 
Mu I t i po 1 a r i sm . ibid. 
i"/01 N' lonc;s. GD. 
1703 Gront Britain. 
' 111~ Croat Britain. 
1713 
1713 
1721 
1725 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1729 
1731 
1733 
i739 
1743 
1748 
1756 
H. N. ~:ntp. 
f:tt\J I u tttl 
N': antis. 
H.R.F.mp. 
Portu!]ol 
Sp. Gl:l. 
:\!'I GildS. 
GB. Vr. 
Sp. 
GB. Fr. 
GB. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
H.R.Emp. 
Sp. 
GB. Fr. 
GB. Fr. 
Sp. 
GB. Mor. 
GB. Sp. 
Fr. 
ibid. 
Fr. Sp. 
GB. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
N'lands. 
Fr. GB. 
fill iance ('i) 
·i":w :Iogue. 
Dc\'ensive 
All i once ('i) 
Lisbon. 
Suspension 
o·i 1\ nns. 
Peace (T) 
Utr<Jc:ht. 
(11·April). 
Peace (T) 
Utrecht 
(n July). 
ibi<.i 
lto1 [);:; r i c: I i ~;rc . 
ShadOI'I Emp-
ire~~ GA 
emerging fm 
oorld leo<1cr. 
~~u r e L i b r Util. 
I io1pC f i U I i Sto1. 
Seapor1e r. 
ibid. GB 
Global 
I en de r. 
Defense AI I ionce Rivals o\' 
(T) Madrid. GB. 
Defense AI I iance ibid. 
(T) Vienna. 
Preliminaries 
o\' Peace (Paris). 
Accession by Sp. Aquiesence 
to GI:J-1- r. 
prel iminories 
1727 (Prado T). 
of Fr. & Sp. 
to GB. 
dom i nonce. 
Cib. Strod 
coveted. 
Gi b. token 
by A I I i od 
Gl::l-1\!' I uncin 
1orco. 
Gl:l. U)jpels 
Alli0i.l1YOio1 
Gib. 
GB. olominant 
poi'Jcr in St. 
rogiQn. 
Sp. cedes 
G i b. to GB. 
Attempts at 
recuperating 
Gibraltar. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
GB Rock/Bose 
Fr. tn area. 
(T) of Fez. Laissez Faire. Mor. friend 
of GB & Gib. 
Peace ll: mutual 
defence (T) of 
Sev iII e. 
(T) of Vienna 
Pol'le r 
consert 
pyramid. 
ibid. 
Gib. status 
quo. 
ibid. 
Alliance (T) 
ofEscorial. 
Attempted Gib. bose 
mullipolarism. threatened. 
Convention 
of Prado 
Aquiesence. Status quo. 
Alliance- Attempted Gib. coveted 
often/defence. Multipolorism. 
(1) Fontainebleu. 
Peace (T) GB commands Gib. status 
Ai)( Ia Chapelle. the seas. quo. 
Peace (T) ibid. ibid. 
1761 
1763 
1'/'/6 
1'/'/9-·1"183 
1782 
i7B3 
1795 
1796 
1799 
1802 
1809 
1814 
1815 
1845 Br. Emp i r e. 
1860 GB. 
1861 
1862 
;\]' I a nels. 
t-"r. Sp. 
~-r. GB. 
Sp. 
Sp. :0.,1or. 
Sp. GB. 
H. Sp. 
Sp. Mar. 
G8. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
Sp. Mor. 
Fr. GB. 
Sp. 
Batavia. 
GB. Sp. 
GB. Fr. 
GB. Fr. 
Sp. Mar 
Sp. Mar. 
Sp. Mor. 
Sp. Mar. 
1\ ill I u C:1. 
/\h1 it y C1 Un i o;1 
(I) Pari'i. 
Dcf in i ~ i vo 
Pcarc (T) 
Pnr is. 
Pca<:c ('f). 
Groot Siege 
Pactc de 
Fcnol iII c (T) 
Aru;1j ue:.:. 
Peace (T) 
(Madrid). 
Peace (T) 
Versai lies. 
Peac.a (T) 
Basi .a. 
All ionce 
offen II! defen. 
i b i ri. 
i:Ja I o1 
po~JO r. 
i:,itl. 
Sp. lt.lpc;· iul. 
Not iono I i st.l. 
G:J •uiGS 
the \C:IOVOS. 
Mo r. accomm- · 
odatcs dse If. 
GG t·ule:; 
the waves. 
Fr. aspirant 
to global 
power. 
ibid. 
iilid. 
ibid. 
G!:l Gib. 
stutus 
conf i no10ci. 
?lu~uu. 
C ro~m Co I ony 
Sp. h. 
ahlb it ions in 
s tro it a rca. 
Plazas. 
Ce::>:;ion of 
Gib confirm. 
Fr tries for 
foot in S t . 
ibid. 
(T) Son I de I f on so. 
Peace (T). Sp. power Plazas. 
in Morocco. 
Peace (T) Power Gib. bose. 
Ami ens. hierarchy. 
Peace & Spain Gib. bose. 
A I I i once (T) subjugated 
London. by GB. 
Peace (T) France Gi b. bose. 
Paris. subjugated 
by GB. 
Peace (T) GB rules the Free posso 
Vienna. waves. -ge of St. 
(T) of Mor subjugated Ceuto land 
Laroche. by Sp. boundary. 
Peace 1'£ ibid. But Sp. Plazas 
Amity (T) GB is steward. to counter 
Tetouan. GB Gib. 
Commercial Sp. imperial Cope 
(T). dream. Sportel. 
Convent ion. Sp. dream Me I iII o 
1t:l6~ 
Hl65 
1866 
1669 
1871 
1880 
1895 
1RQR 
1902 
1904 
1904 
1906 
1907 
Sp. ~Jor. 
Mor. 
[ n ~ ' I 
Po~:1c rs. 
Sp. Mor. 
GEl. Fr. 
l n~' I 
Powers. 
Au s-Hun 
Bel. Fr. 
Ge r . I t . 
Mor. Nor. 
N'londs. 
Por. Sp. 
St'!ed. UK. 
USA. 
Sp. Mor. 
USA. Sp. 
Fr. Sp. 
GB. Fr. 
Fr. Sp. 
I nt' I 
Powers. 
GB. Sp. 
Convention. 
Ccp0 S!)cHtol 
( T) . 
Convent ion. 
Fe:<. 
Suez Cano I. 
Protocol 
Tangier. 
Convention 
Mod rid. 
Convention. 
American--So. 
War. Peace 
(T). 
Draft (T) 
Entente. 
London. 
Treaty. 
(T) Algeciras 
Exchange of 
!dent icol 
Notes. 
(London) . 
u1 'nlOtiOpu I y. llilld 
l::lulance o'l 
bose po~1e r 
in Shad 
area. 
OUUoHJt: ry. 
Sover0ign 
status of 
Plar.os 
confirmoc:. 
~;lore l.i bru:.1. ln~ 'I 
Laissc;: F(Jirc. Strait.. 
GEl shmard. Soverei(ln 
Stot11s o'l 
Plazas 
Con 'I i rmcd. 
lmpe ria I ism. Gib=Key. 
Strait in~'l 
security. 
Tangier 
Plazas. 
European AI I pot'lers 
placed on 
equal foot 
theoretico 
-lly. 
i mpe ria I i sm, 
More Librum, 
Laissez Foire, 
Scramble 1or 
colonies & 
straits. 
Scramble 1or Plazas. 
Morocco 
us exoons- GB. us & 
ion ism. Sp. strait 
Art. 4 
"importance of Tangier" 
"freedom of Strait" 
Sp. refused to s1gn. 
Mutual interests in 
Egypt & Mar. 
Free passage. 
Sp. interests in Plazas 
Secret Articles. 
"special character" 
of Tangier & St. 
Secret anexes. 
Balance of Power in 
strait. 
Maintenance ol Territo 
-rial Status Quo in 
Med. & E. Atlantic. 
1010 
1912 
1S12 
1914 
Hl14 
1919 
1923 USA. 
1924 
1928 
1936 
1937 
1937 
1937 
1937 
1938 
Fr. Sp. 
:: r. Mo r. 
GB. Fr. 
I nt' I . 
l n t ' I . 
In t ' I 
Pov1ers. 
IntI ' 
powers 
e)(cept 
Aust. 
Ger. 
Russia. 
USA. 
l n t' I 
Powers. 
Sp. 
In t' I . 
l nt' I. 
I nt' I . 
In t' I . 
GB. It. 
Convont ion. 
Convention 
Modr i d. 
F r-Yio r . ("f) 
Fez. 
DroHs 1or 
Convent ion. 
w'l;/1. 
Peace (T) 
Versoi lies. 
Convent ion. 
Statute. 
Paris. 
Convention. 
Tangier. 
Protoco I. 
Sp. C i v i I Wo r . 
Agreement 
(London). 
Resolution. 
(London). 
Agreement. 
(Nyon) 
Agreement. 
(Geneva). 
Agreement. 
lh1pcr i a I i s1~. 
~'I u:.-::os. 
1'.1orocco's 
1uturc. 
1 111po r i o 1 i m.1. GO. r, r-, . 
Fr. in111JCi'1CO prepared 
in Shni t 
region. 
More Librum. 
()I d ordf>r 
changeth. 
Internotion-
o I ism. 
More Librum. 
US interests. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
pro I i111i n-
ary draft 
1or int '1·-
i:<ion of 
'fongior. 
Pro~ cc t -· 
oro~ c. 
Tangier 
S~otute 
Ne11trnl Sp 
I nt' I St. 
Neutral 
Tong i e r 
Zone. 
Attempted 
i nt' I 
control 
o1 Strait, 
but accept 
-once of 
GB Gib. & 
Plazas. 
Tangier z. 
St. Int'l. 
Non-Intervention 
in Spain. 
Scheme of Observation of 
Sp. Land & Sea frontiers. 
Co I I ec t i ve Measures 
against Piratical Attacks 
in Med. by Submarines 
Collective Measures 
ago i nst Pi rat i col At tacks 
in Med. by Surface Vessel 
& Aircraft. 
free Usage of Med. & St. 
1U40 
1942 
. 
1943 
1941) 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1945 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1952 
1953 
1946 
1956 
1957 
1958 
J. n ·~ ' I . 
USA. N. 
Af rico. 
GB. USA. 
GB. USA. 
l nt' I . 
GB. Fr. 
Armistice 
Convention. 
Liberation 
o1 Magil(cb. 
rorr1WI piOIIS. 
Formal plans. 
Convention. 
(Chicago). 
Agreement 
Vichy France in ~orocco, 
Fr. I oscu po~:.'O r. 
Ani i-colonial. Gib=l\11 icd 
US Bases in Base. 
"-'1o;·. (1940s-70s) . 
Spacial 
relationship. 
ibid. 
rangier '/.. 
Tnngier z. 
Civi I Aviation, ~I ight 
More I ibrum. rights 
overS~. 
Re-estobi ishment of 
Int'l Adm. of Tangier. 
Int' I. UN (T) Ne~ ~orld order, Decoloni-
End of colonies. zation of 
Strait. 
(Net~ York). 
Arab states. Arab league. 
(Coiro). 
Arab Not'ism. S. shore. 
Is roe I . 
West . 
European 
GB. F r 
IntI' I. 
I nt' I. 
Mo r. Fr. 
W. Europe 
Mor. 
A I ge rio 
Tunisia. 
Creation (lsr). ibid. S. shore. 
N.Atlantic (T) Fr.Aigerio port Gib Base. 
(Washington). of NATO 7. 
Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Decolonizotion. Crown Co-
lony, Pia 
zos. 
Protocol Tangier int'l 
Amending Zone. 
Agreement 
of 31 Aug.1945. 
Convention. 
Ne"' Statute. 
Tangier. 
Courts Reor-
onization. 
Fu I I US 
participation. 
Robot Accords. Moroccan 
independence. 
EEC (T) Rome. 
Declaration. 
(Tangier) 
United EC. 
United 
Maghreb 
ideo I. 
St.Stotus 
quo under 
threat. 
Tangier Z 
Tangier Z 
Sp. holds 
Plazas. 
Transition 
Zone. 
S. Shore. 
1950 
1967 
19'75 
1976 
1976 USA/USSR. 
1979 USA. 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1986 
In~' I . 
Israel. 
Arabs. 
US. USSR. 
Mor. 
Algeria. 
Sp. Mor. 
USA. Sp. 
West/East. 
USA. I ron. 
some 40 
Mus I im 
states. 
GB.Sp. 
(G i b). 
I nt' I 
Sp. 
A I ge rio 
Mor. 
Mor. 
Libya. 
GB. Sp. 
Sp. EC. 
UNCLOS. 
(NY) 
t:Ja r. 
Agreement, 
Boundary 
W.Sohoro (T) 
Mod rid. 
Friendship Cc 
Cooperation 
(T) Madrid. 
Vietnam War. 
Hcgc;.1on i :Jh) 
Vs Mare 
I i b r Uhl. 
Zionism, US 
Vs. Arabs. 
Border closed 
(1975-tl3). 
No COilli•lOn 
agreement 
on St. f( 
tcrrit.seo 
Refusal of 
ovc r f I i l)h t 
in Stroit. 
A I ge ria. 
Dccolonizotion. S. Shore. 
f.. Vs. W. 
US bases. 
Rota bose. 
Dominos Theory. USA 
supports 
r-J.or. poI i-
t i co I reg. 
Fundamentalist Islonlic S. Shore. 
Revolution. 
Islamic 
Conference 
Organization. 
Agreement 
(Lisbon). 
UNCLOS. 
(Net'l York). 
resurgence. 
Pot:~er of 
Islam C! 
oi I supplies. 
S. Shore. 
Decolonizotion. Gib.Crown 
Colony. 
Mariti me 
Pot'lers Vs. 
Sp. & Mar. 
12 nm 
territ. 
seas in St 
Sp.joins NATO. E. Vs W. Gib. Bose. 
Oudja Accords. Boundaries. Prelude to 
Plazas. 
Union. (T) 
Robe t . 
Communique 
(Brussels). 
Sp. joins EC. 
(Brussels). 
Arabi sm. 
Moghrebism. 
Oodhofi 
calls for 
Plazas. 
Decolonizotion Gib.Crown 
Colony. 
EC of the 12. St. part 
of EC. 
o Names 6f countries in table given as found in original treaties eg England or 
Great Britain. 
(T) =Treaty. 
Sources: THE SPANISH RED BOOK (1965); Stuart (1955). Taylor (1985). Rezette 
(1976), Porker (1984), Kinder et Hilgemann (1985). Levie (1983), (see 
bibliography). 
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.AJ?PBNDJ:K XV 
ARTICLF. X OF 'l'HE TREA'l'Y OP U~i'Rl'!C.::trc 
( 13 JUJ,Y J. 7H>) 
The Cat:holic King does hereby, for h:i.mse:Lf, .b.:i.s he:lrs fl":o.d 
successors, yield to tho C:rovm of G:rea;c Brj.tah\ the ful:L a:ud 
entire propriety of tho tm·m and castle of Gib:raJ.ta:r, togetb.e:r 
with the port, forticications, and forts there-unto belonging; 
and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed 
absolutely with all manner of right forever, without any 
exception or impediment whatsoever. 
But that abuses and frauds may be avoided by importing any 
kind of goods, the Catholic King wills, and takes it to be 
understood. the.t the above named propriety bo yielded to Great 
Britain without any territorial jurisdiction, and without any 
open communication by land with the country round about. 
Yet whereas the communication by sea with the coast of 
Spain may not at all times be safe or open, and thereby it may 
happen that the garrison, and other inhabitants of Gibraltar may 
be brought to great straits; and as it is the intention of the 
Catholic King, only that fraudulent importations of goods 
should, as is above said, be hindered by an inland 
communication, it is therefore provided that in such cases it 
may be lawful to purchase, for ready money, in the neighbouring 
territories of Spain, provisions and other things necessary for 
the use of the garrison, the inhabitants, and the ships which 
lie in the harbour. But if any goods be found imported by 
Gibraltar, either by way of barter for purchasing provisions, or 
under any other pretense, the same shall be confiscated, and 
complaint being made thereof, those persons who have acted 
contrary to the faith of this treaty, shall be severely 
punished. 
And Her Britannic Majesty at the request of the Catholic 
King, does consent and agree, that no leave shall be given, 
under any pretense whatsoever, either to Jews or ~oors, to 
reside or have their dwellings in the said town of Gibraltar; 
and that no refuge or shelter shall be allowed to any Moorish 
ships of war in the harbour of the said town whereby the 
communication between Spain and Ceuta may be obstructed, or the 
coasts of Spain be infested by the excursions of the Mcors. But 
whereas treaties of friendship, and a liberty and inte~~ourse of 
commerce are between the British and certain territories 
situated on the coast of Africa, it is always to be u~erstood, 
that the British subjects cannot refuse the Moors ~nd their 
ships entry into the port of Gibraltar purely upon thE account 
of merchandising. 
Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain does further 
promise, that the free exercise of their religion shall be 
indulged to the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the aforesaid 
town. 
And in case it shall hereafter seem meet to the Crown of 
617 
Great Brj.tain to grant, sell, or by any means to alienate 
therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar, it is 
hereby agreed, and concluded, that the preference of having the 
same shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any 
others. 
Source: The Spanish Red Book on Gibraltar (Madrid:l965), 
pp.l55-158. The text of the Treaty is reprinted in the original 
Latin, and in Spanish, and English translations. 
APPJ{NXJJ:X V 
Acco:rding to tho UN Cha:r: Le:P., Cha;?~~e:P. )U., "DocJao:r:>e;cio:u::\ 
nega~dlng Non-Self-Governing ~e~~i.to:P.ies''; ~:P.ticle 37(o) 
p~ovides for tho submission by ~n Administ:rating Power to tho 
Seoreta:P.y Gonoral ol :reports conco:rning those territories. 
During the first session of tho UNGA, it ad.optod a. rcsolutioRl 
pertain:tng to "Non-Self-Governing Peoples" (UNGA. Res. 9(1) 9 
Feb.l946; Red nook, 1965, p.305; Levie, 198~. p.l02). Later 
another resolution entitled '"1'ra.nsmission of Information und.e:r. 
A:rt.37(e) of the Charter" \vas adopted (UNGA. Res. 66(1), 14 
Dec.1946; Djonovich, 1973, I. XII; Levie, 1983, p.l02). A 
Special Com:mj_ttee was created to ha:adle the information. On 14 
December 1960, the UNGA adopted Resolution 1t514 (XV), 
"Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples". To speed up decolonization, another 
UNGA Resolution 1654 (XIII) "!.vas passed (27 Nov. 1961); "The 
Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples". 
HOROC:CO: INTERNAT:ONAL TRADE STATISTICS 
TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COUN~Rf~~ ~~· ~RODTJC~ION AND LAST COVSIGNMENT (VALUE IN THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS) 
COUNTRIES SPECIAL IMPORTS C.I.F. SPECIAL EXPORTS ?.0.3. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980 1981 1S82 1983 ~ s 8·~~ 
World 4182375 4352584 4315286 3~>96000 3906745 2403418 2320271 2058599 2852000 2.1'il8?5 
Africa 89245 72367 63836 64000 56813 84282 118497 68167 70800 1 u~;2g2 
Americas 458930 516061 460108 ~; 17600 645144 132273 98391 86330 75900 522lS 
North America 351293 411613 356034 409800 549156 43574 38699 3S165 3?300 <'c285'7 
LATA 96934 90231 89043 93500 75550 83265 56607 4l668 36600 ;)8:Li8 
CACM 1507 1084 1963 3800 1619 441 :21 1 l 6 48 
Caribbean 5991 8532 l 1943 10500 18252 4834 2647 458£j 2000 8 :~. s 
Rest America 32.05 4601 1125 566 159 317 797 3"t9 
Asia ex. USSR 967790 1244614 1145096 885900 1151935 267955 378298 372433 402700 4S;·;Q23 
Europe ex. USSR 2494258 2335555 2409592 11l74900 1893413 1759474 1551593 1458970 139100J 14;:1·2r;7 
EEC(Ten) 1857699 1767962 1811572 1 ~S64900 1280714 1339769 1140927 112C38l 1056200 1 Gf.~8S32 
EFTA 151330 156615 153884 ~41000 155274 101634 78560 7849C 8C50J 8CC"l8 
Other Europe 3?:?.'535 308805 321914 ;~79200 354803 166084 181155 156058 l5SOOO l?S2G4 
East Europe l 12b91 102172 122222 89800 102622 151988 149952 104031 85300 ?3:::03 
USSR J49:?.4G 167026 2.22420 203700 154843 121063 132295 41986 36900 40S7C 
Oceania 1556 2199 13888 3400 4516 1784 1737 538 300 4S82 
Tunisia ** 2.073 10314 3492 3200 6455 21085 17646 19678 14200 28422 
Libyan Arab Jamahiria X y 12552 44514 662 1490C 311517 
. - -- - -- -- --- -- ~- ----~------------ ----------
(VALUE AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL) 
19?5 1976 1977 1~78 1r.J?r:J 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1988 1881 1982 1983 J9,'J<'l 
Africa 1 0 8 1 . 9 l . 5 2.5 2.0 2. l 1 0 7 l 0 5 1 0 8 1. 5 Africa 4.7 4. 1 4.5 4.5 3.6 3.5 5 . l C.4 3.5 <.5 
Americas 17.3 14.4 13.R 10. 1 >-l.F\ 11.0 11 0 9 10.7 14.4 16.5 Americas 3.4 5.9 6.6 8.6 6.:3 5.3 4.2 4.2 3.7 0.8 
N America 8.3 8.8 8.0 9.4 7.6 8.4 9.5 8.3 1 I . ·± 1 4 . IN Arne rica 0.9 1 0 3 2.2 3.0 2.6 1 . 8 1 0? i 0 9 1 0 8 2.0 
LAIA 3.9 1 . 9 3.9 2. f, 1. 7 2.3 2 0 l 2 0 1 2.6 1.9 LAIA 2.2 4.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.4 2.0 1 0 8 l 0 8 
CACM 0.5 0.9 0. I 0. l 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 l 0.0 CACM 0.0 0.0 o.c 0.0 c.o :J.O O.:J c.c C.O 
Caribbean 3.6 2.7 l. G I. 0 0.5 0. I 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 Caribbean 0.3 0 0 l 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 l 8.2 0 0 l C.2 0 0; 0.0 
Rest Ameri 0.9 0. 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0. I 0. 1 0.0 0.0 Rest Ameri 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 c.o 8.0 0.0 
Asia ex SU12.4 12.4 12.2 13.9 20.0 23.1 28.6 26.5 21.6 29.5 Asia ex SU 6.5· 5.5 7.4 7.3 8.2 1 1 0 1 16.3 1 s 0 1 18.8 22.7 
Eur ex SU 65.3 68.5 70.0 G7.8 85.2 59.6 53.7 55.8 52.1 48.5 Eur ex SU 81.4 78.7 76.1 76.3 77.4 73.2 66.9 78.9 67.8 SS.9 
EEC (Ten) 52 .. 2 52.4 51.5 19.4 48.5 44.4 40.6 42.0 38.0 32.8 EEC (Ten) 55.2 58.0 06.8 58.1 59.4 55.7 49.2 5~.4 52.0 S:J.B 
EFTA 4.0 5.7 6.7 4. 1 4. ,, 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.0 EFTA 4.6 4.0 3 0 1 3.5 3.9 4.2 3.4 ~"i 0 8 3.9 3.'7 
Other Euro 4.7 7.0 9.3 10.P, 0.8 .0..9 7. 1 7.5 7.8 9.1 Other Euro 8.9 8.0 9.4 7.4 s.g 8.8 7.8 7.6 7.7 S.3 
East Europ 4.4 3.4 2.5 3.4 2 .. 4 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.6 East Euro 12.8 8.8 6.9 7.2 7.2 5.3 5.5 5. 1 4.2 3.4 
USSR 2.9 2.6 2.G 2.7 2.7 3.G 3.8 5.2 5.7 4.0 URSS 3.0 4.3 3.9 4.2 3.6 5.0 5.7 2.0 1. El 2.2 
Oceania 0.4 0.3 0. 1 0. l n. 1 0. I 0. I 0.3 0. 1 0 01 Oceania 0.2 0.3 0 0 1 0 0 1 o.::: ::; 0 1 0 0 l 8.0 0.0 :J.2 
France 30.4 29.4 2?.6 ~6.~ ~~.~ ~4.8 24.7 24.7 20.0 18.3 France 21.7 23.7 24.7 26.5 27.4 25.2 21.8 24.0 23.3 81 .'7 
Saudi Arab 0.4 1 . 6 1. 2 1.9 3.6 7.6 14.9 13.5 14.0 12.1 Germany W 6.5 9.6 10.5 10.7 10.6 8.2 '7.2 8.0 7.6 -· ,.. I. u 
USA 7.7 8.7 6.4 8.5 5 8 6.5 7.0 6.0 10.0 12.5 Spain 5.4 5.4 7.5 6.7 6.3 5.9 7.0 3.7 .... ' I •,;, 7.5 
Spain 4.4 6.4 8.7 10.4 9.4 8.3 6.9 7 01 7.3 8.8 Italy 7.5 7.3 6 0 1 6.0 5.2 5.6 5.0 5.7 5.5 ~ ,.. ::J.<.o 
Iraq 5.4 5. 1 5.0 5.8 9.3 9.5 1 0 6 4.0 4.4 8.0 Netherland 3.6 4.3 4.2 4.4 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.3 3.3 
Germany 8.0 8.2 6.7 6.9 6.2 5.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.3 India 0.4 0.5 2 0 l 1 0 8 2.8 4 0 l 5.2 5.7 4.S 7.4 
Italy 3.9 5.6 7.0 6.? 5.9 5.7 4.3 4. l 4.9 3.9 Belgium 6.7 5.5 50 1 4.7 4.7 4.9 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.9 
USSR 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.6 3.8 5.2 5.7 4.0 UK 6.7 5.8 4.3 4.0 3.8 4 0 l 4.0 4 0 1 4. 1 3.8 
UK 3.3 4. 1 3.5 3.3 2 .. 8 2.9 2.2 3.5 3.8 2.2 USSR 3.0 4.3 3.9 4.2 3.6 5.0 5.7 2.0 : 0 8 2.2 
Netherland 3.8 2. 1 3.3 3.4 2.6 ?. . . 4 2 .. 5 2.3 1 0 9 1.5 Japan 2.3 2. 1 1 0 8 1 0 7 l 0 6 1 . 5 2.9 2.8 3.3 0.8 
Source: "1984 International Trade St.<tlis-Lics Yearbook. UN. Vol 1. 1986". Department of Internationa.l Econcnic and Socit:J.: 
Affairs. Statistical Office. ST ESA STAT SER.G 33. 1986. 
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ALGERIA: INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 
TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF PRODUCTION AND LAST CONSIGNMENT (VALUE IN THOUSAND 'J.S. DOLLARS) 
COUNTRIES SPECIAL IMPORTS C. I . F. SPECIAL EXPORTS F.~.B. 
1980 1981 1982 1983 :984 1980 1981 1988 :S83 1984 
World 10524498 11302272 10679396 10331886 10285569 15623587 13298133 !147590~ 11158364 ll86J67'7 
Africa 297214 248572 161061 166512 131035 130241 160605 2G9832 155278 145853 
Americas 1441949 1870583 1711838 14396132 1453615 7643174 4695836 1975'?'73 284;.c<;,s 2"'4~7'7!. 
North America 1064015 1303272 1245311 1009514 979163 7509946 4417533 1838199 264:::124 2659~53 
LAIA 257720 417085 362704 322120 421 169 132107 276849 108458 l548C8 8832'? 
CACM 357 334 6620 33432 :7078 2'?' 8 
Caribbean 118914 149891 97037 745'76 36178 442 468 2C8 462.68 2C6o 
Rest America 943 168 26 678 959 SC4 337 1223 
Asia ex. USSR 637523 889657 1206211 1138455 1270850 522873 99C235 425368 58:S38 275:23 
Europe ex. USSR 8079160 8211096 7515276 7509406 7368909 7233336 7318188 880413:::: '76.<~4::::42 8665:. 1 El 
EEC(Ten) 6581943 6446965 5641241 56764!31 5755823 8213618 629!235 7922235 3872:359 7735933 
EFTA 572317 570789 456704 514160 648238 171702 235065 133572 303::::53 238548 
Other Europe 6 134 1 1 853028 1024966 905307 622505 646616 766738 682718 84932J 593810 
East Europe 31 1489 340314 392365 4134"'8 353345 201408 25158 35605 19011 96824 
USSR 53153 70471 79047 537;59 14487 93962 125599 S8SS7 1638: 288C7 
Oceania 15498 11893 5963 241 -~ 1 46672 5708 
Tur.isia ** 561 14 57329 35592 346'' 1 36147 6044 6485 . 15215 1:}268 8SSC8 
---------- ·---- -- -- --
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(VALUE AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 198: l S3 ~- ~. S82 lS33 ~98{ 
Africa 1 . 9 1 '5 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.2 1. 5 1 '6 1 . 3 Africa 2.6 1 '2 l . 2 0.8 0.9 0.8 1. 2 1.8 l. 4 1 '2 
Americas 19.7 17.9 17.2 13.5 12.3 13.7 16.6 16.0 13.9 14.] Americas 29.7 44.7 52.7 52.8 54.3 48.9 35,3 17.2 85.5 23.1 
N America 13.4 13.8 12.4 9.3 9.4 10. 1 1 1 . 5 1 1 '7 9.8 9.5 N America 27.2 43.0 52.3 5".1 53.2 48.i 33.2 16.0 23.7 22.4 
LAIA 5.3 3.5 4.5 3.8 2.5 2.4 3.7 3.4 3. 1 4. 1 LAIA 2.0 1 . 6 0.5 1 . 5 0.7 C.B 2. l 1. 2 l '4 0.7 
CACM 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0. 2. CACM 0' 1 ~ ..., 0.8 ~. u 
Caribbean 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 1 . 1 1 . 3 0.9 0.7 0.£. Caribbean 0.3 0. 1 0.2 8.5 ,.... ~ :.o ~ r- :.4 v.v v. v v. v 
Rest Ameri 0.0 0.4 0' 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Rest Amer 0.0 ~). 0 o.c 0.0 o.::: ~ ..., ,..., ,.., :.o o.::: ~ 'v ,_,. v 
Asia ex SU 5.2 6.5 7.5 10.1 6.5 6' 1 7.9 1 1 . 3 1 1 . 0 12.<! Asie ex.SU 1 . 7 0.6 l . c 1 . 1 !:.8 3.3 7.4 3.? -!1.5 2.3 
Eur ex SU 71.9 71.6 71.8 7~.9 7A. 1 76.8 72.6 70.4 72.7 71.6 Eur ex.SU 63.8 51.6 44.1 44.: 43.2 48.3 35.0 76.7 38.5 73.1 
EEC (Ten) 62.3 60.4 58.1 5~.5 60.2 62.5 57.0 52.8 54.9 56.C EEC (Ten) 55.6 45.5 38.2 37.8 38.7 39.8 47.3 69.: 59.8 65.2 
EFTA 3.3 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.4 5' 1 4.3 5.0 6. 2 EFTA l '0 0.7 2.5 1 . '7 2. 1 1 . l : . 8 1 . 4 2.'! 2.J 
Other Eur 3.8 3.8 5. 1 4.9 5.8 5.8 7.5 9.6 8.8 6.1 Other Euro 3.9 3.3 2.4 2.8 2.5 4. l. 5.8 0 ~ ,t; 5.8 5.8 
East Euro 2.5 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.7 4.0 3.4 East Euro 3.4 2.2 0.9 1. 7 1 '8 1 . 3 :.2 C.3 8.2 ::::.13 
USSR 1 . 2 2. 1 1. 3 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0' 1 URSS 2.2 I .7 1 '0 1. 3 C.6 o.s .: . g ::::.5 ~ . ::.2 , ..... .!. 
Oceania 0. 1 0.3 0.2 0. 1 0.2 0. 1 0' 1 0' 1 0.2 0.5 Oceania. 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 ..., "' v. v 
France 33' 5 27. 1 24.0 19.0 18.3 23.2 18.5 21.1 23.6 23.5 USA 26.8 42.5 51.8 5C.7 52.3 ~8.1 32.4 l ~ . a zs . ~ 2: . 7 
Germany 1 1 '6 14.7 14.5 17.6 18.2 13.7 13.6 13.9 11 . 3 10.7 France 14.7 13.8 12.7 11 . 3 13.7 l3.0 18.7 3::::.s 34.:::: 28.4 
Italy 7.9 8.9 9.7 10.7 12.6 1 1 '9 13.2 6.8 8.2 8.8 Italy 1 1 . 4 8.7 5.4 7.5 8. 1 5.8 lC.2 :.5. 2 8.7 18' 1 USA 1 1 . 3 11 . 9 8.7 6.8 6.5 7' 1 8. 1 7.6 6.0 5.6 Nethe~land 3.4 1 . 9 2.3 l. g 2.S 5.2 5.5 :.3.). S.8 l2.:J 
Japan 3.7 5.4 6. 1 9.0 5. 1 4.3 5.2 7.4 6.0 8.1 Germany 19.C 16.8 14.7 13.8 11 . 5 12.4 lC.S 3. 1 3.8 3.0 Spain 3.7 3.7 4.9 4.6 5.3 5.2 6.4 7.5 7.0 4.4 Spain 3. 1 3.2 2.4 2.6 2.5 3.4 3 "' 5.3 5.3 3.4 Belgium 3.0 2.9 4.0 5.5 7.0 6.2 3.8 3.7 3.4 4.3 Japan 0.9 a. 1 0.3 0.5 0.<;1 3. l .c. ""' ~· "' 3.5 0.':" ". ' D.~Canada 2' 1 1. 9 3.7 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.4 4.0 3.7 3.9 UK 4.0 2.6 1.4 j. .9 1. 5 i • • 7 l. 3 l.a ]. . 3 l . 4 
UK 3.4 4.6 3.0 3.2 3. 1 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.5 Yugoslavia 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 2.: :.7 C.5 l. 8 
Netherland 1. 8 1 '4 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 Brazil 1 . 5 1 . 2 0.0 ). .0 0. l 0.8 l . 8 l . 2 l . <;, 0 ':" 
Source: "1984 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. u~. Vol.l 1986". Department of International Eoonomio and Soci~l 
Affairs. Statistical Office. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.G/33 1986. G' .,. 
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TUNISIA: INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 
TRADE BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF PRODUCTION AND FINAL DES'I INATlOl'rT'I!ALUE IN THOl.fSANC-U.S. r;OLLARS) 
COUNTRIES 
World 
Africa 
Americas 
North America 
LAIA 
CACM 
Caribbean 
Rest America 
Asia ex. USSR 
Europe ex. USSR 
EEC(TEN) 
EFTA 
Other Europe 
East Europe 
USSR 
Oceania 
GENERAL 
1980 
3508706 
75068 
001219 
267208 
49920 
4189 
9766 
105 
449027 
2612160 
2238880 
14vJ26 
140152 
92005 
28562 
2994 
5870 
14586 
Algeria ~~ 
Morocca ** 
Libyan Arab J amah i r i a ~ ~ 1 0 1 26 
IMPORTS C.I.F. 
1981 . 1982 
3770881 0395720 
59794 100070 
443707 435189 
377223 362310 
58144 47770 
5712 4553 
2625 2422 
4 18134 
585052 246589 
2620997 2649566 
2235843 2238318 
140580 138763 
145259 188:38 
96316 84347 
37608 17988 
3148 2342 
5559 18923 
18079 20095 
10516 8627 
1983 
3099506 
86379 
410586 
334172 
58468 
424 
113i.5 
6007 
199:389 
2408!336 
1984.:13 
181''16 
162092 
80?15 
1 1 €197 
2836 
4E;46 
15!:78 
26480 
1984 
3114943 
141823 
356375 
288175 
57011 
4701 
4287 
2202 
255301 
2314260 
1851687 
116616 
208045 
137912 
42515 
1849 
58472 
l900J 
27414 
GENERAL 
1980 
2233742 
71972 
352195 
324096 
4844 
3 
23251 
2 
112C37 
1662527 
1600951 
9274 
26003 
26398 
5371 
50 
41774 
1814 
17881 
EXPORTS F.C.B. 
1981 lS82 
25~3683 1983538 
216547 142364 
484530 45C645 
455277 4571G: 
2743 96S 
!G 
26491 
10 
119912 
).835876 
;. 499461 
70725 
24285 
41205 
1C79 
77 
49111 
4714 
11 C363 
7 
1208 
1359 
132458 
:253:::11 
1138::::::2 
27318 
4423'7 
43154 
3283 
3S 
233::JS 
958 
77-<:,8~ 
1983 
1871473 
82628 
388853 
383815 
3344: 
lS 
3275 
2<:oG: 
123385 
12o:421 
ll"'2342 
7792 
28342 
42843 
35 
3J8 
2:::828 
; a!. a 
3762L: 
1984 
l7SS383 
118C% 
359238 
343232 
4343 
~333 
78 .~ c 
l417C1: 
1iS385" 
1088258 
<15825 
2S3L:S 
2C44:S 
1787 
.,~ 
... o 
~:2835 
484S 
o7145 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------(VALUE AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1975 1976 1977 1978 1879 198::: 1981 ;ss2 1983 lS84 Africa 2.0 1 . 8 1 . 4 2.9 1 . 6 2. 1 1 . 6 2.9 2.8 4.6 Africa 10.6 7.6 8. 1 8.8 6.3 3.2 8.6 7.2 4.4 6.3 Americas 11.0 10.3 12.1 8.0 9.0 9.4 11 . 8 12.8 13.2 11.4 Americas 10.6 14.8 12.5 13.8 !0.5 15.8 1S.4 23.2 2:.3 a:.c N America 8.0 7.6 8.0 6.2 7.2 7.6 10.0 10.7 10.8 9.3 N America 10.3 13.8 10.6 8.5 8.8 14.5 18.2 23.: 2J.7 1 s. 1 LAIA 2.7 2.2 3.5 1 . 7 1. 7 1 . 4 1 . 5 1 . 4 l . 9 1.3 LAIA 0.3 1. 0 0.7 0.6 J. 1 C.2 c. 1 0.2 ~ ~ ...... ~ ....J.~ CACM 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0. 1 0.2 0. I 0.0 0.2 CACM 0.0 0.0 '-'·~ " ~ ~ - ~ " v. v v. v -.J.v Caribbean 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0. 1 Caribbean O.::l 0.0 0. 1 4.7 l. 5 1 . :::; ' :. l 0.3 C.3 .!. • l Rest Ameri 0.1 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0. l Rest Ameri O.C c.o 1 . 1 0.0 o.:: :::.c o.::: ~ , " . C.4 .......... v. 1 Asia ex SU 9.3 1 1 . 1 9.6 7.8 10.5 12.8 15.5 7.3 6.4 8.2 Asia ex SU 5.8 3.6 2.7 4. 1 3.6 5.C 4.8 S.7 6.8 ?.S Eur ex SU 76.8 75.3 72.1 77.1 74.9 74.4 69.5 78.0 77.7 74.3 Eur ex su 70.8 71.8 75.6 72.1 77.8 74.4 65.3 63.2 86.9 84.8 
EEC (Ten) 66.4 63.6 60.9 67.7 62.4 63.8 59.3 65.9 64.0 59.4 EEC (Ten) 61.9 67.2 70.8 67.4 74.1 71.7 59.8 57.4 32.6 59.5 EFTA 3.5 5.2 4. 1 3.5 5.2 4.0 3.8 4. 1 5.9 3.? EFTA 8.7 0.7 ::::.9 1 . 0 1. 4 0.4 2.8 ) .. 4 C.4 2.5 Other Eur 3.6 4.4 4.8 4.0 4.7 4.0 3.9 5.5 5.2 6.? Other Eur 2.7 1 . 1 , "' 1. 4 1 . 4 1. 2 :. 0 2.2 : . 0 1 . s .. " East Eur 3.4 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 4 . .t" East Euro 5.5 2.8 2.4 2.2 1 . 0 1 . 2 :.6 2.2 2.3 : . 1 USSR 0.4 1 . 0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 l . 0 0.5 0.4 1. <j, URSS 1 . 1 0.9 0.4 8.4 8.2 0.2 ~ ..... :::.2 ,.., ~ ::; . 1 v. ~ V.v Ocean1a 0.3 0.3 0. 1 0.3 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0. 1 0.1 Oceania 0.0 c.o 0.0 0.0 0.0 " " " " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ..... ~ ~ ..... v •v .... . '-' v.V France 34.4 32.2 28.1 33.2 26.2 25.2 24.3 26.C 25.1 24.8 France 19. 1 17. 1 17.9 16.8 1S.4 !5.4 17. 7 S.3 24.3 2:::.5 Italy 9.4 9.0 9.9 10.0 13.3 15.8 14.7 14.8 1 1 . 5 14.7 USA 10.3 13.8 10.6 8.5 8.7 14.5 1'7.0. 3.:J 20.8 1 s. 1 Germany 8.5 10.0 11.2 1 1 . 7 9.9 9.5 9.2 1 1 . 5 1 1 . 5 10.8 Italy 17.0 21.5 13.9 15.9 2C.2 15.8 28.3 8.2 :8.6 17.S USA 6.7 6.2 7.0 4.6 6.0 5.9 7.6 7.9 9.3 7. 1 Germany 7.8 6.9 16.3 18.4 lC.5 12.S 8.2 ::.1 :. : .. 4 S.5 Saudi Arab 2.0 3.6 3.4 2. 1 4.4 8.7 10.4 2.5 C.7 0.8 Greece 14. 1 15.4 13.6 10.0 15.5 18. 2 3. : 2 "" : . 4 ~ . 3 Greece 2.6 2.4 2.5 4.0 5.8 5.5 3.7 3.3 7.8 0.7 Belgium C.9 1.9 3.6 3.3 3.0 3 ~ 2.3 3.5 3.3 2.S ..... Spain 2.5 2.6 3.7 3. 1 3.8 3.3 3.3 4. 1 4.5 6.2 Libya *~ 5.4 1 . 4 2.5 6.::: 2.9 8.8 <.4 3.S 2.C 3.2 Belgium 2.9 3. 1 2.4 3. 1 2.4 2.8 2.0 2.5 3.9 4.0 Netherland 2.5 3.<1, 4.3 4. 1 4.3 4.5 ? "' 2 .<: .... '4 3.3 ~'J I o.J "'·'-Netherland 2.4 3. l 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.6 5. 1 2. 1 2.2 UK 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.6 "' - 2.< 1 . 1 3.8 ..... o Japil.n 0.8 1. 5 1 . 2 1 . 0 0.7 1 . 2 3.0 2.2 2.2 ~.3 Algeria *~ 4.2 2.8 2.4 1 . 3 1 . 7 l. s 2.8 } . 2 1 . 1 2.4 
::;ource: "1984 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. ON. lfol. 1. i9a6''. bepe.i'im0n'G of Yn'Go~"!."'G.~ions.l 2sonew:l;;;; C.::J.t: Soo:.a.:. 0' 
Affairs. Statistical Office. ST/ESA/STA/SER.GI33. 1986. ~z 
LltiXA: INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 
TRADE :BY PRTNCIPAL COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION (VALUE IN THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS) 
COUNTRIES GENERAL IMPORTS C.I.F. GENERAL EXPORTS F.O.B. 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978 1979 1sa:: 1se1 1S32 
World 4602491 5311306 6776377 83gJ697 7175534 9894533 18076:::37 21808387 155'(J.282 
Afrioa 137788 81576 37740 g3484 114805 71713 338·70 2SSC:2 15::3 
Ameri<.:as 309293 323966 510898 638891 457411 4186647 6390827 8!:::98943 .<;;83868'7 
North America 293858 29] 146 469216 575986 426352 4824993 5811844 77S5C7S 43884:6 
LAIA 12152 12493 3486 26687 6235 73374 397:8 177581 3185·42 
CACM 142 3617 2172 2001 622 
Caribbean 539 13517 35301 34183 24202 88280 53827? 112?383 l43"'0S 
Rest America 2601 3193 724 34 
Asia ex USSR 625951 718219 830739 1143539 822237 268620 6304:::6 15EA507 :88468:: 
Europe ex USSR 3481380 4005258 5256370 6312081 5421761 5369553 8020734 11185c35 8444012 
EEC(Ten) 2752594 3349677 4335263 5179247 4324581 4277851 7269526 8805884 7:"'3~8C 
EFTA 187366 184572 265371 341626 343438 182169 290347 585385 282121 
Other Europe 247300 241991 419291 433843 392406 661081 873748 1352883 13229'7:':: 
East Europe 294120 229018 236445 357365 361337 248472 487113 6<:1023 885'781 
USSR 29791 130399 68687 32303 24248 
Oceania 18287 51887 71943 171398 65624 
Tunisia QQ 54252 37105 17021 32197 88336 28368 5597 :so;:; 
Morocco 0 0 10133 10411 5630 75 1 1 5763 1880 1846 
Algeria 0 0 5789 7511 
- - -- -· -. - .. - - - - -- -· - - - ~ ·-
------------------------ -------------------------~------------------------- - ·-(VALUE AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL) 
1973 1974 1975 18?6 187'/ 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1973 1874 19'75 1976 :S77 1978 lS?S 1880 :sal. .tsa:z 
Africa 3.3 2.4 2. 1 1. I 2. 1 3.0 1. 5 0.6 l . 0 1 . 6 A f r i oa 1 . 2 8.9 1 . 0 C.2 1 . 1 :'::.? 0.2 8. 1 ~ ~ V,,J 
Americas 6.2 5.3 7.5 6. I 8.6 8.7 6. 1 7.5 7.6 6.4 Americas 14.8 9 . 9 3:3 . 4 31 . 1 43.7 ~2.3 3S.8 41.5 31 .J 
N. America 5.9 4.0 4.2 4. I 5.6 6.4 5.5 6.9 6.9 5.9 N. America 9.1 0.6 22.7 28.5 39.8 ~C.7 38.2 35.6 28.1 
LAIA 0.3 1 . 2 3.2 1. 7 1.0 0.3 0.2 0. 1 0.3 0. 1 LAIA I. 6 6.9 <~. 9 3.J 1 . 2 ~ '7 v .. :::;,2 0.8 2.:J 
CACM 0. 1 0.1 0. l 0. 1 0.0 0.0 0. 1 0.0 G.O 0.0 CACM 
Caribbean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 Caribbean 4.2 2.3 6.8 1 . 8 2.7 C.8 3./.\ 5. l o.s 
Rest Ameri 0.0 0.0 0. 1 0. 1 0.0 0. 1 0. 1 0.0 0.0 Rest Ameri 
Asia ex SU16.7 16.5 16.2 14.5 12.9 13.6 13.5 12.3 13.6 11.5 Asia ex SU 1. 3 5.2 5.2 5.7 3.4 2.7 3.S '?'.2 8.3 
Euro ex SU72.2 74.1 72.7 77.3 77.8 75.6 75.4 77.6 75.3 75.6 Eur ex SU 81.4 84.0 6~.4 SB.J 61.8 54.3 58.1 5: . 1 88.7 EEC (Ten) 57.4 80.2 80.5 81.9 83.0 59.8 83.1 64.0 81.8 30.3 EEC (Ten) 74.9 77.3 51.8 52.1 43.9 ~3.2 45.2 39.3 48.1 
EFTA 4.4 3.3 2.7 3.9 4.3 4. 1 3.5 3.9 4. I 4.8 EFTA 2.5 2.3 1 . 2 2.2 0.7 l . 8 1. 8 2.7 1. 7 Other Eur 4.6 5.2 4.3 6.0 5.2 5.4 4.6 6.2 5.2 5.5 Other Euro 2.1 3.8 5.9 5.8 6.0 6.7 8. 1 6.2 8.5 East Eur 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.2 6.4 4.3 3.5 4.3 5.0 East Euro 1. 8 0.6 1 . 5 2.6 1. 2 2.5 3.8 2.8 4.4 USSR 1 . 2 1 . 3 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.3 URSS 1 . 4 
Oceania 0. 1 0.2 0.4 0. 1 0.2 0.4 1 . 0 1 . 1 2.0 0.9 Oceania 
Italy 25.8 24.8 25.9 25.5 27.5 24.1 26.4 29.5 30.2 25.4 USA 7.8 C.l 21.9 25.8 39.8 ~:.7 s. l 35.5 27.4 Germany 10.4 11 . 5 12. 1 14.3 12.9 12.8 14.3 13.3 10.5 14.4 Italy 28.0 33.4 21.8 18.4 16.8 2: .. 8 8.: 18.5 23.8 Japan 6.4 7.0 8.3 8.3 7.4 7.4 8.9 7.5 7.6 5. 1 Germany 21.3 22.0 18.5 20.4 17.0 lC.'~' -'L 8 12.6 1:.3 UK 6.9 5.0 5.5 5.4 5,7 7. 1 6.9 7.0 6.9 8.0 Spain 1 . 8 3.7 5. 1 5.2 5,5 6.2 
"' "' 
L]; 0 s 5.'7 "•'-' France 8.2 10.4 8.8 8.2 7.6 8.3 8.2 6.8 6.3 5.7 France 5.3 5.9 3.7 5.2 4.0 5. -C:: 5.S 2.3 3.7 USA 5.3 3.9 4.0 4. 1 5.2 6.3 5.3 6.3 6.3 4.2 Turkey 0.0 0.0 1. 6 2.3 2 "' 2.5 ..1.. s 3.2 5. l . " Spain 2.5 2.8 2.5 4.3 3.3 3.2 2.8 4.4 3.0 3.2 Bahamas 3.8 2.3 4.4 1 . 8 2.2 !:.6 3.2 5.8 0 0 • v 
Source: "1984 International Trade Statistics Yearbook. 'JN. Vol.! 1986". Department 6-f InT--er-nationa,J. Econom:.c e.nd Sooi.~,'. 
Affairs. Statistical Office. STIESA/STATISER.G 1 33 1986. 
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